

BORDER REGIONS OF C



CHINA AND SOVIET RUSSIA

BY

HENRY WEI, PH.D.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
QUINCY WRIGHT



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Dedicated to my parents who have passed away
but whom I shall always remember with feelings
of love and gratitude.

Introduction

ONE of the great puzzles of recent international politics is the problem. Why, in the course of a few years, did the relations of China and the United States change from friendship to hostility? Dr. Hu Shih, who served with distinction as Chinese ambassador to the United States for several years before September 1942, discussed this question at a meeting of the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia in April 1951.

"China's woe began," he said, "on that memorable day in January, 1942, when she was invited by the United States government to sign the Declaration of the United Nations together with the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. The other nations were invited to sign the next day, according to alphabetical order. By that act of well-intentioned courtesy, China was made an ally of the three greatest powers fighting German and Japanese aggression. She became one of the Big Four! From that time on, China's relations with her Anglo-Saxon allies became more and more difficult. Her greatest difficulty was her failure to live up to her American ally's great expectations of her. The United States and China were loyal friends for many decades. But China's elevation from a friend to an ally was the real cause of the worsening of Sino-American relations."

The growth of the Communist Party in China since its first meeting in Shanghai in July 1921, with thirteen participants, including Mao Tse tung, was a factor in this change. But how did this acorn grow to so great an oak in thirty years? Why were the Communists successful?

The Far Eastern policy of Russia, whose revolution of 1917 followed by only a few years the revolution of China in 1911, was a factor both in the rise of Chinese Communism and in the deterioration of Chinese relations with the United States. Chinese-Soviet relations have gone through many changes, none more significant than the change from the treaty of August 1945, in which the Soviet Union recognized the Kuomintang government of General Chiang Kai-shek as the only government of China, to the treaty of alliance

of February 1950 between the Soviet Union and the Central People's Republic of China under Mao Tse-tung. How and why did this change take place in the short period of five years?

In the present volume, Dr. Henry Wei explains *how* these things happened in detail, and he provides the materials with which the reader can make up his own mind *why* they happened and whether at any point different policies or decisions might have produced different results. The narrative is of absorbing interest, and deals with matters which are but little known in America, and yet which affected the future, not only of the Chinese people, but of all humanity. Dr. Wei presents these events in detail with a minimum of comment. He lets the facts tell the story.

The reader learns of the history of early Soviet-Chinese negotiations in the first part of the 1920's; of the attitude of the great Chinese revolutionary leader, Sun Yat-sen, to communism and to the Soviet Union; of the development of Dr. Sun's party, the Kuomintang, and the development of the Communist party in the 1920's; of the fluctuations of the relations of these two parties during a period of great trial for China, the mutual hostility of each being frequently overbalanced by their need of cooperation to fight a common external enemy.

In reading this narrative Americans will continually ask themselves whether the United States was to blame for the state of affairs which exists today. Might the missions of Stilwell, of Hurley, of Wedemeyer, or of Marshall have stopped the tide of Communist development? Was the Yalta Agreement a sellout of China? Could the Soviet invasion, control, and looting of Manchuria after the Japanese surrender have been prevented? What was the Soviet government's attitude to the Chinese Communists at this time, and did its action contribute to Communist successes? All of these mount up to the great question, did the Communists win because of Soviet aid, or because the Chinese people favored them? Was the change which took place in China in 1949 a case of external aggression, as argued by Chinese representatives in the United Nations, or was it a case of self-determination of the Chinese people, as argued by the Soviet Union? Dr. Wei does not answer these questions explicitly, but the answers can be found in his materials.

Then there is the question of present policy. What has the Soviet Union been doing toward expanding its political, economic, and cultural influence in China? Has it really desired the general recognition of the Communist government and its admission to the United Nations? What has been the actual effect of the American policy of nonrecognition? What should be done in the future? On

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these questions Dr. Wei does not commit himself, but all who have views on Far Eastern policy should read his book. Its detail, its objectivity, and its scholarship make it indispensable to both students and statesmen interested in the world problems centering in the Far East.

QUINCY WRIGHT

Preface

THERE used to be a number of imperialist countries regarding China as their hunting ground. Today, by all indications, Soviet Russia is cock of the walk in China, a China dominated by a Communist Party.

Who could have foretold or believed such a situation in 1917 or 1927?

In 1917 and the years immediately following, Soviet Russia was harassed and imperiled by civil and foreign wars. In China she had no influence of any kind. The Chinese Communist Party did not come into existence until 1921 and then had only a handful of members. In point of political and military strength, it was nothing compared with the powerful warlords then dominating various parts of China. In the same period Japan and the Western Powers were firmly entrenched in the Chinese treaty ports, resting on their economic and commercial laurels and exerting their influence on Chinese affairs through the warlords. They were all implacably opposed to Communism even inside Russia, to say nothing of the spread of Communism in China.

In 1927 there had been, indeed, a great promise that Soviet influence might spread over China. That was when the northward expeditionary forces under Chiang Kai-shek, supported by Soviet arms and advice, were rapidly bringing South China under revolutionary control. But that promise was soon shattered when in April of that year Chiang started his drastic campaign against Communists, intending to exterminate them by a few relentless strokes. In North China, Chang Tso-lin was at that time no more lenient toward the Communists. As a result, towards the end of the year China was all but purged of Soviet influence.

Now in the 1950's, Soviet influence is paramount in China, where Communism reigns supreme; while Japan, Great Britain, the United States, and France, to say nothing of the lesser powers, have been forced to beat a rather inglorious retreat. Why this drastic change? Why the complete reversal of fortune? How did Soviet Russia transform weakness into strength and rise from an impotent to a domi-

nant position in China? What were the policies and tactics of Soviet diplomacy? How did China react to these policies and tactics? What initiatives did China take in dealing with Russia? How did the attitudes and policies of third powers affect Sino-Soviet relations? How did Sino-Soviet relations affect, and how were they affected by, the internal developments of the two countries? What is the nature and scope of the cooperation between Communist China and Soviet Russia? Is there any sign that the cooperation may not last?

This work endeavors to answer these questions. It is intended to be a clear and orderly account of the significant diplomatic motives, tactics, setbacks, and successes involved in the long course of Sino-Soviet relations, a course running through more than thirty-five years.

The period of well-nigh forty years following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia is an exceedingly important and eventful period in world history. It witnessed tremendous changes not only in the internal situation of China and Russia but also in the world situation in general. These changes necessarily had great influence on Sino-Soviet relations. To treat these changes fully or even adequately, however, is beyond the scope of this work and the ability of its author. This work deals mainly with Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, and will refer to developments in world politics and in the internal politics of China and Russia only in so far as those developments are considered as having a bearing on Sino-Soviet relations or as affording a background against which Sino-Soviet relations could be better understood.

The viewpoints expressed in this work are governed by the data presented. These data are culled from a large variety of published sources, a substantial amount of gleanings having been thrown away. If in the future new reliable facts should become available, or if some of the data hereinafter presented should be found to be incorrect, the viewpoints therewith connected would need to be modified accordingly.

This work represents a modest attempt to discover a sound and factual basis for the building of peace in the Far East. The author considers it extremely fortunate that by the time the work was completed, he was able to secure the consent of the eminent scholar and authority on international relations, Professor Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago, to go over the manuscript and make some valuable suggestions for its improvement. For these suggestions as well as for the Introduction he has written, grateful thanks are hereby expressed.

The author also wishes to thank two persons who are as yet un-

known to him—namely, the two readers whom the publisher asked to read the manuscript. They have offered a number of general and detailed comments which were highly appreciated and have contributed a great deal toward the betterment of this work.

Last but not least, hearty thanks are hereby expressed to the librarians of Stanford University, of the University of Southern California, and of the Library of Congress. But for their painstaking assistance, patient service, and unfailing courtesy, this work could not be what it is.

Needless to say, the author alone is responsible for the views expressed in this work and for any misstatements, misjudgments, or misinterpretations.

H. W.

San Francisco

May 1956

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Revolutionary China and Russia

MONARCHICAL China and Russia, with a common boundary of over four thousand miles, in frequent contact since the latter part of the seventeenth century and especially since the middle of the nineteenth century, went through a crowded program of diplomatic duels which were sometimes curiously mingled with fraternal embraces. Within the second decade of the present century, revolution toppled the ancient monarchy in both countries and set up a republican regime in its stead. During its infancy each republic was subject to heavy pressure from foreign countries, and each turned intensely anti-imperialistic. During the same period, each republic was harassed by civil strife, caught in a vortex of conflicting economic and cultural currents, and dominated by a desire to find a way out of the bewildering confusion, to free its people from traditional bondage, and to create a new society (though in different ways and on different bases). Being similarly circumstanced and having the same aspirations, the two republics were bound to influence each other's destiny. Following the overthrow of the monarchy in each country, revolutionary changes set in, new forces were brought into play, new problems arose, new conditions were created. And a new era of Chinese-Russian relations was ushered in by the head-on impact of the two young republics. Before looking into this new era it is worthwhile to dwell briefly on the revolution in each case, so as to furnish some general background to the subsequent diplomatic developments.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION, 1911


Through its failure in the prosecution of the war with Japan in 1895, the Manchu dynasty had sunk low in prestige in the eyes of the Chinese people. It incurred further discredit and hatred by its territorial concessions to the powers in 1898, the humiliating settlement of the Boxer riot in 1901, and the supine assumption of neutrality during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, which was fought partly in its territory. In contrast with sinking Manchu

prestige, Chinese nationalism mounted higher and higher. Hazy at first, it soon found conscious and articulate expression through the powerful eloquence and dynamic personality of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

As early as 1895 Dr. Sun had organized a secret revolutionary society and staged a local revolt in Canton. But he failed in the daring exploit and had to leave China to avoid arrest. He afterwards traveled to England, America, Japan, and Hawaii; and wherever he went, he preached the ideas of nationalism, incited the overseas Chinese against the Manchu dynasty, and devised plans for revolution. A born leader and orator, he soon gathered around him a large number of disciples and followers. Some volunteered to serve with the pen, many offered their purse, and others were ready to sacrifice life for the noble cause.

By 1911 Dr. Sun's agents were strategically stationed in the important centers of China, where they secretly spread revolutionary ideas and carried on revolutionary activities. They had formulated an elaborate plan to start an armed uprising at the end of the year. Fate, however, decreed an earlier and perhaps better date. On October 9, 1911, there occurred a bomb explosion in the revolutionary headquarters at Wuchang in the central province of Hupeh. The accident at once forced the hand of the revolutionaries. Instead of passively waiting for arrest and punishment, they considered it the better part of wisdom to defy publicly the authorities and break out in open revolt. Their bold move caught the Manchu garrison by surprise, and with skill and swiftness they captured Hankow, Wuchang, and Hanyang, the triple key cities in central China. News of this tremendous success spread far and fast. One by one the large cities and provinces deserted the Manchu house. Scarcely a month had passed since the accidental explosion in Wuchang when all the provinces south of the Yangtze River came under revolutionary rule.

Confronted with this exigency, the Manchu court in Peking hurriedly sent for Yüan Shih-k'ai, a dismissed Chinese general, and commissioned him to direct an expedition against the revolutionaries. Yüan accepted the commission, and for a time he was quite successful in his military operations. However, the tide of public sympathy was so strong and so adverse to the Manchu regime that Yüan soon realized that resort to force would be futile and would only cause unnecessary bloodshed. An armistice was arranged, and negotiations were initiated between the revolutionary leaders on one side and Yüan Shih-k'ai, representing the Manchus, on the other. In the course of the negotiations the revolutionary leaders themselves held a conference at Shanghai on December 18, and in op-



position to Yüan's idea of a constitutional monarchy, proclaimed their determination to overthrow not only the Manchu dynasty but also the monarchical system. In order to demonstrate their determination, the republican delegates of sixteen provinces soon elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who had just returned from abroad, the first President of the Republic of China. Dr. Sun assumed the presidency on January 1, 1912, and a provisional government was set up at Nanking.

Meanwhile the Manchu Emperor Hsüan T'ung (Pu Yi) was still seated on the dragon throne. It was not until February 12, 1912, that the negotiations came to a successful conclusion, and the emperor abdicated on a number of conditions, including a substantial annuity to be paid to his family by the republican government. Three days later Dr. Sun resigned from the presidency, and Yüan Shih-k'ai was elected to succeed him.

Thus the Chinese Revolution reached a high point of success, overthrowing not only the Manchu dynasty but also the hoary old monarchical system and setting up a republic in its stead.

The destiny of the young republic, however, appeared uncertain and gloomy. Beset with troubles inherent in a sudden transition from an old to a new order, it was menaced by foreign imperialism, especially Czarist Russian and Japanese imperialism. The chief scene of Russian and Japanese imperialistic operations was Manchuria. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, Russian influence in Manchuria was paramount, and the main instrument of Russian policy was the Chinese Eastern Railway with its southern branch from Harbin to Dairen. This railway was so obvious an instrument for Russian imperialistic expansion in Manchuria that the Sino-Russian agreement on its construction, signed in 1896, had to be kept secret.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia, being the defeated party, had to give up her lease of Port Arthur and Dairen in favor of Japan and to cede to Japan a section of the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway—the section from Changchun to Dairen. Roughly speaking, this division of the railway symbolized the division of Manchuria into two spheres of influence: the northern sphere for Russia and the southern sphere for Japan.

Having lost a major portion of its influence and interests in Manchuria, Russia determined to seek compensation in the other outlying provinces of China, namely, Sinkiang and Mongolia. From 1871 to 1881 Russia had occupied the fertile and strategic Ili area in Sinkiang, thereby provoking a sharp dispute with China. It was partly through China's readiness for war and partly through Eng-

land's mediation that the dispute was settled amicably by the Treaty of St. Petersburg. This treaty provided, among other things, for Russian withdrawal from Ili and the creation of a free-trade zone on either side of the Russo Chinese frontier. It was renewed in 1891 and 1901. When the time came in 1911 for a third renewal, however, a dispute arose when China refused to agree to it. Whereupon the Russian Government, eager to maintain an overland route for trade, unilaterally declared the treaty valid for another ten years. This was indicative of Russia's desire to effect economic, if not also military, expansion in Sinkiang.

In Mongolia Russia's policy of expansion was more positive—indeed, aggressive—and caused more trouble to China. On October 30, 1911, just three weeks after the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution in Wuchang, the Mongol princes of Outer Mongolia boldly declared their independence, and forsook their allegiance to China—an allegiance which since 1691 had been regularly testified by the annual tribute of eight white horses and one white camel. After the declaration of independence the princes elected the Kutukhtu, the highest lama priest, as their Grand Khan. The formal inauguration of the Kutukhtu took place on December 28 in a pompous ceremony in which Russian costumes and uniforms were conspicuous, it being attended by no fewer than forty-five Russian military advisers. Equally conspicuous were a number of cannons presented by the Russian Czar as a symbol of Russian power and friendship.¹

Shortly before Yuan Shih-k'ai became president, Russia had brought pressure on the tottering Manchu regime and made a number of demands, including recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia, granting Russia the right to build a railway from Kiakhta to Urga, and a pledge not to colonize or garrison any part of Mongolia and not to alter the *status quo* in Mongolia without consulting Russia.² The Manchu regime rejected these demands, but Russia persisted and later urged them on President Yuan. The latter, busy with domestic problems, put them aside.³ On April 26, 1912, Russian Foreign Minister Sazanov announced in the Duma that Russia would see to it that China should thenceforth cease to colonize Outer Mongolia or to station troops there or to interfere in its government.⁴

Not long afterwards Russia extended her tentacles into Inner

¹ Chen Ch'ung-tzu, *Wai Meng Ku Chin-Shih Shih* [Recent History of Outer Mongolia], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1926, pp. 26-28.

² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³ Liu Yen, *Chung Kuo Chin Shih Wai-Chiao Shih* [Recent Diplomatic History of China], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1921, p. 526.

⁴ J. O. P. Bland, *Recent Events and Present Policies in China*, London, 1912, p. 318.

Mongolia. On July 8, 1912, she concluded a secret treaty with Japan providing for the division of Inner Mongolia into two spheres of influence along the meridian of Peking: the eastern sphere to belong to Japan, the western sphere to Russia.⁵

Following the secret partition of Inner Mongolia, Russia went ahead to tighten her hold on Outer Mongolia in more overt disregard of China's sensibilities. On November 3 she openly recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia, or "autonomy," as she chose to call it, by concluding with the Kutukhtu an agreement and an additional protocol. Two of the important provisions were:

The Imperial Russian Government shall assist Mongolia to maintain the autonomous regime which she has established, as also the right to have her national army, and to admit neither the presence of Chinese troops on her territory nor the colonization of her land by the Chinese.

Russian subjects, as formerly, shall enjoy the right to reside and move freely from one place to another throughout Mongolia; to engage there in every kind of commercial, industrial and other business.⁶

When the above agreement and protocol became known in China, the whole country was aroused to protest, and everywhere there was demand for war against Mongolia. The Peking Government, however, knew that Russia stood behind the Mongols and did not dare to follow public opinion and decide on war measures.⁷ On November 7 it lodged a strong protest with the Russian legation, but the protest produced no effects. For some time President Yüan had entered into direct correspondence with the Kutukhtu, urging him to cancel the declaration of independence and to bring back Mongolia into the fold of the Republic. The Kutukhtu refused the request and suggested Russian mediation instead. Realizing that Russia was pulling wires behind the Kutukhtu, President Yüan thought it expedient to accept the Kutukhtu's suggestion. Accordingly, negotiations were initiated with the Russian Government on November 30. They proceeded in a halting manner and continued thus for nearly a year till November 5, 1913, when a protocol was signed and additional notes were exchanged. By these instruments China conceded autonomy to Outer Mongolia, and practically shared

⁵ E. B. Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia*, Baltimore, 1933, p. 117.

⁶ J. V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894-1919*, New York, 1921, II, pp. 992-995.

⁷ Liu Yen, *op. cit.*, p. 532; Chin Chao-azu, *Hsien-Tai Chung-Kuo Wai-Chiao Shih* [Modern Chinese Diplomatic History], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1930, p. 120.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION, 1911

with Russia her suzerainty over the same region by agreeing to settle Mongolian questions of a political or territorial nature in consultation with Russia through negotiations.⁸

Having entered into an agreement separately with China and with Mongolia, Russia thought it desirable for the three parties to confer together and register their understandings in a single general instrument. Soon she found a favorable moment for achieving her end. On July 28, 1914, World War I broke out in Europe. Russia and Japan were belligerents on the same side. At that time Japan was attacking German interests in the Chinese province of Shantung, and in the course of doing so violated both Chinese sovereignty and neutrality. At this moment Russia pressed China for the opening of the tripartite conference on the Mongolian question. Hence on September 8, 1914, the delegates of China, Russia, and Outer Mongolia came together at Kiakhta to discuss their relations. From the start the going was heavy, and later on deadlocks were frequent. The negotiations drifted into the following year, when they were influenced by diplomatic pressure on China from another quarter. In January, 1915, Japan presented to China the well-known Twenty-one Demands, which aimed at reducing China to a Japanese protectorate. China was greatly embarrassed. A wave of anti-Japanese sentiment swept the country and Chinese nationalism received a powerful stimulus. The United States protested against the demands on the basis of the Open Door. But Japan did not back down. She only modified her demands somewhat, and with an ultimatum forced China to accept them. On May 25 two treaties were signed, followed by several exchanges of notes. They granted Japan, among other things, special rights and privileges in southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia.⁹ While Japan was pressing her demands at Peking, Russia drove hard bargains at Kiakhta. This was perhaps no mere coincidence, in view of the previous Russo-Japanese conspiracy in Inner Mongolia at China's expense. At last after more than forty meetings covering more than nine months the negotiations at Kiakhta resulted in a treaty signed on June 7, 1915.¹⁰ The treaty reaffirmed the validity of the Sino-Russian agreement of November 5, 1913, and the notes exchanged thereafter. It also provided that Outer Mongolia, though having no right to conclude with foreign powers any treaty of a political or territorial nature, was free to contract with foreign powers con-

⁸ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, pp. 1066-1067.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1215-1230.

¹⁰ Pi Kuei-fang, *Wai Meng Chiao She Shih Mo Chi* [Complete Record of the Negotiations Concerning Outer Mongolia], Peking, 1928, p. 14.

cerning commerce and industry.¹¹ This latter provision worked obviously to the advantage of Russia, for it validated all the previous concessions which she had obtained from the Mongolian government.

Russia and Japan were by no means the only countries that brought headaches to young republican China and cast greedy glances at her peripheral provinces. Shortly after the declaration of independence on the part of Outer Mongolia, Tibet followed suit and declared her independence of China. This move found favor with Great Britain, which had been and was at that time keenly interested in Tibet. For instance, on August 17, 1912, the British Government notified Peking that Great Britain recognized "only China's suzerainty, not also sovereignty over Tibet," that the 1906 Anglo-Chinese treaty called for joint action in Tibet by China and Great Britain, and that China had violated this treaty by interfering in the internal affairs of Tibet. The British Government insisted that "until China agrees to these demands the British Government cannot recognize the Republic and will forbid the entrance of Chinese into Tibet via India."¹²


The foregoing is not intended to be a comprehensive account of young China's foreign relations. Perhaps sufficient has been set forth to show that the Chinese Republic was born amidst heavy foreign pressure and adverse circumstances. The state of foreign pressure continued without abatement in the succeeding years. It was against this background of imperialism that the newborn Soviet Government later launched its propaganda campaign in China, playing upon Chinese nationalistic sentiments and stimulating Chinese animosity against the Western Powers.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS, 1917

Oppressed for ages under the yoke of despotic tyranny, the Russian people at the turn of the present century were already inclined to take direct action against Czarism. As early as 1903, the Bolsheviks, the majority of the Social Democrats, were already agitating for class war, noncooperation with the bourgeoisie, and the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship by universal violence. In the first part of October 1905 the revolutionary movement came to a head in the form of a general strike all over the country. At that time Russia was fresh from her defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and the peace treaty had just been signed. Freedom from outside threats

¹¹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, pp. 1239-1244.

¹² Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912*, Washington, 1919, p. 86.



The U.S.S.R. and Adjoining Regions.

tended to encourage civil disobedience. For a time Czar Nicholas was greatly perturbed, but he made a move in the right direction by issuing a manifesto, subsequently often referred to as the October Manifesto, promising the institution of a Duma (national parliament) and proclaiming that no law would be considered valid without the consent of the Duma. Thereupon, the revolutionary movement subsided. But soon the Czar's despotic disposition showed itself again. He first ignored, then dissolved, the Duma. Outraged by this arbitrary step, the liberal and revolutionary elements stepped up their revolutionary efforts. By 1914 the situation had already reached a critical stage.¹³ But the outbreak of World War I diverted the attention of the Russian people to foreign developments, and the revolutionary movement lost its momentum. But not for long. In 1915 criticisms of Czarist corruption and inefficiency were accentuated by military setbacks, and a new impetus was given to the potential revolution. The following year, the Czarist regime was actually suspected of treason and charged with pro-German sympathies and activities. With the approach of 1917 the situation became worse than ever. The army at the front was losing ground and was in process of dissolution. In the rear, discontent and unrest were widespread. Without confidence in the Czarist regime and pursued by the wolf of hunger, the Russian masses resorted to direct action. On March 8, 1917, their pent-up grievances burst into violence. On this and following days, riots broke out in Petrograd, the Russian capital at that time. Workers and students staged demonstrations in the streets. The cry of "Bread!" awakened echoes on every side. Food stores were besieged. Arsenals were seized and prisons opened. The police fired on the crowds. But the garrison troops were sympathetic toward the people and were soon won over. Later even the army sent by the Czar to suppress the riots veered around to support the popular cause.

Under the circumstances Czar Nicholas could see no alternative to abdicating in favor of his brother Michael. The latter, however, hesitated to ascend the throne and soon gave way to the popular demand for a republic. Thus despotic Czarism came to an end, and the revolution tasted the first fruits of success.

On March 13, 1917, an executive committee, composed mainly of members of the Octobrist and the Constitutional Democratic parties, assumed supreme power and became what has since been called the Provisional Government, with Prince George Lvov as Prime Minister. A week later the Provisional Government issued a decree an-

¹³ A. F. Kerensky, *The Catastrophe*, New York, 1927, pp. 77-81.

nouncing that it would respect all the financial and legal obligations which the former Czarist regime had contracted with other countries. It also proclaimed as its aims the establishment of constitutional government, the continued prosecution of the war against the Central Powers, and the protection of private property.

On the diplomatic front, the Provisional Government continued cooperation with the Allied governments and was making appreciable progress. Not so, however, on the home front and the military front. Here the conditions continued to be as bad as ever. The people expected the government to perform miracles and relieve their misery. But the government failed to find the means to fulfill their expectations. This circumstance played into the hands of the rival political factions such as the Menshevik Social Democrats and the Social Revolutionaries, which were as yet unrepresented in the government. These factions now severely criticized the government. They loudly denounced imperialism, and demanded revision of the war aims and conclusion of a general peace based on human justice and equality.

Amidst this political hubbub, Vladimir Lenin on April 16, 1917, returned from Europe. His dynamic spirit at once stiffened the hitherto weak and disorganized Bolsheviks and fostered in them a high degree of political efficiency. He strongly attacked the Provisional Government. He advanced the slogan: "Peace to the army, land to the peasants, factories to the workers!" He drafted a program which envisaged (1) immediate negotiation for a general peace, (2) confiscation of landed estates without compensation and without delay, (3) operation and control of factories by the workers, (4) national control of production and distribution, and (5) government by soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers.¹⁴ This pregnant and powerful political platform moved the deep-seated instincts of the masses and fired them with hope and ambition.

What with this political platform and strict party discipline and dynamic leadership, the Bolsheviks rapidly gained in power and constituted a serious challenge to the other political parties. On July 16 they actually staged a coup in Petrograd, aiming at the seizure of the capital. The coup was evidently not well prepared. In two days it was suppressed. It had the effect, however, of lowering the prestige of the government and encouraging the spirit of rebellion in other discontented groups. Shortly afterwards, the Government, apparently driven to despair by the mounting crisis, resigned and was later reorganized on a nonpartisan basis with

¹⁴ J. Stalin, *The Road to Power*, New York, 1937, pp. 24-28.

Kerensky at the helm. Kerensky at once took drastic measures against the Bolsheviks and ordered the arrest of Lenin and Trotsky. As a result, Bolshevik power in Petrograd vanished or was driven underground. But soon, in early September, a more serious revolt arose, affecting both the home front and the military front. General Kornilov, newly appointed commander in chief of the Russian forces, ordered part of his troops to march upon Petrograd and demanded the surrender of Kerensky. The revolt was promptly foiled, but its effects were downright disastrous to the Kerensky Government. The army now sank low in morale, and mass desertions from the front became frequent. A new wave of anarchy was sweeping the country.¹⁵ The whole situation furnished the Bolsheviks a golden opportunity to spread all sorts of propaganda to discredit the government and to win for themselves the support of the army and the people.

As the year 1917 was drawing to an end, the morale and discipline of the Russian army broke down and the whole Russian front was in danger of collapse. Collapse of the home front was equally imminent. The national treasury was ebbing low. The transportation system was paralyzed. Food grew scarce and prices soared. Agrarian disorders spread wider and wider every day, causing greater and greater discontent. With a quick eye for these symptoms of general insecurity and disintegration, the Bolsheviks considered that the fatal hour had struck. On October 23 Lenin met with the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party and made the historic decision.¹⁶ In the evening of November 6 they started their well-prepared *coup d'état*. They arrested the members of the Provisional Government. They seized all the important public buildings and agencies, notably the railway stations, telegraph and telephone offices, radio stations, power plants, banks and so on. They then used these facilities to influence public opinion at home and abroad. The following day they broadcast to the world that the Provisional Government was dead. The same day, in another broadcast, they reaffirmed their political platform: Peace to the army, land to the peasants, and factories to the workers. They also promised the early summon of a constitutional assembly. Finally, late the same day, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets sanctioned the *coup d'état* and authorized the formation of a new government under the name "Soviet of the People's Commissars." Thus the Soviet government was born, with Lenin as Chairman and Trotsky as Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

Hectic with success, the Bolsheviks promptly carried out their promise of calling a constitutional assembly. On November 25,

¹⁵ Kerensky, *op. cit.*, pp. 321-322.

¹⁶ Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

hardly three weeks after the *coup d'état*, elections to the assembly were held on the basis of direct, secret, equal, and universal suffrage. The Bolsheviks, however, were shocked by the results. They found that only a small minority of the votes were for them. The Constitutional Assembly held its first meeting in Petrograd on January 18, 1918. The following day, the Bolsheviks dissolved the Assembly by force on the pretext that it was a counterrevolutionary bourgeois body.¹⁷ Subsequently the Bolsheviks continued to control the government and exercise the supreme power which they had seized. But they soon found that their program could not work, and that they were just as impotent and incompetent in improving the home and the military front as their predecessors and political rivals. In diplomacy they even aggravated the already dangerous situation by provoking the ire and enmity of Russia's former allies.

To those allies the Bolshevik program, in both its domestic and foreign aspects, was abominable. The Bolshevik abolition of private property was a grave menace to the capitalist system. This menace was augmented by the Bolshevik call for world revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat. Furthermore, the Bolshevik repudiation of former Russian state debts caused immense injury to the Western Powers, notably France. To add moral to financial injury, the Bolsheviks ransacked the state archives and published the secret treaties concluded by Czarist Russia with her allies. These treaties contained agreements and arrangements for the imperialistic division of other nations' rights and interests, territorial or political. France and Great Britain, having for years proclaimed that they were fighting for justice and democracy, felt scandalized. Japan, also a party to secret treaties with Czarist Russia concerning Manchuria and Mongolia, felt no less furious at having her shady affairs exposed.

The greatest Bolshevik blow to the Allies, however, was the eagerness of the Soviet Government to make peace with the Central Powers. At first the Bolsheviks intended to stop the entire war and conclude a general peace on the basis of "no indemnity, no annexations." But the Allies rejected the proposal. The Bolsheviks then proceeded to negotiate a separate peace with the Central Powers. Soon they found that the terms proposed by those powers were astronomically far from "no indemnity, no annexations." Even Lenin, who was most insistent on concluding peace, felt reluctant to accept them. But the Bolsheviks had hardly any alternative. They had already firmly committed themselves to a policy of peace. In

¹⁷ F. L. Bennis, *Europe Since 1914*, New York, 1931, pp. 85-86

fact the collapse of their military front was all but total. After vainly playing for time and hoping for intervention from the Allies, they accepted the bitter terms. Hence the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3, 1918. This treaty typified the kind of peace imposed by a ruthless conqueror on a prostrate foe. By its terms Russia had to place Poland, Courland, and Lithuania at the mercy of Germany and Austria, to evacuate Livonia, Estonia, Finland, and the Swedish Åland Islands, to evacuate the Ukraine and recognize its treaty with the Central Powers, and to surrender to Turkey such districts as Ardahan, Kars, and Batum.¹⁸ By a later supplementary agreement Russia had to pay six billion marks as compensation for losses sustained by Germany through Russian measures.

Indirectly the Brest-Litovsk treaty brought further woes to Russia. Apart from being a violation of the Allied treaty of September 5, 1914, against separate peace with Germany, it seriously prejudiced Allied policy and interests. At that time the Allies were fighting Germany by means of a tight blockade as well as by military attacks. The Russian separate peace with Germany not only relieved the latter of the eastern front and enabled her to hurl added battalions on the western front, but also placed at her disposal large amounts of much-needed foodstuffs and resources to prolong the war. In reaction the Allies, notably France and Great Britain, decided to reestablish the eastern front on the one hand and to destroy the Bolshevik regime on the other.¹⁹ As a result Soviet Russia, already exhausted and prostrate, had to go through yet three more years of devitalizing civil war and foreign intervention.

¹⁸ Department of State, *Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference*, Washington, 1918, pp. 178-185.

¹⁹ W. S. Graves, *America's Siberian Venture, 1918-1920*, New York, 1931, p. 334.

Soviet Attempts to Open Relations with China

AS EARLY as November 1917, just after the Kerensky government had been overthrown, Great Britain and France had thought of directing armed intervention against the Bolsheviks in cooperation with the United States and Japan. After the separate peace of Brest-Litovsk, British marines landed at Murmansk and, together with Japanese troops, at Vladivostok. However, mainly because of American opposition, it was not until July 2, 1918, that the Inter-Allied Supreme War Council approved the Anglo-French plan of intervention.¹ Soviet Russia was then at once subjected to armed invasion and naval blockade. At the same time she was threatened by the Czechoslovak forces who once fought side by side with the Russian soldiers against the Germans, but who had turned anti-Soviet and had deployed themselves on the strategic points along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Furthermore, behind their lines counterrevolutionary regimes sprang up and readily became the tools of the Allied intervention armies.

On November 11, 1918, the Allies signed the Armistice with the Central Powers, but their intervention against the Soviets continued. At the Paris Peace Conference held in the following year, various attempts were made to invite the Soviets to participate in some of the meetings, but these attempts failed one after another. By May the interventionist and counterrevolutionary forces were on the offensive on all fronts and were converging on Moscow, the new Russian capital. During the succeeding months Soviet Russia was like a bear at bay, with fierce hunters closing in on all sides.

THE FIRST KARAKHAN DECLARATION

It was in this, the darkest moment of her existence, when she was isolated, encircled, boycotted, and attacked by the Western Powers and Japan, that Soviet Russia extended her friendly arms across

¹ W. S. Graves, *America's Siberian Venture, 1918-1920*, New York, 1931, p. 23.

Siberia to China and wanted to hug China to her bosom. This gesture was made on July 26 through Leo Karakhan, Deputy Foreign Commissar, in the form of a declaration addressed to "the Chinese people and the governments of North and South China." This declaration, in part, read:

The government of workers and peasants has then [since October, 1917] declared null and void all the secret treaties concluded with Japan, China and the ex-Allies, the treaties which were to enable the Russian government of the Czar and his Allies to enslave the people of the East and principally the people of China by intimidating or buying them for the sole interests of the capitalists, financiers and the Russian generals. . . . The Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people without demanding any kind of compensation, the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all the mining concessions, forestry, gold mines and all the other things which were seized from them by the government of the Czars, that of Kerensky, and the Brigands, Horvath, Semenoff, Koltchak, the Russian Ex-generals, merchants, and capitalists. The Soviet Government gives up the indemnities payable by China for the insurrection of Boxers in 1900. . . . If the Chinese people, following the example of the Russian people, wish to become free and to avoid the fate reserved for them by the Allies at Versailles in their object of making China into a second Korea or another India, the Chinese people should understand that they have no other ally or brother in their struggle for liberty except the Russian peasants and workmen and their Red Army. The Soviet Government, therefore, offers to the Chinese people through the interposition of its government, to establish with us from now some official relations and to send some representatives to the front of our army.²

This declaration reached China on March 26, 1920, after considerable delay caused by the abnormal conditions in Siberia. The declaration was telegraphed to the Peking Government by one Janson, the Soviet representative at Irkutsk. When published in the Chinese papers, it at once evoked an enthusiastic response from the Chinese people, especially the intelligentsia. At that time, the Chinese people were smarting under the Treaty of Versailles, which assigned to Japan the former German interests in the Chinese province of Shantung. They were disappointed at the highhanded action of the Western democracies. Caught on the rebound by the declaration, they felt warmly toward Russia, which offered to treat their country on the basis of justice and equality.

² *China Year Book*, 1924, pp. 868 ff.

THE FIRST KARAKHAN DECLARATION

The Chinese Government, however, assumed a rather skeptical attitude. Of course it would not spurn such a liberal and generous overture from the Soviets; on the other hand, it was not moved by it to eager action. One reason was that by March 1920 Peking had already recovered effective control over Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Eastern Railway. It will be recalled that at the time of the Chinese Revolution in 1911, Outer Mongolia, at Russian instigation, broke away from China and declared its independence, and that China in 1913 entered into a bilateral treaty with Russia and in 1915 a trilateral treaty with both Russia and Mongolia, providing for a general settlement of the situation and granting Outer Mongolia autonomy. Following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, conditions in Mongolia had become confused. In late autumn 1919, urged by the desire to reassert her sovereign rights, China sent an army to Outer Mongolia and persuaded the Kutukhtu to come back within the fold of the Republic. Under the mingled effects of the big stick and the sugar stick, the Mongol authorities subsequently submitted the following petition to the Chinese Government:

We officials, princes and lamas, hereby declare the abolition of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, and the restoration of the relations subsisting under the late Ching dynasty. All Djazaks shall hereafter be subject to the control of the Central Government which shall define uniformly all their rights and shall reform our internal administration and resist external invasions for us.³

On the strength of this petition the Chinese Government canceled the autonomy of Mongolia and declared all treaties relating thereto void and invalid.

As regards the Chinese Eastern Railway, it came back under Chinese protection and partial control even earlier. At the time World War I broke out, it was estimated, as many as 60,000 Russian troops were illegally stationed along the railway, in addition to 30,000 more in Harbin.⁴ In the course of the war a large portion were transferred elsewhere, but many remained. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the remaining troops became divided in their allegiance, and General Horvath, Russian manager of the railway, failed to keep them under control. On December 12, 1917, Bolshevik agents, calling themselves Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, managed

³ *China Weekly Review*, December 6, 1919, p. 12.

⁴ Liu Yen, *Chung Kuo Chun-Shih I-Fai Chiao Shih* [Recent Diplomatic History of China], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1921, p. 608.

to take over by force the administration of the railway and dismiss the former officials of the railway company. This move offended not only China but also the foreign consular corps. Upon request of the latter, the military governor of Kirin province sent an ultimatum to the Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates asking them to surrender control of the railway and disarm themselves. Backed by strong military force, this ultimatum was accepted. Afterwards the disarmed Bolshevik troops were deported to Siberia, and Chinese guards patrolled the railway zone.⁵ Thus China regained her railway rights which had been usurped by Russia since the Boxer riot in 1900. As regards the control or management of the railway, it was divided between General Horvath and Pau Kuei-hsing, governor of Kirin province.⁶ In the spring of 1920 Horvath had trouble with the railway workers, who sympathized with the Soviets and who went out on a general strike to force Horvath to transfer his administrative power to the Soviets. To deal with the situation the governor of Kirin sent troops to suppress the workers and at the same time asked Horvath to resign. Horvath resigned. The governor of Kirin then announced that the affairs of the railway would be referred to the decision of the board of directors, and that a new agreement would be concluded after Russia had become united.⁷ Later, "in view of the situation created by the complete political disorganization in Russia," the Chinese Ministry of Communications and the Russo-Asiatic Bank (which had a financial interest in the railway) on October 2, 1920, entered into an agreement placing the management of the railway practically in Chinese hands.⁸

Already in control of Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Peking Government could bide its time and was not particularly impressed by the Karakhan declaration, although it welcomed the opportunity to discuss friendly relations with the Soviets.

In the meantime the situation in Russia also had changed considerably. Thanks to the newly forged Red Army (which, interesting to note, had Chinese battalions among its crack regiments)⁹ all the armies of intervention were either turned back or destroyed in the latter part of 1919. In April 1920 the Poles to the west and French-supported forces from the Crimea in the south made final attempts

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 608-609; R. T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931*, New York, 1933, pp. 115-117.

⁶ Liu Yen, *op. cit.*, p. 609.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 609-610.

⁸ J. V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919-1929*, Washington, 1929, pp. 30-31.

⁹ N. Makeev and V. O'Hara, *Russia*, New York, 1925, p. 218.

to invade Russia and overthrow the Soviet Government. But in both cases the invaders were defeated and driven out. In the Far East the American army of intervention had withdrawn at the beginning of April, leaving only Japanese forces, estimated at 70,000, still bent on occupying eastern Siberia. To cope with this situation the Far Eastern Republic had been set up, with the approval of Lenin and Trotsky, as a buffer state between Soviet Russia and Japan.¹⁰ This republic professed to be a democracy and repudiated Communism! Its first president, Alexander Krasnoshchekov, drafted and proclaimed a constitution which borrowed liberally from American democratic principles and ideals and set forth all the attributes of an independent state. Later events, however, showed that the whole affair was a magnificent plot to win American support and to bring American pressure on Japan to withdraw her forces from Siberia.¹¹

Thus during the year following the dispatch of the Karakhan declaration to China, Soviet Russia had undergone great changes for the better. When in the summer of 1920 she took steps towards a Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*, she had already freed herself from foreign military pressure, her government had gained more assurance of stability, and, understandably, her foreign policy had become firmer and less conciliatory than was indicated in the Karakhan declaration of 1919.

THE YOURIN MISSION AND THE SECOND KARAKHAN DECLARATION

Towards the end of August 1920 a Russian mission came to Peking from Chita. It was headed by Ignatius Yourin, a member of the Central Siberian Soviet. He professed to be a representative of the Far Eastern Republic; but little doubt was entertained but that he was, in fact, a direct emissary from Moscow.

To reciprocate the diplomatic efforts of Soviet Russia, the Peking Government dispatched a military and trade mission to Moscow under the leadership of General Chang Shih-lin.¹² The purpose of the mission was to find out direct from the Soviet Foreign Commissariat the conditions upon which an immediate trade agreement as well as a long term political settlement between the two countries should be based. The mission reached Moscow in the latter part of September and was officially received with due cordiality.

¹⁰ H. K. Norton, *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia*, New York, 1923, pp. 132

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¹¹ The Japanese forces evacuated Siberia on October 25, 1922, under American diplomatic pressure. On November 17 the Far Eastern Republic vanished as a political phantom and joined the Soviet Union.

¹² *The [London] Times*, October 23, 1920.

In Peking, Yourin spent the first few weeks in informal conferences with some representatives of the Waichiaopu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). He made known that the purpose of his mission was to improve trade relations, although he often harped upon the theme of abolishing unequal treaties and concluding new equal ones. His talks called forth considerable criticism from foreign circles in Peking, which diligently set forth the disadvantages in the establishment of Sino-Soviet relations. The former Russian minister to China, Prince Kudashev, even sent a formal protest to the Waichiaopu against the opening of negotiations with Yourin.¹³

Prince Kudashev and other Russian representatives, diplomatic and consular, were originally accredited to China by the Imperial Government of Russia. Following the Russian Revolution in March 1917, there was set up the Provisional Government which was recognized by China and which confirmed the former Russian representatives in China. When the Soviet Government was formed after the Bolshevik Revolution, it repeatedly instructed Prince Kudashev either to resign or to support the new government; but the Russian envoy ignored the instructions and on January 23, 1918, made an agreement with Peking restraining the payment of the Boxer indemnity to the Soviet regime.¹⁴ Naturally he did not want Yourin's mission to succeed. Hence his protest.

The protest did not alter the position of the Waichiaopu, but drew fire from Yourin, who at once counterattacked by declaring that no diplomatic and consular officials of the Czarist Government were representatives of the new Russia and that their transactions would not be accounted for or recognized by the Soviet Government. Thereupon the Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. W. W. Yen, asked Prince Kudashev to resign; but the latter refused, saying that he could not abandon responsibility for 300,000 Russians in China.¹⁵

The refusal failed to affect the determined policy of the Chinese Government. On September 23, 1920, the President of China issued a mandate, suspending the recognition of the former Russian minister and consuls in China. The mandate declared that these representatives "have long ago lost their representative character and indeed have no ground to continue discharging the responsible duties devolving upon them."¹⁶

Yourin, then in Peking, showed favorable reaction to the mandate,

¹³ Ch'en Po-wen, *Chung-Ao Wai-Chiao Shih* [Sino-Russian Diplomatic History], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1928, p. 105.

¹⁴ *China Year Book*, 1921-22, pp. 623-624.

¹⁵ Liu Yen, *op. cit.*, p. 614.

¹⁶ Chinese text of mandate, *ibid.*, pp. 614-615; English text in *China Year Book*, 1921-22, p. 626.

thinking that the way was paved for China's recognition of the Soviet Government.

In pursuance of the mandate, the Chinese Government assumed trusteeship and direct control of Russian rights and interests in China. Although this measure concerned Russia alone, it provoked the diplomatic corps in Peking, whose members were apprehensive that China's measures toward Russia would be a precedent for similar measures toward the other powers. Accordingly, the diplomatic corps made representations to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, raising questions about Russian rights and interests in China and making suggestions as to how these questions ought to be solved. Dr. W. W. Yen, then Chinese Foreign Minister, patiently explained the various issues and firmly but politely resisted all improper attempts at intervention. In the course of the long exchange of notes,¹⁷ the Chinese Government proceeded to put the presidential mandate into practice. While the Russian legation, military quarters, and post office, which were situated in the legation quarter of Peking, were placed in the custody of the diplomatic corps, the Russian post offices elsewhere in China were closed; the Russian municipal administrations at Harbin and elsewhere within the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway came under Chinese control; the Russian concessions at Hankow and Tientsin were brought under Chinese administration; the Russian consulates in various parts of China, including Mongolia and Manchuria, were taken over; and Chinese officials assumed jurisdiction over Russian nationals. All this did not mean that Russian treaty rights and privileges in China had been terminated. For instance, Russian subjects in China still enjoyed rights and privileges derived from former treaties; only Russian consular jurisdiction was now no more. As a *modus vivendi* the Chinese Government created a special judicial district in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, in which special courts were set up to try cases involving Russian citizens. In these courts Russian lawyers were allowed to act as attorneys.¹⁸ Previously, a network of Russian courts had operated in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone. These courts were set up by the Russian Government without any treaty basis and without any consent on the part of the Chinese Government.¹⁹

About a week after the Chinese Government had repudiated the former Russian representatives in China, the Soviet Government responded by making a second declaration on its China policy. In

¹⁷ Texts *ibid.*, pp. 628-636.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 632 ff.

¹⁹ W. W. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, Baltimore, 1927, I, p. 158.

doing so, it might have been actuated by the apprehension that China was giving too literal an interpretation to the first declaration of 1919. The second declaration was handed by Karakhan, Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar, to General Chang Shih-lin, head of the Chinese mission then in Moscow. In this declaration, dated September 27, 1920, Karakhan first expressed regret for the tardiness on the part of the Chinese Government to establish normal relations with the Soviet Government, and then proposed the following seven points for the consideration of the Chinese Government:

1. The Soviet Government declared "null and void all the treaties concluded with China by the former Governments of Russia, renounces all seizure of Chinese territory and all Russian concessions in China, and [restored] to China, without any compensation and for ever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Czar's Government and the Russian bourgeoisie."
2. China and Russia were to establish regular trade and economic relations, and to conclude a special treaty on the basis of the most-favored-nation treatment.
3. China was not to render aid to Russian counterrevolutionary individuals, groups, or organizations, nor to allow their activities in Chinese territory.
4. Russian citizens residing in China were to be subject to Chinese laws, and Chinese citizens resident in Russia were to be subject to laws of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.
5. The Chinese Government were to sever connections with former Czarist diplomatic and consular representatives and to hand over the property of the former Russian embassy and consulates to the Soviet Government.
6. The Soviet Government was to renounce compensation by China as indemnity for the Boxer uprising.
7. China and Russia were to enter into formal diplomatic relations, and "to sign a special treaty on the way of working the Chinese Eastern Railway with due regard to the needs of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, and in the conclusion of the treaty there [was to] take part, besides China and Russia, also the Far Eastern Republic." ²⁰

This declaration was brought back to Peking by General Chang Shih-lin himself. At the time of its arrival Yourin was still in Peking, and he took advantage of it to promote his negotiations.

²⁰ *China Year Book*, 1924, pp. 871-872.

On November 30 Yourin sent a note to the Waichiaopu, proposing a commercial agreement between China and the Far Eastern Republic. In making this proposal he stated that the Chita government was willing to "revise" all treaties and agreements between China and Czarist Russia and to conclude a new agreement to be based entirely upon the principles of equality and reciprocity. To this broad proposal the Waichiaopu countered with more specific demands, such as that Russia should refrain from spreading propaganda in Chinese territory, that Chinese residents in Siberia should receive compensations for their losses incurred during the confused revolutionary period, that Chinese residents in Siberia should be accorded facilities for trade and travel, and so on. On December 13 Yourin accepted these conditions in a formal note to the Waichiaopu. The latter thereupon sent him a lengthy list of claims for damages and of proposals for the settlement of those claims.²¹ This lengthy list of claims must have produced a staggering effect on the Soviet envoy. The negotiations soon came to a halt.

Resumed in April 1921, the negotiations took a favorable turn and proceeded smoothly. A fairly comprehensive agreement was actually drafted, and Yourin went back to Chita for consultation with his government about the acceptance of the draft.²² On his return to Peking toward the end of July, however, he was disappointed to find that the situation had changed and the Peking Government was no longer interested in the agreement under negotiation. He then left for Siberia again and never came back.²³

The changed attitude of the Peking Government was probably due to two unforeseen developments. In the first place, kaleidoscopic changes were taking place in Outer Mongolia. There in February 1921 the Chinese army of occupation was defeated and ousted by the forces of Baron Ungern von Sternberg, a former aide of Ataman Semenov who fathered the grandiose plan of a Pan-Mongolian state to include Tibet and the Baikal region. Cruel and dictatorial in his rule, the baron soon antagonized the Mongols and exposed them to Soviet intrigues. At Soviet instigation a Mongol revolutionary party and army promptly came into existence. "In 1921 I saw with my own eyes how Red Army detachments, disguised in Mongolian clothes, were sent into Mongolia to enact the part of 'a rebelling Mongolian proletariat' and to form the 'independent' Mongolian People's Republic."²⁴ Later, Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin

²¹ *Mallard Review*, January 1, 1921, pp. 237-239.

²² *North China Herald*, June 4, 1921.

²³ *Ibid.*, August 6, 1921.

²⁴ Fedor S. Mansvetov, "Tsarist and Soviet Policy in the Far East," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1934, p. 669.

admitted that the "People's Revolutionary Mongolian army was created on Russian territory."²⁵ In response to an appeal from these "Mongol revolutionaries," Soviet forces poured into Mongolia and destroyed the power of Baron Ungern, who was captured and executed. Soviet troops occupied Urga, then capital of Outer Mongolia, on July 5. Five days later, about two weeks before Yourin's final visit to Peking, a new Mongol regime was set up, calling itself the Mongolian People's Government. Towards the end of the month the new regime petitioned the Soviet Government, requesting it not to withdraw its troops from Mongolia until the general situation had calmed down. The Soviet Government graciously complied with the request.²⁶ All these developments in Mongolia the Peking Government viewed with grave misgivings, and consequently did not consider the time appropriate to conclude any agreement with either Soviet Russia or her protégé, the Far Eastern Republic.

✓ Another development which might have contributed to the failure of the Yourin mission was the prospect of the Washington Conference (November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922), which was then in the offing. At that time China had more urgent diplomatic problems claiming her attention than her relations with Russia. For the satisfactory solution of these problems China was looking to the Washington Conference and to American support in the conference. As the attitude of the United States toward Soviet Russia was at that time far from friendly, China did not deem it desirable to fraternize with the Soviets.²⁷

THE PAIKES MISSION TO CHINA

The Washington Conference, however, assumed a different significance for the Soviet Government. Because of the conference Moscow appeared even more eager to come to terms with China, as if apprehensive that China might swing too far to the side of the Western Powers.

On December 12, 1921, when the Washington Conference was in session, a Soviet mission under Alexander Paikes arrived at Peking. Four days later Paikes presented his credentials to Chinese Foreign Minister Dr. Yen and expressed his readiness to start negotiations. The Chinese Government did not appear at all enthusiastic about the overture. It was after a lapse of several weeks that some lesser officials of the Foreign Ministry were authorized to begin informal

²⁵ A. L. P. Dennis, *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia*, New York, 1924, p. 322.

²⁶ *China Year Book*, 1923, p. 677.

²⁷ M. W. Graham, "A Decade of Sino-Russian Diplomacy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 22 (1928) p. 54.

conversations with Paikes on such subjects as the Chinese Eastern Railway and the restoration of official relations between the two countries.²⁸ But soon it became apparent that the Soviet mission had little hope of success, inasmuch as developments in Mongolia had shattered China's faith in the sincerity of the Soviet Government. On November 5, 1921, a little over a month before Paikes' arrival at Peking, Outer Mongolia and Soviet Russia had concluded a secret treaty providing that the Soviet Government recognized the People's Government of Mongolia as the sole legal authority of Mongolia; that the People's Government of Mongolia recognized the Soviet Government as the sole legal authority of Russia; that both governments would establish, at their discretion, consulates in necessary places; and that the Soviet Government undertook "to establish in Mongolia, free of charge, postal and telegraphic communications and . . . supply the necessary materials for this purpose, whereupon a special postal and telegraphic convention [would] be signed."²⁹ China undoubtedly looked upon this treaty as detrimental to her sovereign rights. When Paikes came to Peking, he at first denied the existence of any treaty between Soviet Russia and Mongolia, saying that China's apprehension of Soviet ambition in Mongolia was due to mere misunderstanding.³⁰ When later the treaty was published in the papers, he became tongue tied. All this clothed the treaty with a shady character. Paikes stayed on in Peking until the spring of 1922, but accomplished nothing. On May 1 he received a sharp note from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which read in part as follows:

The Soviet Government has repeatedly declared to the Chinese Government that all previous treaties made between the Russian Government and China shall be null and void, that the Soviet Government renounces all encroachments on Chinese territory and all concessions within China, and that the Soviet Government will unconditionally and for ever return what has been forcibly seized from China by the former Imperial Russian Government and the bourgeoisie. Now the Soviet Government has suddenly gone back on its own words and secretly and without any right concluded a treaty with Mongolia. Such action on the part of the Soviet Government is similar to the policy which the former Imperial Russian Government assumed toward China.³¹

This protest tolled the knell of Paikes' mission.

²⁸ *North China Herald*, January 21, 1922.

²⁹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. 132, pp. 854-857.

³⁰ *North China Herald*, December 14, 1921.

³¹ *China Year Book*, 1923, p. 68a.

THE JOFFE MISSION TO CHINA

At the time of Paikes' departure from China, the Genoa Conference, convened solely for the purpose of discussing the issue of Soviet repudiation of Czarist debts, had just broken down. The failure of the conference constituted a serious block to recognition of the Soviet Government by other countries. For this reason, perhaps, the Soviet Government appeared more eager than ever to seek the recognition of Far Eastern countries, notably China and Japan.

About two months after Paikes' return, Moscow appointed another diplomatic mission to China, this time under the leadership of Adolph Joffe, one of the foremost and ablest Soviet diplomats. Unlike his predecessors, Joffe was authorized to settle all outstanding questions with China, including the Mongolian question and the Chinese Eastern Railway question. He reached Peking on August 12, after a short stay at Harbin in Manchuria. While in Peking he arranged banquets, gave easy interviews, sent frequent communiqués to the press, and published pamphlets for circulation. He also attended a large number of parties given in his honor by the hospitable Chinese, especially the intelligentsia. In all this social intercourse he found numerous opportunities to air his view that the awakening of the Chinese people was in line with the Russian Revolution and that while other foreign powers were aggressive, imperialistic, and capitalistic, Russia had rejected all imperialistic policies.³²

Joffe began his official duties on September 2, when he sent a note to the Waichiaopu proposing formal negotiations on the basis of the Karakhan declarations of 1919 and 1920. In response Dr. Wellington Koo, then Chinese Foreign Minister, demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia as a condition precedent to the commencement of negotiations. Before replying to this demand Joffe abruptly left for Changchun in Manchuria to attend a conference there with the representatives of Japan and the Far Eastern Republic. His mysterious movement provoked Peking to notify Tokyo and Chita that it would not recognize any decision of the conference affecting Chinese sovereignty.³³

Returning to Peking on October 3, Joffe found himself still confronted with the demand for Soviet evacuation of Outer Mongolia. In reply he sent a note to the Waichiaopu stating that the withdrawal

³² *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 858.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 859. Actually, the Changchun conference dealt mainly with the question of Japanese evacuation of eastern Siberia and northern Sakhalin. Cf. Dennis, *op. cit.*, pp. 304, 312.

of Soviet troops would only serve the interests of the enemies of China, Russia, and Mongolia herself, and that it was still possible for the White Guards, who had been freely using Chinese territory as a base, to launch attacks on Mongolia. Soon after this assertion was made by the Soviet envoy, the Chinese Government issued an order directing the Chinese authorities to disarm those White Russian bands who were seeking shelter in Chinese territory. Not satisfied with this action, the Soviet envoy then complained of the White management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In a note to the Waichiaopu under date of November 3, he charged Boris Ostroumov, manager of the railway, with black corruption which would ruin the railway, and demanded his arrest and trial. To unfold his plan fully, on November 6 he dispatched another note to the Waichiaopu frankly stating that while still regarding the declarations of 1919 and 1920 as the basis of her policy, Russia repudiated any inference that all her interests in China had been thereby renounced. He further warned that the declarations could not be regarded as valid forever.³⁴

To these charges and warnings Dr. Koo was constrained to reply. In a note to Joffe on November 11 he first reiterated his previous demand for Soviet evacuation of Outer Mongolia as a prerequisite for the opening of negotiations and then refuted Joffe's assertion that China was sympathetic toward the Whites. He maintained that China was working for peace and was supporting neither the Whites nor the Reds. Finally, he requested the Soviet Government to declare once more its intention to return to China, without compensation, all rights and interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway. In support of his request he quoted the following passage in the Karakhan declaration of 1919: "The Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people without demanding any kind of compensation, the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all the mining concessions, forestry, gold mines and all the other things which were seized from them by the government of the Czars. . . ."³⁵

On receiving this note Joffe promptly formulated a retort and dwelt at length on Dr. Koo's request. After reiterating his previous

³⁴ *China Year Book*, pp. 860-861. The first Karakhan declaration was made July 26, 1919. At that time China was in control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Inter Allied Intervention campaigns were in full swing, and Soviet hope of controlling the Chinese Eastern Railway was dim. Perhaps this is why the Soviet Government offered to surrender her interests in China without compensation. By November 1922 when Joffe was trying to recover Soviet rights and interests in China, Japan had already evacuated Siberia, Soviet influence had extended to the Far East, and the Far Eastern Republic had joined the Soviet Union.

³⁵ *North China Herald*, November 18, 1922.

demands relative to the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Soviet envoy contended that the passage concerning the railway as quoted by Dr. Koo was not contained in the 1919 declaration. In regard to the rights and concessions renounced by the Soviet Government through the 1920 declaration, Joffe argued that this move of the Soviet Government was contingent upon another stipulation in the same declaration, which was to the effect that the Chinese Government was not to aid Russian counterrevolutionary individuals, groups, or organizations, nor to permit their activities in Chinese territory. He further pointed out that the 1920 declaration contained the provision that "the Russian and Chinese Governments agree to sign a special treaty on the way of working the Chinese Eastern Railway with regard to the needs of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic."³⁶

With the Soviet Government unwilling to evacuate Outer Mongolia and with the Soviet envoy apparently bent on modifying and qualifying the Karakhan declarations and disavowing their most important clauses, prospects for compromise and *rapprochement* became gloomy if not hopeless. On January 16, 1923, after five months of futile negotiations, Joffe took French leave of Peking and proceeded to Shanghai *en route* to Japan "for reasons of health." While in Shanghai he had frequent conferences with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, leader of the Kuomintang, and on January 26 they jointly signed and issued a formal statement concerning Communism in China.³⁷

SUCCESS OF THE KARAKHAN MISSION

The departure of Joffe caused no little perturbation in Peking and had repercussions elsewhere in China. Strong misgivings were aroused by alleged negotiations between the Soviet envoy and the Japanese authorities. At the same time, anti-Japanese feelings were running high on a mighty wave of mass demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts.³⁸ Amidst such social and political ferment, news was received that Leo Karakhan, author of the 1919 and 1920 declarations, had been appointed Head of an Extraordinary Mission to China. To meet the Soviet move, the Peking Government on March 28 appointed Dr. C. T. Wang Director of a Sino-Soviet Negotiation Commission.

Like Joffe, Karakhan went first to Harbin in Manchuria, where it was said he had intended to reach an agreement on the Chinese Eastern Railway with Marshal Chang Tso-lin, but failed. Accom-

³⁶ *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 861.

³⁷ *Infra*, p. 41.

³⁸ *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 864.

panied by a large staff of experts and secretaries, the new Soviet envoy arrived in Peking on September 2. At the railway station he received a warm popular as well as official welcome, including a military band playing the "Internationale." Afterwards a remarkable series of welcome parties were given in his honor, and he fully availed himself of these opportunities to win the sympathy of the Chinese populace and the intelligentsia. He preached that "the great Chinese people, with its culture, peacefulness, and exceptional diligence is the best ally of the Russian people in Asia," that "the friendship of Russia and China is a pledge of the peace of the Far East," and that "only the Soviet Republics, only the Russian people, desire to see China strong, powerful, possessing a strong army, and capable of defending the interests and the sovereignty of its people," while other foreign powers wanted to see China "a sick man." In response to Dr. C. T. Wang's suggestion at an official luncheon that Soviet Russia should follow the Open Door principles enunciated by John Hay, Karakhan said: "Russia will never follow the example of America. . . . Russia will never claim the rights of extraterritoriality, nor establish her courts or administration in Chinese territory."³⁹

On September 7 Karakhan paid his official call on Foreign Minister Dr. Wellington Koo, and notified him that the Soviet Government desired China's recognition as a preliminary to formal negotiations. Soon afterwards, following the inauguration of President Ts'ao K'un on October 10, Karakhan expressed his desire to present his credentials directly to the President himself, but was told that this formality should be preceded by the settlement of the outstanding issues between the two countries.⁴⁰

Subsequently, informal conversations were conducted between Karakhan and Dr. Wang. In the very first conversation Karakhan again raised the issue of China's recognition of the Soviet Government. He pleaded that the Soviet people had the right to demand a proof of sincerity and friendliness on the part of China, because the Chinese Government had participated in the Inter-Allied Intervention, whose purpose was to overthrow the Soviet Government, and had also supported the White Guards, who had a similar purpose. Furthermore, the Soviet Government, he said, expected China to adopt an independent policy toward Russia instead of following the line of other powers. On his part, Dr. Wang maintained that the restoration of normal relations should rest on a clear understanding

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 865, 866.

⁴⁰ Pollard, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

between the two countries and a general settlement of the outstanding questions.⁴¹

From the standpoint of diplomatic strategy, China could hardly be expected to recognize the Soviet Government at this stage; for after being recognized, the Soviet Government would become legal heir to the Czarist rights and interests in China, and the Chinese position would be weakened in the negotiations. Apart from this consideration, there was also a practical issue which made the Peking Government hesitate to recognize the Soviet Government unconditionally. At that time there had been fresh developments in Outer Mongolia which were prejudicial to China's interests. Despite its treaty with the Mongolian regime on November 5, 1921, the Soviet Government had turned the Mongol representative out of Urianghai (Tannu Tuva), part of Outer Mongolia, and addressed a note to the "people of the Urianghai Territory," declaring that "the sole object of the occupation of their land by the Russian Red troops was to defend them from the reactionary Tsarist officers who had found refuge among them, and to protect the territory of Soviet Russia from those bands."⁴²

Thus for some time Dr. Wang and Karakhan could not see their way to reach a compromise, each believing his own position to be in the proper logical sequence: for Karakhan, recognition should come before negotiation; for Dr. Wang, it should be the other way around.

After further conversation with the Soviet envoy, Dr. Wang hit upon an ingenious plan to end the impasse and to save the face of both parties. He envisioned that the two steps should be taken at the same time. While China would recognize the Soviet Government prior to the commencement of formal negotiations, recognition should be accompanied by an agreement on the basic principles for the solution of the outstanding questions to be discussed in the formal negotiations. At first Karakhan expressed high appreciation of this idea and complimented Dr. Wang on his effort to break the impasse. Later, however, he regretted it. He said that the proposition was incompatible with the instructions he had received from his government. He was also apprehensive that under

⁴¹ Chin Chao-tzu, *Hsien-Tai Chung-Kuo Wai-Chiao Shih* [Modern Chinese Diplomatic History], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1930, p. 191.

⁴² *China Year Book*, 1923, p. 677. Russian official documents proved, and Russian government officials had admitted, that Urianghai belongs to China.—Cf. D. Dallin, *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, New Haven, 1949, p. 140. Yet in 1948 the Soviet Union annexed Urianghai over the protest of the Chinese Government.—Cf. Chinese Delegation to the United Nations, *China Presents Her Case to the United Nations*, New York, 1949, p. 30.

the guise of negotiation for the basic principles, Dr. Wang would edge in the negotiation for the settlement of the outstanding questions themselves.⁴³

During the ensuing impasse, Karakhan found occasion to lodge strong protests with the Waichiaopu against China's refusal to release a Russian fleet which had fled from Vladivostok, and against alleged Chinese atrocities committed against Russians on the frontier. He also caused to be published in the English newspapers in Peking authorized versions of the 1919 and 1920 declarations, with serious modifications: the version of the 1919 declaration omitted the clause relative to the Soviet surrender of the Chinese Eastern Railway, without compensation, the version of the 1920 declaration omitted the clause providing for reciprocal responsibility to suppress the activities of organizations calculated to jeopardize the security of the two governments concerned. The publication of these authorized versions could not but hurt and arouse Chinese public opinion. Publicists pointed out that the 1919 declaration was received by the Waichiaopu from the Soviet representative at Irkutsk, and the French version so received corresponded with the Russian version published in Harbin and in the Soviet Far East. It was also pointed out that that declaration was specific about the renunciation of the Boxer indemnity and of the extraterritorial rights, and that it would be rather odd if such an important problem as the Chinese Eastern Railway had been left unmentioned. As regards the 1920 declaration, it was recalled that the Russian version was handed to General Chang Shih-lin by Karakhan and was brought back to Peking by General Chang himself.⁴⁴

In mid-November the Soviet envoy found occasion to raise the issue of the Boxer indemnity funds which the Soviet Government had renounced. At that time the presidents of many Chinese universities were voicing objection to the abuse of the funds by the Peking Government. To please and support the Chinese intelligentsia, Karakhan protested to the Government against its independent disposal of the funds, asserting that the funds should not be used for other than educational purposes.⁴⁵

In the meantime Dr. Wang had been appointed head of a mission to Japan. Though its purpose was to convey formal condolences to the Japanese Government in consequence of the catastrophic earthquake it had suffered that year, the mission was thought to have considerable political significance. Dr. Wang wrote to Karakhan on

⁴³ *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 875

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 867-868.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 872-873

November 21, saying that he would leave for Japan in a few days and expressing the hope that formal negotiations would begin after his return. On November 30 Karakhan addressed a lengthy note to Dr. Wang, in which, after a brief review of his diplomatic efforts since his arrival, he strongly stressed the point that China's recognition of the Soviet Government should precede formal negotiations. He stated that after the recognition was granted, the Soviet Government would consent to settle all questions with full regard to China's interests and according to the declarations of 1919 and 1920. While saying this, however, he introduced a fresh viewpoint which distinguished specific rights and interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway from general sovereign rights in the railway zone. He said, "Never and nowhere could I have said that all the rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway belong to China. . . . But even now I can confirm what was said four years ago, namely, that the sovereignty of China in the territory of the railway is fully recognized by us, and that we shall not insist on any one of these privileges which the Czarist Government had, and which the other foreign Powers still have today, in the railway zone."⁴⁶

Along with this lengthy note the Soviet envoy enclosed the authorized copies of the declarations of 1919 and 1920, by which, he reiterated, he would be guided in his negotiations.

The note together with its enclosures apparently did not reach Dr. Wang until after his return from Japan. Anyway, Dr. Wang replied to the note as late as January 9, 1924. The first thing he mentioned in his reply was the discrepancies between the authorized versions of the 1919 and 1920 declarations and the original versions received by the Waichiaopu, and he insisted that the latter versions should be regarded as authoritative. In regard to Karakhan's demand for recognition of the Soviet Government, Dr. Wang reaffirmed his previous position that the recognition should be discussed along with other questions. This position, he pointed out, was in fact derived from a proposal originally advanced by the former Soviet envoy Joffe, and he referred Karakhan to Joffe's memorandum to the Waichiaopu dated October 14, 1922. Finally, after mentioning that Soviet occupation of Outer Mongolia was inconsistent with Soviet friendship for China, Dr. Wang requested Karakhan to name an early date for the beginning of formal negotiations.⁴⁷

The request, however, went unheeded, and no negotiations ensued. As the deadlock held on, world events underwent some important changes. Great Britain and Italy had recognized the Soviet

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 875-876.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 877-878.

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Government. Soviet authorities and Japanese representatives had renewed their fishery negotiations, which if successful might lead to a general political settlement. In Peking a portion of the intelligentsia became noisy again in their clamor for an early *rapprochement* with Russia.⁴⁸ Under the circumstances, fresh efforts were made to break the deadlock and begin the negotiations. It so happened that Karakhan on February 18, 1924, lodged with the Waichiaopu a long and strong protest against activities of the White Guards in Manchuria. Instead of heightening the tension between the two countries, this protest was made a pretext for the resumption of conversations between Dr. Wang and Karakhan based on the understanding that China would recognize Russia if the latter would live up to the declarations of 1919 and 1920.

After a protracted exchange of views, the two diplomats on March 14 reached an agreement with fifteen articles. This fairly comprehensive agreement provided for joint administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway, immediate establishment of diplomatic and consular relations, Soviet evacuation of Outer Mongolia as soon as the conditions for such evacuation were agreed upon, Soviet nullification of all Czarist treaties affecting China's sovereign rights, China's nullification of all her treaties affecting Soviet sovereign rights, and return by China of former Russian church property to the Soviet Government.⁴⁹

Both Dr. Wang and Karakhan had signed the preliminary text of the agreement. But before they were to sign the final copy, a dispute arose and quickly developed into a diplomatic storm.

After Dr. Wang had signed the preliminary text, he submitted it to the Cabinet for consideration. The Cabinet soon discerned a number of defects in the provisions, and refused to approve the agreement. It therefore instructed Dr. Wang to notify Karakhan that the agreement had been rejected. According to a Chinese author, this move on the part of the Cabinet was due to an undercurrent of personal rivalry between Dr. Wang and Foreign Minister Dr. Koo⁵⁰ over the authority to sign the agreement.⁵⁰ To a certain extent the Cabinet's decision may also have been influenced by foreign pressure, as evidenced by the fact that on March 12 the French Government addressed a note to Peking, insisting that French interests in the Russo-Asiatic Bank should not be jeopardized by any Sino-Soviet agreement, and demanding that the French legation be

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 879.

⁴⁹ Official text in *China Review*, Vol. 6, No. 5 (May 1924) pp. 132-133. *China Year Book*, 1924, pp. 840-845.

⁵⁰ Ch'en Po-wen, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

notified before the actual settlement of the Chinese Eastern Railway question.⁵¹ It was not until April 9, when negotiations had been secretly resumed with Karakhan, that the Chinese Foreign Minister replied to the French note and stated that neither the French Government nor the Russo-Asiatic Bank had any right of participation in the settlement of the Chinese Eastern Railway question between China and Russia.⁵²

Meanwhile upon being notified of the Cabinet's rejection of the agreement, the Soviet envoy flew into a rage. In a note to Dr. Wang on March 16, he set a three-day limit for confirmation of the agreement by the Chinese Government and declared that upon the expiration of this time limit the agreement would be no longer binding and the Chinese Government would be held responsible for the consequences.⁵³

On March 20 the Chinese Government sent out a circular announcing that the Sino-Soviet negotiations had been transferred to the Waichiaopu. To inform and satisfy public opinion the Government on the same day sent out another circular to the provincial governors and other officials, setting forth the reasons why the agreement had been rejected. (1) The agreement ignored those treaties between Soviet Russia and Outer Mongolia which practically treated Outer Mongolia as an independent state and thus violated China's sovereignty. (2) The agreement attached "conditions" to Soviet evacuation of Outer Mongolia, whereas such evacuation should be effected unconditionally. (3) The transfer to the Soviet Government of Russian churches and other immovable property, as mentioned in the agreement, would set a precedent which might be utilized by other countries. (4) Lastly, the circular stated that Dr. Wang's signature affixed to the agreement was not a formal measure, and that the Chinese Government deemed it improper for the Soviet envoy to set a three-day limit.⁵⁴

Although this circular was released to the public on March 20, its contents had previously been conveyed to Karakhan through Dr. Wang. As a result, on March 19 the Soviet envoy addressed a strong note to Foreign Minister Dr. Koo stating that the Soviet Government "warns the Chinese Government against committing an irretrievable mistake"; that after the time limit previously set had expired, the Soviet Government would not be bound by the agreement signed on March 14; and that in this eventuality the Chinese Government

⁵¹ *China Weekly Review*, March 22, 1924, p. 126.

⁵² *China Review*, loc. cit., p. 153.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136; *China Year Book*, 1924, pp. 883-884.

would not be able to resume negotiations until it had first of all unconditionally recognized the Soviet Government.⁵⁵

On the same day, the Soviet envoy dispatched a much longer note to Dr. Wang and asked him to convey it to the Chinese Government. In this note Karakhan refuted the view of the Chinese Government that the negotiations had not been completed and charged that the Chinese Government had no sincere wish for friendship with the Soviet Union. He further asserted that the undeniable cause of the disavowal by the Chinese Government of the signed agreement with Russia was pressure from foreign powers, particularly the "warning and threatening note" from the French Government on March 12. He then went on to point out the advantages to China accruing from the signed agreement of March 14, saying that "the Chinese Government would certainly be most happy and thankful to any third power which would accord but a tenth part of the respect for China's sovereign rights and the national demands of the Chinese people embodied in the agreement signed on March 14." Disputing the Chinese Government's assertion that the Soviet demand regarding the three-day limit was not in keeping with former Soviet statements, the Soviet envoy declared that "strong indignation was aroused among all the peoples of the Union" when they learned of "the cancellation of all the results of the negotiations," that "for five years the Soviet Government has been striving at doing away with the criminal and shameful heritage of tsarism in China," and that the Soviet Government "had to establish that it had exhausted all its patient efforts, made during five years." Finally, Karakhan repeated the warnings set forth in his note of the same date to Dr. Koo.⁵⁶

Three days later, on March 22, Dr. Koo wrote to Karakhan saying that Dr. Wang had no authority to sign the agreement, expressing surprise at the time limit set, and rejecting the charge that China's foreign affairs were subject to foreign influence. He notified Karakhan of his willingness to continue the negotiations. In reply Karakhan asserted that according to the understanding of the Soviet Government Dr. Wang did have the authority to sign, that it was a fact that China's foreign policy was subservient to the policy of the powers, and that "the three days' limit . . . had only in view not to give the Chinese Government a chance to delay further the settlement of this momentous historic event for both nations." As regards the resumption of negotiations, the Soviet envoy stated that

⁵⁵ *China Review*, loc. cit., pp. 153-154. *China Year Book*, 1924, pp. 879-880.

⁵⁶ *China Review*, loc. cit., pp. 151-155.

he "absolutely declines to carry on any further negotiations," unless they be preceded by "immediate resumption of normal official relations between the two countries."⁶⁷

To this memorandum, Dr. Koo published a lengthy reply on April 1. He made it clear first of all that Dr. Wang was authorized by the President not to sign any agreement, but only to prepare for and carry on the negotiations. He pointed out that the signed copies of the agreement were, as the Soviet envoy himself had admitted, only the preliminary copies, and as such were properly subject to the approval or rejection of the Chinese Government. In further support of his position, Dr. Koo brought out the fact that the signed agreement was the result of only informal conversations, as Karakhan had never consented to formal negotiations. In reference to the three-day limit, Dr. Koo expressed appreciation of Karakhan's view that it was meant only to hasten a settlement. He considered it an improper act, however, for one party to set a time limit to the other when engaged in the establishment of friendly relations. As regards the charge that some third power was interfering in China's foreign policy, Dr. Koo reiterated that the Chinese Government would not suffer outside influence to affect its foreign policy. After a rebuttal of the points raised by the Soviet envoy, Dr. Koo offered strong assurance that the Chinese Government would accept and sign the preliminary agreement if certain defects in its provisions were removed. In this connection he contended, first, that as China was to nullify all her treaties affecting Russia's sovereign rights and interests, the principle of equality and reciprocity demanded that Russia should do the same for China. In other words, not only Czarist treaties affecting China's sovereign rights and interests should be nullified, but also Soviet treaties of similar import. With reference to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia, Dr. Koo maintained that while necessary details might have to be arranged, there should be no conditions for the withdrawal. As regards the transfer of immovable property to the Soviet Government, he proposed that inasmuch as the Soviet Government had not yet made known the size, nature, number, and location of the various Orthodox churches in China, the transfer ought best to be left for discussion in the proposed conference. In concluding his note Dr. Koo asserted that if the Soviet Government was sincerely guided by the declarations of 1919 and 1920, it would not object to the proposed modifications of the preliminary agreement; and that if those modifications were accepted, the agreement would be

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 136-138.

4. Obligation of the governments of both contracting parties not to conclude in the future any treaties or agreements prejudicial to the sovereign rights and interests of either party.
5. Understanding on the part of the Soviet Government that China did not and would not recognize as valid any treaty or agreement concluded between Soviet Russia and any third party or parties, and affecting the sovereign rights and interests of China.
6. Soviet recognition of Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China, and of China's sovereignty therein.
7. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia as soon as the questions for the withdrawal were agreed upon at the stipulated conference.
8. Pledge of both governments not to permit within their respective territories the existence or activity of organizations or groups aiming at the violent overthrow of the government of either contracting party, nor to engage in propaganda against the political and social system of either party.
9. Renunciation by the Soviet Government of the Russian portion of the Boxer indemnity.
10. Relinquishment by the Soviet Government of rights of extra-territoriality and consular jurisdiction.
11. Joint administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway as a purely commercial enterprise, pending settlement of the question at the stipulated conference.
12. Immediate and reciprocal transfer by both governments to each other of all real estate and movable property owned by each government in the territory of the other.
13. Immediate transfer by the Chinese Government of Russian church property at Peking and Patachu to the Soviet Government in accordance with Chinese law.
14. Postponement of the transfer by the Chinese Government of Russian church property outside Peking and Patachu to the Soviet Government until settlement of the question at the stipulated conference.

After the signing of the various agreements and declarations, the Waichiaopu delivered a note to Karakhan notifying him of the re-establishment of normal relations between the two countries. The Chinese and Soviet representatives then exchanged felicitations, and the protracted efforts for a Sino-Soviet *rapprochement* were brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

The Rise of Soviet Influence in China

WHILE Karakhan was conducting negotiations in Peking for a Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*, events of the greatest political importance involving the Soviets were taking place in Canton, the southern metropolis. Initiating and presiding over these epoch-making events was the dominant personality of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Throughout his political career Dr. Sun was engaged in a relentless struggle for China's freedom and independence. After his resignation from the presidency in favor of Yüan Shih-k'ai in February 1912, he kept close watch over the operation of constitutional government in China as based upon the provisional constitution promulgated in that year. Soon he found ample cause for discontent and protest. Yuan was a strong-headed executive and was impatient of interference from the Parliament. His dictatorial tendency was abundantly demonstrated in his conclusion of the reorganization loan (£25,000,000) in the teeth of parliamentary opposition, in his abuse of the loan for military purposes, and in his arbitrary dismissal of provincial governors not to his liking. In July 1913 Dr. Sun asked Yüan to resign, which the latter, of course, refused to do. Thereupon Dr. Sun started the so-called Second Revolution, but failed and had to flee to Japan. Later Yüan so far ignored the constitution as to dissolve the Parliament (January 10, 1914) and make preparations to restore the monarchy with himself as emperor. Dr. Sun strongly opposed this reactionary move and gave wholehearted support to General Ts'ai Ao's revolt in Yunnan, which ultimately led to the downfall and death of Yüan in June 1916.

But Yüan's death did not end China's troubles. It only gave rise to rampant warlordism which spread misery and confusion throughout China during the subsequent years.

In June 1917 President Li Yüan-hung, under the reactionary influence of General Chang Hsun, dissolved the Parliament, which

had previously been reconvened, and in doing so caused many Kuomintang members to flee southward to Shanghai and Canton. In reaction to these developments, Dr. Sun and his partisans assumed the role of guardians of the constitution, declared the Peking Government unconstitutional, and planned to set up a constitutional government in Canton.

In trying to carry out this plan Dr. Sun entered upon the last period of his busy political life. During this period he was more active and sanguine about political reforms than ever. At the same time he experienced political ups and downs with great rapidity. One year he returned to Canton to head the government there; another year he was opposed by the local military and had to flee to Shanghai. He shuttled back and forth between Canton and Shanghai no less than four times in the five years from 1918 to 1923. The last general who once welcomed him to Canton and then revolted against him was Ch'en Chiung-ming. Operating from Wai-chow, a highly strategic stronghold near Canton, General Ch'en in June 1922, directed his armies to attack Canton and surround Dr. Sun's official residence. The revolt came so suddenly and swiftly that Dr. Sun had to flee in the guise of a laborer till he finally got aboard the battleship *Yung Feng*. Many of his belongings in Canton, including the manuscript of his *Three People's Principles*, were destroyed. He felt so furious about the treachery of Ch'en that for nearly two months he remained aboard the *Yung Feng* near Canton and maintained a sort of war against Ch'en's rebellious forces. At this most disappointing moment in his life, one faithful disciple, along with Madame Sun, stood steadfast by his side. That faithful disciple was Chiang Kai-shek.

As usual, Dr. Sun later sailed for Shanghai. He neither lost heart nor gave up hope. With spirit undismayed he planned, as the Chinese would say, "to rise once more from the eastern hill."

THE WAY PAVED FOR COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

It was during this period of political eclipse that Dr. Sun met the Soviet envoy Adolph Joffe at Shanghai in January 1923. Previously Dr. Sun had sought aid from the Western democracies for the development of China, but did not succeed. This was one reason why Dr. Sun now looked toward Soviet Russia. On January 26, after several conferences, Dr. Sun and Joffe jointly signed and issued a declaration concerning the prospect of Communism in China. This declaration soon aroused wide attention, for it set forth the basis for subsequent cooperation between Soviet Russia and the Kuomintang. The declaration read, in part, as follows:

Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either communism or Sovietism. This view is shared entirely by M. Joffe, who is further of opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this great task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.¹

Having made this declaration, Joffe left for Japan. Accompanying him were Liao Chung-k'ai and Ch'en Kung-po, at the request of Dr. Sun, in order to sound out Joffe further. In a conversation with Joffe, Liao was told that what was in operation in Russia was not Communism. He then asked Joffe whether Communism could be realized in Russia in ten years. "No," said Joffe. "In twenty years?" asked Liao again. "No," was again the reply. "In a hundred years?" "Perhaps," said Joffe. Liao then turned to Ch'en Kung-po and said: "Well, what is the use of dreaming about a Utopia which might or might not be realized when we are all dead? Let us all be revolutionaries today, and work for the accomplishment of the National Revolution on the basis of the Three People's Principles. These we can realize within our lifetime. We must now unite with all the revolutionary forces available, and agree on a common aim, irrespective of our ultimate ideals."²

On his return from Japan, Liao reported his conversations with Joffe to Dr. Sun, and the latter became more inclined toward cooperation with Soviet Russia. Now, soon after he parted with Joffe, Dr. Sun's political star was on the rise again. At his instigation, some Kwangsi and Yunnan generals had fought their way into Kwangtung province and expelled Ch'en Chiung-ming from Canton. Ch'en, however, was not crushed. He retreated to his stronghold Waichow and from there dominated the eastern portion of the province. In the latter part of February, when the general situation had become more settled, Dr. Sun returned to Canton and assumed leadership of the government. Soon afterwards he set in motion his plan of cooperation with Soviet Russia.

In August 1923 Chiang Kai-shek was sent by Dr. Sun to Moscow as a confidential representative to interview Lenin, Trotsky, and

¹ *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 863.

² Tang Leang li, *Wang Ching wei, A Political Biography*, Peiping, China United Press, 1931, pp. 77-78. T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution*, London, 1928, p. 132.

Stalin, and to study the revolutionary techniques as well as the organization of the Communist Party and the Red Army. In the following month Michael Borodin came from Moscow to Canton as high adviser to the Kuomintang. With him came forty other Russian revolutionary experts. The way was now well paved for Kuomintang-Soviet cooperation.

(The purpose of the cooperation was the liberation of China from domestic warlordism and foreign imperialism so as to attain national unification and independence, and the means for achieving this purpose was the stimulation of Chinese nationalism—not the preaching of Russian Communism. The Sun-Joffe declaration of January 26, 1923, had made this point abundantly clear. Soon after his arrival in Canton, Borodin purposely emphasized the same point in unmistakable language. He agreed with Lenin and Joffe that China was not yet ripe for Communism and that she must first pass through the capitalistic stage of economic development. In dramatizing his view, he once remarked: "The only Communism possible in China today is the Communism of poverty, a lot of people eating rice with chopsticks out of an almost empty bowl. At present and for many years to come, Communists and capitalists alike in China must have the same ideal of a prosperous and much more highly developed industrial China and a general rise in Chinese standards of living."³

As regards the conditions governing the Kuomintang-Soviet cooperation, they included the following:

1. Borodin and his fellow Russian experts were to serve the Kuomintang in a private capacity. They were not representatives or agents of the Soviet Government.
2. They were liable to be dismissed by the Kuomintang at any time.
3. They had to sever all connections with the Soviet Government and had no privileges other than those pertaining to Chinese officers and officials of the same rank.⁴

It was on the understanding of the above purpose and conditions of cooperation that Dr. Sun subsequently lent an ear to Borodin and placed the many Russian experts in various departments of the party and the government.

All these Russian experts were veterans of the Bolshevik Revolution and of the subsequent foreign and civil wars. They had rich experience in revolutionary warfare and in the organization of

³ T'ang Leang-li, *Foundations of Modern China*, London, 1928, p. 168.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 167. Actually, Borodin and other Russian advisers did have official ties with the Soviet Government.—*Infra*, p. 69.

peasants and workers for political purposes. By placing their rich experience and tried talents at the disposal of the Kuomintang, they were about to make great contributions toward strengthening the party and translating its program into practical action. Their services were much more important and valuable than the financial and material resources which the Soviet Government, itself in straitened circumstances at that time, was reported to have also supplied the Kuomintang.

KUOMINTANG-SOVIET COOPERATION UNDER WAY

Borodin, the ablest and best-known of the Soviet advisers, had the closest contact with Dr. Sun and rendered opinions on matters of the most momentous import. Soon after his arrival in Canton, Dr. Sun carried out a number of important projects and formulated a number of policies with a view to capturing the sympathy and support of the people and building up political and military strength for the coming revolution.

Establishment of the Whangpo Military Academy

Ever since Ch'en Chiung-ming revolted against him in 1922, Dr. Sun had entertained the notion of establishing an academy for training officers for a revolutionary army. Now that Soviet cooperation was available, the project received prompt attention. The result was the Whangpo Military Academy for Officers. When Chiang Kai-shek returned from Moscow in the spring of 1924, he was appointed principal of the academy. Forty Russian experts were employed as instructors and advisers. Emphasis was laid not merely on military training but also on political indoctrination. The object was to create an army not only skilled in warfare but fully conscious of the social and political significance of the coming revolution.

Apparently, the academy had some connection with the Comintern. At the time of its inception in May 1924, the Comintern presented it 3000 rifles. There was a report that the Comintern also bore a substantial portion of its initial expenses.⁵

Propagation of the San Min Chu I

Apart from the establishment of the Whangpo Military Academy, Dr. Sun also attached great importance to the preparation of a proper psychological atmosphere for the pending revolution. In other words, he was fully aware of the importance of psychological warfare. He therefore promptly undertook to give a series of public

⁵ T'ang Leang li, *Wang Ching wei, A Political Biography*, pp 112-113.

lectures expounding the Three People's Principles: the principle of nationalism, the principle of democracy, and the principle of livelihood. These principles were conceived by him early in his political career at the end of the nineteenth century. Since then he had constantly developed his views on the subject and had intended to publish them in book form. By the middle of 1922 the manuscript was near completion when it was burnt in his library during the sudden revolt of Ch'en Chiung-ming. Note Dr. Sun's own words: "Just as I was contemplating the completion and publication of the book, Chen Chiung-ming unexpectedly revolted, on June 16, 1922, and turned his guns upon Kwan Yin Shan. My notes and manuscripts which represented the mental labor of years and hundreds of foreign books which I had collected for reference were all destroyed by fire."⁶

Dr. Sun, however, had his long-cherished ideas well stored in his memory. So, to meet the urgent need, he was able to present them in public extempore. His series of lectures lasted intermittently about eight months, from January to August 1924. He carefully reviewed and corrected the lectures before they appeared in print. Hence the *San Min Chu I*, which played an important part in the psychological warfare accompanying the subsequent Northern Punitive Expedition, and has since become the political bible of Nationalist China.

Reorganization of the Kuomintang

Simultaneously with the establishment of the Whangpo Academy and the propagation of the *San Min Chu I*, another project was carried out, namely, the thorough reorganization of the Kuomintang. According to Tso Lu, a Kuomintang historian, Dr. Sun was favorably impressed by the sound organization of the Russian Communist Party and had, since the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, made two attempts to reorganize his own party: once in 1919 and another time in 1922. Dr. Sun wanted the Kuomintang to excel the Russian Communist Party in effectiveness and efficiency. He was determined that his party should have well-defined principles, clear-cut policies, and a well-integrated organization whereby the leaders could direct the rank and file like the arm exercising the fingers.⁷

With these objects in mind, Dr. Sun decided to effect another reorganization of his party, and for this purpose he convened a Party Congress in Canton on January 20, 1924, under his personal

⁶ Cf. Author's Preface of *San Min Chu I*.

⁷ Tso Lu, *Chung-Kuo Kuomintang Shih Lueh* [An Outline History of China's Kuomintang], Chungking, 1945, pp. 112-115.

chairmanship. In this congress, all the provinces were represented, each by six delegates. The congress lasted ten days till January 30. Afterwards, a Manifesto was issued and has since become a document of great historic significance.

The Manifesto was divided into three sections.⁸ The first section reviewed the conditions in China since the 1911 revolution, critically appraised the various programs that had been put forth for national salvation, and concluded that the sound solution would be a real people's government composed of all classes within the nation and based on the Three People's Principles.

The second section gave a clear outline of the Three People's Principles and in so doing, repeatedly emphasized the necessity of cooperation between the party and all the social classes, namely, farmers, workers, merchants, intellectuals, and soldiers. It also stressed the view that the Nationalist revolution depended for its ultimate victory largely on the active participation of the workers and peasants and that, therefore, the Kuomintang would strive its utmost to assist peasant and labor movements.

The third section set forth a number of concrete measures dealing with China's foreign relations and domestic politics. Of these measures, the most prominent were abolition of the unequal treaties, and reconstruction of the nation in three stages: military conquest, political tutelage, and constitutional government.

It is noteworthy that in the Manifesto the idea of "cooperation of all classes" received repeated emphasis. This idea is characteristic of Dr. Sun's political philosophy, which opposes class warfare and class dictatorship, but envisions a social harmony in which all classes of the people cooperate for the common good of all. To Borodin, however, the idea served as a subtle pretext for bringing the hitherto politically passive peasants and workers into the revolutionary struggle, and for organizing peasant associations and worker unions as steppingstones to the formation of soviets.⁹

THE ADMISSION OF COMMUNISTS TO THE KUOMINTANG

The Party Congress also adopted a number of important resolutions which were not incorporated in the Manifesto. Among these resolutions the most significant was the one concerning the admission of the Chinese Communists into the Kuomintang.

But, first, how did the Communists come into being in China?

The rise of Communism in China was closely bound up with the

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 120-129.

⁹ *Infra*, p. 71.

world Communist movement, which in turn was and has been affected by international relations in general.

As early as November 24, 1918, Stalin wrote an article entitled "Don't Forget the East," in which after discussing how the "imperialists" exploited the abundant material resources and cheap labor of the Eastern countries, he declared that the mission of the Communist Party was to wake up the oppressed peoples of the East, inspire them with the revolutionary spirit of liberation, and summon them to a struggle with imperialism, thereby depriving world imperialism of its "most reliable" rear and its "inexhaustible" reserves of power.¹⁰

The import of this statement is so clear as to need no explanation. When Stalin was making this statement, the Soviet Government was concentrating its attention on Europe and was eagerly looking forward to a proletarian revolution and the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship in the defeated Central Powers, notably Germany and Hungary. By the middle of 1919, however, the Communist movement in Europe had definitely failed. Following this failure, the Soviet Government apparently appreciated Stalin's views and began to turn its eyes eastward. This was perhaps one important reason why the first Karakhan declaration was drafted and dispatched to China at that time.

Then in the summer of 1920 the Comintern held its Second Congress in Moscow, lasting from July 17 to August 7. In this congress, a number of theses were adopted. According to the *Theses on the National and Colonial Questions*:

According to the *Supplementary Theses*:

To determine more especially the relation of the Communist International to the revolutionary movements in the countries dominated by capitalistic imperialism, for instance, China and India, is one of the most important questions before the II Congress of the III International. . . .

One of the main sources from which European Capitalism draws its chief strength is to be found in the colonial possessions and dependencies. Without the control of the extensive markets and vast fields of exploitation in the colonies, the capitalist powers of Europe cannot maintain their existence even for a short time.¹²

These theses heralded the Soviet *Drang nach Osten*. The big target of that *Drang* was China, as indicated by Soviet endeavors in China in the early 1920's.

In 1921 the Comintern sent Marin, a Dutch Communist, as its delegate to attend the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which was held in July of that year first in Shanghai and later, to avoid police detection, in Chiahing in Chekiang province. Attended by thirteen people including Mao Tse-tung, Chang Kuo-t'ao, and Tung Pi-wu,¹³ it marked the formal formation of the party. In the following year the Comintern sent a representative to China to interview Dr. Sun Yat-sen. During the interview, he proposed an alliance between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. Dr. Sun rejected the idea, but agreed to the admission of Communists and members of the Youth Corps into the Kuomintang.¹⁴ Later in the same year Marin came to China again and asked for a convention of a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in West Lake. At the session Marin strongly contended that the Kuomintang was a party of all classes and proposed that the proletariat should enter that party to push forward the revolution. All the five members of the Central Committee opposed the proposal, but Marin finally invoked the discipline of the Comintern, to which the Chinese Communist Party was an affiliate, and overcame the opposition.¹⁵

On January 12, 1923, the Executive Committee of the Comintern passed a special resolution saying that "the Kuomintang is at

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 70

¹³ Research Committee on Modern Chinese History, *Chung-Kuo Hsien-Tai Ko-Ming Yun-Tung Shih* [History of China's Modern Revolutionary Movements], N.p., Hsin Hua Book Store, 1941, pp. 88-89.

¹⁴ Ch'en Tu hsio, *Kao Ch'uan Tang Tung Chih Shu* [Letter to Comrades of the Whole Party]. Handwritten and mimeographed, dated December 10, 1929, p. 2.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

present the only strong organization for national revolution in China," and that "since the present independent labor movement in China is still weak, . . . and since the central task of present-day China is to struggle against Imperialism, . . . the Comintern considers it a necessity for the young Communist Party to collaborate with the Kuomintang."¹⁶ In the light of this resolution, it was no mere coincidence that just about this time Adolph Joffe came down from Peking to Shanghai and had conferences with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, leading to the joint declaration of January 26 on the prospects of Communism in China. In pursuance of the Comintern resolution, the Chinese Communist Party held its Third National Congress in Canton in June 1923. Attended by twenty people, including Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Mao Tse-tung, and Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, and representing the modest membership of about three hundred, the congress formally decided on the question of entrance into the Kuomintang.¹⁷ But naturally the question did not depend on the decision of the Communists alone; it had to receive the consent of the Kuomintang. It was therefore brought up for discussion in the Kuomintang Party Congress in January 1924. During the discussion, some Kuomintang members strongly opposed the admission of the Communists into their party. The opposition caused Li Shou-ch'ang (Li Ta-chao?), a leading and brilliant Communist, to make the following plea and pledge:

In joining the Kuomintang, the members of the Communist Party of the Third International propose to abide by its Constitution and submit to its discipline. Their aim is to take part in the national revolution. They have absolutely no idea of converting the Kuomintang into a Communist Party. Furthermore, they join the Kuomintang, not collectively as a party, but separately as individuals.¹⁸

In consequence of this plea and pledge, it was said, the fears and suspicions of the Kuomintang members were allayed and the proposal for admitting the Communists was adopted.¹⁹

Thus began the partnership between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, which before long developed into mutual animosity and hostility.

¹⁶ Research Committee on Modern Chinese History, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

¹⁸ Tsou Lu, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY BASE

After the adjournment of the Kuomintang Party Congress at the end of January 1924, the Kuomintang leaders, aided by their Soviet advisers, proceeded with great vigor to implement the resolutions adopted in the congress and otherwise to consolidate the revolutionary base in Kwangtung. Dr. Sun was trying to arouse the political consciousness of the people by the propagation of his Three People's Principles. Chiang Kai-shek was soon directing the Whangpo Military Academy and trying to forge a new revolutionary army. Other Kuomintang leaders in collaboration with their Communist partners were energetically organizing the students, workers, and peasants for revolutionary purposes, and were conducting an anti-imperialist propaganda campaign.

The merchant class in Canton viewed these new developments with considerable misgiving. They feared Communism and they found their servants and employees more and more difficult to deal with. For self-defense they had for some time organized what may be called a merchant militia (*shang t'uan*). On October 10, 1924, this militia defied government orders and staged a kind of revolt, allegedly with British support. Despite the fact that the revolt took place in a thickly populated residential area (the Western District), the government called forth the regular troops to deal with the situation. The revolt was quickly suppressed and a possible menace to the government was eliminated.²⁰

Soon afterwards Dr. Sun was invited by the Peking government, then dominated by General Fêng Yü-hsiang, to go north to attend a conference on national rehabilitation. Despite ill health he accepted the invitation and went north via Japan. He reached Peking on New Year's eve. But his poor health worsened after the strain of the journey and incapacitated him for further attendance to state affairs. He passed away on March 12, 1925.

Shortly before his death, Dr. Sun wrote a letter to the Soviet leaders saying that he had ordered the Kuomintang to continue cooperation with Soviet Russia thenceforward, and expressing the ardent hope that the dawn would soon break when Soviet Russia, as friend and ally, would greet a strong, prosperous, and independent China and advance hand in hand with China to secure victory in the great struggle for the liberation of the oppressed peoples.²¹ Later Stalin sent a message to the Kuomintang stating that the Central

²⁰ Tang Leang h, *op cit*, pp. 99-100.

²¹ Ho Han wen, *Chung-Ao Wei Chiao Shih* [Sino-Russian Diplomatic History], Shanghai, Chung Hua Book Company, 1935, pp. 369-370.

Committee of the Russian Communist Party believed that the Kuomintang would keep high the banner of Sun Yat-sen in the great struggle of liberation from imperialism, and would honorably carry that banner to the full victory over imperialism and its agents in China.²²

Not long after Dr. Sun's death there developed in China a strong trend of popular opinion hostile to Great Britain and redounding to the advantage of Russia. On May 30 a number of Chinese students and workers in Shanghai staged a demonstration in protest against the dismissal and imprisonment of certain employees of a Japanese textile mill. When the demonstration passed through the International Settlement, the British police interfered and opened fire, thereby causing a number of casualties among the demonstrators.²³ Anti-Japanese in motivation, the demonstration thus turned out to be explosively anti-British in effect. The atmosphere was at once charged with anti-British sentiments. A general strike in Shanghai soon followed and became more serious when later it was accompanied by a boycott of British goods. On the other hand, pro-Soviet sentiments were growing and gravitated toward Canton.

Amidst this anti-British furor and hubbub, Chiang Kai-shek made his debut on the arena of national affairs. For years mercenaries had been quartered in and around Canton and had become corrupt and recalcitrant and disagreeable to the people. At the very time of the Shanghai incident, Chiang directed his Whangpo cadets against them. The campaign was prosecuted with such swiftness that it lasted scarcely two weeks. By the middle of June it was all over. The mercenaries were routed and crushed.

In view of the new situation created partly by the death of Dr. Sun and partly by the defeat of the mercenaries, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang held a plenary session which lasted from June 13 to June 28. The main task of the session was the reorganization of the government. It was decided that the office of generalissimo, formerly held by Dr. Sun, should be abolished and that the government should be established on a committee basis. According to the new plan, the government was to be a mere organ of the Central Executive Committee and had as its purpose the execution of the committee's decisions and policies. Under the committee a political council and a military council were to be established: the former to assist the committee to make both political and mili-

²² I. Deutscher, *Stalin, a Political Biography*, New York, 1949, p. 399.

²³ Liu Yen, *Tsui-Chin San-Shih-Nien Chung-Kuo Wai-Chiao Shih* [Chinese Diplomatic History of the Last Thirty Years], Shanghai, Pacific Book Company, 1930, p. 164.

ginning of September there was report that these officers were secretly negotiating an alliance with Ch'en Chiung-ming.²⁶ To deal with the critical situation, Chiang Kai-shek brought his Whangpo cadets into action again. He first waged a blitzkrieg on Hsü's army and disarmed all three of its divisions. Having given short shrift to Hsü's forces, he then launched a campaign against Ch'en Chiung-ming. This campaign involved considerable risk and many pitched battles; but the Whangpo cadets proved to be fully equal to them. On October 14 Waichow, Ch'en's stronghold, was stormed and carried. The fall of Waichow marked the downfall of Ch'en. He never rose again. His forces elsewhere were quickly defeated and liquidated. By the end of November the whole Kwangtung province was brought under the unified control of the Canton government. This achievement not only covered the Whangpo cadets with glory; it also raised the power and prestige of the Canton government. Furthermore, it paved the way for the much-needed improvement of the financial administration of the province, which previously had fallen into hopeless disorder. As regards Chiang Kai-shek himself, he had definitely emerged from the campaign as the man of the hour. Borodin was happy too. For at that time Chiang caused it to be known that he would listen to Borodin's advice as if it were Dr. Sun's own.²⁷ Placed high on the pedestal by both Wang and Chiang, Borodin might well have considered himself the darling of Mars and Apollo.

Soon after Chiang had crushed the power of Ch'en Chiung-ming, he began seriously to make plans for the Northern Punitive Expedition which Dr. Sun had planned but tried in vain to carry out during his life. In making the plans, Chiang sought not only to unify and strengthen the armed forces, but also to consider possible alliances and to stabilize the political situation in Canton. Apparently, Fêng Yü-hsiang, then a dominant military figure in North China, was regarded as a possible and useful ally. In the beginning of February 1926, therefore, Borodin left Canton for the north to see Fêng with a view to enlisting his support for the revolutionary cause and for the coming Northern Expedition.²⁸ As regards the political situation, Chiang himself soon took decisive actions for its stabilization.

In the spring of 1926 the air in Canton was filled with rumors subtly spread, it was said, by the right wing of the Kuomintang.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.

²⁷ T'ang Leang-li. *op. cit.*, p. 122.

²⁸ H. F. MacNair, *China in Revolution*, Chicago, 1931, p. 105; T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, London, 1930, p. 242.

The right wingers were at that time led by the so-called West Hill elements, who formed themselves into a clique in November 1925 in the West Hills near Peking, before the body of Dr. Sun. These elements were opposed to Communism and demanded the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang and the dismissal of Borodin and the other Russian advisers engaged by the Canton government.²⁹ Their arch-enemy was Wang Ching-wei, leader of the left wing, who favored the admission of Communists into the Kuomintang and cooperation with the Soviet Union. A subterranean struggle between the two wings had been going on for some time. In March, rumor was afloat in Canton to the effect that Wang and the Communists had formed a secret faction and were planning to oust Chiang.³⁰ An active figure connected with the rumor was Li Chih-lung, commander of the cruiser *Chungshan*, who was charged with plotting to take open steps against Chiang.³¹ Amidst this atmosphere of suspicion and uncertainty, Chiang struck out with his Whangpa cailets again, like a flash of lightning. On March 20 he declared a state of martial law in Canton and dispatched troops to surround the Canton Hongkong strike committee and the premises of Borodin and the other Soviet advisers. The pickets of the strike committee were disarmed; so were the bodyguards of the Soviet advisers and of the Soviet inspecting mission. Most of the Soviet advisers, political and military, were kept under arrest, while Li Chih-lung and about eighty other suspects were imprisoned.³² Wang Ching-wei exiled himself.

These moves on the part of Chiang naturally pleased the right wingers, who thought that Chiang had returned from delirium to sanity and sent him congratulatory messages. To their chagrin Chiang on April 3, even before the return of Borodin, made a proclamation stating that the Russian alliance was as strong as ever.³³ In fact, not long afterwards, on April 25, Chiang staged another coup, this time against the right wing. In consequence of this coup, Wu Te-chen, then police commissioner of Canton, and Dr. C. C. Wu, a leader of the right wing, had to leave Canton "for a rest." According to an American observer, Chiang conducted this second coup in order to win the confidence of Borodin after the latter

²⁹ Hollington K. Tong, *op cit*, p. 84.

³⁰ Tang Leang li, *Wang Ching-wei, A Political Biography*, pp. 127-130.

³¹ Hollington K. Tong, *op cit*, p. 89.

³² Ch'en Tu hsui, *Wo Men Ti Cheng Chih I Chien* [Our Political Views] Hand written and mimeographed, dated December 15, 1929, and signed by 81 Chinese Trotskyites, pp. 5-4. Hollington K. Tong, *op cit*, p. 90.

³³ Tang Leang li, *op cit*, p. 132.

had assured him of Soviet aid and support for the Northern Expedition then being planned.³⁴

Borodin came back to Canton at the end of April, and relations between him and Chiang became more cordial than ever. Chiang readily agreed to have new Soviet military instructors nominated by Borodin to replace those that had been arrested and deported.³⁵

Nevertheless, more moves were yet to be made by Chiang to curb the Chinese Communists and the Soviet advisers. On May 15 at a plenary session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, Chiang introduced a resolution imposing a number of restrictions on the Chinese Communists. Of these restrictions, the more important ones were as follows:

1. The Chinese Communists were forbidden to criticize the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun.
2. Any Chinese Communist entering the Kuomintang must have his or her registration card transferred from the Communist Party to the Kuomintang.
3. Chinese Communists were disqualified from heading any department in the central organization of the Kuomintang.
4. Communist members on the central, provincial, or municipal, executive committee must not exceed one third of the total membership.
5. Any instruction from the Communist Party to the Communist members inside the Kuomintang must first be submitted to the joint committee of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party for approval.³⁶

This resolution was adopted by the Central Executive Committee; so was Chiang's proposal to the effect that the Soviet advisers should not be allowed to take up administrative or executive positions and that Soviet advisers in the army should have their authority defined and limited.³⁷

At the plenary session Chiang was elected Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, and in that capacity he took over the posts previously held by Wang Ching-wei, who had left Canton "on sick leave."

Later, Chiang issued an order, instructing the Chinese Communists to withdraw either from the Communist Party or from the Whangpo Military Academy, and directing the Communist Party

³⁴ G. I. Sokolsky, *The Tinder Box of Asia*, New York, 1931, pp. 336-337.

³⁵ Tang Liang-shi, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

³⁶ T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution*, London, 1928, pp. 176-177.

³⁷ Hollington K. Tong, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

and the Youth Corps to submit a list of their members who had entered the Kuomintang.³⁸

Having clipped the wings of the Communists and having brought the government and party under his direction, Chiang was now ready to tackle the northern warlords and invade their provinces.

But before considering this part of Chiang's program, it is well to examine Soviet influence in North China.

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN NORTH CHINA

It would be a mistake to suppose that in those years, roughly from 1923 to 1926, Soviet influence was spreading only in South China around Canton. During the same period Soviet influence was also making itself felt in a telling though silent manner in North China, including Manchuria. The aim of Soviet designs in North China was, of course, domination of that area. But the designs were not successful in the end and only had the effect of weakening the northern warlords, thereby rendering them more vulnerable to attacks by the southern forces about to sally forth from Canton.

It will be recalled that when the first Karakhan declaration reached China in the spring of 1920, its liberal sentiments and generous gestures produced a very gratifying effect on the Chinese people. Later this effect was further played up by the speeches of Yourin, Joffe, and Karakhan himself when they came to Peking as Soviet envoys. The Chinese intelligentsia in the north were soon won over and became very sympathetic toward the Soviets. This is well known. It is not so well known that some young officers in the northern Chinese armies were also strongly affected by the liberal professions of the Soviet diplomat propagandists. An outstanding specimen of such officers was Fêng Yü-hsiang, then serving under the top Chinese warlord Marshal Wu P'ei-fu. By the time Karakhan came to China in September 1923, "it was already known that Marshal Fêng Yü-hsiang was sympathetically disposed toward Soviet Russia."³⁹ Karakhan became Soviet ambassador to China immediately after official relations had been established between the two countries on May 31, 1924. Amidst his formal duties as a diplomat, Karakhan delved into politics and strove "to detach Christian General Fêng Yü-hsiang from the northern cause and to employ him in the services of the nationalist revolution."⁴⁰

About a month after Karakhan was installed in Peking as Soviet

³⁸ Chen Tu-hsu, *op cit.*, p. 3.

✓ ³⁹ R. T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931*, New York, 1933, p. 180.

⁴⁰ M. W. Graham "A Decade of Sino-Russian Diplomacy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 22 (1928), p. 66.

ambassador, Soviet agents were sent to Mukden to conduct negotiations with Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian warlord, on matters supposed to be connected with the Chinese Eastern Railway. The negotiations resulted in the railway agreement of September 20, which bore a close textual resemblance to the preceding Peking agreement, and therefore was somewhat superfluous.⁴¹ The Peking Government regarded the agreement as a great affront. In this connection Foreign Minister Dr. Wellington Koo first lodged a protest with the Soviet embassy in Peking and then sent a direct protest to Moscow, contending that it was against international practice to enter into an agreement with a local regime without the previous consent of the central authorities.⁴² These protests did not disturb the Soviets, who simply ignored them and who seemed to know that the days of the Peking Government were numbered.

It is possible that the Soviet agents at Mukden did not confine themselves to negotiation for the railway agreement, but got mixed up with military conspiracies. At any rate, at the time the agreement was signed, Chang Tso-lin was pouring troops across the Great Wall to attack the forces of Wu P'ei-fu, strong man behind the Peking Government. Wu, of course, counterattacked. As the struggle was rising to a climax, Fêng Yü-hsiang suddenly rebelled against Wu, his superior commander. Instead of carrying on the struggle against Chang, Fêng marched back on Peking and attacked Wu's rear. Wu at once found himself in a dangerous dilemma and had to beat a hasty retreat into his native province Honan. From this setback Wu never recovered. Fêng later wrecked the Peking Government, placed President Ts'ao K'un under arrest, and with the support of Chang Tso-lin set up a new provisional government, nominally headed by Tuan Ch'í-jui.

It was this government that invited Dr. Sun Yat-sen to come north to attend a conference on national rehabilitation toward the end of 1924. As at that time Dr. Sun was well known throughout China for his policy of alliance with Russia and cooperation with the Chinese Communists, the invitation indicated that the new Peking Government had a proclivity to similar policies.

On March 6, 1925, just a few days before the death of Dr. Sun in Peking, Soviet Ambassador Karakhan notified the Waichiaopu that "the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has proceeded, with the consent of the Mongolian authorities, to the withdrawal of its troops from Outer Mongolia and that at the

⁴¹ J. V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919-1929*, Washington, 1929, pp. 148-152.

⁴² *North China Herald*, October 11, 1924.

present time the withdrawal of the Red Army from the Mongolian territory has been completed." ⁴³ According to the Sino-Soviet Agreement on General Principles of 1924, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia was to take place after further negotiations on the questions involved. Why was it that the Soviet Government, of its own accord and in advance of the "further negotiations," withdrew its troops from Mongolia? The reason appears to have been twofold. In the first place the Soviet Government may have wanted to make a friendly gesture to the Peking Government and to the Chinese people at a time when an All-China Conference on National Rehabilitation was in session at the Chinese capital. Secondly, Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia at that time was already firmly established, and the presence of Soviet troops there had become unnecessary. Following the mysterious death of the last Kutukhtu on May 20, 1924, a revolt had overthrown the regime of lamas and princes and had set up a "People's Republic," which was proclaimed on July 8 and whose constitution was closely patterned after that of the Russian Soviet Republic in both its bill of rights and its provisions for government organization. On August 30, 1924, the war minister of the new regime, Danzan by name, was murdered by Buriat Communists because he had made a violent speech that day, maintaining that closer relations with the Soviet Union would bring Mongolia under the Russian yoke. The following day, the Soviet consul in Urga (capital of Mongolia) issued a proclamation stating that thenceforth there would be a closer bond between Mongolia and the Soviet Union. ⁴⁴ By compulsion as well as by persuasion the Outer Mongolian regime must have been firmly oriented toward the Soviet Union by March 6, 1925, when the Soviet troops withdrew from its territory. On that day in a speech to the Congress of Soviets in Tiflis, Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin said:

The Soviet Government recognizes Mongolia as a part of the whole Republic of China, enjoying, however, autonomy so far-reaching as to preclude Chinese interference with the internal affairs and establish independent relations of Mongolia. It ought to be noted that after several crises the internal situation in Mongolia has settled down and been consolidated on a basis somewhat similar to the Soviet system. ⁴⁵

This statement testified to the paramountcy of Soviet influence in Mongolia, which is next door to North China.

⁴³ *China Year Book*, 1925, p. 428.

⁴⁴ 11 Harald Christensen, *Tents in Mongolia*, New York, 1931, p. 155.

⁴⁵ *Izvestia*, March 6, 1925, *China Year Book*, 1925, p. 429.

Taking the Soviet evacuation of Mongolia as a sign of good will, Foreign Minister Dr. C. T. Wang seized the opportunity to plan for the Sino-Soviet conference as envisaged in an agreement of May 1924 which stipulated that "the Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to hold within one month after the signing of the present agreement, a conference which shall conclude and carry out detailed arrangements." Karakhan, however, did not welcome the move. In reply to Dr. Wang's approach he renewed the old charge against Marshal Chang Tso-lin, saying that he employed the White Guards against the Soviets. In early April Ivanov, general manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, ordered the dismissal of all railway employees who did not adopt either Chinese or Soviet citizenship within a certain time limit. The Peking Government strongly objected to this order and a heated dispute arose. Dr. Wang suggested that the dispute should be settled at the proposed conference. Karakhan maintained that the dispute should be settled before the conference began.⁴⁶ After much time-wasting discussion, the dispute was left to be settled by the local authorities at Harbin. As regards the conference, it was finally inaugurated on August 26; but immediately afterwards, because of Karakhan's abrupt departure for Moscow, it was kept in abeyance.⁴⁷

From Karakhan's reaction to the conference, from his renewed reference to Chang Tso-lin's use of the White Guards against the Soviets, and from the new dispute in connection with the Chinese Eastern Railway, it is clear that at that time the Soviet attitude toward Chang Tso-lin had turned bitter and hostile.

On December 1, about three months after his departure, Karakhan returned to Peking. He returned amidst startling and stirring events which involved the destiny of the whole of North China. The long-interrupted Sino-Soviet conference was, of course, revived, and a separate conference was held at Mukden too to discuss matters relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway. But in both cases little was achieved, although the conferences dragged on far into the following year.⁴⁸ The fact was that from the very beginning the conferences were overshadowed and rendered practically meaningless by the tremendous events and vast military operations that were going on in North China at that time.

A few days before Karakhan's return, General Kuo Sung-lin, the ablest and most trusted commander of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, revolted and attempted to march on Mukden. General Fêng Yü-hsiang,

⁴⁶ *North China Herald*, May 30, 1925.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, August 29, 1925.

⁴⁸ *China Year Book*, 1926-7, p. 1099.

who once cooperated with Marshal Chang against Marshal Wu P'ei-fu, now cooperated with General Kuo against Marshal Chang. On November 27 Fêng and Kuo jointly issued a declaration demanding Chang's resignation.⁴⁹ Marshal Chang was taken by complete surprise, but he did not at once throw up the sponge. War ensued and spread its flames over North China and Manchuria, where, respectively, Fêng and Kuo were operating against Chang's forces.

About two weeks before Kuo started his revolt, Ivanov, Soviet manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, issued an order to the effect that as of December 1, 1925, no Chinese soldiers would be carried over the Chinese Eastern Railway without paying their fares in advance. This order altered a situation that had been going on for years. Even under normal circumstances, Chang Tso-lin would have been enraged by that order; but when he felt that the order was calculated to hamstring him at the most critical moment of his life, he nourished a deep resentment against the Soviets. In the latter part of January 1926, when a number of his troops were prevented from entraining at Changchun for the front, he ordered the arrest of Ivanov and did not release him until after strong protests on the part of the Soviet Government.⁵⁰

Meanwhile Kuo's revolt against Chang was proceeding apace and gave high promise of success. For Kuo controlled the strategic points on the Tientsin-Mukden Railway and was in command of the crack regiments of the Manchurian forces. He also had the moral support of a large proportion of the population of Mukden, where every officer and man in his army had relatives. What he had apparently overlooked, however, was the attitude and capability of the Japanese military in Manchuria. The latter knew that "Kuo's movement had the support of Bolshevik Russia and was therefore a menace to the security of Japan's investment in South Manchuria,"⁵¹ and it decided to intervene. At a critical juncture of the war the Japanese troops in Manchuria, disguised as Manchurian soldiers, were directed to attack Kuo's forces.⁵² This development made the whole affair assume the form of a camouflaged war between Russia and Japan and revealed the traditional and inveterate struggle for Manchuria between the two countries.

In consequence of the Japanese armed intervention, Kuo was foiled in his revolt and had to flee with his wife in the guise of peasants. They were both captured and shot on the spot by Chang

⁴⁹ Text, *ibid.*, p. 1026.

⁵⁰ A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, II, pp. 315-346.

⁵¹ *China Year Book, 1926*, p. 1028.

⁵² Research Committee on Modern Chinese History, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

Tso-lin's forces. Kuo's wife shared the fate of her husband because, it was said, she had "cajoled her husband into treachery against his patron and friends and had reconciled him to fighting in the interest of Red Russian expansion in Manchuria." ⁵³

The liquidation of Kuo did not end the warfare, for Chang was now determined to tackle Fêng Yü-hsiang. The latter now found himself in a tight position. He knew that Chang was meditating revenge on him and it was possible that Wu P'ei-fu, who had received an unforgettable blow from him and who was reorganizing his forces in Honan, would do the same and join forces with Chang. Apprehensive of the consequences, Fêng turned over the command of his forces to a subordinate general, while he himself retired to Nankao near the Mongolian border. It was probably here that Borodin came to see him from Canton in February, 1926. Shortly afterwards he went to Moscow, probably to appeal for aid and to make plans for staging a comeback to power.

As Fêng had anticipated, Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu did enter into an alliance and early in 1926 ordered attacks on his forces, then known as the Kuominchun (people's army). Under the combined attacks, the Kuominchun lost ground and had to evacuate Tientsin and Peking respectively on March 22 and April 16.

The forces of Chang Tso-lin then marched into the capital, and the Peking Government underwent another change and reorganization. Under the new regime, relations between Peking and Moscow became highly strained and were in process of rapid deterioration. Both Chang and Wu "bore Moscow a grudge for having supported their opponent Fêng Yü-hsiang," ⁵⁴ and assumed a hostile attitude towards the Soviets. In April Chang asked Moscow to recall Karakhan, then Soviet ambassador to China. The request was later withdrawn only after earnest solicitations on the part of Serebriakov, a special Soviet envoy then heading a mission to Manchuria, apparently to appease the Manchurian warlord. ⁵⁵

On June 28, Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, once bitter enemies, were brought together in a meeting in Peking. In this meeting a united campaign against Fêng Yü-hsiang was agreed upon and Wu was made commander in chief of the forces for the campaign. The war in North China then became extended and intensified. Fighting raged not only in Chihli (Hopei) and Shansi, but spread to Shensi and Kansu. The allied forces, however, could make little headway. For Feng's forces, the Kuominchun, were well entrenched in the

hand and controlled practically the whole province, although part of Wuhan remained to be taken.

At this juncture of the civil conflict, General Sun Ch'uan-fang, warlord of the five provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi, and Fukien, was frightened out of his dream of splendid isolation and immediately mobilized his forces in Kiangsi, intending to intervene in the military situation. But here as elsewhere Chiang Kai-shek seized the initiative, and while the offensive against Wuhan was reaching white heat, he personally directed a detour into Kiangsi and launched a fierce attack on Nanchang, the provincial capital. Sun Ch'uan-fang countered with his crack troops. A bitter and desperate battle followed and went on relentlessly for weeks. It was not until November 5 that Chiang's forces captured Sun's military headquarters in Kiukiang, near Nanchang, after heavy losses. Thereupon Sun withdrew from Kiangsi, and Chiang dominated the whole province.

Soon afterwards, on December 3, the governor of nearby Fukien province hoisted the Kuomintang flag and pledged support for the revolutionary cause.

Thus toward the end of 1926 practically the whole of South China had come under the control and influence of the Nationalist revolutionaries.

Wherever the revolutionary forces went, the party workers set up party branches, organized the peasants, workers, and students, and encouraged them to engage in revolutionary activities. Their work awakened the political consciousness of the masses and facilitated the consolidation of the conquered areas. The general stirring of the masses symbolized the advance to power of the Kuomintang left wing, the Chinese Communists, and their Soviet mentors.

In the meantime, General Fêng Yü-hsiang, who might be called a "Tushin warrior" in Russian folklore, was planning another bid for power. As soon as he realized the rapid progress of the southern revolutionary forces, he decided to return from Moscow to China. On August 28, 1926, he became a member of the Kuomintang and professed adherence to the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.⁵⁵ Leaving Moscow in September, he reached Suiyuan province in the following month. Here he resumed command of his Kuominchun and swiftly led it southward to attack the rear of Wu P'ei-fu's forces. By mid-November he had advanced to the border of Honan, the remaining province of Wu's once great empire. Later he also recovered control of the northwestern provinces, and thenceforth exerted a

⁵⁵ A. J. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

weighty influence on the general situation. Fresh from his trip to Moscow, his attitude toward the Soviets was friendly and favorable. Indeed, in Russia he was represented as a "former worker" and "faithful revolutionist," and he "was counted upon by Stalin to carry out democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants in China."⁵⁹ Furthermore, he had acquired huge stocks of Russian arms and ammunition with which to equip and strengthen his troops.⁶⁰

In North China and Manchuria, Soviet influence was apparently on the wane; actually it may have been on the increase, though under cover. After Wu P'ei-fu's hurried departure for the south, Chang Tso lin was left sole master of the Peking Government. On his request the Soviet Government recalled Karakhan, who left Peking on September 10, 1926. In the following month Chang took further action to curb the spread of Soviet influence, which he considered to be pernicious. He ordered the seizure of the flotilla of the Chinese Eastern Railway on the Sungari River, as well as its offices on shore. At the same time he also ordered the closing of the schools and other educational institutions which the Soviet management of the railway had maintained in the railway zone.⁶¹ Official relations with the Soviets thus went from bad to worse. However the Soviet embassy, the Soviet consulates, and the many Soviet commercial agencies were still functioning in North China and Manchuria; and through them Soviet agents were intensifying their activities to overthrow the hated Manchurian warlord and to render support to the revolutionary movement in the South.⁶²

It can thus be seen that toward the end of 1926 and at the beginning of 1927, Soviet influence was, directly or indirectly, openly or secretly, operating and making itself felt practically all over China. The red star was at its brightest in the China sky at that time.

⁵⁹ Leon Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, New York, 1932, pp. 55, 436.

⁶⁰ H. R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, Stanford, Calif. 1931.

P. 253

⁶¹ A. J. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

⁶² *Infra*, pp. 68-69.

The Eclipse of Soviet Influence in China

RISING to a high tide at the beginning of 1927, Soviet influence bade fair to engulf the whole of China. But soon, to the surprise of many people, it declined and dropped to a low point. Why it did so is a rather complicated story, involving as it does a large number of conflicts—the conflict between Chiang Kai-shek and Borodin, the conflict between the left and the right wings of the Kuomintang, the conflict between the Kuomintang as a whole and the Chinese Communists, the conflict between the Comintern agents in China (notably Borodin and Roy), the conflict between Peking and Moscow, the conflict between Stalin and Trotsky, and the conflict between Soviet Russia and the Western Powers in China. There were so many conflicts involved in the situation that it was no wonder that not even the much-vaunted Marxist dialectics could resolve them and prevent the defeat of Soviet influence in China.

THE CLASH BETWEEN CHIANG AND BORODIN

In the latter part of October, 1926, when almost the whole of Hupeh province had been occupied by the revolutionary forces and while Chiang Kai-shek was engaged in a fierce battle against Sun Ch'uan-fang in Kiangsi, a special session of the Kuomintang congress was held in Canton at Borodin's request. During the session there was worked out a new governmental organization combining the village, city, district, and province into a well-integrated system, and facilitating participation by the peasants and workers. Two important resolutions were also adopted. One demanded the recall from political exile of Wang Ching-wei. The other called for the removal of the Nationalist capital from Canton to Wuhan. These resolutions were no sooner adopted than carried out. Thus an invitation was sent to Wang Ching-wei to come back and participate in the government; and in the second week of December the transfer of the capital to Wuhan was effected.

Busy fighting at the front, Chiang Kai-shek did not take part in the making of these resolutions, which turned out to be not to his liking.¹ He placed the blame on Borodin; and the relations between the two men, the cordiality of which had been more apparent than real, suffered a breach. Soon the breach was widened when the views of the two men clashed over the question of where the next conference of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee should be held. On January 3, 1927, Chiang sent a message to the Wuhan government requesting that the Central Executive Committee should meet in Nanchang.² The Wuhan group, however, insisted that the conference should take place in Hankow. Clearly Nanchang and Wuhan had become rival centers of authority, each wanting to be the seat of the government.³ Aware of the imminent conflict, Chiang was eager to save the situation and personally went to Hankow to see the matter. While there, he and Borodin had a conversation, during which Borodin fired a barrage of criticisms and sarcasms at the party, the government, and the army, saying that the party, that is, the Kuomintang, tyrannized the peasants and that the army had for three years not done what he had wished to be done.⁴ As at that time Chiang was directing the party, government, and army, the sarcasms and criticisms were in effect leveled at Chiang himself. As a result Chiang felt insulted and embittered and he hurried back to Nanchang without accomplishing anything.

On March 10 the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee held its plenary session in Hankow, which lasted till March 16 and which was boycotted by Chiang. Among the resolutions adopted at the plenary session, two stood out as being more important than the others. One was to the effect that the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang should together rule China. The other was to the effect that the chairmanship of the Government Council, of the Political Council, and of the Military Council should be abolished and should in each case be replaced by a presidium of several members.⁵ Both these resolutions were obviously directed at Chiang Kai-shek. The first resolution was objectionable to him because he had always wished to curb the Communists and had previously taken definite action to do so. The second resolution was an affront to him because it picked off his feathers. At that time Chiang was holding all three of the posts that were being abolished.

¹ Tang Leang li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, London, 1930, p. 261.

² H. F. MacNair, *China in Revolution*, Chicago, 1931, p. 111.

³ T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution*, London, 1928, pp. 225-226.

⁴ Leon Wieger, "Boumi" *Chine moderne* (Hien Hien, 1926-1927) Vol. 7, p. 141.

⁵ Tang Leang li, *Wang Ching wei, A Political Biography*, Peiping, 1931, p. 145.

THE NANKING INCIDENT

There was now a yawning chasm between Chiang and the Wuhan group. However, Chiang did not precipitate an open break. He concentrated on the military campaign and continued his attacks on Sun Ch'uan-fang's forces, intending to crush them in the shortest time possible. Previously, on February 16, his troops had already taken Hangchow. On March 22, just a week after the Wuhan group had ended its conference at Hankow, his troops again secured a big victory. They captured Shanghai. Two days later they seized and entered Nanking. In both cases they were greatly aided by organized workers who played the part of "fifth column" inside the two important cities.

The capture of Shanghai and Nanking raised Chiang's prestige to a giddy height, and also sent forth a wave of joy and hope throughout the Communist world. In Moscow, for instance, Communists held processions by way of celebration and shouted such slogans as: "Shanghai is ours already!" "Shanghai is captured by the power of the proletariat!" "The proletariat should rule Shanghai!"⁶

At this very juncture an international imbroglio occurred in Nanking, where foreign residents were subject to attack, threat, and rough treatment by the incoming troops. To cope with the situation British and American warships resorted to direct intervention and opened a barrage of gunfire on the city.⁷ Simultaneously the powers concerned—Great Britain, the United States, France, Japan, and Italy—lodged a strong protest with the Wuhan regime, demanding punishment of the army commanders responsible for the incident, a written apology by the commander in chief of the Nationalist forces, and complete reparation for injuries and damage done. While they united in their protest and made joint demands, the Wuhan Foreign Minister Eugene Chen dealt with them separately and gave them different separate replies.⁸ In his reply to the British Government Chen stated that his government was prepared to make good the damage except in cases where it could be definitely proved that the damage had been caused by the British-American bombardment or by Northern rebels and *agents provocateurs*. He also suggested that an international commission of inquiry be instituted to investigate not only the Nanking incident but also "the other

⁶ Ho Han-wen, *Chung-Ao Wai-Chiao Shih* [Sino-Russian Diplomatic History], Shanghai, 1935, p. 372.

⁷ "China No. 4," *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 2953, Vol. 26 (1927) pp. 6-11.

⁸ For Chinese texts see Kao Ch'eng-yuan, ed., *Ko-Ming Wai-Chiao Wen-Hsien* [Diplomatic Documents of the Revolution], Shanghai, Kuo Kwang Institute, 1930, pp. 65 ff.

outrages committed successively by British controlled armed forces at Shanghai on 30th May, by British armed marines and volunteers off the Shameen on 23rd June, 1925, and by British naval forces at Wanhsien last year."⁹

All five of the governments considered unsatisfactory the respective replies they received. Great Britain, France, and Italy contemplated the use of force to back up their demands, but met with strong opposition on the part of the United States.¹⁰ The incident was later settled with the new Nanking government which was shortly afterwards set up and which suppressed the Communists believed to be responsible for the incident.

In connection with Communist implication in the incident, a story ran that before the incident occurred, a dispatch had been intercepted which was addressed to one Darovski, a Soviet military instructor, and contained an order from Borodin to sabotage the advance of the Nationalist troops under Chiang Kai shek.¹¹

This story harmonized with the view held by the British Government, which was at that time favorably disposed toward Nanking. On May 9 Sir Austen Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons that "the Nanking Affair precipitated a long impending split within the Nationalist ranks," that the organization and driving force of the affair "were borrowed, directly or indirectly, from the Third International," that "the organized side of the Nanking outrages appears to have been an attempt to embroil Chiang Kai shek with the foreign powers," and that the split within the Kuomintang "has deeply discredited the Communists and their foreign advisers in the eyes of all China."¹²

This declaration clearly reflected the conflict between Soviet Russia on the one hand and the Western Powers, notably Great Britain, on the other, in China.

THE DETERIORATION OF PEKING-MOSCOW RELATIONS

In the course of the intense general civil war in the first half of 1927 the diplomatic and political situation in China was undergoing rapid transformation, particularly so far as Soviet influence in China was concerned.

On February 28, 1927, the Russian merchant vessel *Pamiat Lenina*, while sailing off Pukow (opposite Nanking), was stopped and

⁹ J. V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919-1929*, Washington, 1929, p. 276.

¹⁰ Department of State, *Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927*, Washington, 1912, II, pp. 181-184.

¹¹ Pierre Fromentin, *Mao Tse Tung, le dragon rouge*, Paris, 1949, p. 69.

¹² *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, Vol. 206, p. 19.

searched by the agents of Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian warlord then dominating the Peking Government. The search unearthed incriminating documents in the diplomatic mail the vessel was carrying. Consequently, the vessel and many of its passengers, including Mrs. Borodin, were detained. On March 5 and 17, the Soviet embassy in Peking made vigorous protests against the detention, but in vain. Peking countered the protests with the contention that the Soviets had violated the 1924 Peking agreement which laid down in clear terms that each contracting party undertook not to engage in propaganda incompatible with the welfare of the other.¹³

About a month later, the Peking Government under Chang Tso-lin took further drastic actions against suspected Soviet intrigues in China. On April 6 the Peking police, armed with a warrant countersigned by the dean of the diplomatic corps, entered the legation quarter and conducted a thorough search of the Soviet Dalbank, the Chinese Eastern Railway building, and the offices of the military attaché.¹⁴ On the following day a similar raid by Chinese police was effected on the Soviet Bank, the offices of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and other Russian premises in the French concession in Tientsin—with the sanction and authorization of the French consul. These drastic measures provoked sharp protests from the Soviet Government. In a note to the Chinese chargé d'affaires in Moscow, dated April 9, the Soviet Government made the following demands: (1) removal from residences of Soviet representatives of Chinese military detachment and police, (2) release of all Soviet officials arrested, (3) return of all documents taken from the house of the Soviet military attaché, and (4) return of property seized to its proper owners.

The note, signed by Litvinov as Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, stated that unless these demands were met the Soviet Government would recall from Peking its chargé d'affaires together with the whole staff of the Soviet embassy.¹⁵ The Chinese Government rejected these demands on April 16, and ten days later the Soviet chargé d'affaires and his entire staff left Peking.

The firm attitude of Peking was caused by the nature of the seizures during the raids of the Soviet premises. Apart from some machine guns, rifles, a quantity of ammunition, and a number of flags inscribed with inflammatory slogans, the seizures included

¹³ *China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 789-792.

¹⁴ For a graphic account of the search see William J. Oudendyk, *Ways and Byways in Diplomacy*, London, 1939, pp. 348 ff. Oudendyk was dean of the diplomatic corps in Peking at that time.

¹⁵ *China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 792-797.

many Russian documents of a highly subversive character. Among these documents were an elaborate diagram classifying active members of the Communist Party in various countries, a list of over 4000 Communist agents in the Peking area ready to commit violence, and a copy of a resolution passed early in 1927 by the Executive Committee of the Communist International at Moscow and calling for the establishment of a Communist regime in China. Other documents showed that Borodin and his Russian colleagues were taking orders from Moscow, that the Soviet embassy in China was acting as an agent between Moscow and Canton in the delivery of arms and munitions, and that within the compound of the former imperial Russian legation guard there were set up Communist headquarters in which detailed preparations had been made for a Communist *coup d'état*.

Later the Peking police department managed to have the seized documents translated into English and published photographic copies of the original Russian versions alongside the English translations, first in the daily papers and later in book form.¹⁶

The publication at once provoked and agitated the Soviet leaders in Moscow. They categorically repudiated the authenticity of the documents. They charged that the documents were forgeries—not by the Chinese, but by European imperialists and White Guard Russians. Litvinov was particularly vociferous about the matter. Referring to the documents seized in the *Pamiat Lenina*, he expressed the view that those documents were forgeries placed among the courier's luggage of the vessel by interested persons. He then charged that the seizure of Russian documents in Peking was only another maneuver of a similar character.¹⁷ Outside the Soviet Union, particularly in Europe and the United States, the published documents were widely regarded as authentic and accepted without much doubt.¹⁸ Credence may have been lent to the authenticity of the documents by the fact that on May 12, in consequence of a several days' search of Arcos House in London by the British police, evidence was discovered proving that subversive activities and military espionage were being directed by the Soviets throughout the British Empire and North and South America.

In China the published documents produced a profound effect on public opinion.¹⁹ For years the Chinese people had pinned their faith on Soviet Russia as friend and ally in the struggle against

¹⁶ *Soviet Plot in China*, Peking Police Department, 1927.

¹⁷ *The [London] Times*, May 7, 1927.

¹⁸ A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1927, p. 346.

¹⁹ Oudendyk, *op cit*, p. 351.

Western imperialism. Now their faith was shaken and undermined. They began to realize that Borodin and his colleagues were Soviet agents—not independent individuals serving in a private capacity. They no longer believed, as they had before, that Borodin and the other Soviet advisers were interested merely in a Nationalist revolution in China. And they wondered if Soviet Russia was not just another imperialist power, only using different tactics. According to his official biographer, Chiang Kai-shek was influenced by the disclosures based on the seized documents.²⁰

THE RIFT BETWEEN NANKING AND WUHAN

On April 7 the Wuhan Government issued a mandate abolishing the post of commander in chief of the Nationalist forces, then held by Chiang Kai-shek.²¹ Chiang probably saw in this mandate a signal for the beginning of the intraparty struggle. As a riposte, he initiated the so-called Purification Movement against the Communists. Begun on April 12, the movement lasted many months and involved the arrest and massacre of numerous Communist leaders and thousands of workers, particularly in Shanghai, Nanking, and Canton. Furthermore, on April 15 he summoned a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang right-wingers at Nanking. At the session, it was quickly decided to form a new government at Nanking in opposition to the government at Hankow. On April 18 this government was duly inaugurated.

The above moves on the part of Chiang aroused the fury of the Wuhan Government, then headed by Wang Ching-wei, who had just returned from abroad. Wuhan at once expelled Chiang and his leading associates from the Kuomintang, appointed General Fêng Yü-hsiang as commander of the Kuomintang forces, and ordered T'ang Sheng-chih to march on Nanking.²² It also set up a commission to try and punish the so-called counterrevolutionaries.

Far away in Moscow Stalin was watching the new developments in China with great concern and anxiety. His personal power and prestige depended to a great extent on the success of his policy in China. At any rate he had to defend his China policy in the face of increasing criticism on the part of Trotsky, leader of the Soviet opposition. His reactions to Chiang Kai-shek's startling moves in Nanking were set forth on April 27 in his discussion on the problem of the Chinese revolution. On this occasion, he proposed the ex-

²⁰ Hollington K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and Statesman*, London, 1938, I, p. 148.

²¹ H. F. MacNair, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, 116.

²² A. J. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

pulsion of the right-wingers from the Kuomintang and the continued cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang shorn of the right-wingers. He exhorted the Chinese Communists to maintain their own independence intact during the cooperation, declaring that such independence "is the indispensable condition for safeguarding the proletarian leadership of the bourgeois democratic revolution."²³ In regard to the matter of revolutionary power, he said:

The basic source of power for the revolutionary Kuomintang is the deepening development of the peasant-worker revolutionary movement and of its mass organizations. Consolidation of the revolutionary peasant committees, labor unions, and other mass organizations is the essential preparation for the future formation of soviets. The growth of the positive revolutionary character on the part of hundreds of millions of the toiling masses is the principal guarantee of victory for the revolution, while the arming of the peasants and workers is the principal antidote against counter-revolution.²⁴

These reactions of Stalin may have sharpened the feud between Nanking and Wuhan. Toward the end of April, war between the two parties appeared imminent and would have broken out had it not been for the military movements of the northern warlords. As early as November 18, 1926, the northern warlords—Chang Tso lin, Wu P'ei-fu, and Sun Ch'uan-fang—had held a council of war at Tientsin and had decided to hurl their combined forces against the Nationalist revolutionaries in two directions: one along the Tientsin Pukow Railway, and one along the Peking-Hankow Railway.²⁵ At the time of the open break between Nanking and Hankow—that is, in the first part of April 1927—the northern warlords were carrying out their plan. Both Nanking and Hankow were thus menaced and both found it necessary to continue, though no longer cooperatively, their northern campaign.

The Nanking forces under Chiang Kai-shek made rapid progress. On May 31 they captured Hsuehow, a highly strategic railway junction, and pushed on toward Tsinan, capital of Shantung province. Their advance was balked only by the armed intervention of Japan, whose military government poured 5000 crack troops into the province for the purpose. The Hankow forces under T'ang Sheng-chih, however, did not meet with much success. In mid-May they

²³ Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, ed., *Ssu Ta-Lin Lun Chung-Kuo Ko-Ming* [Stalin on the Chinese Revolution], Mokden, 1919, pp. 82-83.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1926*, pp. 300-301.

launched a large-scale frontal attack on the northern coalition forces personally led by Marshal Chang Tso-lin, and they met with stubborn resistance. In the severe fighting, both sides suffered extremely heavy casualties. General T'ang's desperate position was relieved only by the timely maneuver of General Fêng Yü-hsiang, who emerged at that time from Shensi province, marched his army along the strategic Lunghai Railway, and in quick succession captured Loyang (May 27), Chengchow (June 1), and Kaifeng (June 8), the three most important cities in Honan province. He thus crushed the offensive power of Chang Tso-lin and Chang's allied warlords and made himself a positive force and a deciding factor in the then complicated military and political situation.

By mid-June the development of the civil war had become less intensive, as if a general armistice had been agreed upon. General Fêng was consolidating his new gains; the northward advance of the army under Chiang Kai-shek had been checked by the Japanese military; T'ang Sheng-chih of Hankow had suffered severe losses and was licking his wounds; lastly, Chang Tso-lin had been thrown on the defensive, and his position in Peking was further weakened and threatened by the changed attitude of General Yen Hsi-shan, governor of Shansi province, who on June 5 went over to the side of the Kuomintang, advised Chang Tso-lin to do the same, and moved his troops to the provincial border as if ready to march on Peking.²⁶

THE RIFT BETWEEN WUHAN AND THE COMMUNISTS

Even before the lull in the general military situation set in, the politico-social scene in the domain of Wuhan had been lapsing into chaos and anarchy. In the countryside peasants, abetted by the radical party workers, were seizing land and waging a sort of class war against the landlords. In the towns and cities, labor unions assumed the functions of the police and the law courts, shops and factories were closed by the armed pickets, and workers went on strike. A social revolution seemed to be creeping up from below. On May 20 the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Wuhan found it necessary to issue a manifesto pleading for class harmony and for united efforts to accomplish the revolution.²⁷ The following day there occurred the well-known military coup in Changsha where General Hsü K'e-hsiang, without authorization from the government, used violence to suppress the labor unions, peasant associations, and other mass organizations in the city. This

²⁶ T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, p. 277; A. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1927, p. 327.

²⁷ H. R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, p. 211.

specific episode exemplified the unfolding conflict in the general situation which was skidding fast toward revolution and counter-revolution. On June 1 an electric spark set off the bomb.

On that day a Hindu gentleman by the name of Roy, an agent of the Comintern in China, was visiting Hankow and had an interview with Wang Ching-wei, head of the Wuhan government. In the course of the conversation he informed Wang that fresh instructions had been issued to him and Borodin by the authorities of the Comintern. Wang pricked up his ears in an access of curiosity. He was at that time Chairman of the Joint Committee of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and it had previously been agreed upon that instructions to the Communist members of the Kuomintang should first be submitted to the Joint Committee for approval. His mind filled with misgivings, he grew even more astonished when Roy said: "Borodin does not like to show you this telegram, which is a secret resolution by the Moscow Bureau. I, on the other hand, think that it is most advisable that you should know what it is about, as I am quite sure that you would approve of it."²⁴ He then handed to Wang the Comintern telegram which contained the following directives:

1. The agrarian revolution should proceed from the seizure of land at the lower levels, without orders from the government and without encroaching upon the land of the military officers
2. Use the power of the party to suppress the hotheaded actions of the peasants.
3. Destroy the present unreliable generals, arm 20,000 members of the Chinese Communist Party, and organize a new army of 50,000 men chosen from the workers and peasants of Hunan and Hupeh.
4. Displace the old members of the Kuomintang Central Committee with new representatives of the workers and peasants.
5. Organize a revolutionary tribunal with the prominent members of the Kuomintang to try the reactionary generals.²⁵

After reading the telegram, Wang at once sensed the grave situation that was developing and told Roy at once that on no account could the Kuomintang accept the conditions contained in the telegram. On his part Roy was equally adamant. The following day, June 2, he told Wang: "I am glad I have shown you the telegram, which you can take as an ultimatum. If you accept the tenor of the

²⁴ T'ang Leang li, *Wang Ching-wei, A Political Biography*, pp. 155-156.

²⁵ Ch'en Tu hsui, *See Ch'uan T'ang T'ung Chih Shu* [Letter to Comrades of the Whole Party], p. 7. J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, New York, 1931, p. 249.

telegram and grant facilities for its execution, the Communist International will continue to cooperate with you. If not, it will have nothing to do with the Kuomintang." Roy also said that he opposed both the policy of Borodin and the Sun-Joffe declaration of January 26, 1923. To this blunt statement Wang replied that he cared only for the conditions previously agreed to.³⁰

The firm attitude of Roy was also known to Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, a prominent Communist leader, who pointed out that Roy at that time was prepared for a showdown, thinking that the Kuomintang left wing had no way out except to follow the lead of the Chinese Communist Party.³¹

For showing the Comintern telegram to Wang, Roy incurred the displeasure of his fellow agent Borodin, who felt so offended as to cable Stalin and request the recall of Roy. Many of the Chinese Communists sided with Borodin and they sent Roy back to Russia.³² Mao Tse-tung later called Roy a "fool."³³

In a later work on the Chinese revolution, Roy avoided mention of the above episode; instead, he tried to sell a brand of blended Hindu and Marxist mysticism which obscured rather than clarified the issues.³⁴

Whatever may be said about the discretion or indiscretion of Roy in disclosing the Comintern secret resolution to Wang Ching-wei, there is no doubt that he was grossly mistaken concerning the temper of the Wuhan leaders. Wang Ching-wei and his left-wing associates did not yield to Roy or to the Comintern. They could not do so for practical as well as theoretical considerations. For instance, they considered the policy of land seizure a dangerous game to play, for they knew that many officers in the Wuhan armies came from the landlord class and would be alienated by the enforcement of that policy. For this reason they felt somewhat alarmed when they realized that the Comintern directive concerning agrarian revolution was already being carried out, for at that time land confiscation was effected on an extensive scale, especially in Hunan province. And Borodin told Wang that Roy was responsible for the movement and was instigator of the agrarian troubles, adding that Roy had the complete confidence of Stalin.³⁵

³⁰ T'ang, *Wang Ching-wei*, pp. 156-157.

³¹ Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, *Chung-Kuo Ko-Ming Yu Kung-Ch'an-Tang* [The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party], N.p., Chinese Communist Party, June 1928, p. 101.

³² T'ang, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, p. 282.

³³ E. Snow, *Red Star Over China*, New York, 1938, p. 147.

³⁴ M. N. Roy, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, Calcutta, Renaissance Publishers, 1946, pp. 480-481 n.

³⁵ T'ang, *Inner History*, p. 273.

To deal with the grave situation, Wang, together with Sun Fo, went to visit General Fêng Yu-hsiang at Chengchow in Honan, no doubt with a view to enlisting his support. They met him on June 6 and returned to Hankow on June 13. Two days before their return an anti-Borodin mass demonstration was staged outside Borodin's office. After this, there was a rapid turn of events. After having met Wang Ching-wei and Sun Fo, General Fêng on his part went eastward to Hsuehchow to have a conference with General Chiang Kai-shek. The conference lasted from June 19 to June 21 and resulted in an alliance between the two military leaders. Apparently acting on an understanding reached during the conference, General Fêng on June 21 telegraphed to the Hankow Government demanding the removal of Borodin and his fellow advisers. The telegram read: "It is deemed necessary to try every possible means to send back Borodin to Russia. All Wuhan Communists who wish to proceed abroad can go. Nanking welcomes the cooperation of those remaining, but requests the earliest decision to hasten the formation of a unified front against the north."³⁶

A few days later, Chiang Kai-shek sent an ultimatum to Hankow making similar demands in a blunter manner.³⁷

In the face of these determined demands Borodin already felt his position shaken. But more direct actions against him were yet to come—from the left-wingers of the Kuomintang. These assembled for a conference on July 13. At the conference they passed a resolution to outlaw the Chinese Communist Party. On July 15 they held another conference at which they decided that Borodin and other Soviet experts and instructors should be ordered back to Russia, that all radical activities should be stopped, that a delegation should be sent to Moscow "to explain the true character and purpose of the Kuomintang," and that "a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang should be convened to meet at Hankow on August 15."³⁸

These drastic developments naturally provoked reactions on the part of Stalin and the Comintern in Moscow. On July 14 the Executive Committee of the Comintern adopted a new resolution calculated to meet those critical developments in China. The resolution read in part as follows:

The revolutionary role of the Wuhan government is played out, it is becoming a counter-revolutionary force. This is the new and peculiar feature which the leaders of the Chinese Com-

³⁶ *The [London] Times*, June 24, 1927.

³⁷ H. F. MacNair, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120.

³⁸ A. J. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 354-355. *China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 1371-1372.

munist Party and all the Chinese comrades must fully and clearly take into account. . . .

The Communists should remain in the Kuomintang, in spite of the campaign carried on by its leaders for the expulsion of the Communists. They should seek closer contact with the mass of the members of the Kuomintang. . . .

The Communists should now intensify the work among the proletarian masses . . . build up labor organizations . . . strengthen the trade unions . . . prepare the working masses for decisive action . . . develop the agrarian revolution . . . arm the workers and peasants . . . organize a competent fighting illegal party apparatus.³⁹

Undoubtedly, directives of similar tenor were sent to the Soviet agents in China as well as to the Chinese Communist leaders. Whatever long-term merits such directives may have had, they could not in the short run counteract the determined efforts of the Wuhan government. Borodin saw the hopelessness and helplessness of his position, and on July 27 he and some of his associates left Hankow for Moscow via Mongolia. Prior to his departure, he received a letter from the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang left wing acknowledging the great services he had rendered to the Nationalist government and expressing regret that owing to the changed policy of Soviet Russia toward the Kuomintang an intimate cooperation was no longer possible.⁴⁰

Thus ended the cooperation between the Kuomintang on the one hand and the Chinese Communists and the Soviet advisers on the other. The break was basically due to the impossibility of merging two revolutions different in their ultimate goals and in their major methods of approach. The Chinese Communists, or rather the Comintern, boldly attempted the merger and in doing so only precipitated a split. The Nationalist revolution, as championed by the Kuomintang, aimed at the realization of Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles, and for that realization the Nationalists chose to employ methods of a Fabian or evolutionary character. The Chinese Communists, however, preferred the use of violence and the class struggle as their major methods, and their proletarian revolution aimed at the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship as a steppingstone to the Marxian utopia. The short-term cooperation between the Kuomintang left wing and the Communists was rendered possible only by the fact that in the course of pursuing their respective ultimate

³⁹ *International Press Correspondence*, July 28, 1927. Cited in H. R. Isaacs, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-267.

⁴⁰ T'ang, *Inner History*, p. 286.

goals they found that they had *some intermediate objectives* in common, namely, antiwarlordism and anti-imperialism in China. As soon as they achieved these intermediate objectives, they were bound to come to the forks of the road where they had to part company and to struggle with each other. On these considerations the split between the Kuomintang left wing and the Chinese Communists together with their Soviet affiliates was clearly a matter of time. It was theoretically inevitable and should have been expected. What appears strange is that the split, when it did happen, seems to have been premature. At that time much yet remained to be done in the way of liquidating warlordism and imperialism in China.

STALIN VERSUS TROTSKY

In reviewing the situation, publicists and historians have expressed the belief that the fiasco in which the Soviet mission in China ended was due mainly to the aggressive policy of the leaders of the Comintern as distinguished from the Soviet Government. They assert that while the China policy of the Soviet Government, as laid down by Lenin, aimed at assisting the Kuomintang in a Nationalist revolution, the leaders of the Comintern persistently advocated the policy of introducing Communism into China and urging the Chinese Communists to struggle for supremacy within the Kuomintang, to prepare for class warfare, and ultimately to set up a proletarian dictatorship. They also point out that in the spring of 1927 Borodin was receiving from the Comintern instructions which conflicted with those from the Soviet Government, and that Borodin for a time ignored the instructions from the Comintern, but was undone by some of his associates who disagreed with him and who pursued their own policy.⁴¹

According to Leon Trotsky, an inside authority of the Soviet Communist Party and the Comintern, there was little or no distinction between the Soviet Government and the Communist Party on the one hand and the Comintern on the other, in so far as the policy toward China was concerned. Trotsky held that the Comintern made the same tactical errors as the Soviet Government and the Communist Party, and was responsible equally and in the same way for the Soviet fiasco in China. Note his own words:

Had the Comintern pursued a more or less correct policy, the outcome of the struggle of the Communist Party for the masses would be determined in advance: the Chinese proletariat would have supported the Communists, while the peasants' war

⁴¹ T'ang Leang li, *The Foundations of Modern China*, pp. 189-190, H. F. MacNair, *op. cit.*, p. 120, A. J. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

would have supported the revolutionary proletariat. . . . But precisely in the sphere of leadership something absolutely monstrous occurred, a veritable historical catastrophe: the authority of the Soviet Union, of the Bolshevik party and of the Comintern went entirely to the support of Chiang Kai-shek against an independent policy of the Communist Party and then to the support of Wang Chin Wei as the leader of the agrarian revolution.⁴²

This remark revealed clearly the great difference between the China policy of Joseph Stalin as *de facto* head of the Soviet Government and leader of the majority, and the China policy of Leon Trotsky as leader of the minority Opposition. Stalin and some other Soviet leaders, notably Bukharin, conceived and followed a forward and revolutionary policy in China, but took care that this policy should not be too radically opposed to China's existing social conditions. They agreed with Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China's traditional harmony of the four classes—scholars, farmers, artisans, and merchants—did not point to the necessity of class warfare, and that in modern times the solidarity of the four classes was strengthened by the pressure of foreign imperialism, which was no respecter of classes in China. The objective foremost in the mind of Stalin and Bukharin seemed to be to aid the Kuomintang in accomplishing the Nationalist revolution and freeing China from the imperialist yoke. As regards the social revolution, Stalin and his colleagues cherished the view that it "cannot develop at a fast tempo," and that "one cannot take up a decisive struggle under unfavorable circumstances."⁴³ Hence they did not favor immediate agitation for class warfare in China; but took advantage of the concept of the harmony of the four classes to arouse the political consciousness of the workers and peasants, and ordered the organization of revolutionary peasant committees, workers' trade-unions, and other mass organizations as intermediate stages or steppingstones to the formation of armed soviets in the future.⁴⁴ Above all, Stalin and some other top Soviet leaders were strongly in favor of cooperation with the Kuomintang both on the part of the Chinese Communist Party and of the Comintern. This policy was followed steadfastly from the beginning of Kuomintang-Soviet cooperation in 1923 up to even after the Communist split with Wuhan. It was not until September 19, 1927, that the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party decided to throw away

⁴² Leon Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, New York, 1932, pp. 134-135.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

⁴⁴ *Supra*, p. 71.

the banner of the Kuomintang.⁴⁵ Because Stalin favored cooperation with the Kuomintang, he opposed the immediate formation of soviets, maintaining that soviets were organs of political power and as such they would be appropriate only during a proletarian revolution, but would come into conflict with the Kuomintang government in the case of a bourgeois-democratic revolution.⁴⁶

For his views on China and the Kuomintang, Stalin was roundly condemned by Trotsky, who characterized him as a Menshevik and accused him of failure to assimilate the Leninist conception of revolution. Said Trotsky:

What Stalin had assimilated was merely the Leninist conception of a centralized Party machine. The moment he got hold of that, he lost sight of its roots in theoretical considerations, its programmatic base became essentially unimportant, and in consonance with his own past, his own social origin, training and education, he was naturally inclined toward a petty-bourgeois conception, toward opportunism, toward compromise. In 1917 he had failed to realize fusion with the Mensheviks only because Lenin would not let him, in the Chinese revolution he fully achieved the Menshevik conception under the banner of Bolshevism, implementing the Menshevik program with Bolshevik methods, i.e., with the centralized political machine which to him was the essence of Bolshevism.⁴⁷

Trotsky claimed to be a more apt and intelligent disciple of Lenin, and he envisaged much more radical methods for the revolution in China. He did not believe in the harmony of the four classes, nor in the greater unity of the four classes in consequence of foreign pressure. He conceived that there was in China a "compradore bourgeoisie," whose members were agents or "running dogs" of foreign capitalism and imperialism and were in league with members of the "national bourgeoisie" to exploit the peasants and workers, whom they looked upon with increasing hostility and hatred. He advocated class warfare and regarded the doctrines of Dr. Sun Yat-sen as "a petty bourgeois theory" because they are directed toward social harmony. He cherished an utterly uncompromising attitude toward the bourgeoisie. Consequently he strongly opposed the cooperation between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang in 1923; and when his opposition was overruled by the majority, he afterwards consistently demanded the overthrow of the coalition government in south China. He urged the immediate arming of the workers and

⁴⁵ Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, *op cit.*, p. 134.

⁴⁶ The Sino Soviet Friendship Association, ed., *op cit.*, pp. 163-165.

⁴⁷ Leon Trotsky, *Stalin*, New York, 1941, p. 353.

peasants and the formation of militant soviets. He urged civil defiance and violence in the form of workers' strikes, agrarian uprisings, and armed *coups d'état* to destroy bourgeois society. He urged that the Communist Party should maintain a separate army and should assert absolute theoretical, political, and organizational independence. He urged that the Communist Party should engage in tireless and relentless struggle with the bourgeoisie party, meaning the Kuomintang, for the leadership of the masses and for the establishment of a peasant-worker dictatorship. He adamantly contended that the only road to victory over Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang was "the deepening of the agrarian revolution, the immediate seizure of the land by the peasants."⁴⁸

Such being Trotsky's views toward the Chinese revolution, it is difficult to see how they would have fared better than Stalin's in dealing with the situation in China in 1926 and 1927. Trotsky's views meant open war not only with the entire Kuomintang but with the entire Chinese bourgeoisie. If these views had been enforced, probably both wings of the Kuomintang would have taken severer and more drastic measures to exterminate and liquidate the Chinese Communists. From a long-term point of view, both Stalin's and Trotsky's policies would be sound and effective, if they could be carried out successfully and unopposed. There seems to be no doubt that the deepening of the mass movement and a tight organization of the peasants and workers would be an inexhaustible source of power. However, in the first place the Kuomintang would not go to sleep and let those policies be smoothly carried out. In the second place it is doubtful whether the Chinese masses at that time had been sufficiently persuaded to appreciate Communist ideas and follow an independent Communist banner. In the third place, under the most favorable conditions it would take considerable time for the mass movement and mass organizations to get into being, to consolidate themselves, and to yield the expected strength and power. Meanwhile the flesh and blood of the poorly armed and poorly organized masses would be no match for the bullets and bayonets of the Kuomintang forces. In other words, for the all-important short run, neither Stalin's nor Trotsky's policies could have successfully counteracted the measures of the Kuomintang and saved the situation for the Communists. At any rate, no less an authority than Mao Tse-tung, who was at that time president of the All-China Peasants' Union and who was in the thick of the revolutionary developments then going on, has placed on record the view that "even if the Com-

⁴⁸ L. Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 26-28, 60-61, 78.

5 the work of suppression was done. The forces of Ho and Yeh were driven out of Nanchang, pursued, and broken up into roving bands.

In the meantime Stalin sent a trusted aide and confidential agent to China, as representative of the Comintern to guide the Chinese Communists through the crisis. At the request of this special representative, the Chinese Communists held a conference on August 7 in the Japanese concession in Hankow. At this conference, Ch'en Tu-hsiu was roundly condemned as an opportunist, the Politburo was reorganized without him, and under the influence of the Comintern representative, new lines of revolutionary action were laid down on the theory that the revolutionary wave in China was still rising higher and higher.⁵¹ Held at a dark hour in the Chinese Communist movement, the conference was later accorded tremendous significance. "Without the August 7 conference, the Chinese Communist Party would have lost its political entity and vanished from history," wrote a prominent Chinese Communist leader.⁵²

On December 10, shortly after he had married Miss Meiling Soong, Chiang Kai-shek was reappointed by the Nanking government commander in chief of the Nationalist forces, and in that capacity he once more played a leading role in national affairs. Just one day after he resumed office, a military coup was staged in Canton by the two Communist generals, Yeh T'ing and Ho Lung. Following the failure of their uprising in Nanchang, Yeh and Ho had made a dash into the coastal port of Swatow in the latter part of September, in accordance with a plan "decided long before the August 7 conference;"⁵³ but in the end they were again defeated and driven out of the port. Undaunted and still believing in the continued rise of the revolutionary wave, they now attempted a direct thrust at Canton. This attempt was no mere haphazard affair as generally supposed. According to a noted Communist leader, the Canton coup went through six stages of preparation: (1) formulation of a political platform, (2) military preparation, (3) organization of the Canton soviet, (4) mobilization of the workers and masses through the Red unions, (5) task of the troops during the rapid advance, (6) cooperation with the peasants.⁵⁴ Other observers have recorded that at the beginning of November, i.e., over a month before the coup, Soviet consular officials were smuggling arms into their offices and carrying

⁵¹ Ch'en Tu-hsiu, *Wo-Men Ti Cheng-Chih I-Chien* [Our Political Views]. Handwritten and mimeographed, dated December 15, 1929, pp. 10-11; Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-124.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 130.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

On December 17, Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin dispatched a protest to the Nanking government, denying that the Soviet consulate in Canton had had anything to do with the coup, and contending that the Nanking government, as yet unrecognized by the Soviet Union, had no right to close Soviet consulates in Chinese territory.⁵⁰ In reaction to this protest, Foreign Minister Dr. C. C. Wu made a public statement to the effect that the action taken against the Soviets was not intended to constitute a severance of all political and commercial relations with Russia, but was taken reluctantly and solely as a measure of self-defense without any hostility toward the Russian people. In replying to Chicherin he tendered concrete evidence supporting the charge that the Soviet consulate in Canton had been the center of insurrectionary and other subversive activities.⁶⁰

At a later date Trotsky revealed that it was the Soviet Government that ordered and directed the coup in Canton. He wrote: "Stalin's special emissaries had the task of preparing an insurrection in Canton timed for the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in order to cover up the physical extermination of the Russian Opposition, with the political triumph of the Stalinist tactic in China."⁶¹

This statement was later corroborated by a remark by Li Ang, who was secretary of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party at the time of the Canton coup. Writing at a later date, Li recalled that during the period immediately preceding the Canton coup, telegrams came flying in like snowflakes from the Comintern to the Chinese Communist Party every day, urging it to start uprisings in Canton and other cities.⁶²

The closing down of the Soviet consulates and commercial agencies in South China, the departure of Borodin and his associates from Hankow in Central China, and the earlier recall of the Soviet chargé d'affaires and his entire staff from Peking in North China, marked the prominent stages in the general liquidation of Soviet influence in China in 1927. At the end of the year, Soviet influence in China, which had been steadily built up since the early 1920's and for a time practically enveloped the whole country, was at its lowest ebb. The Soviet movement in China up to that time may be likened to a meteor which rises and shoots across the sky with start-

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Trotsky, *op. cit.*, p. 291; see also B. Souvarine, *Stalin*, New York, 1939, p. 471.

⁶² Li Ang, *Hung Se Wu T'ai* [The Red Stage], Peiping, Min Chung Shu Wu, 1946, pp. 32-34.

China and Russia on the Brink of War

FOLLOWING its refusal to recognize the Soviet consulates and other agencies at the end of 1927, the Nanking Government continued its military campaigns against the northern warlords and further extended its influence. In the early part of June 1928, its forces captured Peking (since called Peiping) despite Japanese armed intervention in Shantung in previous April and May to prevent the capture. Thereupon the former Peking Government went out of existence; and Chang Tso-lin, head of that government, attempted to flee back to his home base in Manchuria. However, when his train reached the vicinity of Mukden, there occurred an explosion which killed him—an event which arose under mysterious circumstances strongly suggestive of Japanese intrigue. The death of Chang Tso-lin brought to prominence his son, Chang Hsüeh-liang, who assumed the reins of the government in Manchuria and took over the command of the armed forces there. At the end of the year, this “Young Marshal” embraced the Nationalist cause and pledged his allegiance to Nanking, thereby bringing Manchuria under Nationalist influence. By the end of 1928 the Nanking Government had also been accorded *de jure* recognition by most of the Western Powers.

The widened influence of Nanking did not give rise to a corresponding widened scope of anti-Soviet activities. The Soviet consulates and other organizations in North China and Manchuria were permitted to continue their functions. Diplomatic relations with Moscow, technically maintained by the former Peking Government, were also preserved. Actually, however, for one and a half years since the end of 1927, China's relations with Soviet Russia had been in the doldrums. It was not until the middle of 1929 that a series of incidents arose and once more whipped up a storm of mutual accusations and indeed large-scale armed hostilities between the two countries.

RAIDS ON SOVIET AGENCIES

For years prior to 1929 there had been a smoldering resentment on the part of the Chinese people against Soviet attempts at control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Russian Czarist Government which undertook to construct the railway knew that the mere existence of the line would provoke Chinese opposition, and had therefore managed to keep the railway agreement with China secret. In the succeeding years, however, the Russians not only operated the railway but proceeded to extend their influence on both sides of the line. This naturally aroused Chinese resentment, which was reflected in the Sino Soviet negotiations of 1924. Afterwards the Russian directors of the railway company endeavored "to manoeuvre the control of the railway into the hands of the general manager [a Russian], to establish Bolshevik influence over the railway, and dismiss employees not in possession of Soviet or Chinese passports."¹ As a result, contrary to both the Peking and the Mukden agreements of 1924, Chinese employees represented only 25% instead of the stipulated 50% of the entire personnel of the railway line; and the membership of the board of directors was not on a fifty-fifty basis as provided in the agreements, but consisted of only three Chinese members as against fifteen Russians.² What further disturbed the Chinese authorities was Soviet exploitation of the railway agencies as bases for propaganda and other activities of high political import. In reaction to this circumstance the Chinese authorities had since the end of 1928 made a number of searches in the various bureaux of the railway system and even proceeded with the arrest of Soviet subjects in the teeth of vigorous Soviet protests.³

The series of raids that eventually led to warfare started on May 27, 1929. According to the Soviet historian Potiemkine, the whole affair was the doing of Chinese counterrevolutionaries who took orders from the imperialist governments of foreign countries.⁴ The leading Soviet magazine, *Bolshevik*, was even more specific. It said:

There cannot be the least doubt now that the United States was the initiator, the inspirer of the conflict. Dollar diplomacy pressed Nanking in order to get the Chinese Eastern Railway into the hands of American capitalism . . . The Kellogg Pact is not only aimed against the Soviet Union but it represents the

¹ Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, II, p. 315.
² International Relations Committee, *The Sino-Russian Crisis 1929*, Nanking, 1929.

P. 14.
³ G. M., "Le Conflit sino-soviétique et le Chemin de fer de l'Est chinois," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, Vol. 140 (1929) p. 185.
⁴ V. Potiemkine and others, *Histoire de la diplomatie*, Paris, 1947, III, p. 425.

efforts of American imperialism at hegemony in the imperialist camp.⁵

The Chinese for their part had a different story to tell. According to the Chinese version, on May 27 the local police at Harbin were ordered to visit the Soviet consulate there to see if some previous information about its activities could be confirmed. When the police reached the consulate, they were surprised to find its doors closed and locked. After forcing an entrance they discovered that a party of over eighty Soviet citizens were holding a conference in the cellar. Their presence frightened the members of the conference, many of whom scrambled upstairs. They later also went upstairs and found the fugitives there in the act of burning documents. Quickly they seized the remaining documents, and salvaged those already in the furnace but not yet entirely destroyed. Before leaving the consulate, they arrested all the persons found there except the consuls and the consular staff. At the trial subsequently held, all the arrested suspects confessed that they were members of the Russian Communist Party. A majority of them said that they were not residents of Harbin but had come from over thirty different places along the Chinese Eastern Railway. As regards their purpose of being in the consulate, they alleged it to be the application for passports. This allegation was considered incredible; because, first, none of the suspects had any passport issued to him, and second, they did not have to come to the Soviet consulate at Harbin for passports, inasmuch as there were Soviet consulates in many of the localities they came from. The Chinese authorities, therefore, entertained the notion that the Communists were gathering in the consulate for some sinister political purposes. This notion was said to have been borne out by the documents captured. These documents, all in the Russian language, showed that a nation-wide campaign of Communist propaganda was being conducted and that an elaborate Communist plan for the violent overthrow of the Chinese National Government had been set afoot.⁶

One of the documents was in the form of a telegram sent by the Third Communist International from Moscow to Harbin via Vladivostok. It was dated January 23, 1929, and read in part as follows:

The Commission of the Third International, with the approval of the Central Executive Committee, has resolved to accept the suggestion made by your department and to increase

⁵ *Bolshevik* (1930) No. 2, p. 78. Cited in D. Dallin, *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, New Haven, 1949, p. 269.

⁶ International Relations Committee, *op. cit.*; Far Eastern Information Bureau, *Documents with Reference to the Sino-Russian Dispute*, 1929, Nanking, 1929.

the fund to 350,000 gold rubles which you suggested to be used to finance the campaign of terrorism against Chinese leaders at different important centers.

In carrying out the schemes, sufficient time should be devoted to careful study of ways and means for carrying them out, in order to be sure of our final success. No attempt shall be made before any scheme has been carefully worked out.

In case the Party's activities should meet with a setback the Commission of the Third International shall organize a secret contingent to execute the scheme for the complete destruction of the Chinese Eastern Railway and all government organs in the three Eastern Provinces.

The documents secured from certain military organizations are very useful to the Commission of the Third International. Steps should be taken to secure additional documents from such sources.⁷

SOVIET PROTESTS AND DEMANDS

In possession of documents of this nature, the Chinese Government maintained that the Soviet Government had violated both the Peking and the Mukden agreements of 1924, stipulating:

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually pledge themselves not to permit within their respective territories the existence and/or activities of any organization or groups whose aim is to struggle by acts of violence against the Governments of either Contracting Party.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties further pledge themselves not to engage in propaganda directed against the political and social systems of either Contracting Party.⁸

Before the Nanking Government sent any protest to Moscow, the Soviet Government on May 31 sent a protest to Nanking, charging that the action of the Chinese police at Harbin on May 27 was a flagrant violation of the very bases of international law, demanding redress and restitution, and announcing its decision to suspend the legal immunities of Chinese diplomatic and consular officials in Soviet territory.⁹

On July 10 and 11 the Chinese authorities at Harbin, impelled by the necessity of suppressing Communist propaganda and uprisings, took action to assume control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ J. V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919-1929*, New York, 1921, pp. 193 ff.

⁹ Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929*, Washington, 1945, II, pp. 193-195

its telegraph and telephone systems by occupying the central offices of the railway company at Harbin. They also arrested a large number of Soviet officials of the railway management, including the manager Emshanoff, and closed down the trade mission of the USSR, the Soviet State Mercantile Marine at Harbin, and the premises of the trade-unions and cooperative societies of the railway employees throughout the railway zone. Emshanoff and the other high officials arrested were later deported across the frontier. They arrived at Moscow on July 21.

Meanwhile, on July 13 the Soviet Government addressed a strong note to both the Chinese Government in Nanking and the local government at Mukden, Manchuria. In this note, which contained an ultimatum, the Soviet Government first charged the Chinese authorities in Manchuria with violation of the Sino-Soviet agreements of 1924, and then made three demands: (1) the calling of a conference for the settlement of all questions relative to the Chinese Eastern Railway, (2) the immediate release of all the arrested Soviet nationals, and (3) the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway to the *status quo* before July 10. The note ended with a warning to the effect that unless the Chinese Government accepted the demands within three days, the Soviet Government would be obliged to resort to other means in defense of the legitimate interests of the USSR.¹⁰

Following the Soviet ultimatum, tension between the two countries at once heightened. Both sides began military mobilization and their forces faced each other along and across the Siberian-Manchurian border—particularly at the terminals of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The Chinese Government replied to the Soviet note on July 17, within the time limit set in the Soviet ultimatum. The reply pointed out that for years Soviet officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway had persistently acted in excess of their lawful authority, thereby rendering impossible the fair execution of the 1924 agreements pertaining to joint Sino-Soviet management of the railway; that Soviet officials had further violated the 1924 agreements by disseminating propaganda subversive of the political and social institutions of China; and that therefore the actions taken by the Chinese authorities at Harbin on May 27 and July 10 and 11 were necessary for the purpose of maintaining peace and order. The reply then set forth the Chinese Government's offer to settle the dispute through negotiations, and expressed its readiness to set free all the arrested Soviet agents if the Soviet Government for its part would release the thousand odd Chi-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 201-206.

nese nationals detained in Russia and give them adequate protection under the law.¹¹

The above Chinese reply failed to satisfy the Soviets. Immediately after it had received the reply, the Soviet Government sent a second note to China, which began thus: "The Government of the U.S.S.R. considers the reply of the Chinese Government as unsatisfactory in content and hypocritical in tone." The note announced the severance of all railway communications between China and the USSR as well as the severance of diplomatic relations.¹² Following this drastic Soviet move, the German Government was requested, and consented, to take charge of Soviet interests in China and Chinese interests in Russia.

Soon after the diplomatic rupture Soviet forces on the Manchurian frontier became more active than ever. On July 18 Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar Karakhan informed the French ambassador in Moscow that Soviet authorities had to take military measures along the Manchurian frontier.¹³ On July 19, according to neutral reports, the Soviet forces had assumed the offensive and captured Pogranichnaya.

To make clear the origin of the developing crisis, the Chinese Government on July 19 issued a manifesto to the powers, stressing that the dispute "is not merely a question of the rights over the Chinese Eastern Railway, but a matter affecting the existence of the Chinese Government and the solidarity of the Chinese nation" and hence necessitated self-defense measures. It invited the governments and peoples of the various powers to "take note of the Chinese Government's exposure of the Soviet plots for internal uprisings and Communist propaganda in China as well as the documentary evidence of schemes to destroy China's unity, to resort to assassination, and to organize secret corps to damage the Chinese Eastern Railway." It also recalled that "in the course of 1927 there was repeatedly discovered both in the north and south of China the fact that the Soviet Government was utilizing its embassy, consulates, and state commercial agencies to carry on Communist propaganda and to harbor Communists with the object of overthrowing the Chinese Government and disrupting Chinese unity."¹⁴

With the situation becoming more ominous every day, concern was aroused on the part of third powers, especially the United States. At that time Secretary of State Henry Stimson was extremely en-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 213-214.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 228-231.

enthusiastic over the Peace Pact of Paris and was ready to participate in the celebration of its coming into force on July 24. Anxious to ward off a stunning blow to the Pact in its infancy, Secretary Stimson made efforts to prevent the Sino-Soviet dispute from developing into open war. Accordingly, on July 18 he initiated conversations separately with the Chinese minister in Washington and with the ambassadors of Britain, France, Japan, and Italy, drawing their attention to the fact that both China and Russia were signatories of the Pact of Paris which enjoined the settlement of disputes only by peaceful means. As diplomatic relations between the United States and Russia had not been resumed, Secretary Stimson suggested to the French ambassador that his Government should make representations to Russia. Acting on this suggestion, the French Foreign Minister Briand offered on July 19 to mediate for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Soviet dispute. This offer was made both by Briand to the Soviet representative in Paris and by the French ambassador in Moscow to the Deputy Foreign Commissar Karakhan. Karakhan, however, rejected the offer, saying that unless the Chinese Government restored the legal status of the railway by accepting the Soviet demands of July 13, the French offer was "without point."¹⁵

In the meantime China had to defend herself not only against Soviet military operations, but against public opinion in the Western democracies, where China's temporary management of the Chinese Eastern Railway was regarded as seizure of the railway and as a possible precedent to the seizure of other foreign rights and interests in China. In a speech delivered on July 22 the Chinese Foreign Minister Dr. C. T. Wang found it necessary to stress the point that "the case of the Chinese Eastern Railway is entirely due to the discovery of malicious plots of Russian Communists against China," and that "the action taken by the Chinese Government was not intended to seize the Railway, but to check the Communistic activities."¹⁶ On the same day the Chinese minister in Washington, Dr. C. C. Wu, personally conveyed the same view to Secretary Stimson.

LOCAL NEGOTIATIONS AND THE STIMSON PLAN

About this time there were reports that direct conversations between the Chinese and the Soviet representatives in Berlin were in progress. While Chinese official sources confirmed these reports, Soviet officials at home and abroad repeatedly denied them.¹⁷ There was no doubt, however, that local negotiations were being carried

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 231-232.

¹⁶ International Relations Committee, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹⁷ Department of State, *op. cit.*, pp. 244, 247, 258, 262.

on in Manchuria. On July 22 Ts'ai Yun-sheng, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in Harbin, conferred with the Soviet consul general Melnikov, and conveyed to him the following proposals made by the Mukden government for the settlement of the dispute:

1. The arrested Soviet laborers and employees were to be released.
2. The Government of the USSR was to appoint the manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway and his assistant.
3. A conference of representatives of both governments was to be called, which was to settle the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway as speedily as possible.
4. The Soviet Government could make the statement that it did not recognize the order of things prevailing after the conflict, and that it would not prejudice the impending negotiations.
5. If the Soviet Government agreed to these proposals, Chang Hsüeh-liang would apply for the consent of the Nanking Government to these proposals.¹⁸

Melnikov did not discuss these proposals but promised to communicate them to Moscow. On July 25 he met Ts'ai again and transmitted the reply of Karakhan to the proposals. This reply stated that the Soviet Government would adopt a favorable attitude toward the proposals if (1) the Nanking Government or the Mukden government would officially make them to the USSR on behalf of Chang Hsüeh-liang, and (2) if the fourth proposal would be altered in the following manner: "Both sides agree that the situation which has formed itself on the Chinese Eastern Railway after the conflict is bound to be altered in conformity with the Peking and Mukden agreements of 1924."¹⁹

After delivering the reply, Melnikov crossed over into Siberia but did not proceed far beyond the Manchurian border. On July 29 two representatives of the Mukden government, Ts'ai Yun-sheng and Li Shao-keng, went northward to meet Melnikov at Manchuli and continue the informal discussions with him there.²⁰ On August 1 Ts'ai handed to Melnikov a letter from Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang to Karakhan, and Melnikov promptly telegraphed the contents of the letter to Moscow. The letter read in part as follows.

In order to settle the prevailing misunderstanding, the following three proposals are made: first, that the Chinese Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. should appoint each

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 265-267.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

its representative for the calling of a conference concerning the question connected with the Chinese Eastern Railway; secondly, that the prevailing situation on the Chinese Eastern Railway should be regarded as provisional, subject to regulation after the conference, on the basis of the Peking agreement and the Mukden agreement; thirdly, that the arrested citizens of the U.S.S.R. should be officially freed and sent to the U.S.S.R. The Chinese arrested in the U.S.S.R. should also be released.²¹

Karakhan considered the terms stated in the letter unacceptable. In his reply he expressed strong objection by saying that the letter omitted the proposal of July 22 concerning the appointment by the Soviet Government of the manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway and his assistant, and that it contained "a proposal of the legalization of the prevailing situation on the Chinese Eastern Railway," instead of the former proposal to have the situation altered in accordance with the Peking and Mukden agreements of 1924. He charged the Mukden government with frustrating the possibility of settling the conflict, and held it responsible for the consequences.²² Despite or because of this reply, local negotiations between the Mukden and the Soviet representatives at Manchuli continued. It was not until August 6 that the Foreign Ministry at Nanking officially announced the rupture of the negotiations and ascribed it to the adamant Soviet demand that the Russian manager and his assistant be reinstated prior to the commencement of formal negotiations.

Throughout the entire course of the negotiations, which lasted two weeks, the Soviets intensified their military threats to impress and intimidate the Chinese representatives. Soviet planes frequently flew over Chinese territory and Soviet artillery fired hundreds of shells across the border.²³ The worsening situation increased the concern of Secretary Stimson, who had been closely watching the situation. As early as July 25 he suggested to the British, French, Japanese, and Italian governments a conciliation plan envisaging the appointment of "a prominent national of some neutral country approved by both China and Russia" as president and general manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway pending settlement of the dispute, and the formation of "an impartial commission of conciliation the membership of which shall be agreed upon by Russia and China and which shall have full power to investigate all the facts" concerning the grievances and claims of both parties. The four

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 267.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 262, 262.

governments, however, all doubted the practicality of the plan which consequently was not adopted.²⁴

On August 13 the plan indirectly came to the knowledge of the Soviet Government. Two days later Karakhan issued a statement complaining of "the violent actions committed by the Chinese authorities with respect of the Chinese Eastern Railway and its Soviet personnel," and warning governments of third states that Russia would not acknowledge any obligation assumed by them in the name of the road after the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Chinese authorities.²⁵

SOVIET ATTACKS AND GERMAN MEDIATION

In the meantime the armed clashes on the Manchurian frontier had developed into a state of more or less regular warfare. The hostilities were particularly fierce around Manchuli, Blagoveschensk, Pogranichnaya, Suifenhö, and Chailinor. On August 17 Soviet planes bombed Manchuria Station, and 10,000 Soviet troops with thirty field pieces and machine guns crossed the border and attacked the Chinese positions.²⁶

In view of the critical state of affairs, the Chinese Government on August 19 issued a communication to the signatories of the Peace Pact of Paris. It began by referring to the "various documents and evidence of plots and conspiracy as well as propaganda material" discovered during the raid of the Russian consulate at Harbin on May 27, and charged the Soviet Government with gross violation of Article 6 of the Peking agreement of 1924 by utilizing the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Soviet state agencies as bases for carrying out its nefarious schemes. It pointed out that under the circumstances China was compelled to adopt precautionary measures such as those taken on July 10 and 11, and explained that such measures were not "calculated to abrogate the existing agreement and to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway." Referring to the Russian military activities on the Manchurian frontier, it asserted that while China was eager to live up to the obligations under the Peace Pact of Paris and to settle the dispute by peaceful negotiations, she would employ her "entire strength within the scope of self-defense."²⁷

The very day the Chinese Government issued the above communication, the Foreign Commissariat of the USSR sent to the German embassy a statement for communication to the Chinese Government,

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 285.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 288-292.

charging the latter with using Manchurian forces and Russian White Guards to carry on raids and attacks on Soviet territory and contending that Soviet military operations were only for self-defense.²⁸

Such mutual recriminations as well as actual warfare on the frontier had practically rendered peaceful settlement hopeless. At this critical juncture, the German Government on August 27 offered its good offices and proposed a joint declaration on the part of China and Russia for the settlement of their dispute. The text of the declaration is as follows:

1. Both sides declare that all disputes between the two sides they will settle in conformity with the agreement of 1924, and more particularly they will settle the conditions of buying out the Chinese Eastern Railway in conformity with article 9 of the Peking agreement.

Both sides will immediately and duly appoint plenipotentiary representatives to attend a conference which is to settle all the questions under dispute, mentioned in the previous paragraph.

2. Both sides hold that the situation on the Chinese Eastern Railway, come about after the conflict, should be changed in conformity with the Peking agreement and the Mukden agreement of 1924, it being understood that all such changes shall be resolved upon by the conference to be called according to the previous article.

3. The Soviet Government will recommend a new Director and a new Vice Director for the Chinese Eastern Railway, who will be appointed by the Board of Administration of the said Railway. The Soviet Government will instruct the railway employees of Soviet nationality on the Chinese Eastern Railway to the effect that they are strictly to observe the provisions laid down in article 6 of the agreement of 1924.

4. Both sides will immediately release all persons arrested in connection with this incident, or after May 1, 1929.²⁹

The Chinese Government accepted the declaration. The Soviet Government, however, refused to accept it unless the third article was amended as follows:

3. The Soviet Government will recommend a Director and a Vice Director for the Chinese Eastern Railway, who will be *immediately* appointed by the Board of Administration of the Railway. The Soviet Government will instruct the railway employees on the Chinese Eastern Railway, who are citizens of the

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 334, 309-311.

U.S.S.R., and the Chinese Government will instruct its local authorities and their organs, to the effect that they are strictly to observe the provisions laid down in article 6 of the agreement of 1924.

In striking off the word "new" before "Director," and adding "immediately" before "appointed," the Soviet Government clearly intended, first, to reinstate Emshanoff and Eismont, whom the Chinese authorities had found offensive, and second, to effect the reinstatement prior to the opening of formal negotiations. To both these amendments the Chinese Government could not agree. To avoid a breakdown in the indirect negotiations, the Chinese Government on September 13 suggested to the Soviet Government, through the German embassy in Moscow, that a Chinese assistant manager and a Russian assistant manager be immediately appointed to manage the railway pending negotiations between the two governments. In reply the Soviet Government on September 17 declared the suggestion unacceptable, and charged the Chinese Government with frustrating the liquidation of the conflict.²⁰

On October 9 the Chinese Government received a suggestion from the German Government that exchange of prisoners with Russia might ease the situation and facilitate peaceful settlement. The Chinese Government replied that it had made a similar suggestion before and still favored it. The German Government then approached the Soviet Government, but the latter formally rejected the suggestion and charged that "China had no intention to respect its treaty obligations."²¹

The firm attitude of the Soviet Government brought negotiations to a deadlock again, and hostilities on the frontier continued with increasing intensity. By October 16 the border clashes approached the proportion of a full-scale war when Soviet heavy artillery and bombing planes were brought into action.

Aware of the mounting crisis, the Chinese Government on October 25 issued another manifesto in which, after reasserting that on May 27 the Chinese authorities in Manchuria "unearthed a dastardly plot within the Soviet Consulate-General at Harbin to overthrow the National Government and destroy the Chinese Eastern Railway," it expressed its renewed faith in the Peace Pact of Paris despite overt acts of Soviet aggression, denied Soviet reports that Chinese troops had attacked and invaded Soviet territory, and held the Soviet Government responsible for all the losses and damages

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 320

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 335-336.

caused to Chinese life and property and for possible outbreak of war in the Far East.³²

The manifesto failed to produce any appreciable effects.

Eager to settle the dispute by peaceful means, the Chinese Government on November 14 sent a note through the German Foreign Office to the Soviet Government, proposing mutual withdrawal of troops from the frontier to a depth of thirty miles.³³ For some unknown reason this note was not delivered to the Soviet Government until two weeks later (on November 29). On the same day in a reply to the German ambassador in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov stated that the note of the Nanking Government was of no avail because the local authorities in Manchuria had already notified the Soviet Government of their readiness to settle the dispute by direct negotiations.³⁴ This marked the end of German mediation.

STIMSON RALLIES WORLD OPINION

Meanwhile hostilities along the Manchurian frontier raged with full fury. On November 18 the Russians launched heavy attacks on Manchuli and Chalainor. Part of the Manchuria Station was destroyed and the Chalainor coal mines were ruined. Soviet planes took part in the attacks and bombed a section of the Chinese Eastern Railway so as to cut Chinese communication lines. After three days of severe fighting, both Manchuli and Chalainor fell to the Soviet forces. On November 22, making full use of the victory as diplomatic pressure, the Soviet Government communicated to Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang the following set of preliminary conditions for settling the dispute:

1. The official consent of the Chinese side for the restoration of the situation which existed on the Chinese Eastern Railway prior to the conflict on the basis of the Peking-Mukden agreements of 1924.
2. The immediate reinstatement of the manager and the assistant manager of the railway recommended by the Soviet side in accordance with the Peking-Mukden agreements of 1924.
3. The immediate release of all Soviet citizens arrested in connection with the conflict.³⁵

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 333-336.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 360-361.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 370.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 362.

Before Marshal Chang replied to this Soviet overture, the Nanking Government on November 25 sent identical telegrams to the League of Nations and the signatories of the Peace Pact of Paris, drawing attention to the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.³⁶ This move aroused action in Washington. The following day, Secretary Stimson prepared a declaration wherein he urged China and Russia to settle their dispute by peaceful means and act up to their obligations under the Pact of Paris which, he pointed out, had already been ratified by fifty-five nations including China and Russia. He sent a copy of the declaration each to the French, British, Japanese, and Italian governments, and suggested that these governments should make public a declaration of similar tenor simultaneously with the United States Government on a date to be agreed upon. To arouse the "broadest possible world opinion," he also urged each of the above governments to line up the many other signatories of the pact to uphold its sanctity.³⁷

The proposed Stimson declaration met with various responses. Japan doubted the practical value of any such declaration, whether jointly or separately made by the powers. France was highly sympathetic but awaited action by Japan. Britain and Italy had no objection to issuing a similar declaration separately, but preferred a joint note.

Before any action was taken on the Stimson declaration, Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov declared that Chang Hsueh-liang had on November 26 fully accepted the Russian terms as presented on November 22, and a conference was scheduled to be held at Khabarovsk. According to reports from the American chargé in China, however, as late as November 30 and December 1 neither Mukden nor Nanking had fully accepted the Russian terms. This latter information appeared more credible inasmuch as the Soviet forces had meanwhile intensified their military pressure, particularly by bombing Hailan and Buketu deep inside the Manchurian border and causing considerable panic and damage.³⁸

On November 30 Secretary Stimson took independent action, and while communicating his declaration of November 26 direct to the Chinese Government, requested the French Government to transmit on behalf of the United States a similar declaration to the Soviet Government. He also urged the French Government to address similar communications to China and Russia in its own name. On December 1 he went further and sent identical notes to all other

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 351-352.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 362-363.

countries bound by the Pact of Paris, urging each of them to issue and address to China and Russia a declaration similar in tenor to the American declaration.

The French Government fully carried out the American suggestion on December 3. Britain, Italy, and many other signatories of the Pact of Paris, except Japan and Germany, also sent substantially similar declarations to China and Russia. The pressure of organized world opinion was thus brought to bear on the dispute.

The Soviet Government was highly exasperated by the step the United States had taken. In its reply to the American Government, via the French Government, it declared that the American *démarche* "can in no way be considered as a friendly act" and called it astonishing that "the Government of the United States, which, by its own will, does not entertain any official relations with the Government of the Soviet Union, should find it possible to address to the latter advice and recommendations." ³⁹

SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE

Despite Soviet exasperation, the pressure of organized world opinion appears to have had some catalytic effects on the direct negotiations already initiated between the two disputing parties on December 2 or earlier. The Nanking Government had given Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang a free hand in negotiating with the Russians for the settlement of the dispute. On December 1 the Mukden representatives, Ts'ai Yun-sheng and Li Shao-keng, left for Khabarovsk to meet the Soviet representatives. On December 3, the day the Soviet Government received the American declaration, Reuter reported from Moscow that the Sino-Soviet "dispute over the Chinese Eastern Railway had already been settled by a protocol signed at Nikolsk-Ussuriisk," providing for reorganization of the railway in strict accordance with the Peking and Mukden agreements of 1924, and for a new Chinese chairman of the railway board as well as a new Russian manager and assistant manager.⁴⁰

The preliminary protocol paved the way for more formal negotiations between the two parties, which, in turn, led to the more elaborate protocol of December 22, signed at Khabarovsk and stipulating the following conditions for a general settlement of the dispute:

1. Restoration of the situation existing before the conflict.
2. Release of Chinese citizens and Soviet citizens arrested in connection with the conflict.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 406.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

3. Granting to the dismissed Soviet employees of the railway the right and opportunity to return to their former posts.
4. Chinese authorities to disarm and deport the Russian White Guard detachments.
5. Immediate restoration of Soviet consulates in Manchuria and of Chinese consulates in the Soviet Far East, with all due privileges under international law and custom.
6. Resumption of normal operations of all Soviet economic institutions in Manchuria, and of Chinese commercial enterprises in the USSR under preconflict conditions.
7. The Sino-Soviet conference for the settlement of all disputed questions to open at Moscow on January 25, 1930.
8. Immediate restoration of peace along the frontiers of China and of the USSR, to be followed by withdrawal of troops by both sides.
9. The present protocol to be effective at the moment of its signature.⁴¹

Most of these conditions were duly fulfilled within a month of the conclusion of the protocol. The Sino-Soviet conference scheduled for January 25, 1930, however, was long delayed and proved fruitless. Mo Teh-hui, the chief Chinese delegate to the conference, did not arrive at Moscow until May 1930. This was already late. Yet the conference did not open until five months later—in October! From then on up to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, twenty meetings had been held but nothing was achieved.⁴²

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 427-429.

⁴² *China Year Book*, 1931-32, pp. 266-267.

China and Russia Maneuvering for Peace

IN LATE October 1929, when Russian artillery was pouring shells into Manchuria and Russian planes were dropping bombs on Chinese railways and coal mines, an economic crisis occurred on the other side of the Pacific—in the United States. On October 29 over sixteen million shares changed hands in the stock market and stock prices dropped to a mere shadow of their former brightness.¹ The crisis gathered momentum and produced repercussions in other countries, reaching portentous proportions in 1931 when Austria closed its financial nerve center, the Kredit-Anstalt Bank of Vienna, and Great Britain abandoned its time-honored gold standard, while in the United States about two thousand banks suspended operations and about three thousand business firms went bankrupt. Industrial dislocations, unemployment, and social insecurity gripped most of the nations, and a pall of economic gloom hung over the world.

This universal economic crisis tended to raise the value of bread above that of liberty and encouraged the growth and development of militarism, fascism, and totalitarianism in Japan, Italy, and Germany and various other European countries. A new phase of international relations then set in, characterized by rampant aggression, contempt for international law and morals, and degradation of the League of Nations to a mockery of international law and justice.

During this abnormal period of international disorder, both China and Russia were thrown on the defensive. The very life of China was menaced by Japan in Manchuria and North China, and she was vainly looking to the League of Nations for the redress of her wrongs. On her part, Russia was harassed by Japan's activities in Manchuria and assailed by the thunderous propaganda of Nazi Germany. In the face of the common menace, however, Sino-Soviet relations failed to improve. Instead, they became relatively un-

¹ Leland D. Baldwin, *Recent American History*, Rindge, New Hampshire, Richard R. Smith, Publisher, Inc., 1954, p. 178.

eventful. They were affected more by China's or Russia's relations with other countries than by direct issues between the two countries themselves.

THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS AND ITS EFFECTS

The World Depression, as the economic crisis came to be called, was one of two main factors encouraging Japan to resume her aggressive expansion in China, which had been restrained since the end of World War I, partly by the League Covenant and the Nine Power Treaty, and partly by the growing strength and prosperity of the Western Powers. The other main factor encouraging Japan's aggressive disposition was the internal distress of China, due not so much to the World Depression as to the disastrous flood of 1931 which affected nearly all the provinces in the country. In 1915, when Japan confronted China with the notorious Twenty-one Demands, the Japanese minister in Peking was reported to have said by way of justification, "The present crisis throughout the world virtually forces my Government to take far-reaching action. When there is a fire in a jeweler's shop, the neighbors cannot be expected to refrain from helping themselves."²

In 1931 the jewelry shop of China was not on fire, but in deep water. The alert Japanese militarists, contrary to the chivalrous tenets of Bushido which they professed to exemplify, helped themselves all the same. On the night of September 18, 1931, Japan directed her armies in South Manchuria to attack the Chinese walled city of Mukden and began her program of armed encroachments on China's territory, economy, and sovereignty. In a few months she had practically the whole of Manchuria under her iron heel.

That China afterwards appealed to the League of Nations and the League failed to take effective actions against Japan need not be detailed here. The position of Soviet Russia in consequence of the Manchurian crisis, however, is worthy of note. Internationally isolated at that time, Soviet Russia was against every party connected with the crisis. She was against Japan for her aggression, against China for her feeble resistance, against the Western democracies for their "collusion" with Japan and their attempt to direct the Japanese advance against the Soviet Union, and against the League of Nations for its ineffectiveness.³

With Japan the Soviet Union soon found herself involved in a number of controversies. The Japanese press published reports to

² P. S. Reisch, *An American Diplomat In China*, New York, 1922, p. 135.

³ "Molotov Addresses TSIS," *Soviet Union Review*, February 1932, pp. 26-27.

the effect that the Soviets were providing the Chinese troops in Manchuria with arms, planes, pilots, and instructors. On the basis of these reports the Japanese Government on October 28, 1931, sent a protest to Moscow. The following day, the Soviet Foreign Commissariat replied, declaring the protest to be without any foundation.⁴ Later the Japanese troops cut the Chinese Eastern Railway line, and the world press then raised a cry about the approaching Russo-Japanese conflict. On November 14 the Japanese ambassador was invited to the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where he was told that the Soviet Government noted with great regret the loud noise created by Japan's military circles about Soviet aid to various Chinese generals. Thereupon, on November 19, Japanese Ambassador Koki Hirota called on Foreign Commissar Litvinov and delivered to him a note from the Japanese Government. In this note the Japanese Government recalled Japan's neutrality during the 1929 Manchurian crisis and asked the Soviet Government to adopt the same neutral attitude towards the Sino-Japanese dispute. In reply Litvinov refused to accept the analogy between Soviet action in Manchuria in 1929 and the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, but agreed to follow a policy of noninterference if Japan refrained from injuring Soviet rights and interests.⁵

Desirous of peace for the completion of its first Five Year Plan which went into effect on October 1, 1928, the Soviet Government adopted a conciliatory policy toward Japan. Apart from maintaining a position of strict neutrality in the Manchurian dispute,⁶ it offered a nonaggression pact to the rising aggressor. This offer was made on December 21, 1931, by Foreign Commissar Litvinov to Japan's Foreign Minister Yoshizawa when the latter passed through Moscow on his way home. The Japanese Government, however, ignored the offer and threw it into the diplomatic cold storage.⁷ It was not until December 13, 1932, that the Japanese Government took cognizance of the offer by proposing to the Soviet Government that conclusion of a nonaggression pact should be preceded by the elimination of all the causes of possible disputes. This proposal proved to be unacceptable to the Soviet Government, which insisted on the conclusion of a nonaggression pact before everything else.⁸ As a result the offer was tossed back into the cold storage.

In the meantime Soviet Russia felt increasingly menaced by her

⁴ V. Potiemkine and others, *Histoire de la Diplomatie*, Paris, 1917, III, p. 442. Originally in Russian, this work was translated into French by I. Levin.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 442-443.

⁶ *Izvestiia*, March 4, 1932.

⁷ *Soviet Union Review*, March 1932, p. 56.

⁸ *Ibid.*, February 1933, pp. 46-47.

ambitious neighbor. The Soviet Government claimed to have obtained documentary evidence of Japan's plans to seize Soviet territory. It also noticed that anti-Soviet activities of White Russians in Manchuria had revived after Japan's occupation of the region. Consequently, it hastened its military preparations and strengthened its military garrisons in the Soviet Far East.⁹ However, while making preparations to anticipate any eventuality, it exercised the utmost care to avoid any direct clash with Japan. For instance, at the end of February 1932, Japan demanded the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway, then under Soviet control, for the transport of Japanese troops. Far from opposing Japan's wishes, the Soviet Government readily yielded to the demand, though well aware that it was counter to both the Soviet-Japanese agreement of 1925 and the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, which fundamentally did not permit Japan to station troops in Manchuria beyond a certain minimum.¹⁰

Much to the disappointment of the Soviets, their appeasement failed to stop Japanese provocations. The press in Manchuria and Japan continued its hostile propaganda campaigns and charged the Soviets with shielding General Ma Chan-shan and with sending secret agents to Manchuria to blow up railways and bridges and to spread "Red Terror." At the same time, Japanese authorities in Manchuria made wholesale arrests of Soviet citizens on mere suspicion of sabotage.¹¹ Japan may have purposed merely to impress upon the world the idea that she was a bulwark against Bolshevism; but her hostile attitude or pose was a source of alarm to the Soviets, who were in desperate need of peace for their national and social development.

On April 20, 1932, when talk of a second Russo Japanese war was rife, and when the Lytton commission of enquiry was proceeding toward Manchuria, Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, addressed a note to the Soviet Foreign Commissariat asking if the Lytton commission "could procure information and evidence from Soviet citizens in official positions in Manchuria." To this inquiry Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov promptly made a noncommittal reply, saying that the Soviet Government was "deprived of the possibility of insuring the proper attitude toward information given by representatives of the U.S.S.R., and could therefore not take upon itself responsibility for conclusions which might be drawn by the League of Nations Commission."¹²

The Lytton commission finished its report on September 4, 1932.

⁹ *Ibid.*, April 1932, pp. 91-93.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

¹² *Ibid.*, June 1932, p. 141.

In general, the report cast adverse reflections on Japan's conduct in Manchuria, but it entirely evaded the legal issue as to whether or not Japan had committed aggression.¹³ It failed, therefore, to satisfy the demand of the Chinese people that Japan's warlike acts be condemned as aggression and punished as such. Disillusioned, China tried to restore normal relations with the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet negotiations in Moscow, which had dragged on since the fall of 1930,¹⁴ were accordingly reinforced by conversations at Geneva between Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov and Dr. W. W. Yen, China's chief delegate to the League of Nations. On December 12, Dr. Yen and Litvinov exchanged notes to the effect that normal diplomatic and consular relations between their two countries had been restored. On the same day Litvinov took care to explain in a statement to the press that "for the Soviet Union, which is free of all secret political combinations and agreements, an improvement in relations with one country does not signify worsening its relations with another."¹⁵

This explanation, however, did not prevent Japan from capitalizing on the occasion and raising the bogey of Communist influence in China. On January 15, 1933, the Japanese War Ministry announced through the press that the Communist International had recently proposed to the Chinese Communist Party to focus attention on the strengthening of the Chinese Red Army and had promised to render maximum financial support through the Soviet embassy to be opened soon in China. A week later, in his address to the Diet, Japan's Foreign Minister Uchida also expressed apprehension that the Communist movement in China would "gain in strength as a result of the Sino-Russian *rapprochement*."¹⁶

On February 24, 1933, the Lytton report on Manchuria was adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations, and on the same day a resolution was passed to set up an Advisory Committee to continue to concert the action of the League in dealing with the Manchurian dispute. Considering that diplomatic relations between China and Russia had been restored, Secretary-General Drummond of the League sent an invitation to the Soviet Government to participate in the Advisory Committee. Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov replied on March 7, declining the invitation. The reason given was that the USSR was not a member of the League and many of the states represented on the Committee had not yet recognized

¹³ League of Nations Commission of Enquiry, *Manchuria*, Washington, 1932.

¹⁴ *Supra*, p. 101.

¹⁵ *Soviet Union Review*, January 1933, p. 3.

¹⁶ *Contemporary Japan*, March 1933, p. 767.

the Soviet Union.¹⁷ A greater reason may have been Soviet reluctance to offend Japan. Said Japan's Foreign Minister Uchida in the Diet on January 21, 1933: "Fortunately, the Soviet Union Government ever since the beginning of the Manchurian incident have maintained an attitude so cautious that nothing unpleasant has occurred to mar their relations with Japan."¹⁸

Behind its cautious attitude toward Japan, the Soviet Government had for years silently stepped up its armament program, no doubt for fear of possible war. In his report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party on January 7, 1933, Premier Stalin declared:

It is true that we are short of fulfilling the general program of the Five-Year Plan by 6 per cent. But this is to be explained by the fact that in view of the refusal of neighboring countries to sign Pacts of Non-Aggression with us, and in view of the complications that arose in the Far East, we were obliged, in order to improve the defences of the country, to hastily transfer a number of factories to the production of modern weapons of defence. . . . Finally, all this resulted in the fact that from a weak country, unprepared for defence, the Soviet Union has been transformed into a country mighty in defence, a country prepared for every contingency, a country capable of producing all modern weapons of defence on a mass scale and of equipping its own army with them in the event of an attack from without.¹⁹

RUSSIA SELLS THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

Ever since Japan occupied Manchuria, the Chinese Eastern Railway had been a source of conflict between Japan and Russia. Troubles did not cease even after the Soviet Government agreed to the use of the railway for the transport of Japanese troops. Cases of sabotage, brigandage, wrecking of trains, and burning of stations were frequent. On several occasions the railway was actually cut to stop traffic between Manchuria and Siberia.²⁰ Under these circumstances the railway suffered more injuries and the railway management received more provocations than in 1929, when a Sino-Soviet dispute over the railway led to actual war. Yet instead of taking strong measures against Japan, the Soviet Government chose the policy of retreat and tried to sell the railway to Japan's puppet Manchukuo. The immediate motive of this policy was to remove

¹⁷ *Soviet Union Review*, April 1933, p. 94.

¹⁸ *Contemporary Japan*, March 1933, p. 766.

¹⁹ J. Stalin, *The Results of the First Five Year Plan*, New York, 1933, pp. 24-25.

²⁰ C. C. Wang, "The Sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1933, pp. 64-65.

a fertile source of troubles with Japan. But there was also a long-term motive involving world power politics. According to a former high-ranking Soviet diplomat, as early as the end of 1927 or the beginning of 1928 Stalin already had the idea of selling the railway to Japan and the motive was to create discord between Japan and the United States. Bessedovsky, a former Soviet diplomat, wrote:

On my arrival at Moscow I had a conversation with Stalin about the Chinese Eastern Railway. . . . "If you ask me," he said, "we shall eventually sell this railway. By doing so we shall be prepared for emergencies, and drive another nail into the coffin of the groups of capitalists who are attracted to Manchuria. Remember that our presence on the railway is weakening our policy in the East. By withdrawing we shall pocket a round sum of money, and increase the antagonism between America and Japan. . . . The thing is to decide what buyer we can cede the railway to with the most advantage to the revolutionary cause. Personally, I think Japan. Talk to Tchitcherin about it." ²¹

Apparently, in 1933 Stalin felt it the more desirable to play off the United States against Japan. On May 2 the Soviet Government offered to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan-sponsored Manchukuo. On that occasion Foreign Commissar Litvinov expressly stated that the sale of the railway was "one of the most radical means" of settling the conflicts which were complicating the relations of the Soviet Union both with Japan and with Manchuria.²² The Soviet proposal, however, constituted a great provocation to China and thus ruffled the surface of Sino-Soviet relations which might otherwise have been stagnant. In its protest against the sale the Chinese Government charged the Soviet Government with violation of Article 9 of the 1924 Peking agreement, which provided that "the governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." ²³

The Soviet Government took a different view of the matter. In his statement to the press on May 12, 1933, Litvinov refuted China's protest, saying that it did not correspond with either the formal obligations of the Soviet Government or with the actual condition of affairs, and that the Nanking Government and its subordinate

²¹ G. Z. Bessedovsky, *Revelations of a Soviet Diplomat*, London, 1931, p. 176.

²² *Soviet Union Review*, June 1933, p. 134.

²³ J. V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919-1929*, Washington, 1929, p. 135.

authorities had ceased to be the actual partners of the USSR on the Chinese Eastern Railway for more than a year and a half. In justifying the sale of the railway Litvinov went on to say:

As for the motives impelling us to agree to the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, they are as follows: In the building of the road in Manchuria, in foreign territory, the Czarist government unquestionably was pursuing imperialist aims. After the October revolution the road lost the significance it had for the people of the Russian empire as an instrument of penetration.²⁴

Ignoring China's protest, the Soviets proceeded to negotiate with Japan for the sale of the railway. The first conference for the purpose was held in Tokyo on June 26, but soon became deadlocked as each side insisted with apparent firmness on the price it proposed: the Soviet demand was for, 625,000,000 yen, later reduced to 200,000,000 yen; the Japanese bid was, 50,000,000 yen.²⁵ The deadlock was followed by frequent arrests and harassment of Soviet railroad officials by the Japanese military.²⁶

With her fear of war equaled only by her anxiety to avoid war, Soviet Russia continued to follow a cautious policy toward Japan and to pursue the negotiations for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. By August 1934 the Soviets had reduced the selling price of the railway to 160,000,000 yen, but Japan was unwilling to offer anything more than 120,000,000 yen.²⁷ Another month of negotiations brought the two parties closer together, and finally the figure of 140,000,000 yen was agreed upon.²⁸ It was not until March 23, 1935, however, that a formal agreement was signed concerning the transfer of ownership of the railway.²⁹

Upon learning of the railway's changing hands, the Chinese Government renewed its vigorous protest to Russia, and in addition circulated a memorandum on the subject to the governments of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty. In this memorandum China asserted that she "can never recognize any party as a successor to any of the rights and interests in the railway," that "Russia's present action constitutes without the shadow of a doubt a direct violation of China's contractual as well as sovereign rights," and that "the painful fact that the Chinese Government has been prevented by

²⁴ *Soviet Union Review*, June 1933, pp. 134-135.

²⁵ *Contemporary Japan*, December 1934, p. 520.

²⁶ *Soviet Union Review*, November 1933, pp. 241-242.

²⁷ *Bulletin of International News*, August 30, 1934, p. 170.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, September 27, 1934, p. 235.

²⁹ *Contemporary Japan*, June 1935, pp. 142-157.

circumstances—for which it is not responsible—from exercising its rights in connection with the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway, does not in the least affect the validity of the provisions of the agreement of 1924, nor the status of the railway.”³⁰

As before, China's protests were ignored by the Soviet Government. They were left to be answered by *Izvestiia*, which in an editorial on March 24 stated that “the Chinese Eastern Railway was an instrument of the policy of conquest of Czarist imperialism in the Far East. It served the purpose of dividing up China. . . . The Soviet Union, having broken finally and irrevocably with the policy of Czarist expansion and colonial conquest could not attempt by arms to assure the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, for such an attempt might have led to participation in the imperialist division of Manchuria. This circumstance dictated the appropriateness of selling the Chinese Eastern Railway to the actual authorities which were established on the territory of Manchuria.”

These high-sounding phrases did not meet the arguments contained in the Chinese protest. Nor could they hide the political motives behind the Soviet offer to sell the railway, namely, to avoid conflicts with Japan and to play the United States off against Japan.

The sale of the railway by the Soviet Union involved not merely the question of violation of the Peking agreement of 1924, as pointed out in a previous Chinese protest. It also involved the question whether the Soviet Union was the rightful owner of the railway. The Soviet Government had claimed that the “toiling masses of Russia had paid for the construction of the railway with their hard-earned money.”³¹ This claim, according to an authority on the subject, is incorrect. According to this authority, who was former president of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company:

With the exception of supervision and the building of the steel structures, the entire work on the railway was carried out by Chinese laborers who were paid with Romanoff ruble notes introduced into the country by Russia after completion of the railway in 1902. Foodstuffs and other valuable goods produced by the toiling Chinese in Manchuria were purchased with same Romanoff notes and were transported to Russia in train-loads, year in and year out until by 1917, when the Czarist regime collapsed, about 1,000,000,000 rubles in notes were in circulation in North Manchuria. When the Soviets renounced the ruble, the value of this enormous amount of Romanoff money evaporated. Since it is clearly printed on the

³⁰ *China Year Book*, 1935, p. 139.

³¹ *The [London] Times*, May 12, 1933.

Romanoff notes that all "the resources of the Russian Empire" are pledged as security, the holders of these notes obviously have a direct claim upon the Chinese Eastern Railway. Therefore it is the toiling masses of Manchuria who have paid for the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently are entitled to take over that railway in partial satisfaction of their losses caused by the Soviet renunciation of the Romanoff ruble.³²

A NEW SOVIET DIPLOMATIC FRONT

In the course of the protracted negotiations leading to the final sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1935, the Soviet Union had made substantial progress toward national security by breaking out from the dangerous position of diplomatic isolation and setting up a new diplomatic front.

On July 3, 1933, a convention for the definition of aggression was signed at the Soviet embassy in London by representatives of eight countries: the USSR, Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania, and Turkey.³³ In the two days following, a similar convention was signed by the USSR respectively with the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia) and with Lithuania.³⁴ Finland adhered to the eight-power convention on July 22, thereby completing the chain of states on the Soviet western border and beyond which had undertaken nonaggressive obligations toward the Soviet Union.³⁵

The greatest Soviet diplomatic success of the year, however, was the establishment of relations with the United States. On October 10 President Roosevelt and President Mikhail Kalinin exchanged messages proposing to end the abnormal relations then existing between their two countries.³⁶ Conversations were later held between Litvinov, Soviet envoy, and President Roosevelt, as well as Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in Washington. On November 16 the American President and the Soviet envoy exchanged notes inaugurating normal diplomatic relations between the USA and the USSR. On the same day, they also exchanged separate notes containing reciprocal pledges not to interfere in each other's internal affairs, not to incite or encourage armed intervention in each other's territory, and not to carry on agitation or propaganda with the aim of overthrowing each other's existing political and social order.³⁷

³² C. C. Wang, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

³³ *Soviet Union Review*, July August 1933, pp. 169-170.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, September 1933, p. 193.

³⁶ Department of State, *Press Releases*, October 21, 1933, pp. 226-227.

³⁷ *Soviet Union Review*, December 1933, pp. 246-248.

The establishment of normal relations between the US and the USSR was intended, at least partly, as a deterrent to Japan's forward policy in the Far East. On the other hand, it may also have had the effect of provoking Japan. By the beginning of 1934 relations between Soviet Russia and Japan had become so tense that Kaganovich, a member of the Politburo, told a party congress of the Moscow region: "Our relations with Japan constantly grow worse. The situation is highly strained. We must expect to be attacked any day now."³⁸ A few days later, speaking at the Seventeenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Stalin pointed out that war threats did not come from Japan alone. After a review of the situation in the Far East and in Germany, he said: "Quite clearly things are moving towards a new war. . . . Their plan is to smash the U.S.S.R., divide up its territory and profit at its expense. It would be a mistake to believe that it is only certain military circles in Japan who think in this way. We know that similar plans are being hatched in the circles of political leaders of certain states of Europe."³⁹

Under the circumstances, the Soviet Union tried further to mend its diplomatic fences and managed to enter the League of Nations, which in previous years it had consistently opposed and sometimes condemned. Mainly through the efforts of France, itself menaced by Nazi Germany, the League on September 15, 1934, sent an invitation to the Soviet Government to join the organization. On the same day the Soviet Government replied in the affirmative and accepted "the international obligations and decisions binding upon its members in conformity with Article I of the Covenant."⁴⁰

The entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations strengthened the tendency for Japan and Germany to come closer together. Both these countries were ambitious and aggressive. Both were hostile to the Soviet Union and loud in their denunciation of Bolshevism. Both were seceding from the League. After the Soviet Union joined the League, therefore, relations between the two countries became more cordial and their cultural contacts were extended.⁴¹ Soon their contacts and cooperation expanded into the political, economic, and military fields. According to a Soviet historian, in May 1935 Nazi Germany and Japan had established between them a complete unity of view in regard to the Italian venture in Abyssinia and to Japan's plans in China; at the same time they

³⁸ *Bulletin of International News*, February 1, 1934, p. 491.

³⁹ J. Stalin, V. Molotov, and others, *Socialism Victorious* (important speeches and reports delivered at the Seventeenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, held January 26 to February 10, 1934) Moscow, 1934, pp. 10-15.

⁴⁰ *Bulletin of International News*, September 27, 1934, p. 238.

⁴¹ A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, p. 667.

were entering into and developing close economic, technical, and military collaboration.⁴² From then on, the two rising aggressors applied greater and greater pressure on the Soviet Union sandwiched between them, and the Soviet Union became more desperate in avoiding war or otherwise extricating itself from the dangerous situation.

CHINA AND RUSSIA BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR

Japanese expansion on the continent did not stop with the occupation of Manchuria. Having seized this vast and important area, Japan continued her aggressive expansion in the direction of Inner Mongolia and North China, thereby threatening not only China but also the Soviet Union, which exercised paramount influence over Outer Mongolia and had tremendous strategic and economic stakes in the Trans-Baikal region. Japan's occupation and development of Manchuria was already threat enough. Her continued and seemingly incessant expansion towards the vital areas of China and Russia aroused further anxiety and misgivings on the part of these two countries. Estranged in their relations and unable to come together to face the common enemy, China and Russia coped with the serious situation by each trying hard to develop national strength on the one hand, and to avoid as far as possible frontal conflicts with Japan on the other.

In the case of China, since 1933 the Central Government had been making definite efforts to set the national house in order and to push forward the program of national reconstruction. For this purpose it invited experts and technicians in various fields from the League of Nations and from friendly countries like England and the United States. Japan could not look upon these efforts with indifference and tried to frustrate them. In April 1934, for instance, her Foreign Office spokesman, Eiichi Amau, made a declaration protesting against foreign economic aid to China and warning the powers to keep their hands off China.⁴³ Early in 1936 Japan's Foreign Minister Hirota announced the three-point policy toward China, and pressed the latter to collaborate against Communism, to cease anti-Japanese activities, and to recognize Manchukuo.⁴⁴ China refused to accept these proposals for fear they might lead to Japan's interference in her internal affairs. Sino-Japanese relations were thus greatly strained, and Japan stepped up her piecemeal encroachments in North China and Inner Mongolia. As each of

⁴² V. Potemkine, *op. cit.*, p. 604.

⁴³ Text of declaration in *Japan Advertiser*, April 18, 1934.

⁴⁴ *Contemporary Japan*, March 1936, pp. 637-638.

these encroachments was not worth the risk of war with Japan, the Nanking Government met the situation by enduring the humiliations and making reluctant concessions in order to gain time for internal consolidation and war preparation. At that relatively early date the Nanking Government was already following the policy of "trading space for time."

In addition to diplomatic and military pressure from Japan, China was also beset by internal troubles. The main source of these troubles was the struggle between the Government and the Chinese Communists. Communism in China did not die out with the deportation of the Russian agents and the great purge launched by Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists in 1927. It was only driven underground. The Chinese Communist Party maintained its headquarters in Shanghai and continued to receive inspiration and guidance from the Comintern. In 1928 the Party actually held its Sixth Congress in Moscow. In 1930 a number of the Chinese Communist leaders, including Li Li-san, were summoned to Moscow, where they had to confess their sins of deviation from the instructions of the Comintern in shaping their program of activities in China.⁴⁵ This ordeal served as an object lesson to later leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. In the interior of China a Red Army was formed under the leadership of Chu Teh, Mao Tse-tung, P'eng Teh-huai, and some lesser figures. At the same time soviets were being organized. There then arose the so-called Red Districts along the borders of the provinces in central China. In November 1931 a Soviet Chinese Republic was proclaimed with Mao Tse-tung as chairman. This republic gradually built up and consolidated its power, and constituted a sharp thorn in the side of the Nanking Government under Chiang Kai-shek. It took Chiang four years and as many mighty military campaigns, involving millions of troops and untold resources, to clear central China of the Communist insurgents. The decisive hour struck on November 10, 1934, when the Communist leaders decided on what has since been called the Long March. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, a former Chinese Communist leader, this important decision was made on instructions from Moscow.⁴⁶ This, then, is another piece of evidence that the Comintern has never relaxed its hold on the Chinese Communist Party. The Long March covered the southwestern and western provinces of China and ended in the

⁴⁵ *Pu Erh Sai Wei K'o* (Bolshevik, a Chinese Communist organ) Vol. 4, No. 3, May 10, 1931.

⁴⁶ R. C. North, *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites*, Stanford, Calif., 1952, p. 38.

bleak northwestern region in August 1935. Here the Chinese Communists exploited their new lease on life, established their capital at Yen-an, and continued their struggle for supreme power.

It was amidst such *serious insurrection on the part of the Chinese Communists and incessant threats from Japan* that the Nanking Government forged ahead with its national reconstruction program. By the end of 1936 the program began to show appreciable results. *Healthy signs of progress appeared in every walk of life.* The country enjoyed a greater degree of real unity than ever before. A national army was emerging out of the previous military chaos. The Chinese Communists had been driven to the northwestern corner of China where they could not build up their strength easily. A unified currency had come into being and commanded confidence at home and abroad. The systems of communication and transportation were improved and extended. Foreign trade flourished. Education was made popular. The New Life Movement bore fruit and the morale of the people rose to a high pitch. Firmly desirous of extending the scope and deepening the foundation of national reconstruction, the Nanking Government needed peace and wanted to maintain it as long as possible. This supreme desire for peace made it yield, though reluctantly, to Japan's piecemeal encroachments in Inner Mongolia and North China, hoping that eventually the full fury of Japanese aggression might be visited upon some other country.

In Russia national development proceeded at an even more feverish pace. Since January 1933 she had embarked upon her second Five Year Plan, which aimed at establishing a vast war industry, improving railway transportation, and increasing the military and economic strength in the Soviet Far East, especially the area east of Lake Baikal.⁴⁷ For the completion of this plan, upon which her position as a world power was to depend, Russia desperately wanted peace.

Furthermore, Russia was constrained to pursue international peace by the exigencies and lurking dangers in her internal situation. On December 1, 1934, there occurred the murder of S. M. Kirov, head of the Leningrad administration and a member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party. Soon afterwards an official Soviet announcement stated that far-reaching plots of terrorism and possible foreign intervention were afoot within the Union, aiming at the assassination of Stalin and other leaders, the disruption of industry and agriculture, and the destruction of the Soviet Government and

⁴⁷ J. Stalin, V. Molotov, and others, *op cit.*, pp. 653, 658, 660, 662-664

the Red Army.⁴⁸ The Great Purge then began. It was in a very real sense a civil war. In its frantic course, many high-ranking political figures, diplomats, generals, and admirals were involved and were either put to death or sent to prison. A large membership of the Communist Party were expelled, exiled, or executed. The number of common people caught and punished on mere suspicion was incalculable.⁴⁹ With an internal situation like this, honeycombed with rebels and fifth columnists, and gripped in fear and terror, Russia would certainly have succumbed to the impact of a foreign war. To avoid the potential unheaval, indeed, to preserve her very existence, Russia found it imperative to prolong peace with her neighbors by all means.

However, the prospects of peace were becoming darker and darker for Russia. Nazi propaganda with its threats was in full blast and rose in pitch and volume as Nazi Germany became more and more aggressive. In March 1935 Hitler announced the reintroduction of universal conscription in the Reich, in violation of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. A year later Hitler repudiated the Locarno Treaties and began the remilitarization of the Rhineland. Nazi power was steadily rising, and the Nazi threat to the Soviet Union became actual and had more substance in it. In a press interview on March 19, 1936, Molotov said: "The remilitarization of the Rhineland has undoubtedly increased the menace to countries lying to the east of Germany, and to the USSR in particular."⁵⁰

In the fall of 1936 Hitler actually proclaimed his ambition to invade and occupy the Soviet Union, saying, "If we had at our disposal the incalculable wealth and stores of raw materials of the Ural Mountains and the unending fertile plains of the Ukraine, to be exploited under Nationalist-Socialist leadership, then we would produce and our German people would swim in plenty."⁵¹

On their part, the Soviets put up a bold front in the war of threats. A week after Hitler had made the above proclamation, Soviet Marshal Voroshilov gave a warning: "We are ready for war, comrades. I can assure the workers of the Ukraine that our Red Army will be fully able to meet the enemy wherever he prefers, or whenever he turns his crazy attacks against Soviet territory."⁵²

Greater and more tangible dangers to the Soviet Union, however,

⁴⁸ F. L. Schuman, *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad*, New York, 1946, pp. 259-263; A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, pp. 366-368.

⁴⁹ The massive purge did not run its full course until March 1938.

⁵⁰ J. Stalin, V. Molotov, and others, *The Soviet Union and the Cause of Peace*, New York, 1936, p. 66.

⁵¹ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, 1936, p. 381.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 383.

came from the East. Here Japan was not merely threatening and bluffing, but actually using military force for territorial expansion. Throughout 1935, border disputes, not only between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia but also between Manchukuo and Siberia, were incessant, and armed clashes along the borders constituted a virtual state of war which continued into the following year.⁵³ No wonder that in a press interview on the first day of March 1936 Stalin said:

In my opinion there are two seats of war danger. The first is in the Far East, in the zone of Japan. . . . The second seat is in the zone of Germany. It is hard to say which is the most menacing, but both exist and are active. . . . At present the Far Eastern seat of danger reveals the greatest activity. However, the center of this danger may shift to Europe.⁵⁴

Towards the end of 1936 Japan and Germany joined hands and hurled a diplomatic bomb at the Soviet Union. This was the well-known Anti-Comintern Pact. The main provision of the pact was cooperation in carrying out preventive measures against the subversive activities of the Communist International, whose aim, as set forth in the pact, "is to disintegrate and subdue existing states by all the means at its command," and whose interference "in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a menace to the peace of the world." ⁵⁵

Almost immediately, Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov tried to minimize the effects of the pact on the Soviet Union, saying that "it really has no meaning whatsoever, for the simple reason that it is only a cover for another agreement which was simultaneously discussed and initialed, and probably signed, and which was not published and is not intended for publication." ⁵⁶ Contrary to the views of Litvinov, the Japanese press, notably the *Asahi* and the *Nichi Nichi*, bluntly avowed that the pact was a German-Japanese alliance against the USSR, and that it had as its purpose the encirclement of Russia.⁵⁷ Coincidentally, within the Soviet Union there were fresh revelations in the course of the Great Purge, showing that the potential rebels and fifth columnists were conspiring not only with Trotsky, but with the Nazis and the Japanese for the purpose of overthrowing the Stalin regime by sabotage and terrorism if they

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 1935, I, pp. 332-335, 1936, p. 933.

⁵⁴ Stalin, Molotov, and others, *The Soviet Union and the Cause of Peace*, p. 35.

⁵⁵ J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Documents on International Affairs*, 1936, pp. 297-298.

⁵⁶ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, 1936, p. 389.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 928.

sufficed, with the aid of German or Japanese invasion if necessary.⁵⁸

It is clear, then, that during 1935 and 1936 the Soviet Union was more than ever menaced by actual dangers and war threats from Germany, and in particular, from Japan. To meet the mounting crisis, the Soviet Government simultaneously followed various policies, all for the desperate purpose of warding off war or turning it in some direction away from its territory. Whenever possible, it carried on negotiations with Japan with a view to settling the numerous border disputes on the conference table instead of on the battlefield. But this policy was never very effective. For instance, the Soviet-Japanese conference on border disputes in the spring of 1936 ended in failure.

Another Soviet policy was the continued offer to Japan of a non-aggression pact. Japan always took the position that the important issues outstanding between the two countries should be settled first before a nonaggression pact was concluded. After the deal about the Chinese Eastern Railway was closed in March 1935, therefore, there was talk again of a nonaggression pact with Japan. The Japanese Government, however, considered such a pact premature, though within the realm of possibility.⁵⁹ Later in the year, the Soviet Government repeated its offer to Japan of a nonaggression pact; but Japan under various pretexts avoided the question.⁶⁰ In May 1936, after the conference on border disputes had ended in smoke, the Soviet official press sent out strong feelers for a nonaggression pact with Japan again, but again met with cold Japanese reception.⁶¹ Japan's indifferent attitude toward the Soviet conciliatory offers could not but increase the misgivings of the Soviet Government. As early as the beginning of 1934, Stalin commented on Japan's attitude thus: "Japan's refusal to conclude a pact of nonaggression, of which Japan stands in need no less than the USSR, once again emphasizes the fact that all is not well in the sphere of our relations."⁶²

In contrast to the policies of negotiation and conciliation, the Soviet Government resorted to warning or bluffing and other more positive and concrete measures, and in general assumed a firm stand in every diplomatic issue. On January 31, 1935, an editorial of *Pravda*, organ of the Communist Party, said: "History is working in our favor, and know ye, Mister Imperialist, that if you impose war

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 377.

⁵⁹ *Bulletin of International News*, April 4, 1935, p. 637; K. Yokota, "The Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact," *Contemporary Japan*, June 1935, p. 1.

⁶⁰ Potemkine, *op. cit.*, p. 607.

⁶¹ *Izvestiia*, May 15, 1936.

⁶² J. Stalin, V. Molotov, and others, *Socialism Victorious*, p. 22.

on us we will fight, not in our territory, but in yours. Woe to any who attacks us." About a year later, on February 23, 1936, the same organ published an article, declaring that the Soviet Union was ready to fight Germany and Japan simultaneously.

In the meantime, the Comintern had mapped out a plan against what it called the "Fascist warmongers." During its Seventh Congress in Moscow in July-August, 1935, it passed a resolution, appealing to the Communist Parties in all countries and urging temporary abandonment of the class struggle tactics and immediate formation of an anti-Fascist united front, that is, an alliance between all groups or all parties commonly threatened by Fascism.⁶³ This Comintern measure, as will be pointed out in a later section, produced considerable effects on the policy and action of the Chinese Communists and played an important part in diverting Japanese aggression in the direction of China.

In the latter part of 1936, the Soviet Government went farther in cope with the rising external menace, and took care to publicize its military measures and armed might. On August 11, for instance, the Kremlin announced that new measures for increasing the strength of the Red Army had been enforced and that the age for military service had been lowered from 21 to 19.⁶⁴ Then on November 29, shortly after the publication of the Anti Comintern Pact, General Khrispiin, Assistant Commandant of the Red Air Force, made his report to the Soviet Congress, and let loose a string of formidable figures testifying to the rapid growth and gigantic strength of the Red Air Force.⁶⁵ All this was most probably intended as a realistic warning to Germany and Japan to be more circumspect before embarking upon their aggressive ventures.

The most positive aspect of Soviet policy in meeting Japan's threatened aggression, however, manifested itself in the regions of Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang. Here the Soviets did not stop at active military intervention to maintain a firm stand. Although there may have been other motives behind such Soviet intervention, an important motive seemed to be the prevention of possible Japanese penetration or invasion.

⁶³ Seventh Congress of the Comintern, *Resolutions and Decisions*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1935, pp. 17-18.

⁶⁴ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, 1936, pp. 136, 380.

⁶⁵ *Bulletin of International News*, December 5, 1936, p. 510.

RUSSIA IN MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG

Russia in Mongolia

Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia, it will be recalled, was firmly established in 1925. From 1930 to 1931, the Mongolian government, upon Soviet advice, launched a comprehensive program of socialization and collectivization and tried to develop an economy on the basis of state monopoly. The program was so opposed to the wishes of the people that local uprisings took place sporadically throughout the land. In 1932 the program collapsed. The Soviets were compelled to acknowledge that the Mongols were not yet prepared for socialism, and private ownership of property was restored.⁶⁶ Failure of the program, however, did not mean at all that Soviet influence and interest in Mongolia had weakened. In 1934 the Soviet Union stepped up military aid to Outer Mongolia and expanded the Soviet forces there.⁶⁷ This measure may have been caused by Japan's expansion in the nearby areas, but it in turn caused further provocations to Japan and may have accounted for the numerous incidents and armed clashes that occurred along the Mongolian border in subsequent years. It was an indication of the stern attitude of the Soviet Government toward Japan. In early March 1936, when there was loud talk of a new Russo-Japanese war, Stalin declared in a press interview:


If Japan should venture to attack the Mongolian People's Republic and encroach upon its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian People's Republic. Stomonyakov, Litvinov's assistant, recently informed the Japanese ambassador in Moscow of this and pointed to the immutable friendly relations which the USSR has been maintaining with the Mongolian People's Republic since 1921. We will help the Mongolian People's Republic just as we helped it in 1921.⁶⁸

Soon afterwards, on March 12, Stalin's warning was confirmed in a Mongol-Soviet Protocol of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ulan Bator, capital of the Mongolian People's Republic. This protocol consists of a preamble and three articles. In the preamble reference is made to a gentlemen's agreement concluded between the two parties on November 27, 1934, and providing for mutual assistance by all means. The provisions contained in the three articles are, essentially: consultation and cooperation in case of military menace to either

⁶⁶ H. L. Moore, *Soviet Far Eastern Policy*, Princeton, 1945, p. 60.

⁶⁷ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, 1934, p. 686.

⁶⁸ Stalin, Molotov, and others, *The Soviet Union and the Cause of Peace*, p. 33.



signatory; mutual assistance, including military assistance, in case of actual attack by any third country; and withdrawal of troops from each other's territory after the emergency is over.⁶⁹

Moscow did not make public the text of the protocol until April 8. On the same day the Chinese Government lodged a strong protest with the Soviet Government on the basis of Article 5 of the 1924 Peking agreement, which stipulates: "The Government of the U.S.S.R. recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China's sovereignty therein." The Chinese Government contended that "Outer Mongolia being an integral part of the Republic of China, no foreign state has the right to conclude with it any treaties or agreements." It charged that the Soviet Government in concluding a military alliance with Outer Mongolia had broken its pledge to China, infringed upon China's sovereignty, and violated the above-mentioned agreement.⁷⁰

In his reply, dated April 8, Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov argued that the protocol with Outer Mongolia did not violate China's sovereignty, inasmuch as it did not contain any territorial claim by the USSR and did not introduce any changes in the relations hitherto existing between the USSR and China, or between the USSR and Outer Mongolia. To support his position he cited as precedent the Soviet agreement with the Mukden government in 1924. He concluded with the affirmation that the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924 still remained in force.⁷¹

On receipt of Litvinov's reply, the Chinese Government sent a second note to Moscow. While taking cognizance of the Soviet pledge that the 1924 agreement was still valid, the Chinese Government repudiated the Soviet position that the Soviet-Mukden agreement of 1924 could be regarded as a justifiable precedent for the Mongol-Soviet protocol, pointing out that in 1924 the Chinese Central Government did repeatedly protest against the Soviet-Mukden agreement and that this agreement later had to be submitted by the Mukden government to the Central Government for approval. Finally, the Chinese Government once more stressed that the Mongol-Soviet protocol constituted an infringement of China's sovereignty and that China would not be bound by it.⁷²


While Litvinov made painstaking efforts to strain the law in defense of the Mongol-Soviet alliance, both *Izvestiia*, organ of the Soviet Government, and *Pravda*, organ of the Soviet Communist

⁶⁹ *Bulletin of International News*, April 25, 1936, p. 821.

⁷⁰ *China Year Book*, 1938, pp. 30-32.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*



Party, expressly stated that the alliance was dictated by military considerations and was designed to forestall Japanese expansion.⁷³

Japan on her part did not fail to note the implications of the alliance. She regarded it as a triumph of Communism and a step of Soviet expansion. As countermoves she pressed demands on China for collaboration against Communism on the one hand, and on the other forged ahead with her own strategic expansion, in particular toward Suiyuan province, which is contiguous with Outer Mongolia.⁷⁴

Thus Soviet moves in Outer Mongolia heightened the tension in the relations between all the three major countries in the Far East, and inclined Japan to follow the line of least resistance and expand at the expense of China.

Russia in Sinkiang

Sinkiang, also called Chinese Turkestan, is important to China mainly because of its geopolitical significance. Like Mongolia, it is a strategic gateway to China for the "barbarians" from Central Asia, and consequently constitutes a key factor in China's national security. This is why China since as early as the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) has always struggled for the control, if not also the exploitation, of Sinkiang and has fought numerous wars to achieve it.

As regards Russia, she first manifested her interest in Sinkiang in 1871 when Czarist troops occupied the rich Ili valley in the northwest of the province. At that time the Mohammedans in the province were staging a gigantic rebellion against China; and the Czarist Government, in dodging a protest from Peking, declared that it would evacuate the Ili area after the rebellion was suppressed. By 1878 the Chinese had suppressed the rebellion, but the Russian forces in Ili showed no signs of withdrawal. A hot dispute thus arose and war between the two countries was avoided only by a hair's breath. The dispute was finally settled by the Treaty of St. Petersburg, signed in February 1881, whereby the whole Ili valley was restored to China, with the exception of a western strip reserved for those of the Tungans who should elect to become Russian subjects.⁷⁵

For thirty years since 1881 and until the Chinese Revolution in 1911, general peace reigned in Sinkiang and was only briefly interrupted by a minor revolt in 1895. After China had become a republic, the governorship of Sinkiang was held by the famous Yang

⁷³ *New York Times*, April 10, 1936.

⁷⁴ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, 1936, pp. 915-916.

⁷⁵ Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs, *Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States*, Shanghai, 1908, pp. 72 ff.

Tseng hsin, a scholar-statesman who had previously established a distinguished record in the public service.⁷⁶ Yang ruled the province with great political skill and evenhanded justice towards the various minority groups, and as a result his administration meant another long period of peace and progress to the province.

At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, a White Russian general, Annekov, retreated with his troops to Sinkiang to evade pursuit by the Bolsheviks. Governor Yang lacked the necessary military strength to expel or to disarm the refugee troops. By some clever strokes of diplomacy, however, he managed to disperse the armed trespassers, imprison Annekov, and later turn him over to the Soviet authorities to be court-martialed.⁷⁷ Thus Soviet forces had no excuse to enter Sinkiang as they had to enter Outer Mongolia in the early 1920's.

Towards the Soviets, Governor Yang adopted a fair and reasonable attitude. While not averse to establishing relations with them, he took care that the relations should be placed on a strictly equal and reciprocal basis. In 1920 he took on the responsibility of negotiating a trade agreement with the Soviets in order to normalize the trade conditions on the border. Signed on September 20, the agreement provided that commercial and consular agencies were to be established by China in Russian Turkestan and by Russia in Sinkiang; that commercial disputes and legal cases should be handled by the local courts concerned, that Russian soldiers and refugees in Chinese territory should be permitted to return to Russia; and that Russian goods imported into Sinkiang were to be subject to duties according to the Chinese Maritime Customs tariff. This agreement was later submitted to the Peking Government and received its approval.⁷⁸

After the general Sino-Soviet settlement of 1924, Soviet Russia began to establish consulates in Sinkiang—first at Tacheng in December 1924, and then at Chenghua, Tihwa (Urumchi), and Kashgar in the following year. On her part China set up consulates at Semipalatinsk, Tashkent, Andizhan, and Alma-Ata in Soviet territory.⁷⁹

The growing interest in Sinkiang prompted the Soviet Government to construct a railway close to the western frontier of the province. This line connects Tashkent with the Trans-Siberian system, and was completed in April 1930.⁸⁰ Apart from its military importance, the line has the obvious effect of making Sinkiang

⁷⁶ A. K. Wu, *Turkestan Tumult*, London, 1910, p. 57.

⁷⁷ Feng Yu-chen, *Hsin Chuang Shih Ch'ia Chi* [Records of an Inspection Tour in Sinkiang], Shanghai, 1931, pp. 41-43.

⁷⁸ *North China Herald*, September 25, 1920, p. 806.

⁷⁹ *China Year Book*, 1929-30, p. 1006.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 1931, p. 42.

gravitate economically and financially toward Russia and away from China.

Prior to the completion of this Russian scheme, Governor Yang's administration abruptly came to an end on July 7, 1928, when he was assassinated by a faction actuated by personal grievances.⁸¹ The governorship then fell on Chin Shu-jen, former chief of the Political Department. Lacking the administrative sagacity of his predecessor, Chin held on hardly three years when the first revolt broke out at Turfan. Though quickly quelled, this revolt heralded other revolts to come. In the early months of 1931 Moslem disturbances were rife in Hami. They soon took on the character of an insurrection when the Moslem leaders succeeded in securing the cooperation of General Ma Chung-ying, a young brilliant Moslem commander from the nearby Chinese province of Kansu.⁸² By the beginning of autumn the situation had become so critical that Governor Chin decided to seek aid from the Soviets. On October 1, 1931, he secretly signed a new trade agreement with the Soviet authorities. This agreement took the form of an exchange of notes. It consisted of seven articles and four annexes. It permitted Soviet nationals and agencies to trade freely in various parts of Sinkiang; it lowered the import duties on Soviet goods; it allowed the establishment of Soviet commissions and commercial houses in various places; it provided for direct radio and telegraphic communication between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union. All these privileges enabled the Soviets to maintain a controlling influence in the economic and commercial life of the province. By the same agreement the Sinkiang government "hoped" that the Soviet Government would permit Sinkiang merchants to move goods to the Soviet Union without previous permission and would supply the necessary machinery and technicians for the development of the province.⁸³

The material aid expected from Russia, however, did not come soon enough or in sufficient quantities. The Moslem insurrection continued into the following year, when Ma Chung-ying actually attempted to march on Tihwa, the capital. At that time Governor Chin had as his chief of staff General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, a native of Manchuria and a former staff officer of Chiang Kai-shek. Through luck as much as through military prowess, Sheng repelled Ma's onslaught and frustrated his attempt to seize the capital. The insur-

⁸¹ Feng Yu-chen, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁸³ Full Chinese text of the agreement, *ibid.*, pp. 81-87. This text was not disclosed until June 1933, when Chin had to flee Sinkiang. English version in A. K. Wu, *China and the Soviet Union*, New York, 1950, pp. 376 ff.

rection subsided, but did not cease. Ma retired only to reorganize his forces. But at the same time Sheng also had his forces replenished, and this in a rather extraordinary way. He took under his command a large contingent of Manchurian troops who, after their struggle with the Japanese invaders in Manchuria, had retreated into the Soviet Far East, where they were indoctrinated with Communist ideas and were later permitted by the Soviet authorities to march into Sinkiang.⁸⁴

In April 1933, when the Moslem revolts were still smoldering, Tihwa became a scene of serious factional strife. Among the forces garrisoning Tihwa was a contingent of White Russians. These White Russians, unlike those in Manchuria, were not hostile to the Soviets. Governor Chin had confidence in them and partly relied on them for protection. They were, however, dissatisfied with their lot and with Chin's general maladministration. On April 12 they staged a *coup d'état* and attacked the official residence of the governor. But Chin disguised himself and succeeded in his escape. He got in touch with his forces outside the city and turned back to attack the insubordinate elements. The latter were on the verge of defeat when General Sheng Shih-ts'ai came along and decided the battle in their favor. Chin was forced to flee. Sheng then assumed control of the situation and peace was restored.⁸⁵

The flight of Chin might have furnished a good occasion for a political solution of the revolts and for a reconciliation between Sheng and Ma. Indeed, in the latter part of 1933 Nanking sent two special representatives in succession to persuade the two leaders to cease their hostilities. But in vain. In the early part of 1934 Ma once again tried to march on Tihwa. Large scale hostilities ensued, and at a critical stage Sheng turned to Soviet Russia for aid. The Soviet Government was more than willing to comply with the request, because Ma had some Japanese military advisers on his staff and was looked upon by the Soviets as a Japanese puppet. Consequently Soviet planes, tanks, machine guns, trucks, and ammunition were sent to Sheng to replenish his depleted armory. Above all, trained Soviet troops also marched into Sinkiang and actively helped in the fight against the Moslem forces.⁸⁶ The outcome, as could be expected, was the complete defeat of Ma. His forces were annihilated, and he himself was driven into Soviet territory, where he disappeared mysteriously.

⁸⁴ Toynbee, *op cit.*, 1934, pp. 687-688.

⁸⁵ Feng Yu chen, *op cit.*, pp. 50-54.

⁸⁶ O. Lattimore, "Sinkiang's Place in the Future of China," *Asia and the Americas*,

With his archenemy utterly defeated, Sheng became undisputed master of Sinkiang. During his administration Soviet influence in the province grew by leaps and bounds. A signal feature of the administration was the launching of a gigantic program of economic reconstruction. In this program the Soviet Government invested considerable sums. On one occasion Sheng borrowed from the Soviet Government five million gold rubles for reconstruction purposes.⁸⁷ The Soviet Government furnished extensive technical assistance in the various projects included in the program, such as oil-well drilling, oil refining, irrigation, road building, animal husbandry, and establishment of schools and hospitals. Just as Soviet technicians played a conspicuous role in the industrial enterprises and social services, Soviet advisers were prominent in the army, police, and air force, and Soviet instructors were employed in the provincial military academy. A series of airfields were constructed under Soviet auspices, and a Soviet motorized unit was stationed at Hami. An interesting but shady feature of this unit was that its members wore Chinese instead of Soviet uniforms.⁸⁸

In his speech before the Diet on January 22, 1935, Japan's Foreign Minister Hirota stated that there had been frequent reports about the "sovietization" of Sinkiang and that for this reason Japan had to watch carefully this Communist movement in China.⁸⁹ In reply to this statement Molotov, then Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, said in a report to the Seventh All-Union Soviet Congress in Moscow on January 28, 1935:

It remains for me to say a couple of words on the slanderous rumours about the sovietization of Sinkiang. One is struck by the fact that special efforts to spread this slander against the USSR are being made in Japan whose policy in relation to China is known to everybody and cannot possibly be covered up by the spreading of inventions. I consider it necessary to emphasize the real Soviet policy towards China: The Soviet Union considers as incompatible with its policy the seizure of foreign territories, and is an absolute adherent of the independence, integrity, and sovereignty of China over all of her parts, including Sinkiang.⁹⁰

This declaration by no means constitutes an adequate answer to Hirota's statement. Whatever Molotov's declaration may mean, there

⁸⁷ Tu Chung-yuan, *Sheng Shih-ts'ai Yu Hsin Hsin-Chiang* [Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the New Sinkiang], Shanghai, 1938, p. 93.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94; T. White, "Report from Turkestan," *Time*, October 25, 1943, pp. 27-28; *New York Times*, April 3, 1944, and May 17, 1945.

⁸⁹ *Contemporary Japan*, March 1935, p. 704.

⁹⁰ J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Documents on International Affairs*, 1934, p. 410.

seems to be no doubt that at that time Sinkiang was undergoing a fairly *comprehensive* process of sovietization in the sense that its internal developments, economic, military, and cultural, were proceeding along Soviet lines and in effect under Soviet direction. Soviet aims in Sinkiang were mixed. But one of the most important among them was to strengthen the industrial and military position of the province and to check Japanese aggression in that direction.

THE SIAN INCIDENT AND RUSSIA

As may be seen from the preceding sections, since 1931 both China and Russia had been subject to tremendous pressure from Japan, and both had adopted an extremely cautious policy toward Japan and had yielded to various unreasonable Japanese demands, in order to avoid war. The fulfillment of the first Five Year Plan by the beginning of 1933 strengthened the Soviet position to a certain extent; but at that moment Hitler had risen in Germany and the Soviet Union began to be menaced not only from the East but also from the West. The Soviet Union then appeared to be in a more difficult and dangerous position than China. But this was a difference in degree only. In general, especially since 1934, the situation of China was similar to that of the Soviet Union in three important aspects. (1) Each country was threatened by external aggression. (2) Each was confronted with a gigantic internal conflict: civil war in the case of China, the Great Purge in the case of Russia. (3) Amidst difficulties, each was strenuously and feverishly pushing forward the task of national reconstruction. Similar circumstances resulted in similar policies. Each country was trying all manner of ways to gain time for constructive efforts by maintaining peace and avoiding war with any foreign country. Japan took advantage of the situation and exploited it for her own purposes, keeping China and Russia in suspense as to the direction of her eventual full-scale aggression.

Although it is difficult to present full evidence for the chain of causes and consequences, there is much to indicate that the Sian incident had the direct effect of attracting the locomotive of Japanese aggression in the direction of China, thereby relieving Russia of a tremendous cause for anxiety.

By the end of 1936, when the incident occurred, the Chinese Communists had been for over a year actively agitating for a united front against Japan and for the cessation of the civil war. The united-front policy was not new to the Chinese Communists, however, it definitely gave them added and renewed enthusiasm after it had been proclaimed as the official policy by the Comintern in August 1935. Chiang Kai-shek as actual leader of the Nanking Government

had no relish for the idea. He was determined to exterminate the Chinese Communists first before resisting external aggression. He was by all indications on the point of success when on December 12, 1936, just two weeks after Germany and Japan had concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact, he was detained and deprived of personal freedom by his subordinate General Chang Hsüeh-liang, often dubbed "the Young Marshal," who was entrusted with the north-western campaign against the Chinese Communists, but played ball with the Communists instead.⁹¹ Having made his superior his prisoner, the Young Marshal demanded a united front against Japan and urged Chiang to cease warfare against the Communists and agree to the admission of all parties and cliques to share the responsibility for national salvation. In a telegram to Reuter, a British news agency, the Young Marshal declared:

An active anti-Japanese struggle is the only way out for China, which is unanimously demanded by the people. . . . As soon as the Generalissimo gives up his fallacious policy and mobilizes an active anti-Japanese struggle, we shall immediately become his loyal followers again and will fight on the first front.⁹²

This statement provoked Japan. Two days later, Japan's Foreign Minister Arita declared that "the Japanese Government would oppose any compromise settlement of the Sian dispute involving a strong anti-Japanese front." At the same time the Japanese embassy spokesman in Nanking asserted in a press interview that "if strengthening of the Chinese attitude against Japan has been made the condition of Generalissimo Chiang's release, the situation will become very serious."⁹³

What complicated the situation most was Japan's belief that Moscow fathered the Sian conspiracy. The Japanese press hinted that the conspiracy was engineered by emissaries of the Soviet Union. The Japanese Kwantung Army went even farther. It claimed to have known that for six months negotiations had been proceeding between the Young Marshal and the Moscow Government. Moved by such charges, I. Spilvanek, Soviet chargé d'affaires in Nanking, called on Chinese Foreign Minister Chang Chun on December 20 and assured him that the Soviet Government had ceased relations with the Young Marshal ever since the Mukden incident of September 18, 1931.⁹⁴

⁹¹ *China Weekly Review*, December 19, 1936, p. 81.

⁹² Cited in Hollington K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek*, Shanghai, 1937, II, p. 473.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 476-477.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 479.

According to Edgar Snow, Moscow definitely had a hand in the Sian incident. Commenting on the quick release of Generalissimo Chiang, he wrote, "There is no doubt that the attitude of Soviet Russia influenced this quick disposition of the Sian Affair, and that Moscow was quite pleased with the peaceful settlement that restored Chiang to power."⁹⁵

Years later, in a conversation with General Hurley in Moscow, Molotov admitted: "Due to the political and moral support of the Soviet Government, Chiang had been allowed to return to the seat of his government and the revolutionary leader (Chang Hsueh-liang) had been arrested."⁹⁶

The extraordinary nature of the Sian incident, the implication of the Soviet Union as well as the Chinese Communists in it, and the outspoken demands for a united front against Japan, combined to arouse the ire and suspicion of Japan and constituted a most important factor in diverting toward China the full force of Japanese aggression, which in the absence of the incident might very possibly have been directed against the Soviet Union.

⁹⁵ E. Snow, *The Battle for Asia*, New York, 1912 pp 296-297

⁹⁶ Department of State, *United States Relations with China*, Washington, 1949, p 72

Russian Support for China Against Japan

THE story of Sino-Soviet relations now enters the period of turbulence in the Far East and in the world in general. This period may reasonably be taken as dating from July 7, 1937, the day on which the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) incident occurred and led to the eight-year Sino-Japanese war. During this period, Japan's aggression in China and later in southeastern Asia posed a host of crucial problems for all the major powers. During the same period Europe also was shaken by rampant aggression involving the rapid rise and fall of empires, states, and governments. These developments posed a further set of problems for all the major powers.

As a result, international relations during this period became more than ever intertwined and interconnected in the sense that developments in one region often hinged on developments in other regions. In this respect Russia's foreign relations may serve as a noteworthy example. With her territory sprawling across two continents from the Baltic to the Pacific, and situated roughly between anti-Comintern Germany and Japan, Russia found it more imperative than ever to coordinate her policies in Europe and in the Far East. In this and following chapters, therefore, the story of Sino-Soviet relations will be recounted against a wider background of world history.

THE OUTBREAK OF SINO-JAPANESE HOSTILITIES

With all its sinister implications, the Sian incident served as a convincing proof that Chiang Kai-shek enjoyed the support of the Chinese people and that China had attained a high degree of real unity by the end of 1936. When Chiang regained his freedom and returned to Nanking on Christmas Day, the Chinese people evinced great relief and joyful excitement.¹ Indeed, it was because of Chiang's influence and achievements at that time that the Soviet Government intended to make use of him as the leader of an anti-Japan China

¹ *China Weekly Review*, January 2, 1937, p. 153.

and directed the Communist faction in Sian to release him from captivity.

Cognizant of the increasing unity and growing strength of China, Japan contemplated a reorientation of her China policy. In February 1937 a new government in Japan was formed under General Hayashi, and the portfolio for foreign affairs was assigned to Sato, a veteran diplomat. Soon after he assumed office, Sato declared himself in favor of a new deal with China. He called his countrymen's attention to China's progress toward political unity and economic recovery. He asserted that Japan's policy toward China should start from a new point and negotiations with the Chinese Government should be taken up on a basis of equality.²

Just as Japan's policy toward China was turning relatively friendly and conciliatory, the Chinese Communists intensified their agitation for united efforts against Japanese aggression. On February 10 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent a telegram to the plenary conference of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Nanking, wherein it made some pledges and presented some demands. It pledged (1) to stop its program of conducting armed uprisings throughout the country for the overthrow of the National Government in Nanking, (2) to change the Soviet Government into a Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China, (3) to reorganize the Red Army into the National Revolutionary Army under the direct leadership of the Central Government and the Military Affairs Commission in Nanking, and (4) to put an end to the policy of expropriating the land of landlords and to execute persistently the common program of the anti-Japanese united front.

It demanded (1) freedom of speech, assembly, organization, etc., (2) suspension of civil wars of all sorts and concentration of all the national strength for unanimous resistance to external aggression, and (3) immediate accomplishment of the preparatory work for a war of resistance against Japan.

At the end of February the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee decided to accept the "red surrender."³

Whether this Communist agitation had any important effect on Japan's policy it is difficult to show. Concurrence of events does not necessarily mean that they have any causal relations. It is worthy of note, however, that the new relatively moderate and conciliatory policy of Japan toward China *did not last long*. The influence of the Japanese military, which had been in the saddle since 1927 and had

² A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1937, I, p. 162.

³ *China Weekly Review*, February 27, 1937. PP. 433-435.

further strengthened its position since the Manchurian invasion in 1931, soon reasserted itself, and the relatively liberal-minded members of the government had to modify their policies and qualify their former statements. On the specific question of China, whatever the new policy the Hayashi government may have framed, it was not to apply to North China, which was designated as Japan's special sphere of interest.⁴ This arbitrary attitude of Japan toward North China was the rock upon which Sino-Japanese relations foundered. Nanking was determined to retain and recover sovereignty in North China, while Tokyo persisted in attempting to cut off this area from the rest of China by political pressure, military force, and economic penetration including large-scale smuggling and public sale of morphine and other poisonous drugs.⁵

Following the general election in April 1937, the Hayashi cabinet had to resign, and Prince Konoe on June 5 assumed the premiership.⁶ The new government soon manifested many symptoms of totalitarian rule with its military character and warlike tendency. It put into effect the Five Year Plan of the Army. It placed imports under stringent restriction and rigid regulation. It instituted arbitrary control of labor. On June 24 the Japanese Government instructed its ambassador in London to start discussions with the British Government on concrete issues in regard to China and concerning Anglo-Japanese economic cooperation.⁷ These discussions greatly disturbed and irritated Nanking. They ultimately failed, but the failure did not obviate the fact that Japan was making economic preparations for war.

The aggressive tendency of the Konoe government was further indicated by the reappointment of Hirota as Foreign Minister. In resuming his post as Foreign Minister, Hirota also resumed his "Japanese Doctrine of East Asia," and his "Three Point Policy toward China," which previously had brought both Sino-Japanese relations and Russo-Japanese relations to an impasse. He now connived at the independent actions of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and permitted it to persist in its aggressive policy toward China and the Soviet Union.

In the latter part of June an incident arose over the Amur River when Russian forces occupied some islands which Japan-sponsored Manchukuo claimed as under its sovereignty. The Japanese Gov-

⁴ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-163.

⁵ League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement, No. 174, p. 43; *China Quarterly*, Fall 1937, p. 597.

⁶ *Japan Year Book*, 1937, p. 172.

⁷ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

ernment at once protested, and the ensuing negotiations led to a provisional agreement on June 29 whereby both Soviet and Manchukuoan forces were to withdraw from the islands. The following day, however, there occurred a clash between the opposing forces near the islands, and one of the Soviet gunboats was sunk. The Soviet Government nevertheless consented to withdraw from the islands and raised no question about compensation for the lost gunboat.⁸ This feigned or real weakness on the part of the Soviets possibly strengthened the belief of the Japanese war clique that Soviet military power had been seriously weakened by the Great Purge, which earlier in the month had involved the execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other officers of the high command after a trial *in camera*. Relieved of worry over the Soviet menace to Manchuria and perhaps noting the increased anti-Japanese agitation of the Chinese Communists, Japan stepped up her aggressive activities in China.

Toward midnight of July 7-8, 1937, Japanese forces attacked Chinese troops at Lukouchiao in the outskirts of Peiping. Afterwards China and Japan each blamed the other for firing the first shot, and held it responsible for the consequences. The hostilities thus begun were later continued on an increasingly larger scale. They were punctuated by truces which were no sooner arranged than broken. Scarcely three weeks after the incident Japan's forces had occupied Peiping, Tientsin, Fengtai, Lukouchiao, and the adjoining areas. By mid-August the hostilities had spread to Shanghai, China's greatest commercial port, and soon afterwards Japanese planes bombed Nanking, the national capital. Her peace efforts frustrated and her patience broken, China determined to resist and fight Japan to the finish.

Thus began the panorama of the eight year Sino-Japanese war with all its pathos and drama. Amidst this tragic panorama, a new phase of Sino-Soviet relations developed.

THE SINO SOVIET NONAGGRESSION PACT

Japan's full-scale attack on China was beyond doubt a great relief to the Soviet Government, which had been for years patiently and desperately maneuvering to divert Japanese aggression away from its own domain. On July 22, two weeks after the Lukouchiao incident, *Izvestiia*, organ of the Soviet Government, jeeringly remarked "Certain British statesmen, incorrectly judging the correlation of forces in the Far East, evidently supposed that Japanese aggression in Man

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-122

churia would unfold in an entirely different direction from North China."

Now that hostilities between China and Japan had begun, the Soviet Government took care to confine Japanese aggression within Chinese borders. During the months following Lukouchiao, incidents on the Manchurian-Siberian border continued to crop up, and Japan actually occupied the Amur islands. The Soviet Union, however, neither resumed her attempt to dispute Japan's right over these islands, nor did anything that might aggravate the related issues.⁹

While cautious to avoid friction with Japan in other matters, the Soviet Government did not disguise its intention to encourage and support China so as to prolong her fight against the Japanese invaders. On August 21, 1937, it signed with the Chinese Government a Nonaggression Pact, with this essential provision:

In the event that either of the High Contracting Parties should be subjected to aggression on the part of one or more third Powers, the other High Contracting Party obliges itself not to render assistance of any kind, directly or indirectly, to such third Power or Powers at any time during the entire conflict, and also to refrain from taking any action or entering into any agreement, which may be used by the aggressor or aggressors to the disadvantage of the Party subjected to aggression.¹⁰

In its application to the Sino-Japanese conflict, this provision obligated the Soviet Union not in any way to support Japan or to embarrass China. In other words, it restrained the Soviet Union from fishing in the troubled waters of China or robbing the Chinese jewelry shop while it was on fire. To this extent and in this rather negative fashion, the pact gave China some comfort and encouragement. But it showed that the Soviet Government was still cautious not to offend the sensibilities of Japan.

Following the conclusion of the pact, the Chinese Communist Party on its part made efforts to strengthen the united front and establish some kind of understanding with the National Government. On September 22, 1937, the Central Committee of the Party issued a manifesto, pledging (1) allegiance to the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, (2) abolition of the Soviet form of government in China, (3) reorganization of the Red Army under the control of the National Military Affairs Commission, and (4) abandonment of all measures aimed at overthrowing the Kuomintang,

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

¹⁰ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 181, p. 102.

sovietizing the country, and confiscating the properties of landlords.¹¹ This manifesto was substantially the same in content as the telegram sent to the Kuomintang the previous February. The reaffirmation of the Communist pledges was useful for propaganda and created an impression of national unity in the face of Japanese aggression. Actually, there is considerable doubt as to whether the Communists ever faithfully carried out their pledges.

SOVIET MORAL SUPPORT FOR CHINA

From the very beginning of the Sino-Japanese hostilities, the Soviet Union was sympathetic toward China and was quick in rendering moral support to the Chinese Government and people.

In the latter part of September 1937, when Japan threatened to bomb Nanking to destruction, the Soviet Government sent a strong protest and warning to Japan against such "unlawful air bombardment of Nanking."¹²

It deserves notice also that while the Soviet Union applied no specific sanctions against Japan, her economic and commercial relations with Japan had shrunk into insignificance after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities. For instance, Soviet exports to Japan were valued at 3,902,000 yen in 1937, but fell to only 380,000 yen in 1938.¹³

Soviet moral support to China further manifested itself in international conferences dealing with the conflict in China. Japan's attack and occupation of Chinese territory constituted a *prima facie* violation of the Nine Power Treaty which obligated its signatories to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of China. On October 29, 1937, therefore, the Belgian Government undertook to invite the signatories of the treaty to a conference at Brussels on the Sino-Japanese conflict. An invitation was also sent to the Soviet Union and Germany, though they were not signatories of the treaty. While Germany declined the invitation, the Soviet Union accepted it. In the course of the conference Potemkin, the Soviet delegate, strongly advocated the case of China and urged joint and effective efforts on the part of the powers to maintain peace in the Pacific.¹⁴

In the meantime on September 12 the Chinese Government appealed to the Council of the League of Nations, invoking Articles

¹¹ Mao Tse tung and others, *China: The March Toward Unity*, New York, 1937, pp

119-123

¹² *Bulletin of International News*, October 2, 1937, p. 59.

¹³ *Japan Year Book*, 1939-1940, pp. 375-377.

¹⁴ Chinese Delegation to the League of Nations, *Japanese Aggression and the Nine Power Conference*, II, p. 16.

10, 11, and 17 of the Covenant and calling for advice on such means and actions as might be appropriate to deal with the existing situation in China.¹⁵ The Council, however, took no action under the articles invoked, not even, as required by Article 17, inviting Japan to accept the obligations of membership for the purpose of the dispute. At a meeting of the Council on September 16, 1937, the President proposed that the Chinese appeal be referred to the Advisory Committee set up by the League Assembly on February 24, 1933, in consequence of the Manchurian crisis. This proposal was passed, and the Council thus conveniently quitted the task of directly dealing with the dispute. Later, the Advisory Committee in turn appointed a subcommittee to examine and report on the situation.¹⁶

The Soviet delegation to the League of Nations participated in the work of all the committees, and Maxim Litvinov, head of the delegation, often pleaded for the cause of China and urged that not only moral but material aid should be given to China and that such aid should be given directly by the League instead of being referred to other organizations. He also criticized the other members of the League for not recognizing Japanese aggression as aggression. In his address to the League Assembly on October 5, 1937, he said:

The Soviet delegation has taken part in the work of the Advisory Committee, of the Subcommittee, and of the Drafting Committee. The Committees have impartially examined all the facts brought before them by the Chinese delegation, and have found these facts correct. We found in the action of the Japanese Government all the elements that constitute aggression, but still we did not use the word "aggression." We have not drawn the necessary conclusions from the statements we have made, out of deference to the opinions of some members of the League.¹⁷

In subsequent years the Soviet delegation continued to espouse the cause of China. The Soviet position was well set forth by Litvinov when he said at a meeting of the League Assembly on September 21, 1938:

The Soviet delegation always insisted that the League of Nations should afford the maximum support to the victim of Japanese aggression, and those modest recommendations which the League of Nations adopted are being fulfilled more than loyally by the Soviet Government.¹⁸

¹⁵ League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement, No. 177, p. 6.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 35.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁸ M. Litvinov, *Against Aggression*, New York, 1939, p. 128.

On the whole, this statement was quite correct. The record shows that for years up to the time of the Soviet invasion of Poland and the Soviet attack on Finland in the latter part of 1939, the Soviet Union had been a staunch supporter of collective security and a faithful member of the League of Nations. This Soviet stand was, of course, dictated fundamentally by the interests of the Soviet Union itself. In the latter part of 1937, for instance, aggression was raising its head not only in the Far East but also in Europe, and in both cases the security of the Soviet Union was directly or indirectly affected. Indeed, at that time a full-dress war was being waged between the Soviet Union on the one side and Germany and Italy on the other—only the battlefield was in Spain. Furthermore, on November 6, 1937, Italy adhered to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact as an original member, thus strengthening the aggressive trend against the Soviet Union. In denouncing aggression and preaching collective security, therefore, Litvinov and other Soviet officials censured not only Japan but also Germany and Italy, and advanced not only the interests of China but also those of the Soviet Union itself.

SOVIET MATERIAL AID TO CHINA

In March 1938 Nazi Germany annexed Austria and set all other European countries on tenterhooks. The Soviet Union, for years the target of Nazi threats, was especially concerned over the deepening crisis. Under the circumstances the Soviet Government found it the more necessary to weaken Japan, virtual ally of Germany, and to keep her busy and entangled outside the Soviet Union. The important point was that a weakened and preoccupied Japan would not only lessen her threat to the Soviet Far East but also discourage the designs of Nazi Germany in Europe. Obviously, one way to attain this strategic end was to increase China's military strength and prolong her fight against Japan. In the spring of 1938, therefore, Soviet material aid to China began to assume appreciable proportions. By that time Japan was already deeply embroiled in the hostilities in China, and there was little likelihood that she would retrace her steps and start a major war against the Soviet Union. So the Soviet Government became bolder in supporting the cause of China and proceeded to render China material in addition to moral aid, beyond the obligations called for in the Sino-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. Against such aid Tokyo at the beginning of April lodged a strong protest with Moscow. In reply Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov stated that the sale of arms and ammunition to China was in complete accord with the principles of international law.¹⁰ About a

¹⁰ *Bulletin of International News*, April 23, 1938, p. 371.

month later, on May 5, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow made representations to the Soviet Government regarding the latter's supply of planes and pilots to China. He charged that the Soviet Union had sent 500 planes and 200 pilots and mechanics and large quantities of war equipment to China since the outbreak of hostilities, and pointed out that a lieutenant in the Russian service had been captured with the Chinese Air Force. Litvinov evaded the question, saying that many countries were sending arms and volunteers to China. Thereupon the Japanese ambassador replied that volunteering was impossible in Russia, and that the Soviet Government would be responsible for any situation that might arise from its sending aid to China.²⁰ The Soviet Government did not pay much heed to the warning.

By way of retaliation and perhaps taking advantage of Russia's misgivings in Europe, Japan managed to harass the Soviet Far East. On July 15 there occurred the Changkufeng incident on the Manchurian-Siberian border, and large-scale hostilities quickly developed between Soviet and Japanese forces. While putting up a stiff and brilliant defense, the Soviet Government sought a pacific settlement of the dispute. On August 10, 1938, Foreign Minister Litvinov proposed an armistice, and afterwards a commission was set up to demarcate the frontier.²¹

No sooner had the Japanese menace to Russia calmed down than the threat from Europe became more pronounced. In September Nazi Germany clamored for the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, and on October 1 the infamous Munich Pact was signed by Germany, Britain, and France, granting the Nazi demand. Though Russia had a mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia and with France, she was left out of the affair. Suspicious of Anglo-French conspiracy to divert Nazi aggression eastward, and sandwiched between the two menacing anti-Comintern allies, Russia could not but persist in her strategy of rendering aid to China so as to draw Japan deeper into the military mire and thereby weaken the potency of the anti-Comintern alliance. It is understandable, therefore, that shortly after the Munich settlement Russia signed with China a credit and barter agreement, whereby China was to obtain war supplies from Russia. The amount of the credit corresponded to about 50,000,000 American dollars.²²

The months following Munich were a portentous period in international relations. War seemed just around the corner. While anx-

²⁰ *Ibid.*, May 21, 1938, p. 458.

²¹ *Ibid.*, September 24, 1938, p. 44.

²² Chinese News Service, *Contemporary China*, May 25, 1941, p. 5.

ious to avoid or postpone war with any country. Russia assumed a firm diplomatic front so as not to give any impression of weakness, especially to Japan. For years Japan had been desirous of a long-term fishery convention with Russia. At the end of 1936 such a convention was nearing consummation when Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and thereby provoked Russia to balk at the very last moment. Since then, the fishery convention had been put on a yearly basis. Toward the end of 1938 Japan sought to extend the convention again; but the negotiations dragged on and were punctuated with sharp words and threats on both sides. It was not until April 2, 1939, that the fishery negotiations ended in an agreement providing for the renewal of the old convention for another year.²³ In the tortuous course of these negotiations, Russian aid to China became more direct and extensive. On February 23, 1939, a group of Soviet army officers reached Chungking and were entertained by China's War Minister Ho Ying-chin.²⁴ In the same month Russia pledged in an agreement to extend another credit loan of 50,000,000 American dollars to China.²⁵

At the time the Soviet-Japanese fishery agreement was signed, the situation in Europe was extremely grave from the Soviet standpoint. In March, Loyalist Spain, an object of Soviet sympathy, was doomed, and General Franco, the ally of Hitler and Mussolini, had assumed supreme power over all Spain and had secured the recognition of Britain and France. Furthermore, in the same month Nazi forces had overrun Czechia (Bohemia and Moravia) and reduced the remaining Slovakia to vassalage. Britain and France were greatly perturbed by Hitler's breach of his promise that he wanted no other Czech territory than the Sudetenland, but they seemed to be hoping that Hitler's territorial aggrandizement might ultimately be oriented toward Russia. Stalin, probably suspicious of this Anglo-French motive, tried to frustrate it. On March 10, just a few days before Nazi occupation of Czechia, Stalin gave an important address to the Eighteenth Party Congress.²⁶ In this address, he strongly hinted a peace offer to Hitler, saying:

We stand for peace and for the strengthening of businesslike relations with all countries.

²³ *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, January 30, 1940, p. 2.
²⁴ *New York Times*, February 24, 1939.

²⁵ *Chinese News Service*, *op. cit.*

²⁶ *Soviet Union Today*, April 1939, pp. 7-11. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow* (reports and speeches of the Eighteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, 1939), Moscow, 1939, pp. 20-34.

He continued the hint by denouncing the Western press in the following terms:

The fuss raised by the British, French, and North American press about the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. . . . It looks as if the object of this suspicious fuss was to raise the ire of the Soviet Union against Germany, poison the atmosphere and provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds for it.

In reference to the Far Eastern situation, Stalin gave a heartwarming pledge of continued aid to China. He said:

We stand for the rendering of support to nations which have fallen prey to aggression and are fighting for the independence of their countries.

From these remarks by Stalin, it may not be farfetched to infer that on balance the Soviet Government at that time was more concerned over the threat from the East than from the West and was trying to come to terms with Germany in order to gain a freer hand to deal with Japan.

Scarcely two weeks after Stalin's address the Nazis seized Memel (March 22) and not long afterwards Italy invaded and annexed Albania (April 7). The international tension in Europe was thus aggravated. Amidst the mounting crisis Molotov displaced Litvinov as Foreign Minister. The policy of collective security was abandoned, and diplomacy of the Machiavellian cloak-and-dagger type began. At that time the Soviet Government was playing a kind of double game. It was simultaneously engaged in open negotiations with Britain and France on the one hand, and secret negotiations with Nazi Germany on the other. According to the Soviet historian Potiemkine, however, it was Britain and France that were playing the double game by appeasing Germany while at the same time negotiating with the Soviet Union.²⁷ Perhaps all these powers were playing a double game.

A few days after Molotov became Foreign Minister, the tension in Europe was further sharpened by the announcement of a ten-year German-Italian military alliance (May 7). Always timing her actions with developments in Europe, Japan once more tried to test strength with Russia. On May 11 a Russo-Japanese armed conflict arose over Nomonhan on the border of Outer Mongolia and gradually developed into large-scale hostilities. The severity of this conflict may be gathered from a subsequent remark by Molotov in the course

²⁷ V. Potiemkine and others, *Histoire de la Diplomatie*, Paris, 1947, III, p. 710.

of his speech at the Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 31, 1939. On this occasion he said:

For several months or, to be more precise, in May, June, July, August, and up to the middle of September, hostilities took place in the Nomankhan district in the vicinity of the Mongolian-Manchurian border, between Japanese-Manchurian and Soviet-Mongolian troops. During this period all kinds of arms, including airplanes and heavy artillery were engaged in action, and battles were sometimes of a very sanguinary character.²⁸

In the meantime, itself practically at war with Japan, the Soviet Union naturally continued aid to China. Thus in his address before the Supreme Soviet at the end of May, Molotov reaffirmed Soviet aid to China against Japan in the following terms:

There is no need for me to deal with our attitude toward China. You are well acquainted with Stalin's statement regarding the support for nations which have become victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their countries. This fully applies to China and her struggle for national independence. We are consistently carrying out this policy in practice.²⁹

Before long, Molotov's words concerning China were translated into reality. On July 16 there was concluded between China and the Soviet Union a trade agreement which provided for Soviet supply of arms and war materials to China and for the grant by China of diplomatic status to Soviet trade representatives.³⁰ About two months later, the Soviet Union extended another credit loan to China, this time amounting to 150,000,000 American dollars.³¹

It is worthy of note that while the intense Russo-Japanese armed conflict over Nomonhan had accelerated Soviet aid to China, it may also have inclined the Soviet Union to come to terms with Germany in order to avoid fighting on two fronts. For on the same occasion as Molotov promised continued aid to China, he said:

While conducting negotiations with Great Britain and France, we by no means consider it necessary to renounce business relations with countries like Germany and Italy . . . To judge by certain signs, it is not precluded that the negotiations [with Germany] be resumed.³²

²⁸ V. Molotov, *Soviet Peace Policy*, London, 1941, p. 44.

²⁹ *New York Times*, June 1, 1939.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, June 26, 1939.

³¹ Chinese News Service, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

³² *New York Times*, June 1, 1939.

Later, Soviet negotiations with Germany, not of a "business" nature, were secretly resumed; while negotiations with Britain and France were proceeding along more regular and responsible channels but were still impeded by contrary views over the inclusion of the Baltic states in the general guarantee against aggression.³³ On August 23, 1939, while Russo-Japanese hostilities were raging on the Mongolian border, and before the negotiations with the British and French military missions in Moscow were wound up, Molotov pulled a rabbit from his hat and surprised the whole world. This rabbit was the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact.³⁴ It was signed in Moscow by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop.

This *mariage de convenance* between Communism and Nazism, possibly a result of the Russo-Japanese conflict in the East, now in turn produced repercussions on developments in the East. On September 15 Japan found it necessary to sign a truce with Russia; and the hostilities around Nomonhan which had been raging for over three months abruptly ended.³⁵ Thus by a stroke of diplomacy, the Soviet Union relieved itself at once of pressure from the West and from the East, and furthermore secured an opportunity for its own aggrandizement.

In Europe a week after the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed Nazi troops invaded Poland. This provoked Great Britain and France to declare war on Germany on September 3. A state of war thus came into existence, and Soviet Russia declared herself a neutral. However, on September 17, when Poland was desperately grappling with the Nazi horde in the west, Russian armies marched into Poland from the east. On the same day Molotov declared that Poland was suffering from obvious impotence and that her treaties with Russia, including a nonaggression pact, had ceased to operate.³⁶

Shortly after the marriage of Communism and Nazism the rift in the united front in China, already apparent since the end of 1938, deepened and widened. Confused like Communists elsewhere by "Communazism" and parroting Molotov's remark on October 31 that it was "senseless and criminal to wage war for the destruction of Hitlerism," the Chinese Communists began to call the war an imperialist war. They then disregarded their early pledge to support the National Government and to resist Japan with united efforts. They continued to resist Japan but mainly for the expansion of their

³³ Potiemkine, *op. cit.*, pp. 704-705.

³⁴ *Bulletin of International News*, September 9, 1939, p. 904.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, September 23, 1939, p. 53.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 986.

own power. They created the so-called "Shen Kan Ning (Shensi-Kansu Ninghsia) Border Region," and ruled it like an independent state with its own laws, currency, and taxation system. They also increased their armed forces and expanded beyond the war zone which was originally assigned to them by the Government, and which covered northern Shensi, eastern Suiyuan, Chahar, and northern Hopei.⁸⁷

Like the Chinese Communists, the Soviet Government itself now began to play a kind of double game in the Far East, just as it had done in Europe. On the one hand, it continued to give aid to China. For instance, on October 23, 1939, it was reported that five hundred Russian technicians already were in China and additional supplies of tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and other materials were on their way from Russia.⁸⁸ At the same time, in October 1939, Molotov made conciliatory remarks to Japan, and Stalin sent a new ambassador, Smetanin, to Tokyo to promote friendly Russo-Japanese relations. The new ambassador and his wife drank tea with the Mikado and the Empress. This was no mere diplomatic flirtation. It soon led to an agreement providing for the holding of formal talks, and these talks later settled some disputes on fishery rights and payment for the Chinese Eastern Railway.⁸⁹

On November 30, 1939, under the pretext of strengthening Russian border defenses near Leningrad, Soviet troops, without any declaration of war, marched into Finland, while Soviet planes bombed Helsinki, Finland's capital. The brave Finnish people offered stiff resistance and at the same time appealed to the League of Nations. In defense of the Soviet case Molotov pleaded in terms of international law after the Japanese fashion and said that Russia was "not in a state of war with Finland" and did "not threaten the Finnish people."⁹⁰ On December 14 the Council of the League condemned the USSR and voted for its expulsion from the venerable institution. The Chinese delegate attended the Council meeting but abstained from voting. This gesture reflected the cordial relations between China and Russia at that time.

Brave as the Finnish people were, they could not defy the Russian Colossus forever. On March 12, 1940, they had to accept a peace on Russian terms.

Shortly afterwards Nazi forces with lightning speed invaded and

⁸⁷ Sun Fo, *China Looks Forward*, New York, 1944, pp. 85-86.

⁸⁸ *New York Times*, October 24, 1939.

⁸⁹ Edgar Snow, "Will Stalin Sell Out China?" *China Weekly Review*, May 11, 1940.

PP 369 ff.

⁹⁰ *Bulletin of International News*, December 16, 1939, p. 1424.

overran Denmark and Norway. Toward the end of May the Nazis successfully repeated their blitzkrieg in Belgium and the Netherlands. They then rushed into France. Italy was thereby encouraged to enter the war and stab France in the back. On June 14 Paris fell into Nazi hands and France soon capitulated.

The submergence under the Nazi tide of so many countries in so short a time produced profound effects on world power politics. Britain was at once seized with the fear of imminent invasion and on June 18 had a foretaste of Nazi bombing, which developed with increased severity in the latter part of the year. Russia, despite her nonaggression pact with Germany, was by no means free from misgivings. Hitler's statement in *Mein Kampf* that destruction of France should precede the German drive to the east may have taken on a new and real significance to the Soviets at that time. Accordingly, Soviet Russia committed further aggressions to protect her borders. On June 14, the very day Paris fell, Moscow sent an ultimatum to Lithuania demanding the right to send additional Soviet troops into her territory. Within two days Soviet forces overran Lithuania. On June 16 a similar fate befell Latvia and Estonia.⁴¹

In the Far East the balance of power was violently upset by the Nazi conquests in Europe. Britain, France, and the Netherlands, the principal colonial powers in East Asia, were now unable to defend their colonies. Japan could not resist the temptation. She determined to go south.⁴² And in her southward expansion she tried first to gain control of Indochina. On September 22, 1940, she forced France to permit the establishment of Japanese air bases in Indochina. Early in October she landed troops at Hanoi and tried to bring the whole of Tongking under occupation.⁴³ Further indicating her preparation for southward expansion, she entered into a new pact with Germany and Italy on September 26, providing for mutual assistance against possible attack by "a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict," and excluding Russia from its scope of operation.⁴⁴ This clearly meant that the pact was designed against the United States, which at that time was the only power that could check Japan's southward expansion in the southwestern Pacific.

While Japan had greatly improved her position both in her war against China and in her southward drive, China throughout 1940

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, June 29, 1940, pp. 834-835.

⁴² R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie, ed., *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, New York, 1948, pp. 220-221.

⁴³ *Bulletin of International News*, October 19, 1940, p. 1388.

⁴⁴ *Tokyo Gazette*, November 1940, pp. 193-194.

was faced with great hardships and discouragements. In March the Wang Ching-wei puppet government was set up in Nanking and proclaimed itself to be the "New Central Government of China."⁴⁵ Through this puppet government Japan hoped to effect the political domination of China which she had hitherto sought in vain. To add to China's difficulties and hardships the British Government in July ordered the closing of the Burma Road, which at that time was the principal supply route for China.⁴⁶ Then in early autumn Japan acquired strategic air bases in Indochina and was threatening China not only with economic strangulation but with actual attack from the backdoor. Lastly, the Chinese Communists had become a greater threat to internal peace and unity in consequence of their intensified attempt to enlarge their army and expand their territory. Early in the year the Communist Eighth Army Group moved into Shansi province and then steadily made their way into Shantung, northern Kiangsu and Anhwei, and the Kiangsu Chekiang border to join the Communist New Fourth Army there. In doing so the Communist forces crossed into the war zones assigned by the National Government to other military commanders, and consequently armed clashes broke out. To prevent aggravation of the conflict, the Government in late autumn ordered the Eighth Army to stop its southward expansion and withdraw northward, and ordered the New Fourth Army to cross the Yangtze River to north Kiangsu. The orders, however, were defied, and civil strife in the midst of foreign aggression loomed larger and larger in the offing.⁴⁷

Menaced and attacked from without and within, China as represented by the government at Chungking found herself in a most distressing situation during 1940. But Soviet Russia did not let her down, although Soviet relations with Japan at that time were improving.⁴⁸ With a German war now clearly only a matter of time, Soviet Russia deemed it imperative to ensure freedom from Japanese attack in the East. The Tripartite Pact between Germany, Japan and Italy, though excluding Russia from its operation, did not obligate Japan to refrain from aggression against Russia. The main objective of Soviet policy, therefore, continued to be the prevention of Japan from effecting a quick conquest of China, which certainly would incline Japan to commit aggression in the Soviet Far East and Central Asia, especially when Soviet Russia was being attacked in Europe. Soviet Russia was thus compelled by the iron logic of global

⁴⁵ *New York Times*, March 30, 1940.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, July 19, 1940.

⁴⁷ *Sun Fo*, *op cit.*, p. 86.

⁴⁸ Molotov, *op cit.*, pp. 79-80.

forces to continue giving aid to China and sustaining China as an effective buffer against Japan.

At the end of March, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in his report on the war of resistance against Japan pointed out that Soviet support for China had been considerably stronger since the end of the Soviet-Finnish war.⁴⁹

After the close of the Burma Road, Soviet Russia and China drew closer together and on July 27 concluded another trade agreement providing for the exchange of Chinese raw materials for Russian war supplies.⁵⁰

At that time Dr. W. W. Yen, China's veteran diplomat, said: "Soviet Russia has rendered perhaps more than any other Power material aid to China, in the form of arms, ammunition, and planes."⁵¹

Later, Dr. Wang Chung-hui, another high official of the Chinese National Government, paid tribute to a different kind of Soviet aid to China. He wrote:

The Soviet news agency, newspapers and periodicals have also done their share in winning sympathy and securing support for China. What is published in the Soviet Press tends to make the Soviet people more sympathetic toward the Chinese people and more confident in their governmental policy toward China. Besides, the Soviet press exercises a considerable influence over world opinion, and indirectly enhances our capacity in international publicity work.⁵²

As late as January 4, 1941, China and Soviet Russia signed a new barter agreement whereby Russia undertook to supply China with machinery and military equipment.⁵³ A friend in need is a friend indeed!

⁴⁹ *New York Times*, April 2, 1940.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, July 27, 1940.

⁵¹ Cited in L. K. Rosinger, "Soviet Far Eastern Policy," *Pacific Affairs*, September 1940, p. 265.

⁵² Wang Chung-hui, "China's Foreign Policy during the Last Three Years," *China Quarterly*, Autumn 1940, p. 549.

⁵³ *New York Times*, January 5, 1941.

Russian Appeasement of Japan and Desertion of China

AT THE time it was concluded, the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1939 was generally regarded as testimony of a great diplomatic revolution. Subsequent events, however, showed that it did not represent a true *rapprochement* but only a delaying tactic between two giant powers which, while unafraid and unscrupulous in bullying and attacking the lesser nations, felt as yet unprepared for war with each other and desired a reasonable period for preparation and strategic expansion at the expense of their neighbors before coming to the supreme struggle. In this light it was no wonder that immediately after the pact was concluded Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany vied with each other in the violation of international law and morals and in the absorption of one weaker nation after another as buffers to safeguard their respective boundaries.

On the part of Russia the expectation of the oncoming struggle with Germany became greater after the fall of France in June 1940. To avoid the fatal dilemma between fire and the devil, the Soviet Government, while continuing aid to China to enable her to keep up the fight against Japan, considered it increasingly necessary also to make a readjustment of her relations with Japan. It happened that Japan at this time was seriously contemplating her expansion into southeastern Asia and the southwestern Pacific, and consequently the Japanese Government, while not eager to appease the Soviet Union, was inclined to ease the tension of her relations with that power on a reciprocally beneficial basis. Under the circumstances, the trend toward a Russo-Japanese *rapprochement* waxed stronger and stronger and a new international situation, with far-reaching effects on China's war efforts and internal politics, was about to emerge in the Far East.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE NEUTRALITY PACT AND CHINA

After his forces captured Paris in June 1940, Hitler could not contain his joy, and he danced in glee. He was now fired with ambition to conquer the British Isles. "We are coming," he proclaimed to the Britons.¹ This was no empty threat, for soon afterwards Nazi bombers dropped death and destruction on British cities. However, towards the end of the year Hitler was forced to recognize British air superiority and had to change his plans. He then probably decided to drive to the east. This decision was in keeping with his early notions of conquest as set forth in *Mein Kampf*.

In the meantime it seems that the Soviet Government had anticipated the possible reorientation of Hitler's ventures and had felt gravely concerned over the situation in the Balkans. Indeed, Russia herself had designs in this cockpit of Europe. In early November the Soviet Government dispatched Foreign Minister Molotov to Berlin to discuss the Balkan situation with the Nazi leaders. Arriving on November 12, Molotov immediately had conversations with Hitler, Göring, and Hess, and later had lunch conferences with Hitler and Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop.² During the conferences a wide range of questions were discussed in regard to Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey and the Straits, Russo-Japanese relations, the possibility of Russia adhering to the Tripartite Pact, and so on.³ After a stay of two days Molotov returned to Moscow. A communiqué later issued by the Nazi Government stated that there had been an exchange of views which led to agreement on all important questions which were of interest to the two countries.⁴ This communiqué was intended only for foreign consumption. As a matter of fact there was a strong undercurrent of conflict and tension during the conferences, especially concerning such questions as German troops in Finland, the German guarantee given to Rumania, and the contemplated Soviet guarantee to Bulgaria. An apt commentary on the conferences was that a month or so later, on December 18, Hitler issued the top-secret directive, Operation Barbarossa, aimed at crushing Soviet Russia in a quick campaign.⁵

On January 10, 1941, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia signed a pact of friendship, providing for the settlement of questions connected with the Soviet annexation of the Baltic countries and with

¹ *New York Times*, September 5, 1940.

² *Ibid.*, November 13 and 14, 1940.

³ R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie, ed., *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, New York, 1942, pp. 217-254.

⁴ *New York Times*, November 15, 1940.

⁵ Sontag and Beddie, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-260.

the Polish frontier. On the same day the two countries also entered into a new trade agreement, extending the old one for another year.⁶ On the surface these gestures were signs of further *rapprochement*; actually they were smoke screens designed to cover up Nazi hostility for the Soviets, and possibly vice versa. When spring set in, Nazi expansion in the Balkans began in earnest, and towards the end of March Nazi forces had occupied and dominated Bulgaria, which Russia considered to be within her sphere of influence.

At this critical stage of Nazi aggrandizement, Yosuki Matsuoka, Japan's Foreign Minister, made a visit to Berlin via Moscow, where he stopped over for a while. While in Berlin he had a series of conferences with Hitler and other Nazi leaders and discussed such subjects as Japan's relations with Russia and China and the possibility of Japan entering the war on the side of Germany against the United States and Great Britain.⁷

In the course of the conferences Nazi forces were on the move to invade Yugoslavia. Russia was provoked by the move and quickly extended support to the Yugoslavs. On April 5, when the Nazi invasion was imminent, Russia and Yugoslavia entered into a pact of friendship and nonaggression providing that if one of the contracting parties should be attacked by a third state, the other contracting party pledged itself to preserve its policy of friendship. Nevertheless, the very day after the conclusion of the pact, Nazi bombers launched heavy raids on Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital.⁸

This circumstance could not but outrage the sensibilities of the Soviets. The Soviet Government now considered it imperative to conciliate Japan so as to avoid fighting on two major fronts thousands of miles apart. Accordingly, when Matsuoka on his homeward journey stopped over at Moscow again, Molotov engaged him in conversation, and in a surprisingly short space of time the two diplomats came to a complete concordance of views. The upshot was the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact, signed on April 13, which, like the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939, was generally regarded as symbolizing a revolutionary reversal of international relations.⁹ The conclusion of the Neutrality Pact may appear sudden. Actually, in the latter part of 1940 Russo-Japanese relations had already shown great improvement. Indeed, shortly before Molotov visited Berlin the Japanese Government had offered the Soviet Government a non

⁶ *Bulletin of International News*, January 25, 1941, pp. 100 and 122-123.

⁷ *New York Times*, March 28 and 29, 1941.

⁸ *Bulletin of International News*, April 19, 1941, pp. 531-537.

⁹ *New York Times*, April 14, 1941.

aggression pact and the latter had raised a number of questions as a basis for negotiation.¹⁰

Soon after the pact was signed, Matsuoka resumed his homeward journey. At the railway station, no less a person than Generalissimo Stalin himself, accompanied by Foreign Minister Molotov, came to see him off and bid him farewell.¹¹ This was the greatest honor ever given by the Soviet leaders to a foreign diplomat. It reflected the immense importance which the Soviet leaders must have attached to the newly signed pact.

The very fact that Russia, hitherto a strong supporter of China's war efforts, had reached a *rapprochement* with Japan, as yet still China's bitterest foe, constituted a great disappointment to the Chinese Government and people. But the conditions of the *rapprochement*, as embodied in the provisions of the Neutrality Pact, deepened the disappointment.

Article 1 of the pact provided that "both Contracting Parties agree to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and to respect each other's territorial integrity and inviolability."

By Article 2 the two parties pledged that should one of them be the object of military action by one or more states, the other would observe neutrality throughout the whole duration of such conflict.

Article 3 stated that the pact was to be valid for five years and then would be automatically renewed unless previously denounced.

A joint statement annexed to the pact declared that the Government of the Japanese Empire and the Government of the USSR "respect on the part of the Japanese Empire the territorial integrity and inviolability of the People's Republic of Mongolia and on the part of the Soviet Union the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Empire of Manchukuo."

With these terms, the pact was embarrassing to China for a number of reasons.

(1) It raised the morale of Japanese forces and encouraged Japanese aggression. It therefore ran counter to the letter and spirit of the Sino-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1937, whereby Russia undertook "to refrain from taking any action or entering into any agreement, which may be used by the aggressor or aggressors to the disadvantage of" China.

(2) By the declaration on Mongolia and Manchuria, Russia clearly indicated her willingness to recognize Manchukuo, and her disposition to assume the same position in Outer Mongolia as Japan

¹⁰ Sontag and Beddie, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-252.

¹¹ *Time*, April 21, 1941, p. 34.

assumed in Manchuria. In both cases a great injury was done to China's sovereignty as well as her territorial integrity.

(3) The pact eased the tension on the Siberian-Manchurian border and thereby enabled Japan to shift part of her seasoned troops from Manchuria to eastern and central China for active aggression. Following the conclusion of the pact Japan intensified her offensive along the China coast and occupied a number of important towns, including Ningpo, Wenchow, and Foochow.¹² At the same time her forces in the interior started a large-scale offensive against Chinese strongholds in Hupeh province.¹³

(4) While facing intensified Japanese attacks, China on the other hand was threatened with cessation of war supplies from Russia, which had been coming for years in a steady stream. In reply to a query from the Chinese Government as to whether the pact with Japan constituted Soviet recognition of Manchukuo and whether it would affect the continuance of Sino-Soviet trade, the Soviet Government on April 16 formally gave the assurance that the Neutrality Pact with Japan did not mean a change of Soviet policy toward China.¹⁴ This assurance turned out to be mere diplomatic platitude, especially after the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union on June 22. In late October the Chinese Government received notification from Moscow that in view of the war with the Nazis war shipments to China would have to be discontinued.¹⁵

(5) Last but not least, the pact had the effect of encouraging the separatist tendency on the part of the Chinese Communists and increasing the difficulties of the National Government. In January 1941 the Communists' defiance of the Government had culminated in a big armed conflict on the southern bank of the lower Yangtze. The severity of the conflict may be seen from the fact that General Yeh T'ing, veteran Communist commander, was captured and his New Fourth Army practically wiped out by the Government forces.¹⁶ But this serious setback strengthened rather than weakened the determination of the Communist leaders to oppose the Government and to seek expansion whenever and wherever possible. By March the situation had so worsened that the Communists even withdrew from and boycotted the People's Political Council.¹⁷ When

Russia came to terms with Japan, the Chinese Communists thought, and rightly, that the Chungking Government had been abandoned by Moscow, and consequently they had even less regard for the Government and became more intransigent in continuing their independent course of action and expanding their influence.

It can thus be seen that the Soviet *rapprochement* with Japan not only weakened Soviet ties with China and dampened China's war efforts against Japan but also accentuated the internal dissensions in China.

THE NAZI-SOVIET WAR AND PEARL HARBOR

By the end of April 1941 Nazi forces had pushed into Greece and Yugoslavia, in disregard of Soviet interests and susceptibilities. Stalin and other Soviet leaders could not fail to realize that their war with the Nazis was coming apace. To prepare for the imminent conflict the first care of the Soviets was, as it had always been, to ensure freedom from attack on the Far Eastern front. In order to further cement the understanding, if not friendship, with Japan, the Soviet Union on June 11 signed a commercial agreement with Japan to last for five years and providing for an exchange of goods totaling 30,000,000 yen a year and for reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment concerning tariff and commercial procedures.¹⁸

Ten days afterwards Hitler declared war on Russia in a characteristic anti-Bolshevik diatribe, and almost while he spoke, Nazi forces rushed eastward onto Soviet soil.

In waging war on Russia Hitler may have thought that the moment he actually fulfilled his former pledge to destroy Bolshevism, Great Britain and the United States might join his crusade, particularly when he noticed that up to that moment Soviet relations with Great Britain and the United States had been deteriorating in consequence of Soviet attack and occupation of various countries including Finland. To his chagrin, quite the contrary happened. The moment the Nazi-Soviet war began, the two Anglo-Saxon powers ceased to regard Soviet Russia as a potential enemy and their suspicions of Soviet Russia vanished like morning dew before the rising sun. The British Government under the leadership of Churchill soon proclaimed its community of interest with the Soviet Government. On July 13 Great Britain and Soviet Russia formally became allies by signing an alliance agreement which came into force immediately, without being subject to ratification.¹⁹

On August 14 Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt

¹⁸ *Bulletin of International News*, June 28, 1941, p. 860.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, July 26, 1941, pp. 924-925.

had a meeting aboard a battleship in the north Atlantic and afterwards issued what has since been called the Atlantic Charter, whose contents substantially resembled the Fourteen Points of President Wilson toward the end of the first World War. At the meeting of the Inter-Allied Council in London on September 24, Maisky, Soviet ambassador to the Court of St. James, declared that the Soviet Government endorsed the principles expressed in the charter, "principles which are so important in the present international circumstances." In November the United States Lend Lease Law, enacted the previous May, was extended to include Soviet Russia as a beneficiary. The first US loan to the USSR amounted to \$1,000,000,000 and carried no interest.²⁰

Meanwhile developments in the Pacific were heading toward a crisis. Following the conclusion of her Neutrality Pact with Russia, Japan not only intensified her aggression in China but continued her aggrandizement in southeast Asia. On July 21 Japanese forces occupied south Indochina. This move greatly provoked the United States.²¹ In protest, the United States on July 25 froze Japanese assets in its territory. The next day Great Britain followed suit and froze Japanese assets in the British Empire. Later the Dutch Netherlands enforced similar measures against Japan. The situation then became tense. War clouds cast a dark shadow over the Pacific. At the end of August, Prince Konoe, Japan's Prime Minister, proposed a meeting between President Roosevelt and himself for a frank exchange of views concerning issues between their respective countries.²² This proposal was later repeatedly made by the Japanese ambassador Admiral Nomura in Washington in the succeeding months. But Secretary of State Cordell Hull replied that as preliminary requisites for the meeting of the heads of the two governments, Japan must show manifest intention to withdraw her troops from China and Indochina and make clear the fundamental principles concerning the outstanding issues.²³ The meeting did not take place. Exploratory conversations, however, were continued between Secretary Hull and the Japanese ambassador. Early in November, Saburo Kurusu, Japan's special envoy, flew to Washington to assist the ambassador in the conversations. Nevertheless the conversations showed no progress. On December 6 President Roosevelt telegraphed a personal message to the Emperor of Japan, referring

²⁰ *Ibid.*, October 4, 1911, p. 1276; November 15, 1911, p. 1901, *American Review on the Soviet Union*, February March 1912, p. 47.

²¹ Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, New York, 1918, II, p. 1014.

²² Department of State, *United States Foreign Relations Japan, 1911-1912*, Washington, 1912, II, pp. 572-575.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 656-661; Hull, *op. cit.*, II, p. 1033.

to the "tragic possibilities" in the Pacific, and stating that both he and the Emperor had "a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world."²⁴ The reply came the following day. Its delivery to Secretary Hull by the Japanese envoy and the Japanese ambassador at 1:20 P.M. (Washington time) synchronized with Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, an attack which appears to have taken the United States completely by surprise. Soon afterwards the United States declared war on Japan and later also on Germany in Europe. World War II thus assumed its full stature and proceeded in full swing with the rapid victories of Japan in southeastern Asia echoed by rapid Nazi victories in Russia.

On New Year's Day 1942 the embryo of the United Nations was formed when representatives of twenty-six nations, including the United States, China, Russia, and Great Britain, signed in Washington the United Nations Agreement stipulating that each of the four Governments pledged itself to employ its full resources, military and economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which that Government was at war.²⁵

SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM SINKIANG

Throughout the course of World War II, or more precisely after Pearl Harbor, Sino-Soviet relations continued to be in a state of slow but steady deterioration. A beginning and important feature of this phase of Sino-Soviet relations was the wholesale Soviet withdrawal from the Chinese province of Sinkiang.

It was Stalin's plan to make Sinkiang a sphere of exclusive Soviet influence and a bulwark of Soviet power in the East.²⁶ In consequence of Soviet interest and investment in its economic development,²⁷ Sinkiang had reached an advanced stage of material progress when the Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out in July 1937. Following the Soviet policy of supporting China against Japan, General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, director of the Sinkiang administration, pledged his support for the Chinese National Government. This pledge assumed special significance about mid-1940, when Japan had cut off China's supply lines from Indochina and Burma and the only route of supply for China was the Siberian-Northwest Highway which traverses Sinkiang to the Soviet Union. A year later, after Russia had joined the war against Germany, Russian aid to China

²⁴ Department of State, *op. cit.*, pp. 784-786.

²⁵ Department of State, *Bulletin*, January 3, 1942, p. 3.

²⁶ A. Barmine, *One Who Survived*, New York, 1945, p. 231.

²⁷ *Supra*, p. 128.

ceased and the highway lost its significance. However, before long Sinkiang assumed a new significance to China, and the Chinese Government and people developed a new and intensive interest in that province.

Following Pearl Harbor, Japan drove into Indochina and Burma and seriously menaced China from the rear. The Chinese Government then determined to broaden its war base to anticipate the moment when it might be compelled further to trade space for time. Attention was then directed to Sinkiang. In March 1942 the Government sent a special commissioner, General Chu Shao-liang, to Tihwa to negotiate with General Sheng.²⁸ Probably expecting the Nazi defeat of Russia, General Sheng early in April publicly pledged his loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek and arrested some of the principal pro-Soviet officials and discharged numerous others.²⁹ From then on, events moved at a rapid tempo. A substantial portion of the huge army of war refugees from the coastal areas were encouraged to migrate into the northwestern province under the leadership of university students and engineering experts. In early July Dr. Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economics, and General Chu Shao-liang, commander of the Eighth War Zone, led a delegation to Tihwa and made a general survey of the province. A "Go Northwest" movement then began in China, and the Central Planning Board worked out a ten-year plan for the development of the Northwest.³⁰ In the latter part of August Madame Chiang Kai-shek flew to Tihwa, where she had several conferences with General Sheng. This event gave an impetus to the "Go Northwest" movement. For various purposes connected with this movement the Government appropriated a big sum at the beginning of 1943.³¹ At the same time the regime in Sinkiang was reorganized. A Supervisory High Commissioner, responsible to Chungking, was installed in Tihwa, and a branch of the Kuomintang was established there. Many of the former officials were removed and replaced by new ones appointed by Chungking. In a few months Sinkiang was made subject to a large measure of effective Chinese rule. The new political picture included the establishment in Tihwa of British and American consulates.³²

Meanwhile Russia was being ravaged by the Nazi forces and had suffered tremendous losses and casualties, particularly in the grim struggle at Stalingrad which lasted almost half a year, till February

²⁸ T. White, "Report from Turkestan" *Time*, October 25, 1913, pp. 27-28.

²⁹ *New York Times*, August 30, 1914; May 17, 1915.

³⁰ *China at War*, July 1913, pp. 56-57.

³¹ *Ibid.*, February 1913, p. 80.

³² White, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

republic.³⁴ Several months later, in March 1944, these disturbances took on a more menacing character and involved Outer Mongolia as well as the Kazakhs. At that time it was reported that Kazakh raiding parties had crossed into northern Sinkiang and that during the ensuing skirmishes about ten Soviet planes bombed and strafed the Chinese troops for four days between March 11 and March 16.³⁵ On April 2 the Moscow radio broadcast a dispatch received by Tass, the Soviet news agency, from Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, alleging that Chinese troops in Sinkiang in their pursuit of persecuted Kazakhs had violated the territorial integrity of the Mongolian People's Republic and that Mongolian authorities expected the Soviet Government to give them "every necessary help and support" in accordance with the Soviet-Mongol Mutual Assistance Pact of March 12, 1936. The Tass dispatch also charged that Chinese planes had machine-gunned the fleeing Kazakhs.³⁶ The Chinese Government promptly denied these charges.

Before April came to an end, Moslem revolts sprang up from a new quarter when parties of Kazakhs on the border of Soviet Kazakhstan fought their way eastward and advanced as deep as seventy miles beyond the important center of Ining. With the occupation of this key point as well as of Tacheng (Chugutchak), the revolt simmered down for a while, but flared up again in July and steadily increased in intensity and severity.³⁷ In August, apparently to mollify Soviet feelings, General Sheng resigned his post, and General Wu Chung hsin was appointed to head the Sinkiang government.³⁸ But the Moslem revolt did not abate. On November 7, 1944, when General Chiu Shao-liang, commander of the Eighth War Zone, was attending a reception given by the Soviet consul-general in Tihwa in honor of the twenty-seventh anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, he was suddenly informed that an armed band equipped with mortars and machine guns had captured Kulja (Ili).³⁹ Thus gathering strength and momentum, the Moslem revolt continued into the following years and clogged the wheel of Sino-Soviet relations.

SOVIET DENUNCIATION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

For years since the Lukouchiao incident in 1937 the Soviet press had been sympathetic toward China's war efforts and consistent in

³⁴ *Ibid.*, May 18, 1945.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, April 5, 1944.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, April 3, 1944; *American Review on the Soviet Union*, November 1944.

P 107.

³⁷ *New York Times*, May 16 and 18, 1945.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, August 30, 1944.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, May 16, 1945.

after the triumph at Stalingrad, Russia was at least freed from the fear of defeat, if not assured of final victory. It was also clear at that time that Japan was beginning to feel the impact of American naval and air power in the Pacific and was neither willing nor able to open a Far Eastern front against Russia. In the second place, Moscow wanted to uphold the Chinese Communists. At the time Rogov made his criticisms, the Chinese Government and Communist forces were engaged in fierce though sporadic armed conflicts.

THE MOSCOW, CAIRO, AND TEHERAN CONFERENCES

In the latter part of 1943, even when Soviet withdrawal from Sinkiang was going on, prospects of Allied victory in Europe began to appear brighter and brighter. Apart from crushing the Nazi onslaughts, the Soviet forces secured big gains in their own offensives and were rolling along in their persistent advance towards Germany, while the Anglo-American armies were making rapid progress in North Africa and the Mediterranean and had brought about the unconditional surrender of Italy on September 3. On the other hand, in the previous March and April it had been reported that Germany and the Soviet Union were carrying on secret negotiations in Bulgaria. Furthermore, Japan had always been active in bringing Germany and the Soviet Union together.⁴⁰ Lest the reassuring signs of victory should revive separatist considerations of selfish interests and ambitions on the part of the Allies, or should induce Hitler to make considerable concessions to make a separate peace and split the Allied coalition, the chief Allied Powers considered it necessary to take steps to strengthen their own solidarity and continue their united action against their enemy. Accordingly a conference was held at Moscow on October 19, attended by the Foreign Secretaries of the United States (Cordell Hull), Great Britain (Anthony Eden), and Soviet Russia (V. M. Molotov). It lasted twelve days till October 30. China was never a party to any of the sessions. However, among the declarations that were the products of the conference there was one dealing with general security, and Secretary Hull suggested that it should include the sponsorship of China. The suggestion was seconded by the British Foreign Secretary, but met with opposition from Molotov. It was through Hull's insistence and efforts that this opposition was overcome and the Chinese Government was given a chance to participate. When the declaration concerning general security was ready on the morning of October 30, therefore, the Chinese ambassador to Moscow, Dr. Foo Ping sheung, was called in to

⁴⁰ D. Dillin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East*, New Haven, 1943, pp. 175-180.

attach his signature to the document, which has since been called the Moscow Declaration. This instrument envisaged the creation at the earliest practicable date of a general international organ, based on the "sovereign equality" of all peace-loving states and open to membership of all such states, large and small. It further provided that after hostilities ended, Russia, China, Britain, and the United States would not employ their military forces within the territories of the other nations except for the purposes envisaged in the declaration and after joint consultation.⁴¹

Perhaps during the Moscow conference the Soviet Government had indicated its unwillingness to participate in any conference to which China was a party. Anyway, soon afterwards two separate conferences were held: one without Russia, the other without China. The former took place at Cairo from November 22 to November 26, 1943; the latter at Teheran from November 28 to December 1 of the same year. Deep secrecy surrounded both conferences as they ran their course. It was only after they had ended that announcements were made of their time and locale. The Cairo conference was attended by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, with their respective military and diplomatic advisers. Its results were crystallized in a statement issued on December 1. This statement proclaimed that "the three great allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan," that "they covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion," and that "it is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." The statement also mentioned that "in due course" Korea should become free and independent.⁴²

In the course of the Cairo conference the three leaders also discussed the prosecution of the war in China and southeast Asia. In this connection Chiang Kai-shek requested that the Allies should undertake an amphibious operation to supplement the land operations in Burma. Roosevelt complied with the request and promised Chiang "a considerable amphibious operation across the Bay of Bengal within the next few months." Churchill, however, strongly opposed the idea, but Roosevelt stuck to his promise.⁴³

⁴¹ Leland Goodrich, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1943-1944*, Boston, 1945, p. 229.

⁴² *New York Times*, December 1 and 2, 1943.

⁴³ Winston S. Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, Boston, 1951, p. 328.

The Teheran conference was attended by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill. This was what Stalin wanted. In a note to Churchill he said: "It stands to reason that a meeting of the heads of only three Governments must take place at Teheran as it had been agreed. There should be absolutely excluded the participation of the representatives of any other Powers." In the same note Stalin declined the invitation to attend the Cairo conference.⁴⁴

At the end of the conference the three leaders issued a statement to the effect that the three great allies were determined that their nations "shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow," and that "no power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air. Our attacks will be relentless and increasing."⁴⁵

This statement may give the impression that only the European war and problems were discussed. Actually, the leaders at the conference also exchanged views on the Far Eastern war, and some of the views affected China very intimately. For instance, during his first meeting with Stalin, Roosevelt spoke of his promise to Chiang Kai-shek concerning offensive operations in Burma. Stalin at once took the opportunity to discredit the Chinese Government. He expressed a low opinion of the fighting quality of the Chinese armies and ascribed this military inferiority to the fault of the Chinese leaders.⁴⁶ Later in the meeting, Stalin gave the assurance that the moment Germany collapsed Russia would join the war against Japan.⁴⁷ Among other implications, this assurance also was a blow to the plan of operations in Burma; for Russian participation in the Far Eastern war would practically ensure the defeat of Japan and render operations in Burma unnecessary. After the Teheran conference, Roosevelt had some further arguments with Churchill concerning the Burma operations, but in the end he changed his mind and informed Chiang Kai-shek that the Burma plan had been thrown overboard.⁴⁸

During the conference, the *quid pro quo* for Russian participation in the Far Eastern war was also discussed, and questions such as Russian use of the Manchurian railways and international guaranty of Dairen as a free port were raised and explored.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

⁴⁵ *New York Times*, December 7, 1943.

⁴⁶ R. E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, New York, 1948, p. 777.

⁴⁷ Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 411-412.

⁴⁹ Department of State, *United States Relations with China*, Washington, 1949.

p. 113n. Hereafter cited as *US Relations with China*.

The Teheran conference foreshadowed the later Yalta conference in that questions intimately connected with China were discussed without China's participation.

On the whole, the Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran conferences revealed the hostile attitude of the Soviet Government towards the Chinese Government and the consequent festering state of Sino-Soviet relations.

FURTHER RUSSO-JAPANESE RAPPROCHEMENT

While its Red Army continued to gain in counterattacks against the Nazi legions, and though it had established understandings with the British and American governments through the Moscow and Teheran conferences, the Soviet Government in the spring of 1944 further cemented its relations with Japan, and this by an agreement concluded on March 30. At that time, D-Day (June 6) was still months away, and the Soviet deal with Japan might have been designed for the purpose of pressing the United States and Great Britain to open a second front in Europe. To China the new Russo-Japanese agreement was another painful surprise. Its effects, whether intended by the Soviet Government or not, were highly disastrous to China in her war against the Japanese invaders.

By the new agreement Japan undertook to surrender back to Russia the oil and coal concessions in northern Sakhalin which she received from Russia in 1925 through a treaty signed that year, and which should have run for a period of forty-five years till 1970. In return, Russia undertook to renew the fisheries convention with Japan for five years, to pay Japan 5,000,000 rubles, and to deliver to Japan annually 50,000 metric tons of oil "on ordinary commercial terms over a period of five consecutive years after the cessation of the present war."⁵⁰

In an explanatory editorial which accompanied the publication of the agreement, *Izvestiia*, official organ of the Kremlin, maintained that the new deals with Japan were "advantageous to Russia and her allies in war," for, so it alleged, Japan was practically compelled to give up the concessions in view of the Allied victories and of the strong diplomatic position of the Soviet Government. To support this view the Soviet organ declared that at the time of the signing of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact in April 1941 Japan had agreed to liquidate the concessions in northern Sakhalin within six months but afterwards broke her promise in consequence of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. This explanation was gen-

⁵⁰ *American Review on the Soviet Union*, November 1944, p. 107; *New York Times*, April 1, 1944.

erally accepted by the British and American press, which looked upon the new agreement as an important triumph in Soviet diplomacy.

As a matter of fact the Soviet explanation was far from adequate. It entirely ignored what Japan received in return for the concessions surrendered. It did not mention the 5,000,000 rubles. It did not mention the fact that the long-term fishery convention—to last for five years—was ardently desired by Japan as early as 1936 but had been denied her during the intervening years. And it did not mention the diplomatic implications of the agreement, which clearly indicated that Russia was to maintain peaceful relations with Japan, for only on the basis of such relations would Russia deliver the stipulated 50,000 metric tons of oil to Japan every year for five years after "the present war." In this connection, it should be noted that "the present war" could only mean the war in Europe. First, Russia by that time had meticulously kept herself from being involved in any way in the war in China and in the Pacific. Secondly, only when Russia was out of the war in Europe could she be in a position to deliver the annual quota of oil to Japan. Thirdly, if "the present war" meant the Pacific war, then the agreement was virtually meaningless. For if Japan came out of the Pacific war victorious, she could obtain plenty of oil from the Netherlands East Indies and would not care much for the oil from Sakhalin; if she were defeated, as she actually was, in the Pacific war, she either did not need the oil from Sakhalin which was intended for war purposes, or could not claim it. Lastly, it is an undeniable fact that the war policy of the United States and Great Britain was to concentrate on attacks in Europe and to finish Hitler first before everything else. Under the circumstances, it was evident to all sensible people that the war in Europe was to end before the war in the Far East. In short, Japan made the new agreement with Russia in anticipation of the day when the Anglo-American air forces would bomb not only the Netherlands East Indies but also Sakhalin and the Japanese homeland.

Sober views on the new Russo-Japanese agreement were not absent. Representative Mike Mansfield told the American House of Representatives on April 1 that the new agreement between Russia and Japan would not materially injure Japan's oil supply, but would strengthen her position at home and in her occupied territories by providing food staples.⁵¹ In Tokyo the agreement was hailed as a sure sign of the solidity of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact of

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, April 2, 1944

1941. In Chungking the news of the agreement was regarded as a clear indication that Russia would continue to remain neutral in the Pacific war and that Japan would feel free to shift her crack troops from Manchuria to the war theaters in central China.⁵² This view was fully substantiated by subsequent events. Scarcely three weeks after the signing of the agreement Japan launched a big drive in Honan province, where her forces made rapid advances and captured many important railway centers. Other drives followed and by mid-May developed into a powerful double-pronged offensive toward the central provinces of Hupeh and Hunan, aiming at seizing the Peking-Hankow-Canton Railway, cutting China in half, and completing the overland supply route from Manchuria to Indochina.⁵³ The offensive became so threatening that the Chungking Government was confronted with a new crisis and began to wonder whether the policy of trading space for time was still possible.

THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONFERENCES

By late spring 1944 the Red Army had recovered all Soviet territory as of 1939 and was continuing its thunderous advance toward Germany and Nazi-controlled countries. With Allied victory in Europe appearing near, organization for world peace became more urgent. On May 30 Secretary of State Cordell Hull took the first step in that direction. On that day he conferred with the British Ambassador Viscount Halifax and Soviet Ambassador Gromyko simultaneously in the morning, and with the Chinese Ambassador Wei Tao-ming in the afternoon. During the conferences Secretary Hull invited the British, Soviet, and Chinese governments to participate in "conversations" looking to the formation of a world peace organization.⁵⁴ In the conference with Halifax and Gromyko, Hull also made "a very earnest appeal to their Governments to let China take part in the conferences."⁵⁵

Ten days later the British and Chinese governments notified Secretary Hull that they accepted his invitation to exploratory conversations on world peace. The Soviet reply came later, but also indicated acceptance of the invitation.⁵⁶

The four governments appear to have had great difficulty in reaching a compromise on methods of approach and procedure for the conversations. In early July such a compromise was yet to be

⁵² *Ibid.*, April 2 and 3, 1944.

⁵³ *Bulletin of International News*, May 13 and June 10, 1944, pp. 396 and 490.

⁵⁴ *New York Times*, May 31, 1944.

⁵⁵ Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1671.

⁵⁶ *New York Times*, June 10, 1944.

made. About the same time the Soviet Government formally expressed its unwillingness to participate in multilateral conversations to which China would be a party, its pretext being that Russia was then not at war with Japan.⁵⁷ Consequently, it was later announced that two parallel series of conversations would be held: one for Russia, Britain, and the United States, and one for China, Britain, and the United States. It was also decided that the Russian-British American series should begin first, and this on August 14. In the meantime, however, the Soviet Government raised other questions. It requested more time to make preparations for the coming peace talks. It also objected to the written exchange of ideas on peace prior to the talks.⁵⁸ As a result the talks were postponed to August 21.

On this date representatives of the three countries met at Dumbarton Oaks and began their discussion on the formation of an organization to enforce world peace. The discussion lasted almost forty days, till September 28.

The Chinese British-American series of conversations began on September 29 and lasted eight days till October 7.

On October 9 the so called Dumbarton Oaks proposals or agreements were made public.⁵⁹ They envisaged an international organization resembling in its bold outlines the former League of Nations. They were incomplete and inadequate, inasmuch as they left for consideration at a later conference such important problems as the voting procedure in the Security Council and the relative authority in the Security Council between the big and the small powers.

So far as Sino-Soviet relations were concerned, the Dumbarton Oaks conversations were important in that they pointed up once again the deteriorating state of the relations. The conversations were held in two separate series because the Soviet Government did not like to join any discussion in which the Chinese Government took part. The pretext that Russia was not then at war with Japan is a lame one. In the first place, the conversations dealt with peace only, not also with war in any of its aspects. Secondly, since Pearl Harbor, Great Britain and the United States were also at war with Japan, and their status vis-à-vis Japan was technically the same as that of China. It was, therefore, technically inconsistent for the Soviet Government to carry on the conversations with the United States and Great Britain on the one hand and to refuse to do so with China on the other.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* July 6, 1911.

⁵⁸ *Hull, op cit* p. 1674.

⁵⁹ Department of State, *Bulletin*, October 8, 1944. pp. 356-374.

SINKING PRESTIGE OF THE CHUNGKING GOVERNMENT

While the Dumbarton Oaks conversations were on, the general situation in China became highly critical. After their new *rapprochement* with Russia in the previous March, the Japanese launched powerful offensives in Central China and, as a result, the Chinese Government suffered some serious military setbacks with all their disastrous consequences.

In contrast, the Soviet Red Army, which had been making steady advance against the Nazi forces ever since Stalingrad, was staging all-out offensives and winning spectacular victories, while the Anglo-American forces were also making rapid progress after their landing in Europe on June 6 (D-Day). Allied military cooperation against Nazi Germany was rising to a climax. Furthermore, the United States and Great Britain were not only gratified that Soviet Russia was doing well in fighting Germany, but were also hoping that she would continue to be their ally to fight and defeat Japan after Germany was laid low. At the same time they were anxious to prevent her from coming to terms with Japan and enabling Japan to prolong the war in the Pacific. On the other hand, Soviet Russia was in a relatively safe position, being completely free from foreign pressure. In the west, Germany was being defeated. In the east, Japan was entangled in war with China and the United States and had ceased to be a threat to Siberia. Indeed, it was now Japan's turn to worry about Soviet policies and designs. For all these reasons, Soviet Russia was enjoying immense prestige in Allied countries, and her words and attitudes undoubtedly carried great weight in Allied councils. This circumstance could not but produce telling effects on the situation in China. The very victory and rising prestige of Soviet Russia were sufficient to inspire the Chinese Communists with hope and to encourage their struggle for supreme power. But the Soviet Government had made deliberate efforts to boycott and slight the Chungking Government, and through its powerful organs of propaganda, it continued to denounce the latter government. Such an unfriendly Soviet attitude toward Chungking might have influenced not only the policy of the Chinese Communists but, possibly, also the policy of the United States Government which was at that time eager to secure Soviet participation in the war against Japan.

Since their severe armed clashes on the lower reaches of the Yangtze in the summer of 1943, the Chungking Government and the Communists had not healed the sores that festered in their re-

lations. The threat of civil war continued to hang like the sword of Damocles over the nation. Acting on the policy of settling political issues by political means, as enunciated on September 13 by Chiang Kai-shek,⁶⁰ the Government proceeded to arrange negotiations with the Communists. Early in May 1944 a conference was held at Sian between Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, representing the Government, and Lin Tsu-han, representing the Communists. Toward the end of the month the conference was shifted to Chungking. Little progress, however, was made in the negotiations.⁶¹

In the following month Henry Wallace, then Vice-president of the United States, came to Chungking to see what could be done to bring the Nationalists and the Communists together. Chiang Kai-shek must have felt that Soviet Russia was behind the Chinese Communists. He might also have had misgivings concerning the designs of a triumphant Soviet Russia in the Far East, especially in China. Undoubtedly, he was the more concerned about those designs when, as he realized, the Soviet attitude towards his Government became increasingly cool and unfriendly. He desired to have a conference with the Soviet authorities; but such was the unsatisfactory state of relations between his government and Moscow that he tried to seek the good offices of a third party. During one of his conversations with Wallace, therefore, Chiang asked him to inform President Roosevelt that he would welcome the latter's friendly assistance to bring about "better relations between the U.S.S.R. and China" and to bring about "a meeting between Chinese and Soviet representatives," and that he "would go more than halfway in reaching an understanding with the U.S.S.R."⁶²

Did President Roosevelt answer this request by the Yalta agreement regarding Manchuria? One wonders.

On his return to the United States in July, Wallace submitted to President Roosevelt a report on his mission, which was not made public until January 18, 1950.⁶³ In this report he made some rather adverse reflections on Chiang Kai-shek and his regime. Said he:

Chiang, a man with an Oriental military mind, sees his authority threatened by economic deterioration, which he does not understand, and by social unrest symbolized in communism, which he thoroughly distrusts; and neither of which he can control by military commands.

⁶⁰ *New York Times*, September 14, 1943.

⁶¹ *U.S. Relations with China*, p. 55.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 558.

⁶³ *New York Times*, January 19, 1950.

Toward the end of the report, Wallace wrote:

Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence or political strength to run post-war China. The leaders of post-war China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now seems more likely the latter.

Such being its tenor, the report was a positive blow to the prestige of the Chungking Government.

In fact by mid-1944 a significant change was shaping up in American public opinion toward the Chungking Government. The American press correspondents in Chungking were undergoing a reorientation in their feelings towards the Government and the Communists, becoming less friendly towards the former and more sympathetic towards the latter. In their articles and dispatches they played up the war efforts of the Communists against Japan. In July an American military mission was stationed at Yen-an, and the reports that later came out from the mission members highly praised the fine discipline and skillful leadership of the Communist forces and urged that they should be equipped with better arms.⁶⁴ These reports, no doubt, tended to raise the prestige of the Communists and lower the prestige of Chungking in the eyes of the American public and the American Government.

Similarly, Moscow exerted its influence to induce American interest in the Chinese Communists. Towards the end of August, while in Moscow en route to China, Donald Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, and General Patrick Hurley had a conversation with Foreign Minister Molotov, wherein the Soviet diplomat told them that the Chinese Communists were in no way related to Communism, that they were in no way tied to the Soviet Government, and that they were only reformers interested in improving the economic conditions of China.⁶⁵ The implication of such talk is obvious: There was no reason why America should not arm and aid the Chinese Communists as well as the Nationalists.

General Hurley and Donald Nelson, accompanied by General Stilwell, arrived at Chungking in the first part of September. They were sent by President Roosevelt to help the Chinese Government solve its military, political, and economic difficulties. Perhaps influenced by the Soviet stand toward China and by the many reports coming from China by American officers and correspondents, the American Government was trying to apply pressure on the Chinese Govern-

⁶⁴ Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle*, Princeton, 1953, pp. 148n, 160-161, 175.

⁶⁵ *U.S. Relations with China*, pp. 71-72.

At the beginning of February, a Big Three conference was held at Yalta in the Crimean peninsula. President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill, with their military and diplomatic advisers, were the participants. Before the conference terminated on February 11, a series of secret deals were made. One of these secret deals was Soviet participation in the Pacific war in return for important concessions in Manchuria at the expense of China and without the knowledge of China. The text of this secret deal follows:

The leaders of the three great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

(1) The *status quo* in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

(2) The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz., (a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union, (b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored; (c) The Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway, which provides an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

(3) The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114

At the conclusion of the Yalta Conference a statement on its results was issued by the Big Three leaders. This statement, of course, did not mention the above secret deal. It is of interest to note, however, that it contained this declaration: "We reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter"⁶⁹—as if it had been forgotten that one of the principles of the charter is that no territorial changes shall be made without the consent of the peoples concerned!

In his report to a joint session of Congress on the Crimean conference on March 1, 1945, President Roosevelt did not make any reference to China or Manchuria, but made this statement: "It is still a tough, long road to Tokyo. The defeat of Germany will not mean the end of the war against Japan. On the contrary, America must be prepared for a long and costly struggle in the Pacific."⁷⁰

On April 5 the Soviet Government showed its determination to act up to the secret Yalta deal by denouncing its Neutrality Pact with Japan concluded on April 13, 1941. As the pact still had more than a year to run, the Soviet Foreign Minister in its brief note to the Japanese Government advanced the pretext that the conditions originally governing the conclusion of the pact had "radically changed." The note then stressed the point that Germany in her attack on Russia had been aided by Japan, and that Japan had also attacked Russia's allies: Great Britain and the United States.⁷¹ Thus the Soviet Government, on the eve of victory over Nazi Germany, was about to pounce on Japan, whose good will it had for years tried to cultivate and to preserve in order to avoid a conflict that might have taken place simultaneously with the Nazi-Soviet conflict in the west.

It may not be out of place here to mention that the secret deal involving China and Manchuria was first made public by the United States Department of State on February 11, 1946. Accompanying the text was a statement by Secretary of State Byrnes, saying that the deal was a military agreement marked top secret.⁷² Prior to its disclosure the agreement was locked up in President Roosevelt's personal safe. Even Truman, when he became President upon Roosevelt's death in April 1945, had no idea about its existence, to say nothing of its content.⁷³ James Byrnes became Secretary of State in the beginning of July 1945. He confessed he did not know of the agreement until several weeks afterwards.⁷⁴

As to why the agreement came to be made, opinions have been

⁶⁹ Department of State, *Bulletin*, February 18, 1945, p. 215.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, March 4, 1945, p. 326.

⁷¹ *New York Times*, April 6, 1945.

⁷² Department of State, *Bulletin*, February 24, 1946, pp. 282 ff.

⁷³ L. R. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians*, New York, 1949, p. 96.

⁷⁴ J. T. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, 1947, p. 219.

conflicting. According to Robert Sherwood, President Roosevelt consented to the agreement because he was "tired out and anxious to end the negotiations relative to Russia's entry into the war against Japan."⁷⁵ Former Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, however, assailed this view, and declared that the Yalta agreement "was carefully worked out and was not a snap decision." According to his knowledge, the agreement was dictated by military considerations.⁷⁶ Previously Churchill had expressed the same view. In his well-known Fulton address on March 5, 1946, he said: "The agreement which was made at Yalta, to which I was party, was extremely favorable to Soviet Russia, but it was made at a time when no one could say that the German war might not extend all through the summer and autumn of 1945 and when the Japanese war was expected by the best judges to last for a further eighteen months from the end of the German war."⁷⁷

Whatever may have motivated the agreement, President Roosevelt later regretted it. Shortly before he passed away on April 12 (before V-E or V-J Day) he told General Patrick Hurley: "I would like for you to go to London and see Churchill to ameliorate that agreement. It has got some things in it. I would like for you to go to Moscow and see Stalin."⁷⁸

THE EVE OF JAPANESE SURRENDER

It was agreed at the Yalta conference that a United Nations conference be held in the United States on April 25, 1945, to discuss world peace organization on the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. In connection with this agreement the Big Three leaders at Yalta set up an advance safeguard for their respective sovereign powers by insisting that "decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members."⁷⁹

The United Nations conference was later held at San Francisco according to schedule despite the fact that in the meantime, on April 12, President Roosevelt had passed away. The conference lasted till June 26, when representatives of fifty nations signed the United Nations Charter in which is incorporated the above method of making decisions by the Security Council.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 854, 867.

⁷⁶ Stettinius, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-97.

⁷⁷ *New York Times*, March 6, 1946.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, June 22, 1951.

⁷⁹ Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 11, 1945, pp. 394 ff.

⁸⁰ Department of State, *Charter of the United Nations*, Publication #368, Conference Series 76.

In the course of the conference, events of immense historic significance were unrolling in Europe. On May 1 the Nazi radio reported that Hitler had died "fighting the Bolsheviks in Berlin." The following day the German capital was captured by Russian forces after almost two weeks of grim street fighting. Four days later, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, who had succeeded Hitler as *Führer*, surrendered to the Allies. May 8 was fixed as V-E Day, when wild popular celebrations were held in the United States and Great Britain.

To effect a broad general settlement of the complex European situation following Allied victory, President Truman, Premier Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill met at conference in Potsdam on July 17. In the course of the conference the Soviets revealed that the Japanese Government had requested their mediation in the Pacific war. This information plus favorable reports concerning the test of the atomic bomb on July 16 in New Mexico prompted the United States together with Great Britain and China to send on July 26 an ultimatum to Japan, demanding total disarmament, punishing of the war criminals, dismemberment of the Japanese empire, and liquidation of war industries.⁸¹ A copy of the declaration was simultaneously sent to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, who at once felt nonplused by it. He asked that it be held up two or three days. When told that it had already been released, he felt more perturbed. What he wanted now was that the chief belligerent powers against Japan should send a formal request to the Soviet Government for its participation in the Pacific war.⁸² If Japan had accepted the Allied ultimatum at that time, the Soviet Union would have had no cause to declare war on Japan, Soviet troops would not have occupied Manchuria, North Korea, and any of the Japanese islands and territories, and the whole picture of postwar East Asia would have been entirely different. But the Japanese Government, under Premier Suzuki, found the ultimatum unacceptable and on July 29 formally rejected it.⁸³ This rejection saved the situation for the Soviet Union.

On August 6 President Truman on his return trip to the United States made an announcement that shocked the world: "Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. . . . It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its powers has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East." ⁸⁴

⁸¹ Department of State, *Bulletin*, July 29, 1945, pp. 137 ff; Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-207.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 207.

⁸³ *New York Times*, July 30, 1945.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, August 7, 1945.

On August 8 Soviet Russia declared war on Japan, saying: "Taking into consideration the refusal of Japan to capitulate, the Allies submitted to the Soviet Government a proposal to join the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the duration of the war, reduce the number of victims and facilitate the speedy restoration of universal peace."⁸⁵

The following day a second atomic bomb was dropped—this time on Nagasaki—and once more demonstrated its vast destructive power.

On August 10 the Japanese Government offered to accept the Potsdam ultimatum on condition that the Emperor retain his power. This offer was conveyed in a communication addressed to the Swiss and Swedish Governments for transmission to the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. The communication pointed out that "the Japanese Government several weeks ago asked the Soviet Government, with which neutral relations then prevailed, to render its good services in restoring peace with the enemy powers."⁸⁶

This Japanese offer was turned down the following day by the Allied Governments, which insisted that the Emperor take orders from the Supreme Allied Commander.

Under the circumstances Japan could not choose but surrender unconditionally, and this took place on August 14. But formal V-J Day did not come until September 2, when the Japanese Premier and military leaders signed formal surrender documents on board the United States battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay in the presence of representatives of the Allies.

Thus World War II *de facto* came to an end. Amidst the rush of events that led to the end of the war, the Chinese Government and the Soviet Government, whose relations had been for years all but totally severed, came together for a so-called treaty of alliance and friendship which, not unexpectedly, only led to another phase of bitter relations.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, August 9, 1945

⁸⁶ Department of State, *Bulletin*, August 12, 1945, p. 205

Alliance and Estrangement Since V-J Day

ON THE very day of Japan's unconditional surrender, August 14, 1945, China and Soviet Russia signed a treaty of alliance and friendship together with a number of supplementary agreements, envisaging close cooperation against Japanese aggression. This apparent belated move was preceded by about four weeks of negotiation in Moscow, during which Japan's surrender appeared far off and Japan's eagerness to make peace was known to the Soviet Government alone. It will be recalled that on August 10 the Japanese Government formally declared that "several weeks ago" (presumably the first part of July or earlier) it had solicited the good offices of the Soviet Government to restore peace with Japan's enemies.¹

Inasmuch as the treaty and the related agreements contain many provisions for a broad settlement of the outstanding problems between the two countries, it was thought that while Japan's surrender had removed the main purpose for which they were concluded, they would still be useful as a satisfactory and solid groundwork upon which to cultivate constructive and cooperative Sino-Soviet relations. Unfortunately, disillusionment set in soon after Japan acknowledged defeat. Far from improving, Sino-Soviet relations worsened. Far from being a bulwark of world peace, the Far East has become one of the danger spots where a third world conflagration may flare up unless responsible statesmanship gives a better account of itself and effects the necessary adjustments in time.

THE MOSCOW NEGOTIATIONS

In the spring of 1945 China was confronted with three main problems: the war with Japan, the threat of civil war, and the unsettled political conditions in Sinkiang.

The war with Japan had entered upon a new and more menacing

¹ Department of State, *Bulletin*, August 12, 1945, p. 205.

phase ever since Japan, after her agreement with Russia in March 1944, launched strong offensives in central China and succeeded in effecting an overland route from Manchuria to Indochina and cutting China in two. With Japan pressing in and with supplies from outside reduced to a trickle, China was seized with extreme anxiety in the prosecution of the war. Her allies were still concentrating their efforts on the war in Europe; and while the United States was increasing her air and naval blows on Japan, these had only indirect effect on the Japanese land operations in China. Accordingly, when in early April 1945 the Soviet Government denounced its Neutrality Pact with Japan, the Chungking Government could not but regard the move as highly welcome, although it may also have had misgivings about the long-range Soviet designs in Mongolia and Manchuria. At that time China may or may not have known of the Yalta secret agreement which had already committed Russia to the war against Japan in consideration of certain pre-eminent interests to be secured in Manchuria. Anyway, Russia's denunciation of her pact with Japan would in itself have constituted sufficient motivation for China to attempt readjustment of relations with her great neighbor.

This motivation was supplemented by others. In the first place, the Chinese Communists had remained a serious problem. On January 24 Chou En-lai, representative of the Communists, came to Chungking and resumed the negotiations that had reached an impasse toward the end of the previous year.² The Government offered to admit Communist representatives to a policy-making body of the Executive Yuan; to appoint a committee of three members (one Nationalist, one Communist, and one American) to make recommendations regarding the reorganization and equipment of the Communist forces; and meanwhile, to appoint an American officer responsible to the Government to command the Communist forces for the duration of the war. Chou En-lai objected to these terms. He insisted on termination of the Kuomintang one-party rule and the formation of a coalition government, and reiterated the view that the Chinese Communists would turn over the command of their forces only to such a coalition government, not to any government dominated by the Kuomintang. On its part the Government did not favor the idea of a coalition administration, considering it to be only a political device of the Chinese Communists to seize political power. Another impasse was looming when the Government revised its terms and proposed to call a political consultative conference, representing all parties, to consider the establishment of a consti-

² *U.S. Relations with China*, p. 78.

tutional government and the unification of armed forces. Chou considered this proposal a fair basis for cooperation and on February 16 left for Yenan.³ The proposed consultative conference, however, was not held until a year later when General Marshall was in China. In the meantime the Chinese Communists continued their policy of political infiltration and territorial expansion, thereby posing a further threat to the Government and making the internal situation more critical. As before, Soviet authorities showed a strong interest in the situation and took occasion to severely condemn the Chinese Government. From April to June such powerful organs as *Izvestiia*, *Pravda*, and *War and the Working Class* frequently published articles denouncing the Chinese Government for failure to adopt a policy of national unity and urging it to remove its reactionaries and form a coalition government.

Paralleling the independent activities of the Chinese Communists in North China, there were at that time also troubles in the outlying province of Sinkiang. Towards the end of January little sporadic battles between Chinese and Kazakh troops occurred in the province and steadily developed into a fierce civil war by the beginning of May, with the Kazakhs well entrenched in Kulja and Tacheng. At that time, diplomatic circles in London widely believed that Moscow had offered to help Chungking to quell the revolt in return for certain considerations which would lead to the restoration of the Sino-Soviet condominium as existed in 1941-1942.⁴

As all the three major problems facing China in the spring of 1945 were in one way or another connected with Soviet policies, and as at that time Soviet triumph in Europe was practically assured, a strong trend soon developed in China for better relations with Soviet Russia. Towards the end of April the People's Foreign Relations Association of China planned to send a good-will mission to Russia and to set forth its findings, which would go to show the desirability of friendly Sino-Soviet relations.⁵ About the middle of May the Sixth Congress of the Kuomintang, which was then in session, passed a resolution to the effect that in view of the long common frontier and the many intimate contacts between the two countries, the keynote of China's foreign policy should be the development of friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union.⁶

Since then, rumors had been afloat that some top leaders of the Government were to visit Russia and conduct negotiations with the

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-81.

⁴ *New York Times*, May 16, 1945.

⁵ *Ibid.*, April 22, 1945.

⁶ *U.S. Relations with China*, p. 100; *New York Times*, May 19, 1945.

Soviet Government. These rumors hardened into solid fact by the end of June, when Dr. T. V. Soong, then China's Premier and Foreign Minister, set out on his trip to Moscow. Shortly before his departure he received from General Patrick Hurley, United States ambassador to China, a note from President Truman containing the provisions of the secret Yalta deal relative to Manchuria.⁷ This information practically forced the hands of the Chinese Government. It will be recalled that under the Yalta Agreement the President of the United States was to take measures to make Chiang Kai-shek grant Russia various concessions in Manchuria. Chiang of course could refuse to go along, but the refusal would mean the loss of American friendship and the possibility of fighting Japan alone. Apparently desirous of defeating Japan first before everything else, Chiang yielded to American pressure and tried to make the best of an adverse situation.

While in Moscow, Dr. Soong had his first conference with Generalissimo Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov on June 30. Later, he conducted conversations alternately with Stalin and Molotov on the one hand and with W. A. Harriman, United States ambassador to Russia, on the other. These conversations with Harriman indicate that the secret Yalta deal was under discussion and that the United States was playing the role of mediator. By July 11 the negotiations had already reached an advanced stage, Dr. Soong having had five conferences with Stalin and Molotov and as many with Harriman.⁸

On July 14 an official joint communiqué was issued stating that the negotiations had been conducted in a friendly atmosphere, that the most important questions affecting both countries had been discussed, and that the negotiations were interrupted for the time being on account of the impending departure of Stalin and Molotov for the three power conference at Potsdam. Soon after this communiqué was issued, Dr. Soong returned to Chungking. While there at the end of the month, he resigned his post as Foreign Minister in favor of Dr. Wang Shih-chieh. He reported that the Soviet Government had made claims extending beyond the Yalta agreement.⁹

The Potsdam Conference began on July 17 and lasted about two weeks. Early in August Dr. Soong and the new Foreign Minister Dr. Wang, together with a number of advisers and experts, left for Moscow to resume the negotiations. Immediately upon their arrival on August 6 they were received by Stalin and Molotov for a conference

⁷ Herrymon Maurer, "The Tyrannous Decade," *Fortune*, February 1948, p. 154. Department of State, *United States Relations with China*, Washington, 1949, p. 116.

⁸ *New York Times*, July 15, 1945.

⁹ James Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, 1947, p. 205.

at the Kremlin. About a week later, seven important instruments—one treaty of alliance and friendship, four agreements, and two exchanged notes—were completed and signed. In addition there was also a statement by Stalin about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria.¹⁰ Few instruments in diplomatic history, of equal importance, took as short a time for their consummation.

THE ALLIANCE AND RELATED AGREEMENTS

By the main treaty the two contracting parties undertook to cooperate with and aid each other in war with Japan till victory, and to continue, after Japan's defeat, the cooperation and mutual aid so as to make Japanese aggression impossible. In addition, the two contracting parties pledged to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs, and to refuse to join any coalition whatsoever directed against either of them.

Supplementing some important specific points of the main treaty was a note signed by Molotov which declared that Russia recognized China's full sovereignty over the three eastern provinces of Manchuria and respected the territorial integrity and administrative entity of these provinces; that Russia's pledge not to interfere in China's internal affairs covered Sinkiang province from which, therefore, Russia would keep out; and that any Soviet moral and material aid to China would be given to the National Government as the central government of China.

The statement by Generalissimo Stalin, appended to the treaty, contained the pledge that Soviet troops would begin their withdrawal from Manchuria three weeks after the capitulation of Japan and would complete the withdrawal in a maximum of three months.

In a note to Molotov, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh declared that China would agree to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia if, following the defeat of Japan, a plebiscite of the people there should confirm their desire for independence. In reply Molotov stated that Russia would respect "the political independence and territorial integrity of the People's Government of Outer Mongolia."

The appended agreements on Dairen, on Port Arthur, and on the main railways in Manchuria put Soviet Russia practically in the same privileged and dominating position held by Czarist Russia before her defeat by Japan in 1905. The main railways in question were the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Rail-

¹⁰ Department of State, *op. cit.*, pp. 585-596.

way, both of which were built by Czarist Russia for the purpose of imperialistic expansion. This purpose was repeatedly admitted by high Soviet officials themselves at the time of the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan sponsored Manchukuo in the middle 1930's.¹¹ According to the new agreement, the two railways, hence to be called the Chinese-Changchun Railway, were to be operated as a "purely commercial transportation enterprise, with profits divided between China and Russia." The general manager was to be a Russian, while the president of the board of directors was to be a Chinese. "Except during such time when joint military operations are carried on by the two countries against Japan, the railway shall not be used for transportation of Soviet troops." Russia was accorded the right of transporting military goods over the railway in sealed cars without customs inspection, but the guarding of such goods was to be undertaken by Chinese railway police.

Port Arthur was to be made a naval base for the "joint use" of China's and Russia's naval forces. Around the port there would be set apart an area in which Russia would have the right to maintain an army, navy, or air force. "Civil administration in the given area belongs to China, and in making appointments for responsible leading posts the Chinese Government shall take into account the interests of the USSR in the given area. The civil administration in the town of Port Arthur is appointed and dismissed by the Chinese Government by agreement with the Soviet military command."

Dairen was to be made a free port open to the trade and shipping of all nations. Half of the port installations and equipment should be leased, free of charge, to Russia. "Administration in Dairen will be exercised by China. The chief of the Port shall be appointed from among Soviet citizens by the manager of the Chinese Changchun Railway by agreement with the mayor of Dairen. The assistant chief of the port shall be appointed in the above way from among Chinese citizens." In case of war with Japan, Dairen was to become subject to the military regime established in Port Arthur.

During war with Japan, the Soviet commander in chief of Soviet forces would assume authority and responsibility in all matters relating to the war in the war zones in Manchuria. "As soon as any part of the restored territory ceases to be a zone of direct hostilities, the National Government of the Chinese Republic shall assume full authority as regards civilian affairs and shall render the Soviet commander in chief every assistance and support through its civil and military organs."

¹¹ *Supra*, pp. 109-110.

Like the main treaty, all the supplementary agreements were to remain in force for thirty years from the date of their ratification. At the end of this period, all facilities shared with Russia or installed by Russia should revert to China without compensation.

Soon after the signing of the various instruments the Chinese mission left Moscow for China, while Premier Soong flew direct to Washington. Just before his departure the premier expressed the view that "the new Sino-Soviet treaty is the cornerstone for durable peace in the Far East."¹²

On August 24 the Chinese National Defense Council and the Legislative Yuan ratified the treaty and the related agreements, just ten days after they were signed in Moscow. On that occasion Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh said that after the conclusion of the treaty Sino-Soviet relations would become more intimate and friendly. According to Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, the treaty marked "the beginning of a new era in Chinese-Russian relations."¹³

RUSSIA OCCUPIES MANCHURIA AND NEARBY AREAS.

In the meantime Russian armed forces were pouring into Manchuria. Inasmuch as the Soviet declaration of war on Japan came after Hiroshima, and as two days after the declaration the Japanese Government had indicated in unmistakable language its imminent surrender, much fighting could have been spared. Yet, with full confidence that victory was already in the bag, Soviet land and air forces were brought into full operation as if they were to grapple with a formidable army of Japanese fanatics sworn to fight to the death. Southwest from Vladivostok and northeast from the Trans-Baikal area, Soviet forces moved into Manchuria, crossing the Amur and the Ussuri rivers, occupying the frontier strategic points, and sweeping along the Chinese Eastern Railway. At the same time, on August 10 Soviet planes bombed Changchun, capital of Manchuria, Harbin, and Kirin and continued to hammer Japanese military targets.¹⁴ Even after Japan surrendered on August 14, the Soviet military operations continued at full blast. They did not cease until a week later when Japanese surrender in Manchuria was formally executed. Soviet forces then entered Mukden, Harbin, Changchun, Hulan, Kirin, Tunhwa, and other points.¹⁵ Port Arthur and Dairen were first occupied by Soviet paratroops and later by Soviet land forces.¹⁶

¹² *New York Times*, August 17, 1945.

¹³ *Ta Kung Pao* (Chungking), August 25, 1945.

¹⁴ *New York Times*, August 11, 1945.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, August 20, 1945.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, August 23, 1945.

On August 23 Generalissimo Stalin issued an order of the day proclaiming victory over Japan. According to a Moscow communiqué covering the period from August 9 to September 9, the Soviet Red Army lost 8219 killed and 22,261 wounded and took 591,000 Japanese prisoners of war including 118 generals.¹⁷

Meanwhile Russian military and naval forces were operating in Sakhalin Island, Korea, and the Kurile Islands. The entire Sakhalin Island was occupied by August 29.¹⁸ In Korea the Russian land forces first captured Seishin and Rashin and then marched southward to effect a junction with the Russian marines landed on the east coast on August 26.¹⁹ On September 9 American marines landed at Jinsen near Seoul on the south and gradually spread out fanwise.²⁰ In accordance with a rough-and-ready military decision at Potsdam, Korea was soon divided into two occupation zones along the Thirty-eighth Parallel, with the northern zone under Russian administration and the southern zone under American administration.

Before August came to an end, Russian forces also completed their occupation of the Kurile Islands, stretching from northern Japan to the Kamchatka Peninsula. With the occupation of these islands, Russia recovered all the territory in the Far East in which she had an historic interest. It will be recalled that in 1875 Japan withdrew from Sakhalin in consideration of Russian withdrawal from the northern Kuriles, and that Russia ceded the southern half of Sakhalin to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.

MONGOLIA BECOMES INDEPENDENT

While Manchuria was made a battlefield and later came under Russian occupation, Outer Mongolia continued its peaceful existence and underwent a great political change.

According to the Yalta secret deal, the *status quo* of Outer Mongolia was to be preserved. In an exchange of notes annexed to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, however, the Chinese Government agreed to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia if after the defeat of Japan the Mongol people would demonstrate their desire for independence. As China did not stall on her pledge, preparations were soon made for the Mongols to register their political aspirations. Less than two months after V-J Day a plebiscite was held in Mongolia on the question of independence. Among the stage managers of the plebiscite were, it was reported, a

¹⁷ *American Review on the Soviet Union*, November 1945, p. 77.

¹⁸ *New York Times*, August 29, 1945.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, August 15-26, 1945.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, September 10, 1945.

number of Soviet agents. Each voter was required to sign the ballot. When the complete returns were in on October 25, they showed that out of about 500,000 votes cast all were in favor of independence. No negative vote was recorded.²¹

On January 5, 1946, China formally recognized Outer Mongolian independence, thereby renouncing a portion of her sovereignty which she had tenaciously held during all the previous years of political uncertainty in that outlying region.

Having attained independence, Outer Mongolia reaffirmed its close relations with the Soviet Union. On February 27, 1946, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and Marshal Choy Bal-san, Premier of the Outer Mongolian Republic, signed in Moscow a new treaty of amity and mutual assistance.²² According to the Moscow radio the new treaty reinforced the gentlemen's agreement on mutual aid of 1934 and the treaty of friendship signed in 1932. Its provisions are in general similar to those of the Soviet-Mongol treaty of alliance of 1936.²³ They included mutual consultation in case either contracting party is threatened with aggression, material and military support in case of actual armed attack, and withdrawal of troops from each other's territory after the purpose requiring their presence has been served.

MANCHURIAN INDUSTRIES ARE STRIPPED AND LOOTED

While the Chinese Government was prompt in fulfilling its pledge to Russia in regard to Outer Mongolia, the Soviet Government was slow to live up to its obligations in regard to Manchuria. According to the Cairo Declaration as well as the Potsdam ultimatum to Japan, Manchuria was to be returned to China. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945 provided likewise. This treaty gave Russia the right of joint control with China over the main Manchurian railways and over Port Arthur and Dairen for a certain period. It did not give Russia any claim to the industrial assets in Manchuria. Yet during their military occupation of Manchuria the Soviet authorities, who professed to be the vanguard against imperialism, put into practice the naked tenet of predatory imperialism:

"The simple rule, the good old plan
That he shall take who has the might
And he shall keep who can."

²¹ *Izvestiia*, November 22, 1945; *New York Times*, October 24, 1945.

²² Text in *American Review on the Soviet Union*, May 1946, p. 82.

²³ *Supra*, pp. 120, 122.

Although Soviet acquisitiveness concerning industrial property had early made itself known in occupied Germany,²⁴ reports on Soviet looting in Manchuria made a late appearance. Toward the end of November 1945 there appeared in the *New York Times* a report on the subject by Steffan Andrews, which involved the supreme leader of Soviet Russia but has not been denied. According to this report, the looting of Manchuria was carried out on direct orders from Generalissimo Stalin who on August 23 (1945) ordered the Russian Army to "take everything out of Manchuria that you can move out." The report added that the dismantling of industrial plants and factories was supervised by 226 experts from Moscow, and that eight huge dynamos from the Kirin and Fushan dams and hundreds of turbines and generators from power plants in every major city had been removed. The report also mentioned that intelligence men of the United States Army had obtained copies of the Soviet orders and a number of photographs showing Russians looting plants, factories, and private homes.²⁵ This report was in general supported by others that came later from different sources. It was pointed out that along with industrial equipment Japanese technicians were also removed from Manchuria and Korea to reestablish the seized plants in Siberia and to train Soviet workmen to operate the machinery.

On February 5, 1946, Chiang Kai-shek told foreign correspondents in Chungking that informal discussions had been going on with the Soviet authorities about economic concessions to Russia in excess of those stipulated in the Sino Soviet Treaty of 1945. This announcement apparently aroused concern on the part of the United States. On February 9 Secretary of State James Byrnes sent identical notes to China and Russia, proclaiming the position of the United States in regard to the matter. While primarily a protest on the basis of the Open Door against possible Soviet exclusive privileges in Manchuria, the note also touched on the matter of reparations from Japan. It referred to Russian looting in Manchuria in these words:

This Government considers that the ultimate dispositions of Japanese external assets, such as the industries in Manchuria, is a matter of common interest and concern to those allies who bore the major burden in defeating Japan. . . . It would seem, therefore, most inappropriate at this juncture for any final disposition to be made of Japanese external assets in Manchuria either by removal from Manchuria of such industrial assets as "war booty" or by agreement between the Rus-

²⁴ James Byrnes, *op cit.*, p. 215.

²⁵ *New York Times*, November 27, 1945.

sian and Chinese Governments for the control or ownership of these assets.²⁰

The Chinese reply to the American note revealed that in a memorandum dated January 21, 1946, the Soviet Government had claimed that all Japanese enterprises in Manchuria that had served the Japanese Army were regarded as war booty of the Soviet forces; but, the reply continued, the Chinese Government had rejected the Soviet claim as beyond the scope of war booty as generally recognized by international law. The reply also made known that the Soviet Government in a memorandum to the Chinese authorities in Manchuria had proposed that while part of the Japanese enterprises regarded as war booty would be handed over to China, the remaining enterprises such as certain coal mines, power plants, iron and steel industries, chemical industries, and cement industries should be jointly operated by China and the Soviet Union. This proposal, the reply added, was rejected by the Chinese Government as exceeding the provisions of the Sino-Soviet agreements of 1945.²⁷

The Russian reply to the American note was not received until March 12. The State Department did not make public its contents. It was learned, however, that the reply contained a defense and a denial. It defended Soviet stripping of Manchurian industries on the ground that anything that had belonged to the Japanese Army was fair booty for the Russian Army. It denied that the Soviet Government had proposed any exclusive Sino-Soviet economic control of Manchuria.²⁸

Shortly before receiving the Soviet reply, the State Department thought that its note had been ignored; so on March 9 it dispatched another note to Moscow, the content of which was not divulged.²⁹ On the same day, the British Government, through its chargé d'affaires in Moscow, also sent a communication to the Kremlin protesting the removal by the Soviets of industrial properties in Manchuria. The note contended that "disposal of Japanese assets is a matter for discussion and settlement between Allied nations having claims to Japanese reparations"; and that in the absence of an Allied agreement, "a state, in whose territory they are located, should retain such assets on custodian basis to be debited against that state's eventual share of Japanese reparations."³⁰

The reply of the Soviet Government to the second American note

²⁰ Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 17, 1946, p. 448.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 448-449.

²⁸ *New York Times*, March 13, 1946.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, April 26, 1946.

³⁰ *The [London] Times*, March 11, 1946; *New York Times*, April 9, 1946.

came on April 25, over six weeks after the note was sent. This second reply, like the first, was suppressed by the State Department. It was said to be a long document, with more than five hundred words.³¹

In the meantime, reports about Soviet looting in Manchuria continued to appear. On February 23, 1946, a wireless dispatch to the *New York Times* by Henry Licherman from Mukden stated that American and British correspondents inspected a number of Mukden factories and "found evidence of the careful removal of machinery as well as signs of indiscriminate mob looting." The dispatch reported General Andrei Kovtoun-Stankevitch, commander of the Red Army garrison in Mukden, as having said, "As far as this concerned the Japanese military industry, according to the Big Three, it could not be left here, and so it happens that some has been taken out." As this statement clearly mentioned Big Three sanction of the looting, it for a time puzzled Secretary Byrnes who appeared totally at sea about the matter. He denied knowledge of any agreement in that regard.³² Later, the Moscow radio denied that the Soviet commander had made the statement as reported.³³

On March 14 Dr. Chang Kia-ngau, Head of the Economic Commission to Manchuria, made a report to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on his negotiations with the Russians. After describing the Russian proposal in regard to joint control of various economic enterprises, he asserted that since V-J Day, 16% of the Manchurian coal mines had become inoperative owing to the destruction or removal of machinery, and that 70% of machine plants, 50% of textile factories, 50% of steel plants, and 25% of food processing plants had been damaged.³⁴

At the time Dr. Chang made the above report, the Soviet forces in Manchuria had already considerably overstayed their stipulated time limit, but they continued to stay for fully two and a half months more—until May 31. This prolonged occupation might have been closely connected with the economic spoliation that had been going on. For the spoliation later assumed far greater proportions, according to a comprehensive report prepared by Edwin W. Pauley, American delegate to the Japan Reparations Commission, who had headed a mission to survey industrial conditions in Manchuria. The report was completed about mid-December 1946 and in a summarized form was distributed by the Department of State. According to this report, "appalling damage" had been done to Manchuria during the Rus-

³¹ *Ibid.*, April 26, 1946.

³² *Ibid.*, February 27, 1946.

³³ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), March 4, 1946.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, March 15, 1946.

sian occupation. "Two billion United States dollars is considered to be a conservative estimate of the damage," the report said. In specific reference to the looting, the report pointed out that "upon their arrival, the Soviets began a systematic confiscation of food and other stockpiles, and in early September started the selective removal of industrial machinery," that "the Soviets took by far the larger part of all functioning power generating and transforming equipment, electric motors, experimental plants, laboratories and hospitals," and "not only were buildings and structures damaged by the removal of the equipment, but the taking of some key equipment, such as generators and pumps from mines, resulted in the loss of current production, and in irreparable damage to the mines by flooding." The report also revealed that the Soviet occupation authorities had confiscated 3,000,000 United States dollars' worth of gold bullion stocks and more than 500,000,000 Manchurian yuan from Manchurian banks, and had, in addition, issued occupation notes totalling nearly 10,000,000,000 yuan.³⁵

Fully one month and a half after the Pauley report had been published, *Izvestiia*, official organ of the Soviet Government, came out with a reply. The Soviet organ did not deny Soviet removal of industrial properties from Manchuria. It only challenged the estimated cost of the removed assets. It declared that the Manchurian assets removed by the Soviets amounted to just \$95,000,000.³⁶

In the war with Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia had suffered tremendous losses and sacrifices. It was reported that millions of Russian soldiers were killed, hundreds of Russian cities devastated, and thousands of Russian industrial plants destroyed. On these considerations a sense of equity may incline one to condone the highhanded Soviet measures of removing industrial properties from Germany. In the Far East, however, the story was quite different. Soviet Russia fought Japan for only a few days. Not one single city in the Soviet Far East had been bombed. Not one single inch of Soviet territory in the Far East had been subject to invasion. On the other hand, China had fought Japan for eight years and suffered untold losses and hardships. Such being the facts, it would seem that the industrial properties should legitimately remain in Manchuria and that their removal by the Soviets could not be justified on the basis of equity. From the standpoint of international law the Soviet case appears even less tenable. The Soviet argument seemed to be that the looted properties were the public property of Japan and that therefore

³⁵ *U.S. Relations with China*, pp. 601-603; Department of State, *Bulletin*, December 22, 1946, pp. 1154-1155.

³⁶ *Izvestiia*, January 29, 1947.

poning the Soviet withdrawal to February 1. Again the Russians claimed that the postponement was an accommodation to China. Thus Foreign Minister Molotov, in the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference in December 1945, stated: "Withdrawal of Soviet forces had been postponed until February 1 at the request of the Chinese Government."⁴¹ According to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh, however, the postponement was requested by the Russian authorities as a condition for facilitating the transport of Nationalist troops to Changchun, allowing Chinese exercise of civil police power at certain places in Manchuria, and insuring the security of Chinese civil officials in Changchun and Mukden.⁴²

When February dawned, it found Russian troops remaining on Manchurian soil as before. This time the delay of withdrawal was ascribed to the cold weather, the scarcity of trains, and the shortage of fuel for locomotives.⁴³

Apparently sceptical of this explanation, the Chinese Foreign Ministry made representations to the Soviet Embassy in Chungking and sought for a clarification of the intentions of the Soviet Government with regard to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria. The representations, however, failed to evoke any Soviet response.⁴⁴ Later the Soviet Army chief of staff told the press at Changchun that Soviet troops would withdraw from Manchuria as soon as American troops did so from China.⁴⁵

As February drew to an end, there was still no indication of Soviet troops withdrawing from Manchuria. While their Government was seeking a solution through normal diplomatic channels, the Chinese people lost their patience. A wave of popular indignation spread over the country. In Chungking, Peiping, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Chengtu, Tsingtao, and Canton, hundreds of thousands of students, workers, merchants, and women groups held anti-Soviet demonstrations, protesting against Soviet occupation of Manchuria and demanding withdrawal of Soviet troops therefrom. On March 3 Soviet Ambassador Appolon Petrov called on Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh and lodged a protest over the anti-Soviet demonstrations, calling them an unfriendly act towards the Soviet Union. The following day, as if to defy the popular protest in China, the

⁴¹ Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy*, Washington, 1950, p. 64.

⁴² *New York Times*, March 7, 1946.

⁴³ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), January 31, 1946.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, February 25, 1946.

⁴⁵ *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, February 18-March 3, 1946, p. 123.

Russian authorities notified the Chinese Government that Soviet troops in Manchuria would soon stage sham battles in such cities as Mukden, Harbin, Changchun, and Dairen.⁴⁶

Aware of the rising crisis, Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh on March 6 sent a formal note to the Soviet Government, asking for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria. For days no reply came.⁴⁷

Soon it became known that the Soviets were making use of their occupation of Manchuria to exact excessive economic concessions from the Chinese Government. In his report to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on March 14, Dr. Chang Kia-ngau, Head of the Economic Commission to Manchuria, revealed that the Soviets had demanded joint Sino-Soviet management of the bigger enterprises in Manchuria, and that the Soviet claims for booty and joint economic control included mines, electric power, industries suitable for war purposes, and other basic industries. By January, he added, the Soviets had considerably reduced their economic claims and had suggested joint management of only nine mines instead of the original twenty-two, nine power plants instead of the original fifty-four, and six major factories instead of the original eight. He said that no agreement had been made.⁴⁸

Two days afterwards at the final meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang there was introduced a resolution condemning the negotiations with the Soviets relative to Manchuria and demanding the dismissal and censure of Dr. Chang Kia-ngau and General Hsiung Shih-hui, Chief of the Military Headquarters in Manchuria. The assembly was applauding the resolution when President Chiang Kai-shek rose and made an emphatic speech wherein he explained that relations with Russia were very delicate and important, and that world peace as well as the fate of China depended on them. He concluded by pointing out that the two officials denounced in the resolution had been acting under his direction and that, therefore, he accepted the responsibility for their actions. The resolution was finally withdrawn.⁴⁹

On March 22 a reply came from the Soviet Government to the Chinese note of March 6 concerning Soviet evacuation of Manchuria. The reply stated that withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria would be completed by the end of April "at the latest."⁵⁰

⁴⁶ *New York Times*, March 6, 1946.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, March 24, 1946.

⁴⁸ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), March 15, 1946.

⁴⁹ *New York Times*, March 17, 1946.

⁵⁰ *American Review on the Soviet Union*, August 1946, p. 107.

Yet even this late and self-imposed deadline was not observed subsequently by the Soviet authorities. According to no less an authority than Foreign Minister Molotov, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria was not fully carried out until the end of May. In a letter to Secretary of State General Marshall, made public on April 7, 1947, Molotov said: "On its part, the Soviet Government fulfilled on time [sic] its commitment to withdraw the Soviet troops from China. The evacuation of Soviet troops from Manchuria was completed on May 31, 1946."⁵¹

The Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria did not cover Port Arthur and Dairen. As late as the end of February 1948 Soviet troops and officers were still seen in Dairen, according to an American eyewitness.⁵²

RUSSIAN AID TO CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Russian aid to the Chinese Communists in the civil war has been a highly controversial subject. The real controversy seems to be not whether Russian aid has been given to the Chinese Communists but what is the nature and extent of the aid. That the Russians have given some kind of aid to the Chinese Communists should no longer be subject to dispute, inasmuch as both the Russians and the Chinese Communists have admitted it. Mao Tse-tung on June 30, 1949, at a high point of Communist military success remarked that without aid from the Soviet Union and other people's democracies, Communist victory in China would not have been possible, and even if possible, could not consolidate itself.⁵³ On October 5, 1949, a few days after the setting up of the Peking Government, the *New Times*, a publication in the Soviet Union, carried an article entitled "People's Republic in China" stating that the victory of the Chinese Communists was due to a great extent to the "support of the forces of the world democratic camp, headed by the Soviet Union, the sole defender of democracy and national independence."

As regards the nature and extent of Russian aid to the Chinese Communists the questions are: whether, in addition to arms and ammunition captured from the Japanese, Soviet-manufactured equipment has been given to the Chinese Communists; whether Soviet military experts have served in the Chinese Communist armies; whether Soviet military experts have helped in the training of Chinese Communist military personnel, in the shaping of strategy,

⁵¹ *New York Times*, April 7, 1946.

⁵² *Ibid.*, February 24, 1948.

⁵³ Mao Tse-tung, *Lun Jen-Min Min Chu Chuan Cheng* [On the People's Democratic Dictatorship], Hongkong, Hsin Min Chu Ch'u-Pan She, 1949, p. 10.

and in the mapping of campaigns; whether the numerous bases in Soviet territory around Manchuria have been used to facilitate the advance or retreat of the Chinese Communist forces; whether the Soviet authorities have allowed Japanese prisoners of war to serve in the Chinese Communist armies. Naturally, reliable evidence and documentary data concerning these questions are difficult to obtain. Following are some instances of Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists that are less subject to dispute.

Russia's entry into the war against Japan on August 8, and Japan's conditional acceptance of the Potsdam ultimatum on August 10, moved the Chinese Communists to new enthusiasm and induced them to increase their efforts to exploit the situation. On August 10 General Chu Teh, Commander in Chief of the Communist forces, issued an order directing his forces to accept Japanese surrender and to occupy all towns and cities and communication centers. The following day he issued another order directing four armed groups to proceed to Manchuria.⁵⁴

The Chinese Government was offended by this independent line of action, and Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Communist armies to remain at their posts, stop occupying Japanese-held areas, and refrain from taking any further independent action. He might as well have ordered the sun to stand still. General Chu Teh remained adamant in his resolution and assumed a defiant attitude. On August 13 he sent out a telegram calling Chiang Kai-shek's order "a blunder, contrary to the national interests of China and advantageous only to the Japanese aggressor and the Chinese traitors who betrayed their mother country."⁵⁵

The Soviet authorities, however, showed no objection to the entry of Chinese Communist forces into Manchuria. On October 2, 1945, Allied military officials told the press in China that Chinese Communists had entered Manchuria in force and were cooperating with the Soviet forces in policing Mukden and other cities.⁵⁶ Later, a Communist spokesman admitted that General Chu Teh had ordered four of his generals into Manchuria; that the Soviet authorities, while preventing Communist troops from entering Manchuria as a military body, had permitted them to come in as civilians; and that these troops had since secured Japanese weapons.⁵⁷ By the beginning

⁵⁴ *Chieh Fang Jih Pao* (Yenan), August 11 and 12, 1945.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, August 14, 1945.

⁵⁶ *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, September 24-October 7, 1945, p. 156.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, October 22-November 4, 1945, pp. 196-197.

of October, just a month after V J Day, there were over 100,000 Communist troops in southern Manchuria alone.⁵⁸

Towards the end of November the Communists openly acknowledged that during the war and after Japan's surrender they had been operating strongly in Manchuria from Chihnsien to the Great Wall and that at that time (the end of November) they had in Manchuria 200,000 men, including the people's militia, ready to fight the Government forces.⁵⁹

While this huge Communist force was mostly quartered in the countryside, part of it was deployed over strategic areas along the Peiping-Mukden Railway, the Antung-Mukden Railway, and the former South Manchuria Railway. It was also permitted to occupy, either alone or jointly with Soviet forces, such important cities as Mukden, Changchun, Dairen, Hulutao, Yingkow, and Antung.

The presence of such a large number of Communist forces in so many places in Manchuria did not appear to bother the Soviet authorities. They existed side by side with the Soviet forces as if there were perfect understanding between them. Similar understanding seems to have existed between them in the apportioning of industrial properties in Manchuria. According to General P'eng Chen, secretary-general of the Communist headquarters in Manchuria: "In areas controlled by the Russians they had the railway equipment. In areas controlled by us, we had the railway equipment."⁶⁰

During the Soviet occupation of Manchuria, numerous local regimes were set up under Soviet auspices and cooperating with the Soviet authorities. Whether after the Soviet evacuation these regimes had welcomed and helped the Chinese Communists could not be ascertained. It is worthy of note, however, that in early May 1946, when the Soviet evacuation was under way, General P'eng Chen was able to report that under Communist guidance provincial governments had been established in eight of the nine newly formed Manchurian provinces and that local governments in over two thirds of Manchuria had been taken over by Communists.⁶¹ On August 21, 1946, a Communist broadcast from Yen-an announced that the Communists were establishing an independent Manchurian state with Harbin as the capital. The move was described as a "provisional supreme administration for democratic Manchuria."⁶²

The admission of Communist forces into Manchuria produced pro-

⁵⁸ *New York Times*, October 4, 1945.

⁵⁹ *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, November 5-25, 1945, p. 211.

⁶⁰ *New York Times*, May 9, 1946.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, August 12-25, 1946, p. 490.

found effects on the destiny of China and on peace in the Far East. It enhanced the power and encouraged the ambition of the Communists. It increased the difficulties of a compromise between the Communists and the Kuomintang. It invited the specter of civil war into Manchuria and thereby shattered the hope for peace and unity in China.

The crisis came when the Government proceeded to occupy Manchuria and to bring it under Chinese sovereignty, as provided in the Cairo Declaration and in the Sino-Soviet Treaty. Because of Communist obstruction in North China, the Government attempted to send its troops into Manchuria by sea through Dairen, Yingkow, and other southern Manchurian ports. But the Soviet Government refused to permit Chinese troops to land in Dairen.⁶³ Then the Government troops tried Yingkow. They soon found, however, that the place was occupied by Chinese Communist troops. General Tu Li-ming, Commander of the Chinese forces, then went to negotiate with Marshal Malinowski, commander in chief of the Soviet forces in Manchuria. The latter said that he did not have sufficient troops around to guarantee the Nationalist troops safe landing. Thereupon General Tu abandoned the attempt.⁶⁴ Subsequently the Chinese Government was forced to use the famous strategic pass, Shanhai-kwan, with the Communist troops strongly entrenched behind it. It was only after a fierce battle that the Government forces succeeded in breaking through and entering Manchuria.⁶⁵

Meanwhile the Government had initiated negotiations with Soviet authorities about the taking over of Manchuria and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. For a time the negotiations appeared hopeful. The Soviet authorities declared that their forces would evacuate Manchuria by the end of November.⁶⁶ A Chinese delegation of three hundred members was then flown to Changchun, capital of Manchuria, to set up a municipal administration there. Upon arrival they were lodged in the building of a former Japanese coal-merchants' association and were practically placed under house arrest by the Soviet authorities. They were allowed only one automobile and several horse carriages for transportation. What was worse, the Chinese Communist troops were closing in on Changchun. The Government delegation was so embarrassed that it had to fly out of the beleaguered capital under Soviet protection.⁶⁷

⁶³ *Ibid.*, October 22–November 4, 1945, p. 196.

⁶⁴ *Ta Kung Pao* (Chungking), November 6 and 7, 1945.

⁶⁵ *New York Times*, November 19, 1945.

⁶⁶ *Ta Kung Pao* (Chungking), November 2, 1945.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* (Shanghai), November 24, 1945.

Towards the end of November an agreement was reported to have been reached with the Soviet authorities for the peaceful occupation of Manchuria by Nationalist forces and the postponement of Soviet withdrawal. A Government source even reported that under the agreement the Soviet authorities would order the Communist forces out of Mukden and Changchun so as to make way for the Nationalist troops.⁶⁸ Yet by the end of December the Nationalist troops were still unable to enter Mukden and negotiations were still going on between General Tu Li-ming and the Soviet authorities.⁶⁹ It was not until mid-March 1946 that the Soviet forces evacuated Mukden and were replaced by Nationalist forces.⁷⁰ The negotiations for this arrangement had been so protracted and had followed such a tortuous path that they may not be unreasonably regarded as Soviet obstructionist policy to delay the plans of the Chinese Government.

The Soviet evacuation of Mukden was soon followed by a Soviet announcement concerning the evacuation of other parts of Manchuria.⁷¹ A race then began between Government and Communist forces for the cities about to be evacuated by the Soviet troops, and the civil war was thus intensified. The first race was for Changchun, the capital, and was won by the Communists. As with Changchun, so with Harbin, Kirin, Tsitsihar, and other cities.⁷² They were occupied by Communist forces immediately after Soviet evacuation. By May 19 the Communists were able to report that they were in administrative control of about two thirds of Manchuria and admitted they had operated under a military plan hitched to the evacuation timetable of the Soviet troops.⁷³

It seems clear, then, that Soviet Russia had helped the Chinese Communists by letting them enter Manchuria in force and occupy various strategic points and areas; by equipping them with Japanese arms and ammunition; by obstructing the course and delaying the plans of their opponents, the Chinese Government forces; by setting up local regimes favorable to them; and by letting them, through skillful timing, occupy the cities evacuated by the Soviet forces.

THE DISPUTE OVER DAIREN AND PORT ARTHUR

As it had previously been agreed with Russia that Dairen was to be made a free port under Chinese administration and open to inter-

⁶⁸ *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, November 26–December 9, 1945, p. 256.

⁶⁹ *Ta Kung Pao* (Chungking), December 29 and 30, 1945.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* (Shanghai), March 15 and 17, 1946.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, March 24, 1946.

⁷² *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, April 22–May 5, 1946, p. 250.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, May 6–26, 1946, p. 271.

national shipping and that Port Arthur was to be made a naval base for the "joint use" of China and Russia and under Chinese civil administration, the Chinese Government considered it within its sovereign rights and treaty obligations to station troops at both ports as well as to take over the administration there. The Soviet Government, however, persistently refused to have the ports garrisoned by Chinese troops or placed under Chinese administration. It did not even allow Chinese troops to pass through Dairen to other Manchurian cities. On the other hand, Soviet forces which by previous agreement should have withdrawn from Dairen continued to stay there even after Soviet forces had evacuated other parts of Manchuria.

On September 18, 1946, Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh declared that relations with Russia had been strained by the continued presence of Soviet forces in Dairen. He also pointed out that full information concerning the inside situation of Dairen was unavailable and that the Chinese administration had been frustrated in its attempt to take over the administration of the port.⁷⁴

Towards the end of the year an incident arose involving the United States, when a United States Navy ship was ordered out of Dairen by a verbal ultimatum of the Russian authorities. For a time this incident provoked vigorous comments in the American press and by some members of the United States Senate. Later, however, the spokesman of the State Department conceded that the Russian authorities were acting "within their legal rights," that the reported ultimatum was not "in any sense an ultimatum," and that the Russian authorities had in fact been very cooperative.⁷⁵

Following this incident, Secretary of State James Byrnes sent on January 3, 1947, identical notes simultaneously to the Chinese and Soviet Governments, urging them to give prompt consideration to the status and control of Dairen "with a view to the implementation of the pertinent provisions of the Soviet-Chinese agreement of August 14, 1945."⁷⁶ The note added that there appeared "no reason why there should be further delay in reopening the port, under Chinese administration, to international commerce as contemplated in the aforementioned agreement." Replying to this note, the Chinese Government on February 1 stated that it was making efforts to bring back Dairen under Chinese administration.⁷⁷ For its part, the Soviet Government in a reply dated February 27 made this

⁷⁴ *New York Times*, September 19, 1946.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, December 24-27, 1946.

⁷⁶ Department of State, *Bulletin*, January 19, 1947, p. 127.

⁷⁷ *New York Times*, March 26, 1947.

exacting statement: "The status of Dairen and the Chinese Changchun Railway is defined by the Soviet Chinese agreements of August 14, 1915. . . . The Soviet Government for its part has always expressed its readiness for appropriate steps and has done everything possible for the exact execution of these agreements."⁷⁸

This reply did not mean that things in Dairen had become more agreeable to the interests of the United States. In the beginning of March, the Soviet Government notified the State Department that Dairen was a closed port under military administration and would not admit American courier ships. In this the American Government acquiesced, and after that time supplies and mail for the American consulate-general in Dairen were carried on Russian ships.⁷⁹

Later, Sino-Soviet negotiations for the transfer of Dairen were carried on and were soon snarled by conflicting views. On April 12 the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that it had received a reply from the Soviet Government to its note concerning the occupation of Dairen by Chinese forces; the contents of the reply were not disclosed, but was described as inadequate and failing to meet the points raised in the Chinese note.⁸⁰ Shortly afterwards a spokesman of the Chinese Government stated that the obstacle to China's taking over the administration of Dairen was the Soviet refusal to permit Chinese troops to enter the port. It was learned that Dairen was then under the domination of the Chinese Communists, and that unless backed by armed force the Government-appointed administration would meet with opposition at every turn.⁸¹ There was a report that on November 17, 1946, the Russians withdrew from Dairen, leaving the Chinese Communists in sole control.⁸² But as late as the first part of 1948 Soviet troops and officers could still be seen in that port.⁸³

In the meantime on June 25, 1947, when the civil strife in Manchuria was in a critical stage and when relations with the Soviet Union had become less cordial, the Chinese Foreign Ministry lodged a vigorous protest with the Soviet Government against the latter's continued refusal to permit the establishment of Chinese authority over Dairen and Port Arthur.⁸⁴ On the same day the Foreign Ministry also issued a lengthy communiqué, setting forth the two-

⁷⁸ Department of State, *op. cit.*, September 14, 1917, p. 533.

⁷⁹ *New York Times*, August 9, 1917.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, April 13, 1917.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, April 17, 1917.

⁸² *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, November 11-14, 1946, p. 699.

⁸³ *New York Times*, February 24, 1948.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, June 26, 1947.

year record of Soviet obstruction to China's efforts to take over the two ports.⁸⁵ This communiqué stressed that Soviet obstruction manifested itself in two ways: first, persistent refusal to allow Chinese troops to enter and stay in Dairen and Port Arthur; second, concentration of strong Chinese Communist forces in the vicinity of the two ports so as to hinder the efforts of the National Government.

According to the communiqué the Soviet pretext for barring Chinese National troops from Port Arthur was that the defense of the base had been entrusted to the Soviet Government by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. In the case of Dairen the communiqué pointed out that the Soviet authorities in opposing the entry of Chinese troops had advanced the argument that the state of war with Japan had not yet ended, and therefore Dairen should be subject to Soviet military administration like Port Arthur. The Soviet authorities, however, assented to admitting Chinese police into Dairen, provided their strength and their location in the city was subject to Soviet approval.

The Chinese Government regarded the Soviet position as unreasonable and unacceptable, the communiqué revealed. The Chinese Government considered itself fully entitled to dispatch troops to Port Arthur and Dairen because, far from restricting this right of the Chinese Government, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 had provided that the entire Port Arthur naval base area was for the "joint use" of China and Russia. In regard to the Soviet argument that the state of war with Japan had not yet ended, the Chinese Government maintained that Japan had been under Allied occupation for more than a year and that war no longer existed in actuality. It contended further that even in case of war against Japan, China was not prevented by the Sino-Soviet Treaty from sending troops to Dairen.

The communiqué went on to point out that the dispatch of Chinese troops to Dairen was not merely an assertion of treaty rights but a practical necessity dictated by the presence of Communist forces nearby. It also called attention to those provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty which obligated the Soviet Government to render assistance entirely to the National Government, to recognize Manchuria as part of China under Chinese sovereignty, and to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of Manchuria.

No formal Soviet reply to the Chinese protest appears to have been made. However, on July 11 Tass, the official Soviet news agency, issued a statement denying that China had the right to

⁸⁵ *China Magazine*, August 1947, pp. 58-61.

station troops in the Port Arthur naval district and declaring that "the Russian Government, for defense purposes of the naval base, is erecting necessary constructions there."

On August 20, when the Soviet Government had become adamant in its position and no prospect of a compromise was in sight, the Chinese Government issued an order closing the harbor of Dairen to foreign shipping. This order evoked a statement from Tass on August 28. Broadcast over the Moscow radio, the statement said: "In connection with this report in the Chinese press, Tass is empowered to state that Dairen in accordance with Article IV of the Soviet-Chinese agreement on Dairen, prior to the peace treaty with Japan, falls under the regime established in the area of the naval base of Port Arthur. In view of this, Soviet ships have the indisputable right to enter Dairen."

Two days later the Chinese Foreign Ministry repudiated the Soviet interpretation of the Dairen agreement as "an inadmissible distortion." It maintained that Article IV of the agreement applied only "in time of war against Japan," not "prior to the peace treaty with Japan."⁸⁶

Meanwhile, noting the failure of the Soviet Government to live up to its promise to open Dairen, the United States on August 14 dispatched another note to Moscow inquiring about the matter. Referring to the previous note of January 3, the second note, sent through the United States Embassy in Moscow, stated:

As the Embassy pointed out at that time, the Government of the United States feels that it has a responsibility to American interests in general to urge that there be established at Dairen at an early date normal conditions which will permit American citizens to visit and reside there in the pursuit of their legitimate activities. . . . This Government . . . will of necessity hold the Soviet Government responsible for the treatment accorded in the interim to United States interests there.⁸⁷

To this note the Soviet Government replied on August 26, saying:

As is known, in accordance with that agreement, Dalny during the existence of a state of war with Japan falls under the regime which has been set up in the naval base of Port Arthur. Inasmuch as the state of war with Japan is not terminated because there is as yet no peace treaty with Japan, naturally, the regime of the naval base continues to prevail over Dalny. Considering this circumstance as well as the fact that civil administration of the Chinese Government, for reasons beyond Soviet

⁸⁶ *New York Times*, August 31, 1917.

⁸⁷ Department of State, *op cit.*, August 31, 1917. PP. 426-437.

control, has not as yet undertaken fulfillment of its functions in Dalny, the Soviet Government sees no basis for a change of regime which at the present time exists in Dalny. The Soviet Government in this connection categorically rejects, in view of above-mentioned circumstances, any attempt to burden it with responsibility for treatment of American interests.⁸⁸

If the Soviet interpretation of the agreement on Dairen and Port Arthur were acquiesced in, these two ports would remain under Soviet military domination and for exclusive Soviet use indefinitely. The point is that from the very beginning there has been little likelihood of any general peace treaty with Japan. Russia persisted in restricting the membership of the peace conference on Japan to the United States, China, Great Britain, and Russia herself. The United States in particular, however, preferred to have the membership of the conference include all the nations that had participated in the war with Japan. Another block in the path of a general peace with Japan was the disagreement over the problem of reparations. Russia regarded her loot in Manchuria as "fair war booty," not to be included in her share of reparations from Japan. The United States, China, and Great Britain all contested the Soviet position.

From the above account it is clear that the Sino-Soviet dispute over Dairen and Port Arthur was caused, technically, by the difference in interpretation of the term "war." War can be conceived of in two senses: the material sense and the legal sense. In the material sense, war is a large-scale armed conflict pure and simple. In the legal sense, war is often referred to as a state of war, which has to be declared by at least one of the belligerents or recognized by some neutral states and which has to be terminated by a peace treaty between the belligerents. This dual conception of war has been recognized by the courts.⁸⁹ In the Sino-Soviet agreement on Dairen and Port Arthur, only the word "war" was used; and in the subsequent dispute the Soviet Government chose to interpret the term in the legal sense, while the Chinese Government preferred to interpret it in the material sense. Each party was right in accordance with the position it took. In such a case of conflict over interpretations, it is necessary to go over the minutes of the negotiations leading to the agreement and to see what was the intent of the parties during the negotiations. In the absence of such minutes the matter should be viewed in the light of the spirit of the general treaty and in terms

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, September 14, 1947, p. 533.

⁸⁹ See "The Three Friends" in E. C. Stowell and H. F. Munro, *International Cases*, Boston, 1916, II, p. 264; Quincy Wright, "When Does War Exist?" *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 26 (1932) p. 363.

of the principle upon which the general treaty was based. The treaty was called "The Treaty of Alliance and Friendship." It was motivated by a spirit of friendliness and was intended to promote friendly relations between the two countries. The principle governing the general treaty was mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Soviet Union has specifically recognized Manchuria as under Chinese sovereignty. On these considerations and in view of the basic fact that Dairen and Port Arthur are integral parts of Manchuria, it would seem that in the conflict of interpretations of the term "war" in connection with the status of the two ports, the presumption should be in favor of China.

INTERVENTION AND INVASION IN SINKIANG

Troubles in Sinkiang appeared interminable. Together with the conflicts and disputes in Manchuria, they represented the general state of deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations in the years following V-J Day.

Almost simultaneously with the negotiations for the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship in 1915, violence in various forms was rampant in Sinkiang, particularly in the rich Ili area, and Russia was reported to have offered to mediate.⁹⁰ By the newly concluded treaty the Soviet Government pledged not to interfere in China's internal affairs in general, and in particular in the Sinkiang situation.

It is a sad commentary on Sino-Soviet relations that scarcely a month after the solemn Soviet pledge was made, there occurred in the northwestern part of Sinkiang large-scale hostilities in which Soviet intervention seemed manifest. The hostilities were conducted by the Kazakhs against the Chinese forces stationed in that area. Along with the Kazakhs, however, were 6000 troops from Ili who spoke Russian, wore Russian uniforms, and were commanded by a Russian general by the name of Birkdorff.⁹¹ It was when these hostilities were going on that the Soviet ambassador in Chungking informed the Chinese Foreign Ministry that the Soviet Government was willing to lend its good offices to mediate the Kazakh dispute with the Chinese. This offer was accepted, and soon afterwards General Chang Chih-chung was dispatched to Sinkiang to conduct the negotiations.⁹² Apparently because of the difficult nature of the problems involved, it was not until January 3, 1946, that a pre-

⁹⁰ *Supra*, p. 180.

⁹¹ Ian Morrison, "Some Notes on the Kazakhs of Sinkiang," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, January 1949, p. 70.

⁹² *Ta Kung Pao* (Chungking), October 25, 1945.

liminary eleven-point agreement was reached granting the Kazakhs complete freedom of religion and the right to elect their own county magistrates and provincial representatives, to organize local armies, and to carry on trade with Russia under the terms of the existing Sino-Soviet treaties.⁹³ After some further negotiations the agreement was reaffirmed and signed on June 6 amidst an impressive ceremony in Tihwa (Urumchi).⁹⁴ The revolt of the Kazakhs and Turkis was thus formally brought to an end.

During the subsequent period the situation in Sinkiang was apparently pacified and stabilized. When on March 29, 1947, General Chang became governor of the province, the situation turned even better and showed greater promise of peace. Hardly two months afterwards, however, the Chinese Government appointed Masud Sabri (Wu-Teh), a native of Sinkiang, to replace General Chang as governor.⁹⁵ It was thought that Masud, being a native of the land and familiar with its conditions and affairs, would continue the maintenance of peace there. But the Kazakhs and Turkis in the Ili area voiced strong opposition to Masud Sabri and threatened to start fresh troubles.

It was when this crisis was mounting in the early days of June that the province was invaded by armed forces from Outer Mongolia. The invasion began on June 5 when units of Mongol troops from Outer Mongolia, assisted by planes alleged to be Soviet, crossed the border and attacked the Chinese garrison in Peitashan inside the Chinese border.⁹⁶

The Chinese Government then lodged strong protests with both the Soviet Government and the Outer Mongolian Government, charging them with violating the territory of Sinkiang.⁹⁷ On June 15 the Moscow radio broadcast an official declaration of the Outer Mongolian Government, denying that its troops had invaded Sinkiang and countercharging that Chinese troops had invaded Mongolian territory but were driven out by Mongol troops and aircraft. This declaration was later denounced as false by the spokesman of the Chinese Government.⁹⁸

The official Soviet reply to the Chinese protest came to Nanking on June 23. In it the Soviet Government rejected the Chinese protest and denied that Soviet planes ever took part in the fighting

⁹³ *Ibid.* (Shanghai), March 13, 1946.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, June 8, 1946.

⁹⁵ *China Magazine*, July 1947, p. 68.

⁹⁶ *Ta Kwang Pao* (Canton), June 11, 1947.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, June 12, 1947.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, June 19, 1947.

on the Sinkiang border.⁹⁹ The official reply of the Outer Mongolian Government came at about the same time, being dated June 22, 1947. It denied the charge of having violated the territory of Sinkiang. On June 27 the Outer Mongolian Government addressed another note to the Chinese Government charging that Chinese troops in Sinkiang had crossed the border and attacked Mongol positions. The Chinese Government vigorously denied this charge, calling it a falsehood.¹⁰⁰

On July 28 the controversy found its way into the United Nations at Lake Success. On that day the Soviet representative Alexei Krasilnikov at a meeting of the Membership Committee of the Security Council jeeringly remarked that "it is likely that some circles in China, by provoking the frontier incidents with the Mongolian People's Republic, want to divert world public attention from the serious internal situation created in China by the civil war." The Chinese representative Dr. Hsu Shu-hsi did not reply to this thrust until the next meeting held on July 30. On that occasion Dr. Hsu stated: "China simply could not afford to pick a quarrel with Outer Mongolia at a time when the rebels in Northeast China launched an attack on Sipingkai with an attempt to cut Changchun from Mukden. The Soviet representative would have demonstrated a better insight into the political situation in the Far East, if he had come with the statement that Outer Mongolia invaded Sinkiang as a diversion for the rebels in Northeast China and as a second front against the Chinese Government."¹⁰¹

The hostilities in the Peitashan area had scarcely ceased when Sinkiang was plagued by troubles from another quarter, namely, the fertile Ili area in the northwest. According to an Associated Press dispatch from Urumchi dated August 17, the situation had become so critical in the first part of August that the Chinese Government had to send arms and ammunition by airplanes to Tihwa (Urumchi), the provincial capital, in anticipation of revolts.

A month later Chang Chih-chung reported that the Kazakh leaders had not abandoned their attempts to set up an Eastern Turkestan Republic and were organizing revolts and incidents throughout Sinkiang to embarrass the provincial administration.¹⁰² This tense situation continued into the following year. In February 1948 the Turki group declared that it would resume negotiations

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, June 24, 1947.

¹⁰⁰ *New York Times*, July 12, 1947.

¹⁰¹ United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council*, 2d Year, Special Supplement No. 3, pp. 40-41.

¹⁰² *New York Times*, September 12, 1947.

with the Chinese if Governor Masud Sabri were removed. In reply Chang Chih-chung, Director of Pacification Headquarters for Northwest China, set forth five conditions for the resumption of negotiations. Among the conditions were cessation of all preparations for war and abolition of the propaganda campaign for an independent Eastern Turkestan Republic. As late as the following September, however, no progress had been made toward a *rapprochement*.¹⁰³

It can thus be seen that in Sinkiang as well as in Manchuria, postwar developments conspired to weaken the alliance and friendship envisaged in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and to estrange the Chinese Government from the Kremlin.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, September 7, 1948.

China's Civil War and the Soviet-American Cold War

IT IS true that following Japan's unconditional surrender the sky of China was darkened by clouds of civil war. Yet at the same time there were hopeful signs of peace which gleamed like bright silver streaks through the general gloom. It was later that the bright hopes vanished one by one till peace was blacked out.

POSTWAR PEACE ILLUSIONS IN CHINA

After V-J Day the greatest hope for peace in China rested on the newly signed treaty with Russia, which, if observed in good faith by both parties, could serve as a sound basis of peace. This treaty, among other provisions, obligated Russia to render aid to the Chinese Government alone. For this reason the hope arose that it would not only stabilize Sino-Soviet relations but also facilitate the solution of the internal crisis in China. Indeed, for some time not a few Far Eastern "experts" were of the opinion that the treaty had "pulled the rug from under the feet of the Chinese Communists." The fact turned out to be that the rug was pulled from under the treaty. For before long the treaty was made a mockery by the unopposed entrance of Communist forces into Manchuria, by their free military and territorial expansion, by various forms of Soviet obstruction to the advance of the Chinese Government forces in Manchuria, by Soviet dismantling of Manchurian industries, by the long delay of Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria, by excessive Soviet demands for economic concessions, and by Soviet refusal to admit National troops into Dairen and Port Arthur.

Another great source of hope in China following V-J Day was the conference at Chungking between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Inasmuch as the conference took place after the ratification of the Sino Soviet Treaty, it was regarded as indicative of possible submission on the part of the Communists and as a harbinger of

internal peace. Accompanied by United States Ambassador General Patrick Hurley, Mao reached Chungking on August 29, 1945, and conferred with Chiang and other Government leaders. For a time there were high hopes that the differences between the two major political parties might be ironed out and an agreement reached to bring peace and unity to China. After about three weeks, however, the conference resulted only in the proclamation of a set of high-sounding principles which have had little practical value.¹ Indeed, the day after he left Chungking, Mao attacked the Government, saying that it was making preparations for a civil war.² The failure of the conference may be ascribed to two causes. According to General Hurley, who had used his good offices to bring about the conference, his mediation efforts might have succeeded, but they had been sabotaged by his American subordinates in the United States embassy in Chungking, who did not deem it desirable to effect the political reconciliation.³ The second cause lay in the political or military realities of the time. In the course of the conference the Communist forces were disarming Japanese troops and occupying towns and cities in North China. For instance, on September 12 the Communist Hsin Hua news agency reported that during the month from August 11 to September 11 the Communist forces had taken 156 towns and cities in nine provinces.⁴ Two months later the Communist forces claimed to have "liberated" the whole of Chahar province.⁵ At the same time Government forces were rushing by land and air towards the coast to accept Japanese surrender and to assert sovereignty over the entire Chinese territory. Under the circumstances, conflict between Government and Communist forces became inevitable and rendered futile any peace talk. Towards the end of October most of the provinces in north and central China were in varying degrees involved in the civil war.

As 1945 drew to an end, the foreign secretaries of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain met in Moscow to discuss, among other things, the situation in China. The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the conference stated in reference to China that the three foreign secretaries "were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil

¹ Department of State, *United States Relations with China*, Washington, 1949, pp. 107-108. Hereafter cited as *U.S. Relations with China*.

² *New York Times*, October 14, 1945.

³ *U.S. Relations with China*, p. 582.

⁴ *Chieh Fang Jih Pao*, September 13, 1945.

⁵ *Ibid.*, November 11, 1945.

strife," and that the Soviet and American foreign secretaries were "in complete accord as to the desirability of withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from China at the earliest practicable moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibilities." ⁶ This declaration was acceptable and welcomed by both contending parties in China and to this extent constituted another hopeful sign of peace. But the sign did not last long. The declaration did not set forth any ways or means to deal with the Chinese problems. Apart from the provision for withdrawing foreign troops from China, it contained merely some lofty objectives which, in effect, formed the crux of the very problems that required to be solved. As regards the provision for withdrawing Soviet and United States forces, for months afterwards it remained unimplemented. The declaration, therefore, failed to produce the desired and hoped-for effect on the internal situation in China.

THE MARSHALL MISSION TO CHINA

About the time the above declaration was made, General George C. Marshall, former Chief of Staff of the United States Army, was appointed by President Truman to head a mission to China to help resolve the differences of the two major political parties that had embroiled the country in civil war. General Marshall made an excellent start. Hardly two weeks after his arrival in China he succeeded in arranging a truce between the Government and Communist forces. This truce was effected on January 10, 1946.⁷ On the same day, representatives of the Government and the Chinese Communists came together for a Political Consultative Conference in Chungking. At this conference, frank and free discussions were conducted on all the major problems confronting the nation. Before the conference came to an end on January 30, a number of important agreements were reached covering the organization of a coalition government on a wider and more representative basis, the organization of a national army under civilian control, economic and social reconstruction, and the promotion of education.⁸ General Marshall himself was fully satisfied with the result. Back in Washington in mid-March he was able to report at a press conference that the Kuomintang and Communist leaders were engaged in organizing their respective armies into a national army, that an executive headquarters with an American staff had been set up in

⁶ Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy*, Washington, 1950, p. 64.

⁷ *China Magazine*, May 1946, p. 78.

⁸ *Ibid.*

Peiping for the purpose of implementing the agreements already reached, and that field teams of three men each—one American, one Kuomintang man, and one Communist—were being organized to carry out the agreements in various localities.⁹

At the very time General Marshall was making this report, however, the situation in China, especially in Manchuria, was about to take a sharp turn for the worse. Shortly after Marshall made the report, the Soviet authorities announced their decision to withdraw their troops from Manchuria.¹⁰ Thereupon the Nationalist and Communist forces embarked upon a desperate race for the key points about to be evacuated. This exigency proved too strong to be prevented by the agreements reached in Chungking or by the field teams organized. Another factor compromising the agreements was the irreconcilable viewpoints on the timing of political reform and military reorganization. The Communists insisted on political reform first and then military reorganization. The Government maintained that military reorganization should precede political reform. This dispute was brought to a focus in Manchuria. According to the terms of the truce agreement of January 10 the Communists agreed to have Government forces enter Manchuria to recover sovereignty there. Now the Communists demanded that all the political institutions set up in Manchuria by the Government should be reorganized so as to absorb the local "democratic elements," that "the existing anti-Japan democratic armies" in Manchuria should be recognized and share the responsibility with the Government armies for the maintenance of order in the area, that the Government should recognize the many "democratic self-governments" in the various counties in Manchuria, and that the number of Government troops entering Manchuria should be limited and fixed. At the same time the Communists announced that they had already organized "a Northeastern Democratic Allied Army" of about 300,000 men, scattered over various places not yet occupied or already evacuated by Soviet troops.¹¹ The Government under Chiang Kai-shek, however, declared that it would effect sovereign control of Manchuria first before discussing Communist participation in the administration of the region. Hence the deadlock, which clearly revealed the deep-seated suspicion and distrust between the two parties.

On April 5 Chou En-lai, the Communist representative in Chungking, charged that the Government had failed to live up to the

⁹ *New York Times*, March 17, 1946.

¹⁰ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), March 24, 1946.

¹¹ *Chieh Fang Jih Pao*, February 14, 1946.

agreement with the Communists and had pursued a policy likely to spread civil war in Manchuria. Later a spokesman of the Government stated that it was the Communists who were breaking the agreement.¹² The rift between the two parties became further widened when on April 13 Chou En-lai announced that unless the political and military problems were completely settled, the Communists would not participate in the National Assembly scheduled for May 5. He proposed at the same time that the assembly should be postponed till October 10.¹³

Thus the agreements reached at the Political Consultative Conference at the beginning of the year were rendered difficult of execution by concrete realities and by basic considerations of power.

Despite or because of this deplorable state of affairs, the two parties now and then resumed their truce talks and peace negotiations, with General Marshall as the intermediary. While these talks and negotiations may have slowed up military operations, they may also have covered up military preparations and the jockeying for positions. At that time the Government forces appeared more than a match for the Communists and often inflicted severe blows on their opponents. The Communists would then denounce the United States and charge the latter with direct participation in the civil war. For instance, when on August 2, 1946, some Government planes bombed Yen-an, the Communists demanded the immediate withdrawal of all United States forces from China and charged that the pilots, planes, and bombs were all American.¹⁴

COMMUNIST ATTACKS ON UNITED STATES POLICY

Ever since V-J Day, American planes and naval vessels had been used in transporting Government troops to the coastal areas to disarm the Japanese armies. American marines also had been employed in guarding and keeping open the communication lines. In justifying these measures, President Truman, in a statement on December 15, 1945, said:

The United States and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal Government of China. . . . In continuation of the constant and close cooperation with the National Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of the

¹² *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, March 25-April 7, 1946.

P 196.

¹³ *Chieh Fang Jih Pao*, April 16, 1946.

¹⁴ *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, July 22-August 11, 1946.

P 441.

war, in consonance with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove the possibility of Japanese influence remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops. Accordingly, the United States has assisted and will assist the National Government in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops in the liberated areas.¹⁵

The Chinese Communists were not satisfied with these justifications. They untiringly reiterated the charge that the American forces in China were helping the Government in the civil war.

The Soviets too were quick to point an accusing finger at the United States on the matter, and thus China was becoming a subject of the US-USSR cold war. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria on May 31, 1946, Soviet officials and the Soviet press and radio kept up a steady barrage of charges against the American Government, and these charges were often echoed by those of the Chinese Communists. On June 22 *Red Star*, the Red Army organ, attacked American military aid to the Kuomintang and charged that the United States was responsible for the civil war in China. On the same day Mao Tse-tung voiced strong opposition to the China Aid Bill of the United States and demanded that the United States immediately withdraw its troops from China and immediately stop and cancel all military aid to the Kuomintang.¹⁶ On July 5 *Izvestiia*, official organ of the Soviet Government, charged American capitalists with dumping cheap American goods on the China market and in concurrence with two other papers attacked the United States for supporting "reactionary forces" in China and pushing China back to the status of "a semi-colonial country." Two days later *Pravda*, organ of the Soviet Communist Party, contended that American military aid to the National Government was "direct interference in the internal affairs in China" and constituted a breach of the Moscow agreement reached at the end of the preceding year. On the same occasion *Pravda* also accused the Chinese Government of violating the civil war truce and of preparing a major offensive against the Chinese Communists. Not coincidentally perhaps, on the same day the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Yen-an issued a proclamation demanding that the United States cease its armed intervention in the internal affairs of China, cease prolonging the Chinese civil war, cancel its China Lend Lease Bill, stop sending military advisers to China, and im-

¹⁵ Department of State, *op. cit.*, p. 692.

¹⁶ *Chieh Fang Jih Pao*, June 23, 1946.

mediately withdraw all its military forces in China.¹⁷ On August 10 *Izvestia* leveled severe criticisms at the Marshall mission to China, asserting that American mediation in China was an illusion and that "it is impossible with one hand to reach for peace and with the other to render active cooperation to one of the conflicting sides." A week later the Moscow radio again urged complete withdrawal of American troops from China. Toward the end of August the Soviet delegate on the Security Council of the United Nations abruptly proposed that member states with troops in the territory of other member states should report to the Security Council within two weeks as to the location and number of the troops.¹⁸ This proposal was obviously directed against the United States which had troops in China. Early in September, when the peace prospects in China were all but eclipsed, the Moscow radio strongly reiterated its demand for withdrawal of American troops from China, contending that the withdrawal was "the prime consideration for a peaceful settlement of the issues that face the Chinese people." Later in the month on September 14 and 15 Chou En-lai sent lengthy notes to General Marshall, charging the United States with intervening in China's internal affairs and prolonging the civil war, and demanding immediate withdrawal of American troops from China and cessation of all American aid to the Kuomintang Government.¹⁹

AMERICAN ATTACKS ON SOVIET POLICY

In the meantime, American attacks on Soviet policy in China were by no means absent. When after an inspection tour in the Far East Senator Owen Brewster returned to the United States, he told his countrymen on August 8 (1946) that the American marines were in China for the purpose of insuring that "China will not be in America tomorrow under the spur of a Soviet dictatorship as ruthless as Genghis Khan's," and that "a sovietized China in the next quarter of a century would mean the certain end of America and of everything for which it stands."²⁰ On his return from China, Representative Fred L. Crawford made a speech in Washington on August 10 wherein he vigorously urged stronger action on the part of the United States in dealing with the situation in China. Said he: "We either have to go in there and really do a good job or recede entirely and take the consequences. If we pursue the latter

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, July 7, 1946.

¹⁸ United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council*, 1st Year, Second Series, No. 5, August 29, 1946, pp. 141-142.

¹⁹ *Chieh Fang Jih Pao*, September 27, 1946.

²⁰ *New York Times*, August 9, 1946.

unity. This plan included the redistribution of troops in Manchuria according to an agreement of the previous June and the maintenance of the military *status quo* in North and Central China pending an agreement by the Committee of Three.²⁶ The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, however, rejected the plan, and offered a counterproposal similar to the proposal that Chou En lai had previously made in his note to General Marshall. This counterproposal in turn was rejected by the Government.²⁷

About this time the hostile attitude of the Communists towards the Government was accentuated by two new developments, namely, the signing of the Sino-American Treaty of Friendship and Commerce on November 4 and the convocation of the National Assembly about to take place. The Communists strongly condemned the newly signed treaty, regarding it as more cruel than Japan's Twenty-one Demands and calling it an instrument of American imperialism for enslaving the Chinese people.²⁸ As regards the National Assembly yet to be convened, the Communists charged that it was an illegal step, that its sole stage manager was the Kuomintang, and that its purpose was to pass a constitution which would prolong Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship. They warned that its convocation would mean a complete break between the two parties.²⁹ When later the National Assembly was convened according to schedule and a constitution was adopted on Christmas Day, the Communists felt indignant and considered the peace negotiations as practically at an end.

On December 18 President Truman issued a statement on United States policy toward China, saying: "The views expressed a year ago by this Government are valid today. . . . We recognize the National Government of China. . . . We shall therefore continue our positive and realistic policy toward China, which is based on full respect for her national sovereignty and on our traditional friendship for the Chinese people and is designed to promote international peace."³⁰ This proclamation drew fire from Chou En-lai, who in a long and bitter statement to the press on December 28 sharply denounced United States policy as contrary to the principles set forth in the Big Three Moscow Declaration of December 1945 and accused President Truman of fomenting civil discord in China and turning China into an American colony.³¹

²⁶ *U.S. Relations with China*, pp. 198-199

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 200

²⁸ *Chieh Fang Jih Pao*, November 13, 1946.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, November 10, 1946.

³⁰ Department of State, *op. cit.*, pp. 699-700

³¹ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, December 31, 1946.

The dawn of 1947 found General Marshall back in Washington. On January 7 he issued a statement announcing the failure of his mission and blaming both the major political parties in China for the blackout of peace.³²

The situation in China now entered a new and confused stage of development, where internal conditions and international forces combined and interacted to rule out a peaceful solution, and incidentally to corrode both Sino-Soviet relations and American-Soviet relations.

THE COLD WAR INTENSIFIED

Toward the end of January, the Department of State, now headed by General Marshall, announced the decision of the United States Government to terminate its mediatory efforts in China and to withdraw from the executive headquarters in Peiping as well as from the Committee of Three.³³ Later, part of the American marines in China were withdrawn, reducing the total number to about 10,000. These measures were strongly suggestive of a hands-off policy toward China and seem to have given comfort and encouragement to the Chinese Communists. On February 23 General Chu Teh, commander of the Chinese Communist forces, declared at a press interview in Yen-an that he was deeply pleased with the withdrawal of American troops, that he was fully confident the Communists would win the civil war, and that the Communists would not resume peace negotiations with the Government unless the latter would abolish the constitution already adopted and restore the military *status quo* as of January 13, 1946.³⁴

In the meantime an interesting and important report appeared to the effect that Mao Tse-tung had left Yen-an for Moscow for "a hush-hush visit." "It now develops," said the report, "that Mao Tse-tung, head of the Chinese Communist Party, was summoned to the Kremlin late in February. He conferred with both Stalin and Molotov, after having spent long hours in extensive conference with Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik, in charge of *L'Affaire Chine*."³⁵

According to the same report, it was the information received from Mao at the Kremlin that caused the "Molotov cocktail" to be

³² *U.S. Relations with China*, pp. 686-689.

³³ Department of State, *Bulletin*, February 9, 1947, p. 258.

³⁴ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), February 24, 1947.

³⁵ *United Nations World*, April 1947, p. 55. Whether Mao Tse-tung had been in Moscow before 1949 has been a controversial subject. One writer said that he definitely saw Mao with Stalin at the Kremlin in the fall of 1934.—See E. Ravines, *The Yen-an Way*, New York, 1951, p. 122.

served on March 10. On this day at the opening session of the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow on European problems, Molotov suddenly proposed to discuss the situation in China and opposed the presence of any Chinese representative in the discussion.³⁶ This move surprised the other members of the conference, and aroused the ire of the Chinese Government. In reaction to the move, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh issued a statement strongly protesting against it. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, also denounced the move, saying: "It is at least an insulting attitude if not an unfriendly act. . . . No decision made by the Big Four conference without Chinese participation will be acceptable. China is not an international colony."³⁷ Owing to the objection of the other foreign ministers, the Molotov proposal was dropped. It was subsequently agreed, however, that written exchange of information on China be made within the framework of the Moscow agreement of December 1945.

Later, in accordance with this agreement, Secretary of State Marshall informed Molotov and the other foreign ministers that American armed forces in China would soon be reduced to a total of 6180 men.³⁸ This information did not satisfy Molotov. In a letter made public on April 7 the Soviet Foreign Minister reminded the United States of its pledge in December 1945 to recall its troops from China at the earliest possible date and contended that "the Soviet Government in its relations with China has maintained and is maintaining a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China."³⁹

Meanwhile, shortly after Molotov sprang the diplomatic surprise at the expense of China, President Truman let go his diplomatic bombshell by proclaiming what has since been called the Truman Doctrine. In his message to Congress on March 12 the American President proposed that the United States intervene wherever necessary throughout the world to prevent the subjection of free peoples to Communist-inspired totalitarian regimes at the expense of their national integrity and importance.⁴⁰

This proclamation obviously ruffled the feelings of the Soviet authorities. In a special article *Izvestia* took President Truman to task and said:

³⁶ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), March 11, 1947.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *New York Times*, April 3, 1947.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, April 7, 1947.

⁴⁰ Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 23, 1947, pp. 534-537.

Soviet Diplomacy on the Eve of Nationalist Defeat

FOR a time the capture of the Communist capital Yenai by the Nationalist forces in the spring of 1947 caused a sensation and boosted Nationalist morale. In the light of subsequent events, however, the victory was hollow and practically marked the beginning of the end of Nationalist ascendancy.

Following the loss of Yenai, the Communists concentrated on operations in Manchuria and moved their main forces there, leaving mostly guerrilla bands in North China for subversive and diversionary purposes. By that time many fierce battles had been fought in Manchuria and many important cities changed hands frequently. But strategic and logistic factors appeared to be strongly in favor of the Communists. Whatever the reasons, the Communists in Manchuria steadily gained the upper hand and turned the table on the Nationalists. Their first signal victory was marked by the recapture of Szepingkai, a highly important strategic point, on June 21. This victory rendered the Nationalist position in Manchuria so grave as to arouse apprehensions on the part of some Nationalist leaders. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, solemnly warned that Manchuria might fall under Soviet domination and urged aid from the United States.¹ Later, Wang Ch'ung-hai, a member of the State Council and former judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice, pointed out at a press conference that the Manchurian situation was a direct outcome of the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty for which both the United States and Great Britain were in part responsible; and he proposed that China "should immediately demand the United States and Great Britain intervene in the situation in China with a view to bringing all Sino-Soviet problems to a just and reasonable settlement."² Apparently the United States and Great Britain did not pay heed to the request. Under the circumstances, Generalissimo

¹ *China Magazine*, July 1947, p. 68.

² *Ta Keng Pao* (Nanking), June 27, 1947.

Chiang Kai-shek became determined to use drastic measures to deal with the Communists. On July 7, the tenth anniversary of the outbreak of war with Japan, he broadcast a lengthy address to the nation denouncing the Communists in the sharpest terms, proclaiming an all-out war against them, and exhorting the people to give unselfish support to the crusade.³ Previously the State Council had ordered a general mobilization and placed the entire nation practically on a war basis.⁴ Thus the civil war embarked upon its irrevocable course.

NATIONALIST CHARGES AGAINST THE USSR

At about this time, official charges against the Soviet Union for rendering aid to the Chinese Communists began to appear and continued intermittently in the subsequent period. These charges usually accompanied Nationalist military reverses in Manchuria and therefore reflected Communist progress and growing strength in that important area. On June 23 Sun Fo asserted in a press interview that the Soviet Union had violated the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 by permitting the entry of Chinese Communist troops into Manchuria and turning over to them large quantities of Japanese arms, while at the same time refusing to admit Chinese Government troops into Dairen and Port Arthur.⁵

Shortly afterwards, General Ch'en Ch'eng, chief of staff of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, declared in Nanking that at least thirty-one Russian advisers were with the Communist troops at Szepingkai in Manchuria and that within a year Communist strength in Manchuria had increased to 850,000 troops, with 600,000 more under training. General Ch'en also charged that the Soviets had assisted in transporting Communist troops from Manchuria to Shantung.⁶

On July 7 General Tu Li-ming, commander of Government forces in Manchuria, reiterated the charge that Korean Communists, Japanese prisoners of war, as well as Russian officers were rendering direct aid to the Chinese Communists. He also reported that the arms and ammunition seized by the Communist forces in Manchuria were quantitatively greater than those seized by the Nationalist forces, and that the artilleries and machine guns of the Communists are also better than those of the Nationalists.⁷

In his 1948 New Year message to the Chinese people, the General-

³ *China Magazine*, August 1947, pp. 5 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-58.

⁵ *Ta Kwang Pao* (Canton), June 23 and 24, 1947.

⁶ *Ta Kung Pao* (Nanking), June 25, 1947; *New York Times*, June 25, 1947.

⁷ *Ibid.*, July 7, 1947; *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), July 7, 1947.

issimo himself clearly though indirectly intimated that Soviet Russia was helping the Chinese Communists, and gave the people a serious warning. He said: "The present Communist menace comes as much from without as from within. Unless checkmated, it will cause the downfall of our nation, make unity an impossibility, and reduce our people to serfs." ⁸

While Nationalist officials made those charges against the Soviet Union, Soviet authorities on their part denied them. According to an Associated Press dispatch dated Peiping, December 30, 1947, the Soviet consul-general in Peiping, Sergei Tichvinsky, said on that day: "My Government recognizes only one Government in China—the National Government—and is not supplying the Communists with anything. This is a 100 per cent denial." Later the Soviet news agency Tass also denied an Associated Press report that Russia was supplying the Chinese Communists in Manchuria with advisers and Soviet-made arms and equipment. It denounced the report as an "absurd fabrication." ⁹

THE WEDEMEYER MISSION TO CHINA

Whether with or without Soviet military aid and support, the Communists in Manchuria were making persistent progress in the latter part of 1947 and brought more people and territory there under their control than were under the Nationalists'. In the meantime, apparently in view of the mounting crisis, President Truman appointed General Albert Wedemeyer as his special envoy to head a "fact-finding mission" to China.¹⁰ The Chinese Communists at once showed their resentment and attacked General Wedemeyer as an imperialist planning "to further aggression." This soon evoked echoes from the Soviet Union. On August 11 the Moscow radio broadcast the allegation that General Wedemeyer was seeking eleven air bases in China in return for American aid and that American advisers would soon exercise a controlling influence in the Chinese Government. Two weeks later, *Pravda*, organ of the Soviet Communist Party, asserted that the aims of the Wedemeyer mission were not confined to fact-finding but included American aid in the civil war.

On the other hand, the Nationalists were heartened by the Wedemeyer mission, possibly considering it as an indication of American continued or renewed interest in their cause. While in China, therefore, the Wedemeyer mission was welcomed everywhere, and Gen-

⁸ *China Magazine*, January 1948, p. 6.

⁹ *New York Times*, January 6, 1948.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, July 12, 1947.

eral Wedemeyer conferred not only with Government officials but also with leaders of various social groups. On August 24 after a sojourn of about six weeks in China and just prior to his return to the United States, General Wedemeyer issued a statement which gave the Nationalists a shock. In the statement General Wedemeyer, while blaming the Communists for using force to impose ideologies, stressed that military force in itself would not eliminate Communism and maintained that China possessed most of the physical resources necessary for reconstruction but lacked the needed inspirational leadership.¹¹ This statement was so disappointing to the Nanking Government that Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh soon afterwards dispatched a note to the United States embassy, pointing out that the Government was not trying to eliminate Communism by force alone and that China had been prevented from capitalizing on her full resources by economic dislocations during the war and by the delay in taking over Manchuria afterwards.¹² Later, Sun Fo spoke of "vacillation, uncertainty and confusion" in the Far Eastern policy of the United States, and hinted that China may have had "little choice except to seek closer Soviet cooperation."¹³

In his report to President Truman, however, General Wedemeyer did make the final conclusion that the Nationalist regime must be and could be effectively aided, although it had various defects. The report also recommended that Manchuria be placed under the guardianship of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China. On account of this recommendation the Department of State considered it necessary to suppress the report for several years.¹⁴

CHIANG SEES THE RED TIDE RISING

In the midst of a major military campaign against the Communists, the Government went ahead with its political measures establishing a constitutional democracy for the Chinese people. On November 21, 1947, in accordance with the constitution adopted the previous Christmas, a general election was held for the election of representatives to the National Assembly. In April of the following year these representatives in turn held a presidential election, and Chiang Kai-shek and Li Tsung-jen were elected President and Vice-president.¹⁵ In his inaugural speech on May 21 President Chiang

¹¹ *U.S. Relations with China*, pp. 257-258.

¹² *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), August 27, 1947.

¹³ *Ibid.*, September 17, 1947.

¹⁴ Joseph Alsop, "The Foredoomed Mission of General Marshall," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 21, 1950, p. 114; *U.S. Relations with China*, pp. 260-261.

¹⁵ *China Magazine*, May 1948, p. 64.

made an appeal to the Chinese people and tried to rouse and rally them against the Communists, saying:

The present military campaign was not brought on by friction between political parties. Much less was it caused by conflicting interests. It is a war between democracy and totalitarianism, between forces of unity and those of disunity, between patriots and traitors, between liberty loving peoples and oppressors, between those who want to see China continue as an independent nation and those who seek to subjugate her. In effect, this is an all out war on the part of the Chinese people to save their nation from collapse.¹⁰

Meanwhile the civil war went on, and the position of the Nationalists was turning from bad to worse. At the beginning of the year the position of the Government forces in Manchuria was already reported to be in danger, and there was talk of abandoning all the principal cities except Mukden. Towards the end of February the Communists extended their major military operations to North China, especially the provinces of Shantung, Honan, and Szechuan, no doubt for the purpose of diverting Government forces from Manchuria. In the first part of March such important cities as Kirin, Yingkow, Sipinghai were seized from the Nationalists. A month later it was reported that 250,000 Communist troops were operating in Central China. The basic strength and general superiority of the Communist forces became more and more manifest. On April 23, that is, shortly after Chiang Kai-shek was elected president, the Chinese Communists recaptured their former capital, Yenan,¹¹ which had been taken by the Nationalists a little over a year before. This event symbolized the changing political fortunes in China at that time. The tide had definitely turned against the Nationalists, and the wick of their lamp began to flicker. Later, severe fighting kept on raging in north and central China as well as in Manchuria. The Communist advance was gaining momentum, and important cities in Manchuria and within the Great Wall were either occupied or attacked or threatened. As a result the Nationalists found themselves in deeper and deeper woe and felt the more convinced that Russia was behind their formidable antagonists. On July 9, 137 members of the Legislative Yuan passed a resolution to the effect that the world had been misled into believing that China was engaged in a civil war, whereas in fact the Chinese were battling against Communist aggression directed by Moscow.¹²

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, June 1948, pp. 6-12.

¹¹ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, April 25, 1948.

¹² *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), July 10, 1948.

In the latter part of 1948 more and more provinces north of the Yangtze River were enveloped in the smoke of the civil war, and the Nationalists suffered more and more reverses. On November 2 Mukden was captured by the Communists.¹⁹ The loss of Mukden symbolized the loss of the whole of Manchuria. With the loss of Manchuria, the keystone may be said to have fallen out of the Nationalist arch. For some time the loss had been known to be inevitable, but considerable sacrifices were made to keep up the fighting to gratify, so it has been reliably reported, the patriotic sentiments and insistent demands of those members of the Legislative Yuan who represented various districts in Manchuria and North China.²⁰ Immediately after their capture of Mukden, the Communists shifted 300,000 troops across the Great Wall into north and central China.²¹ Towards the end of the year their forces were operating in the suburbs of Peiping and Tientsin, had captured such key cities and railway centers as Kalgan, Loyang, Kaifeng, Tsinan, and Hsuehchow, and were advancing southward along the Peiping-Hankow Railway and the Tientsin-Pukou Railway on their way to Wuhan and Nanking. The Nationalists were in a desperate position.

VAIN APPEALS FOR AMERICAN AID

In their despondent and desperate mood the Nationalists again turned to the United States for aid. Previously, on April 3, 1948, the United States Congress had passed a bill providing for the sum of \$463,000,000 as aid to China, of which, however, only \$125,000,000 could be used for arms and military equipment.²² Even this relatively small sum was not put to quick use. According to a reliable report the first shipment of arms from the United States did not arrive until early December,²³ when the Communists had already conquered the whole of Manchuria and were sweeping across North China. "Too little, too late."

Soon after the loss of Manchuria, President Chiang wrote a letter to President Truman, dated November 9, 1948, asking for speedy and increased military assistance, for a firm statement of American policy in support of the Nationalist cause, and for a high-ranking military officer to help plan military operations.²⁴ To this letter President Truman replied on November 12. He did not comply with

¹⁹ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, November 4, 1948.

²⁰ Thomas Dewey, *Journey to the Far Pacific*, New York, 1952, p. 106.

²¹ *New York Times*, November 5, 1948.

²² "China Aid Act of 1948," *Public Law 472*, Title IV, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 25-26.

²³ *Department of State Publication 3573*, p. 280.

²⁴ *U.S. Relations with China*, pp. 888-889.

any of the requests, nor did he make any commitment beyond the aid program previously decided upon by Congress.²⁵

On December 1 Madame Chiang came to Washington. Two days later, according to a United Press dispatch from Washington, she had a long conversation with Secretary of State Marshall, lasting three hours and fifteen minutes. The details of the conversation were not divulged, but it was known that she was appealing for American aid.²⁶

Shortly afterwards Ambassador Wellington Koo submitted a program to President Truman urging action in four directions: (1) immediate declaration of support for Chiang Kai-shek; (2) acceleration of supplies to the Nationalist forces; (3) appointment of a military leader to help direct these forces; (4) grant of three billion dollars for aid over a period of three years.²⁷ According to Reuters, a British news agency, this program was brought over by Madame Chiang.²⁸

Apparently, the program did not receive any favorable response. So on December 15 the Control Yuan of the Chinese Government sent a direct appeal to the United States Congress, requesting increased aid to stop the conquest of China by the Communists and to prevent the Sovietization of the Far East.²⁹ This appeal received no favorable consideration either.

On the whole, the Nationalist appeals for aid appear rather pathetic. There were quite a number of reasons why they failed to evoke any sympathetic response. Of course at that time there was in the United States a powerful body of articulate public opinion opposing aid to the Nationalists, and this for various political reasons such as sympathy for the Chinese Communists, dissatisfaction with the Nationalists, or fear that United States aid to China would diminish United States aid to Great Britain and Europe. Apart from the pressure of public opinion, the United States Government might also have been deterred by considerations of the huge size of the aid needed, the risk of the intervention, and the uncertainty of the outcome. In 1947 William Bullitt, a noted American diplomat, in a long article in *Life* conscientiously thought out what the problems facing China were, how the United States could contribute toward the solution of these problems, what materials and weapons the United States had to send and could send to China, how much they

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 889-890.

²⁶ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), December 5, 1948.

²⁷ *New York Times*, December 5, 1948.

²⁸ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), December 6, 1948.

²⁹ *New York Times*, December 15, 1948.

would cost, how many new Nationalist divisions would be required "to drive out of Manchuria the 350,000 Communist troops," and how many would be required "to clean up North China" and corner the Communist guerrillas, and so on. And he figured that a sum of \$1,350,000,000 and a period of three years would do the job, would prevent "Stalin from taking over China and organizing its resources and manpower for war against us."³⁰ That this estimate was over optimistic appears evident in the light of the subsequent experience of the United States in the Korean war. The Korean front was much smaller than the civil war front in China. Yet after three years of warfare and after incurring 33,600 casualties and spending \$22,000,000,000 (nearly twenty times \$1,350,000,000)³¹ the result has been disappointing from the American standpoint, being far short of the original objective, namely, "a united democratic Korea."

Whatever the reason, the United States Government did not pay much heed to the urgent appeals of the Nationalists toward the end of 1948. At that time it was disclosed in Washington that since Japan's surrender \$2,881,065,000 had been given the Chinese Government as military and economic aid.³² If this figure is correct, a substantial portion of the amount must have been allotted before 1947. According to a declaration by Dr. T. F. Tsiang in the General Assembly of the United Nations, during the period from August 1947 to March 1949 United States aid to China was only \$125,000,000, less than half the amount given to Greece during the same period.³³

THE CRUMBLING OF NATIONALIST RULE ON THE MAINLAND

With no assurance for support from the United States, the morale of the Nationalists sagged, and hope for stiffening the military front against the Communist forces vanished. On the other hand, the Communists with reinforcements from Manchuria appeared stronger and more formidable than ever. Under the circumstances it was not at all surprising that in his New Year (1949) message President Chiang threw out strong peace feelers and said that he would be glad to discuss with the Communists the means to end the civil war, if the entity of the Nationalist armies would be safeguarded and if the

³⁰ William Bullitt, "A Report to the American People on China," *Life*, October 13, 1947.

³¹ Major General Courtney Whitney, "The War MacArthur Was Not Allowed to Win," *Life*, September 5, 1955.

³² *New York Times*, December 19, 1948.

³³ Chinese Delegation to the United Nations, *China Presents Her Case to the United Nations*, p. 38.

constitution would not be violated.³⁴ At the same time an attempt was made to seek foreign mediation to end the civil war. On January 8 Wu Te chen, the Foreign Minister at that time, had conversations with the envoys of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France and asked what would be the attitude of the various Governments concerning the Chinese Government's desire for peace with the Communists. The envoys then reported the matter to their respective governments and waited for instructions. About two weeks later it was announced that all four governments had turned down the request for mediation.³⁵ The dignified and lofty tone of the Soviet reply deserves special note. In a memorandum to the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky stated that the Soviet Government had "invariably abided by the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries and does not consider it expedient to undertake the mediation referred to in the above memorandum."³⁶

In the meantime, on January 14, Mao Tse-tung made a proclamation, in which he rejected Chiang Kai-shek's peace terms as deceitful and put forth eight counterproposals. These were (1) punishment of the civil war criminals, (2) abolition of the "illegitimate" constitution, (3) abolition of the "illegitimate" legal system, (4) reorganization of all reactionary armies, (5) confiscation of the capital assets of politicians, (6) reform of the land system, (7) abolition of the "reasonable" treaties, (8) convening of a political consultation conference free from participation by reactionaries.³⁷ Confronted by these severe terms, and what was worse, by unmitigated military reverses, Chiang resigned from the presidency and left Nanking. Thereupon Vice-president Li Tsung-jen took over the supreme post and at once proceeded to carry on negotiations with the Communists. For this purpose he sent two missions to Peiping to discuss the basic terms. On April 7, in a rather desperate mood, he sent a telegram to Mao Tse-tung, expressing his willingness to accept Mao's eight proposals as basic principles for the peace negotiations.³⁸ A week later the delegation of the Communist Party handed to the Government delegation a set of peace terms, namely, admission by the Government of guilt in starting the civil war, abolition of the Nanking constitution, abolition of the legal system of the Government, and reorgani-

³⁴ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), January 3, 1949.

³⁵ *New York Times*, January 21, 1949.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, January 18, 1949.

³⁷ Chieh Fang She, *Chang Ko-Ming Chun-Hung Tao-Ti* [Pushing the Revolution to the Limit], N.p., Hsun Hua Book Store, 1949, p. 22.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 174-175.

zation of all the Government armed forces.³⁹ The Nanking Government found these pills too bitter to swallow and rejected them.

Immediately afterwards the Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River and occupied Nanking, Shanghai, Hangchow, and Hankow in quick succession. With swiftness and precision they conquered the China mainland by the end of the year. The seat of the Nationalist Government was shifted from place to place: from Nanking to Canton on February 8, from Canton to Chungking on October 15, from Chungking to Chengtu on November 25, and from Chengtu to Taipei in Taiwan (Formosa) on December 9.

THE TWO-SIDED SOVIET POLICY AND SINKIANG

During this important period of sweeping Communist triumph and deepening Nationalist woe, Sino-Soviet relations manifested themselves in some strange and significant ways. What exactly went on between the Kremlin and the Chinese Communist Party is of course veiled behind the iron curtain. It is known, however, that the Chinese Communist leaders frequently demonstrated their solidarity with the Soviet Union. In July 1948, for instance, they strongly backed the attack of the Cominform on the Yugoslav Communist Party, declaring that Marshal Tito and his followers had betrayed the basic viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism and had fallen into the mire of bourgeois nationalism.⁴⁰ On November 7 on the occasion of the thirty-first anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Mao Tse-tung sharply criticized the policy of the United States while expressing his readiness to follow the leadership of the Soviet Union. In an article in *For Lasting Peace and People's Democracy*, a Cominform paper published at Bucharest, he charged the United States with madly preparing for a new war and called for "an anti-imperialist united front headed by the Soviet Union."⁴¹ In March 1949 the Communist New China News Agency sent forth a lengthy editorial declaring that China could not but regard "the warlike American imperialists" as a deadly enemy and at the same time could not but regard the Soviet Union, "leader of the world's anti-imperialist front," as a constant and reliable friend.⁴² Then in June 1949 Mao Tse-tung proclaimed his "lean-to-one-side" policy, saying that China must unite with the Soviet Union and the new democratic countries to form an international united front.⁴³ Although these expressions

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

⁴⁰ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, November 7, 1948.

⁴¹ Chinese version, *ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*, March 19, 1949.

⁴³ Mao Tse-tung, *Lun Jen-Min Min-Chu Chuan-Cheng* [On the People's Democratic Dictatorship], Hong Kong, 1949, pp. 7-8.

are one sided, they point to the conclusion that the Chinese Communists and the Soviets are and have been hand and glove with each other and supporting each other in the game of world politics. It may not be out of place here to recall that, as has been discussed in a previous chapter, the Soviets have given the Chinese Communists very effective and substantial aid since August 1945 when Soviet forces poured into Manchuria.

While developing greater and greater solidarity with the Chinese Communists, the Soviet Government throughout the entire course of the civil war maintained diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government, and its diplomatic behavior was a model of correctness. When in the spring of 1949 the Communist forces captured one after another such cities as Tientsin, Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai, and so on, the Soviet diplomatic and consular officials in those cities either suspended their official duties, or retreated with the Nationalists, as if the Nationalists were their great friends while the Communists were their great enemies. Thus after Peiping and Tientsin had been occupied by the Communists, the Soviet consulates there were closed. So was the Soviet consulate in Shanghai on May 29, after that metropolis had fallen to the Communists.⁴⁴ When Nanking fell, the Soviet Ambassador Roschin followed the Nationalist Government to Canton.⁴⁵ He was the only one of the foreign ambassadors in China to take this step.

Such behavior on the part of the Soviet diplomats seems overcorrect and may have had some special reasons behind it. According to international law and diplomatic practice, foreign embassies and consulates in a certain country do not have to close or move away when a new regime comes in to displace the old. The real reason behind the Soviet diplomatic behavior may have been fourfold: (1) to create the impression that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the Chinese Communists; (2) to make believe that a Government capable of such diplomatic correctness would never violate any treaty, especially the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance which the Chinese Government officials had repeatedly charged the Soviet Government with violating by its actions and activities in Manchuria; (3) to create a precedent for the closing of the embassies and consulates of other countries in China; (4) to maintain relations with the Nationalist Government as long as possible in order to exact concessions from it.

In the last phase of its relations with the Nationalist Government, the Kremlin manifested special interest in Sinkiang. On the other

⁴⁴ *Chung Yang Jih Pao*, May 31, 1949.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

hand, some Nationalist officials entertained the grandiose notion of using concessions in Sinkiang to manipulate the Soviet Union against the Chinese Communists! The story began in the latter part of September 1948 when the severity of the civil war was rising to a high pitch. At that time the Soviet Government asked for an extension of the old agreement concerning Soviet air rights in Sinkiang. The Chinese Government did not make any immediate commitment and wanted to study the Soviet overture beforehand. Later, according to a special report from Urumchi (capital of Sinkiang) dated April 1, 1949, to the *New York Times*, preliminary talks on the subject were held in Alma Ata and paved the way for subsequent negotiations.

At the beginning of 1949 the Soviets revealed other aspects of their interest and initiated negotiations on the renewal of trade and the establishment of oil and mining companies in Sinkiang in addition to aviation rights.⁴⁶ About this time Governor Masud Sabri, who had been strongly opposed by the Turki and Kazakh rebels, was removed from office; and the former vice-governor, Bor Han, who was more acceptable to the rebels, took over the administration. This change in the government was probably intended to set the stage for new developments in the province. Towards the end of January the Soviet initiative in trade, oil, and mining negotiations met with a ready response from the Chinese Government. At that time the Government, headed by Acting President Li Tsung-jen, was taking urgent steps to make peace with the triumphant Chinese Communists, and General Chang Chih-chung was made one of the peace delegates. Now General Chang was a dominant figure in the Northwest, and he cherished the idea of swinging the Soviet Union against the Chinese Communists by making a new deal with the Soviet Government in regard to Sinkiang. According to reports the proposed plan envisaged the establishment of a pro-Soviet belt stretching from Central Asia all the way to the Sea of Japan. The same reports stated that in its economic aspect, the proposed plan was modeled on the 1934 agreement between the Soviets and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, whereby the Soviet Union was to provide arms, planes, and technical aid in return for mining and trade rights and a voice in the provincial administration.⁴⁷

To what extent the above reports are reliable cannot easily be determined. According to Chang Chih-chung himself his plan was not so extravagant as people thought it to be. At a press conference at Hankow on his way to Sinkiang he said that the new Sino-Soviet

⁴⁶ *New York Times*, May 12, 1949.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, February 1 and 2, 1949.

"commercial agreement" was designed to meet mutual needs, that it had been under negotiation for over a year, that it was "of a local character," and that its contents were "not so serious as rumors have it." He added, however, that the formal signature of the treaty in the future might require the participation of representatives from the Defense Department, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and the Ministry of Natural Resources.⁴⁸ This would seem to indicate that the agreement was pretty important.

That the negotiations in Sinkiang were somehow linked with the peace talks in Peiping was indicated by the fact that Chang Chih-chung had to divide his time and attention between the two scenes of political discussions.

Despite Chang's enthusiasm for a new agreement with the Soviets, the negotiations did not make any headway. Toward the end of February, Chang's plan met with stiff opposition from the Chinese Foreign Ministry. According to a special dispatch from Canton (then seat of the Chinese Government) to the *New York Times*, dated February 27, the Ministry insisted that the agreement should be limited to only five years and should be purged of its monopolistic features and placed on a most-favored-nation treatment basis. It also objected to giving the Soviets blanket mining rights and suggested that the agreement should specify the mining concessions to be developed by the Soviet Union. Probably because of this opposition, the negotiations in Tihwa (Urumchi) were grinding to a stop in the first days of March. There were some major points of difference that could not be ironed out. According to a report from Tihwa dated March 19, to the *New York Times*, the Soviets wanted the directors of the joint mining companies to be Russians; the Chinese, however, wanted them to be Chinese. The Soviets also could not agree to the Chinese proposal that specific mines be named and that the output of ores should be divided equally between the two countries.

Later, negotiations were devoted solely to the joint airline in Sinkiang. Points of difference existed on this subject also. The Chinese insisted that the agreement should run for only a five-year period and that the whole enterprise should be placed on a fifty-fifty basis. The Russians, however, wanted the agreement to last twenty years.⁴⁹ The negotiations went on for nearly six weeks after the first meeting on April 1 at the Soviet consulate. On May 11, an agreement was signed, extending the old Sino-Soviet airline agreement another five years. The Russians yielded to the Chinese proposal presumably be-

⁴⁸ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), February 1, 1949.

⁴⁹ *New York Times*, April 6, 1949.

cause time seemed running out for the Nationalist Government, whose authority on the mainland was rapidly melting away before the onward advance of the Communist forces.

In the subsequent months the Chinese Government was harassed by military defeats and consequent embarrassments. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists were making preparations to form a central national government. The final phase of the preparations was the convention of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference at Peiping, which lasted eight days till the end of September. Before it adjourned, it adopted three important documents: the Common Program, the Organic Law of the Central People's Government, and the Organic Law of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.⁵⁰ On October 1, 1949, the new republic was proclaimed and Mao Tse-tung, as Chairman of the Central People's Government, declared, *inter alia*:

At the same time it is resolved that a declaration be made to the governments of the various countries to the effect that this government is the only legal government representing the entire people of the Central People's Republic of China, and it is willing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government which will observe such principles as equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.⁵¹

The following day the Soviet Government shed its diplomatic mask and recognized the new regime.

Weeks later, on November 15, Chou En-lai, Premier and Foreign Minister of the new regime, sent a letter to the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations, declaring that the Nationalist Chinese delegation to the United Nations could not represent China and had no right to speak for the Chinese people.⁵² This declaration has caused a hot issue in the United Nations ever since and has been consistently espoused by the Soviet delegation.

A new era of Sino-Soviet relations has begun. Before proceeding to deal with developments in the new era, however, it remains to examine the appeal of the Nationalist Government against the Soviet Union in the United Nations. The following chapter deals with this appeal in some detail, setting forth the manner in which the United Nations handled the case and plainly reporting the views not only of China and Soviet Russia but also of many other member states of the United Nations on a very important phase of Sino-Soviet relations.

⁵⁰ Teng Ch'u-min, *Chung-Kuo Cheng-Chih Wen-T'i Chiang-Hua* [Talks on China's Political Problems], Peking, 1949, p. 125.

⁵¹ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, October 2, 1949.

⁵² United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings*, 1949, p. 335.

China's Accusation of the USSR in the United Nations

IN THE first part of 1948, when the civil war was rising to a climax and the Communist forces were rolling from triumph to triumph, the suspicion of Soviet influence behind the Communist advance became stronger on the part of the Nationalist leaders, and the idea began to take shape in their mind of maneuvering the machinery of the United Nations against the Soviet Union. On March 14 the People's Political Council at Nanking demanded that Dairen and Port Arthur be returned to China, if necessary through the United Nations.¹ Before long, this idea on the part of the Nationalist leaders was strengthened by the attitude of the top leaders of the United States toward the Soviet Government in regard to the latter's treaty obligations to China. On June 2 the United States Senate released a document submitted by the Department of State concerning Soviet violations of treaties. According to this document, the Soviet Government had violated Article VI of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945, by removing and damaging the industries in Manchuria, had broken its pledge to render aid exclusively to the Central Government of China by giving Japanese arms to the Chinese Communists, and had failed to live up to the agreement on Dairen by obstructing the Chinese Government in its efforts to establish an administration in that port.² A few months later, on November 11, during a discussion on disarmament at a meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Chinese representative, T. F. Tsiang, suddenly referred to the civil war in China and quoted a dispatch of the Associated Press to the effect that the Japanese Foreign Office had estimated that some 50,000 Japanese prisoners of war captured by the USSR were employed by the Chinese Communist forces either as soldiers or as technicians. He charged that the USSR was organizing and equip-

¹ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), March 14, 1948.

² *U.S. Senate Report*, 80th Cong., 2d sess., June 2, 1948, No. 1440, p. 11.

ping Japanese to fight the Chinese Government.³ These remarks startled both the Soviet representative, Andrei Vyshinsky, and the Ukrainian representative, Dmitri Mamulsky. Mamulsky demanded censure of the "slandereous statements," while Vyshinsky shouted that the Chinese representative had "stepped outside the line of decency."⁴ Later the Soviet representative remarked that whether or not the Chinese Government reduced its armed forces by one third, there would be no effect on the outcome of the battle of the Chinese people against the Chinese generals which was then marked by the brilliant victories of the People's Liberation Army of China.⁵ Towards the end of the year President Truman, in the course of his speech at a luncheon party in Kansas City, attacked the Soviet Government for having shattered the peaceful aims of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. He said: "Contracts are not sacred with the Soviet Government. I made certain specific agreements with the Russians at Potsdam, none of which has been kept. Certain agreements were made at Yalta, none of which has been kept."⁶

As the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945 was a direct offspring of the Yalta agreements, this remark of the American President might have given encouragement to the Chinese Nationalist leaders who wished to accuse the Soviet Government of treaty violations. On May 20, 1949, when Nanking had already fallen into the hands of the Chinese Communists, the Chinese Legislative Yuan asked the Cabinet to seek United Nations mediation in the civil war and accused the Soviet Government of violating the 1945 treaty.⁷

THE FIRST BLAST AT THE USSR

The above series of events may be likened to distant rumblings before the storm which finally broke towards the end of September, when the Chinese Communists were triumphant in the civil war and the Central People's Government in Peiping was about to come into being.

On September 22 at the 223d plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the Chinese representative blasted the Soviet Union, saying that Communism, in itself a great menace, was inseparably joined with the old deep-rooted Russian imperialism, that the change from Czarist imperialism to Soviet imperialism was entirely on the surface, and that at bottom the two brands of imperialism were really

³ United Nations, *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, First Committee*, 1948, p. 556.

⁴ *New York Times*, November 12, 1948.

⁵ United Nations, *op. cit.*, pp. 562-563.

⁶ *New York Times*, December 28, 1948.

⁷ *Chung Yang Jih Pao*, May 21, 1949.

identical.⁸ He stated further that the Soviet Union, through the Chinese Communist Party, had an instrument and a lever with which to undermine the independence and integrity of China and the peace of the Far East. He urged the representatives of the nations to pay due attention to the storm that had reached China and would soon reach other countries.⁹ By these statements the Chinese representative made the situation in China one of the subjects for debate in the General Assembly.

The following day at the 226th plenary meeting Vyshinsky replied to the Chinese charges rather angrily. He stated that Tsiang, the Chinese representative, had tried to retrace historical events, but that he had grossly falsified the facts and in order to conceal the truth had omitted to say that twenty-five years previously the Soviet Union had renounced all rights granted to it under the agreements signed by the Czarist Government in violation of Chinese sovereignty.¹⁰ Some other representatives also made reference to the situation in China. Thus Santa Cruz, the representative of Chile, in the course of his survey of world problems, remarked that part of the territory of China was occupied by military forces engaged in a movement of expansion which ran counter to all the principles of the United Nations. The danger which hovered over all Asia, he continued, could not be ignored if world peace was still regarded as one and indivisible. The participation of the USSR in those events, which had been denounced by the representative of China, showed the tragic seriousness of the situation, he concluded.¹¹ At a later meeting, the British representative, Ernest Bevin, drew attention to the question of China and said that the plea of the Chinese Government representative merited full consideration. He declared that the United Kingdom would make no attempt to interfere in the choice of government, but that China had entered into certain international obligations which must be honored and that a wise approach to the handling of those problems would be in the interests of the whole world.¹²

CHINA LAUNCHES A FORMAL APPEAL

On September 28, the case of the Chinese Government against the Soviet Union began to take a more definite turn. On that day at the 67th meeting of the General Committee of the General Assembly,

⁸ United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 1949*, p. 15.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

the chairman disclosed a letter from the Chinese delegation to the President of the General Assembly, requesting that a new item should be added to the agenda of the fourth session of the Assembly. After reading the letter the chairman invited comments on the Chinese request. To make the matter better understood, the Chinese representative explained that the point at issue was not a dispute between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists, but one between the Government of China and that of the Soviet Union. He said that it was not considered proper to discuss the substance of the matter in the General Committee, and that for the time being it would be sufficient to stress that the matter was especially important and urgent and needed action on the part of the General Assembly. Thereupon Vyshinsky began to speak and expressed objections to the Chinese move. He asserted that the motive behind the move was in reality a slanderous attack on the Soviet Union made at the instigation of the United States. He then began to quote Dean Acheson's White Paper to support his view that the collapse of the Chinese Government was not due to Soviet help to the Chinese Communists but due to purely internal causes. He categorically opposed the inclusion in the agenda of the new item proposed by the Chinese delegation.¹³

Despite Soviet objection, it was finally decided by eleven votes to two to recommend that the new item should be included in the agenda of the fourth session of the General Assembly and should be referred to the First Committee.¹⁴

This recommendation was introduced the following day to the 230th meeting of the General Assembly, where the members were to consider whether it should be adopted. The item recommended was phrased thus:

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from violations by the Soviet Union of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance concluded on 14 August 1945 between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and from violations by the Soviet Union of the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁵

Tsiang, the Chinese representative, began the debate by saying that in the matter under discussion China had taken the initiative

¹³ United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, General Committee, 1949*, pp. 9-10.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁵ United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 1949*, pp. 95-96.

of its own free choice and decision, not, as the Soviet representative had asserted, at the instigation of the United States. He pointed out that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and the annexed agreements were concluded in fulfillment of the Yalta agreement, and that under them the two contracting parties had assumed definite obligations towards each other. He charged, however, that the Soviet Union had failed to honor its treaty obligations, saying that instead of giving China economic assistance, the USSR army had removed a considerable part of the industrial equipment of Manchuria; that instead of giving moral support and military aid to the Central Government of China, the Soviet Union had given direct and indirect moral and material support to the Communist insurrection in China; that instead of respecting China's sovereignty in Manchuria, the Soviet Government had prevented the Central Government of China from using the port of Dairen and from setting up an administration there. He contended that these violations were also violations of the principles of the United Nations Charter.¹⁶

This stand of the Chinese delegation aroused immediate opposition from the delegations of the Soviet bloc and also of Yugoslavia. Vladimir Clementis of Czechoslovakia quoted the White Paper to show that the Chinese Government was reactionary and that it was the United States that had supplied arms through the Kuomintang to the Chinese Communists. Ales Bebler of Yugoslavia stated that any action against the people's movement for liberation would be tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of China, and that it would not be proper to include the Chinese item in the agenda. Vyshinsky argued that the Chinese representative had failed to present facts or considerations as a basis for his complaint and that the Assembly could not decide to examine the proposed item without looking into the substance of the question. He contended that the real motive behind the submission of the Chinese complaint was the desire of the Kuomintang to deceive public opinion at home and throughout the world, and that the White Paper clearly showed that it was the United States that had undertaken direct intervention in the Chinese civil strife. Stefan Wierblowski of Poland supported the Soviet position and quoted the White Paper.¹⁷

Then Warren Austin of the United States addressed the meeting. He attacked Vyshinsky's assertion that an item must first be substantiated before it was placed on the agenda. He pointed out that only a few days previously, the Soviet delegation had submitted proposals containing the gravest possible charges against the United

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-102.

States and the United Kingdom without offering a shred of evidence, and yet those proposals had been placed on the agenda. He declared that he would vote for the recommendation.¹⁸

The recommendation was finally adopted by forty-five votes to six, with five abstentions. Thus the Chinese appeal against the Soviet Union was included in the agenda and was allocated to the First Committee for consideration.

CHINA STATES HER CASE

The First Committee began to deal with the Chinese appeal at its 338th meeting, held on November 25, 1949. On that occasion, Vyshinsky seized the first opportunity to speak. He recalled that the Chinese appeal was placed on the agenda in the teeth of Soviet opposition. He contended that there was no threat to peace in China and in the Far East as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, and that the appeal was made with the sole aim of diverting attention from current developments in China. He maintained that the Kuomintang Government had no right to claim that it represented the Chinese people. He declared that his delegation would not participate in the consideration of the Chinese appeal, nor would it take into account any decision made in that regard.¹⁹ After Vyshinsky, the Ukrainian, the Polish, and the Czech representatives took turns to address the meeting. They all supported Vyshinsky and declared that their delegations would not take part in the consideration of the Chinese question and would not regard as binding any decision that might be taken in connection therewith. The Yugoslav delegation, too, echoed Vyshinsky and raised the question whether the Committee could consider an item proposed by a delegation which had lost the right to represent China. In reply, the chairman of the meeting stated that any challenge to the right to represent China should be sent to the proper agency of the General Assembly, and that until a previous decision of the Assembly had been reversed, the Chinese delegation then represented on the Committee would be recognized as such. Having made this reply, he called upon Tsiang, the Chinese representative, to start the discussion of the item.²⁰

Tsiang first expressed surprise at the position taken by the Yugoslav delegation, pointing out that the Chinese Communists had denounced Marshal Tito and his followers as traitors to the cause of

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

¹⁹ United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 1949*, pp. 339-340.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

international Communism. He also fired a shot at the Polish delegation, saying that China was one of the few countries to protest "the second partition of Poland." In presenting China's case against the Soviet Union, he first drew attention to Article II of the United Nations Charter, which provides that "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state," and that "all Members . . . shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter." He told the Committee that it was the contention of his Government that Soviet measures in China were violative of the underlying spirit, the Preamble, Article I, and Article II of the Charter. Referring to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1915 and the annexed agreements, he pointed out that Soviet obligations under these instruments were in general fourfold, namely: (1) to render moral support and material aid entirely to the National Government as the Central Government of China; (2) to respect China's full sovereignty over Manchuria and to recognize its territorial and administrative integrity; (3) to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Mongolia; (4) to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs in Sinkiang. All these obligations, he said, the Soviet Union had failed to honor.

To substantiate his charges, Tsiang went on to outline for the Committee "the steps and measures by which the Soviet Union obstructed the re-establishment of national authority in Manchuria by the Central Government of China," and to present "facts and figures relating to Soviet military and economic assistance to the Chinese Communists in Manchuria." He said that Soviet authorities had, by using various legal pretexts and subterfuges, prevented the Chinese Government from using Dairen and other Manchurian ports. He added that Soviet authorities had refused "to advise the appropriate Chinese authorities of the exact dates of the withdrawal of Soviet troops," but always informed the Chinese Communists of Soviet plans beforehand, so that the Chinese Communist forces were able to occupy the areas in the wake of Soviet withdrawal. He told the Committee that the Soviet Union had helped the Chinese Communists by equipping them with Soviet as well as Japanese arms, by training their armies and military officers, by allowing them to employ Japanese war prisoners, by permitting its own military force to engage in their operational activities, by extending to them economic and technical assistance to develop their resources, and by rehabilitating their transportation and power industries.

Tsiang next asked the Committee "to consider Soviet economic

designs on Manchuria." He at once referred to the well-known Soviet removal of industrial assets from that important area. In no mood to "weary the Committee with details," he conveniently cited the report of the "Edwin W. Pauley Mission on Japanese Reparations, and pointed out that according to this report "the total value of the property removed by the Soviet Army from Manchuria was worth 800,000,000 American dollars." Nothing was said as to whether this highhanded Soviet measure could be justified under international law. Tsiang further reported that the Soviet Union also wanted to exploit the mining and industrial enterprises in Manchuria. He informed the Committee that on November 24, 1945, the Economic Adviser of the Soviet High Command in Manchuria handed to the Chinese Economic Commissioner there a list of 154 mining and industrial enterprises which the Soviet Government proposed to place under joint Sino-Soviet operation, and that later the Soviet High Command threatened to delay the withdrawal of Soviet forces in Manchuria until the economic questions were settled. He added that the Soviet authorities did not stop at murder to discourage and intimidate Chinese Government authorities from taking over the economic enterprises in Manchuria.

In substantiating the charge that the Soviet Union had failed to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of Outer Mongolia, Tsiang stated that according to reports received by his government, Soviet officials were directing the Outer Mongolian army and were attached to "all levels of the political and administrative machinery of this so-called independent state, from the central government down to the villages." Moreover, the Soviet Union in 1948 had annexed Tannu Tuva, which was part of Outer Mongolia, he added.

In regard to Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of Sinkiang, Tsiang stated that the Soviet Union had been "creating disturbances in the whole Ining-Tahcheng-Altai area, and establishing there a so-called Republic of Eastern Turkestan," had supported the troops of Outer Mongolia in their invasion of Sinkiang in April 1947, and had made proposals to the Chinese Government concerning the exploration and exploitation of the mineral and oil resources of Sinkiang.

Tsiang asserted that the Soviet Union employed "the new weapon of the fifth column" for territorial and political expansion, and that the Chinese Communist Party "is completely subservient to the dictates of Moscow." He told the Committee that the Chinese Communist Party was linked with Communist activities in Indochina, Burma, India, Malaya, and the Philippines. He reported that under

the Chinese Communists three curtains—the "bamboo curtain," the "wooden curtain," and the "iron curtain"—had descended on China, to shut off China from Western influence and to keep her completely under Soviet influence.

Apparently in an effort to refute the many charges of graft and corruption leveled at the Nationalist Government, Tsiang contended that poverty in China was the "accumulated result of centuries," that despite such poverty the Chinese Government had conducted a long war against Japanese aggression, that the Chinese Communists themselves had admitted that their forces had suffered nearly one and a half million casualties in the civil war, and that in the period from August 1947 to March 1949 United States aid to the Chinese Government was only \$125,000,000, while during the same period United States aid to Greece was \$318,000,000.

Finally, the Chinese representative dealt with the question as to what the General Assembly of the United Nations could do to cope with the situation in China. In this connection, he expressed three hopes. He hoped that "the General Assembly will pronounce judgment on the Soviet Union for obstructing the efforts of my Government in re-establishing its authority in Manchuria and for giving military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists." He hoped that "the General Assembly will recommend to all Member States to desist and refrain from giving further military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists." He hoped that "no Member State will accord diplomatic relations to any regime which the Chinese Communists may organize."²¹

These three hopes were later embodied in a draft resolution submitted to the First Committee for consideration. That resolution also included a call upon all member States "to refrain from taking advantage of the present situation in China for any purpose that is incompatible with the political independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China."²²

The long and elaborate statement of the Chinese representative against the Soviet Union lasted the entire meeting of the First Committee, and no discussion followed. Apparently, the various members of the Committee wanted to think over the matter before expressing any opinion.

²¹ Abridged version of the Chinese statement, *ibid.*, pp. 340-347. Complete version is in Chinese Delegation to the United Nations, *China Presents Her Case to the United Nations*, pp. 8-38.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

DISCUSSION OF THE CHINESE AND THE AMERICAN RESOLUTIONS

In the succeeding meeting, held three days later, the principal speaker was Philip Jessup of the United States delegation. In his lengthy speech Jessup did not dwell on any of the questions raised by the Chinese representative during the previous meeting. Instead, he started with a criticism of the position taken by the Soviet delegation, pointing out that this was not the first time that the Soviet Union had refused to participate in the discussion of an item which it regarded as unpleasant. He then launched into an exposition of the principles that should govern international relations, particularly where China was concerned. In the course of this exposition he said that it had been the United States view that limited rights should be granted to the Soviet Union at Dairen and on the Chinese Eastern and South Manchuria railways, that such rights would not have impaired the sovereignty of China, and that it had never been thought that the Soviet Union would impair that sovereignty by seeking complete control of the Dairen area and the railways and by establishing puppet regimes in the northern provinces. He wound up by submitting to the Committee a joint draft resolution, which was sponsored by the United States together with Australia, Mexico, Pakistan, and the Philippines, and of which the operative portion read:

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

Desiring to promote the stability of international relations in the Far East,

Calls upon all States:

1. To respect the political independence of China and to be guided by the principles of the United Nations in their relations with China;
2. To respect the right of the people of China now and in the future to choose freely their political institutions and to maintain a government independent of foreign control;
3. To respect existing treaties relating to China; and
4. To refrain from seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create foreign controlled regimes within the territory of China, and from seeking to obtain special rights or privileges within the territory of China.²³

This joint draft resolution was intended to displace the previous Chinese draft resolution, which Jessup consistently opposed along with the representatives of the other four sponsoring delegations. Hence there were before the Committee two draft resolutions in

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

addition to the charges made by the Chinese delegation against the Soviet Union. Discussions centering around these three subjects lasted several meetings and brought forth a variety of opinions from the various delegations.

Comparing the two draft resolutions, the Chinese representative pointed out that the joint draft resolution was only a detailed version of the final paragraph of the Chinese draft resolution, omitting all reference to its three preceding paragraphs. The Committee must therefore decide, he said, whether those three other paragraphs were necessary. He contended that they were necessary.²⁴

Carlos Stolk of Venezuela, however, expressed doubt as to whether it was in order to issue an appeal to all member states to stop aiding the Chinese Communists at that time. He maintained that the first task should be to ascertain whether the Chinese accusation was correct, and that without assessing the validity of the charges the draft resolution should contain only a general statement of principles.²⁵

At the 340th and the 341st meeting, held respectively on December 1 and 2, the discussions became more intense. The question of recognizing the Peking regime particularly received attention and provoked comments.

In reply to a suggestion that the Chinese case should be referred to the International Court of Justice, the Chinese representative, Tsiang, stated that strictly speaking, only one of the Soviet treaty violations came within the scope of international law and that was the dispute concerning Dairen. The other charges brought against the Soviet Union, he said, did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. He declared that his delegation would agree that all the charges, except that relating to Dairen, should be referred to a special committee or to the Interim Committee for further study, if the First Committee should so decide. Coming back to the two resolutions, he said that the joint draft resolution, in itself nothing but a collection of beautiful phrases, must be supplemented by the three operative clauses of the Chinese draft resolution. The Peiping regime did not control the whole of China and was not supported by the population, he added.²⁶

As if merely to cause embarrassment, the Yugoslav representative, Bebler, reiterated the view—a view already ruled out by the chairman at the beginning of the discussion—that the Chinese delegation no longer represented the Chinese people, as it received instructions from a government which had lost the confidence of the people.

²⁴ United Nations, *op. cit.*, pp. 351-352.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 352.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 353-354.

The representative of Haiti, Stephen Alexis, then expressed his objection to the Chinese resolution, saying that the question of recognition was for the various governments alone to decide and should not be debated in the First Committee.

The position taken by the Peruvian delegation further highlighted the question of recognition. Victor Belaunde, the representative of Peru, said that the Chinese assertion concerning Soviet violation of the Charter and of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 was true; however, his delegation could not vote for the recommendation contained in the Chinese draft resolution relating to diplomatic recognition.²⁷

Apparently hinting at the joint draft resolution, Martinez Moreno of El Salvador criticized the attitudes of the great powers as lacking in foresight and political responsibility, and said that the situation was reminiscent of the Munich era of appeasement. He said that the Chinese representative had proved that the Soviet Union had given moral and material aid to the Chinese Communists in violation of the Charter, the Yalta agreement, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, and there was no reason for not supporting the Chinese draft resolution.

These views aroused opposition from some of the delegations which had sponsored the joint draft resolution. Salvador Lopez of the Philippines said that in sponsoring the joint draft resolution his delegation had followed the only feasible course. Sir Mohammed Khan of Pakistan stated that the Committee could not reach a finding without an investigation of a judicial character, and that Pakistan would oppose any recommendation seeking to compel member states not to accord recognition to a regime.²⁸

The strongest supporter of the Chinese draft resolution was the Chilean delegation. Carlos Valenzuela of this delegation believed that the rebellion in China was an insurrection controlled and supported by Moscow. He regretted that the Chinese appeal was not brought up earlier, particularly when it was considered that Soviet participation in the activities of the Chinese Communists had been known for years. He said his delegation would support the entire Chinese draft resolution, pointing out that the paragraph concerning nonrecognition of the Peiping regime only constituted a recommendation and said nothing about consular and commercial relations. In regard to the joint draft resolution, he asserted that its operative provisions had already been violated. He contended that while the joint draft resolution called upon all states to respect the political independence of China, the Chinese People's Republic under the

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 355.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 356-357.

Communists was already a member of the Soviet bloc and had lost its independence, that while the resolution invited states to respect the right of the Chinese people to choose their political institutions freely, events in eastern Europe would illustrate what could be expected to occur in China; that while the resolution called for respect for existing treaties, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 had already been disregarded; and that while the resolution urged States to refrain from seeking spheres of influence and special privileges in China, it was known that only the Soviet Union could seek them. For this reason, he said, his delegation would vote for the joint draft resolution only after the Chinese resolution had been rejected.²⁹

Another outspoken speaker was Sir Carl Berendsen of New Zealand. He shared the regret of the Chilean representative that the Chinese appeal had been brought up so late. Turning to the joint draft resolution, he wondered just how the United Nations and in particular China would benefit if it were to be adopted. It would be improper to pretend that the situation was being faced squarely and that something was being done about it. If the General Assembly was indeed intending to wash its hands of the matter, it would do well to acknowledge it openly and honestly, he exclaimed.³⁰

The British representative, Sir Terene Shone, was of a different opinion. He bluntly asserted that the United Kingdom would support the joint draft resolution and would vote against that submitted by the Chinese delegation. Commenting on the question of recognition, he said that if the government in question was in effective control of the whole country or the greater part of it, there was at least a *prima facie* case for recognition. While other considerations must be taken into account, the decision must rest on fact rather than sentiment.³¹

A NEW RESOLUTION IS INTRODUCED

At the 342nd meeting, held on December 5, 1949, the discussion took on a new aspect when a new joint draft resolution was submitted by the delegations of Cuba, Ecuador, and Peru. The essence of this new draft resolution was that the Chinese charges against the Soviet Union should be examined and studied by the Interim Committee, which should submit a report thereon to the following session of the Assembly.

In supporting this draft resolution, the sponsoring delegations asserted that the previous five power joint resolution was inadequate.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 357-358.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 358-359.

Jose Trujillo of Ecuador considered the old joint resolution disappointing and evasive of the issue. Belaunde of Peru thought that if the old draft resolution was adopted, an impression might be created that the Chinese charges against the USSR had been waived by the Assembly as unjustifiable.

The delegations of Chile and Iraq offered their support for the new joint draft resolution.

To counter the trend, the United States representative, Jessup, refused to agree that the intervention of the Interim Committee could provide the elements of a solution. He said that during the previous ten days the question had been to find the appropriate action to be taken, not to analyze the details of the Chinese statement. The United States delegation still favored the old joint draft resolution, he said. The delegations of Australia and Mexico supported the United States position.³²

On December 6, the First Committee held two meetings to deal with the Chinese question. After being modified by some amendments proposed by the representatives of the Philippines and the Lebanon, the three-power joint draft resolution was put to the vote and was adopted.³³ The operative portion of it read:

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

Considering that item 68 regarding threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China . . . requires further examination and study;

Considering further the resolution on the promotion of the stability of international relations in the Far East;

Decides to refer that item and any other charges of violations of the principles contained in that resolution to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly for continuous examination and study in the light of the resolution mentioned above, and to report to the next session of the General Assembly with recommendations, or to bring it to the attention of the Secretary-General in order to report to the Security Council if it deems it necessary to do so as a result of the examination or of the state of the matter submitted to it for study.³⁴

As this resolution was not incompatible with the five-power joint draft resolution, the latter was put to the vote too, and was also adopted.

The two resolutions then had to be introduced to the General

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 359-362.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 371.

³⁴ Chinese Delegation to the United Nations, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

Assembly for further consideration with a view to their final adoption or rejection.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERS THE RESOLUTIONS

At the 272d plenary meeting of the General Assembly, held on December 7 consideration of the two resolutions began. The Soviet representative, Alexander Panyushkin, at once expressed disapproval of the whole matter. He reiterated the views that the Chinese delegation had no powers and did not represent the Chinese people, that the Chinese complaint was intended to divert attention from the historical events taking place in China, and that the Soviet delegation would not take part in the discussion of the complaint and would ignore any decision taken thereon. This position was fully endorsed by the Polish delegation.³⁵

In reply Tsang, the Chinese representative, asserted that the Peiping regime was a puppet regime without popular support, while the government he represented was duly elected by the people. With reference to the two draft resolutions before the Assembly, he said that the one sponsored by the United States, Australia, Mexico, Pakistan, and the Philippines did not go far enough, while the one sponsored by Cuba, Ecuador, and Peru was merely of a procedural nature. He hoped the General Assembly would go further than the two resolutions and would censure the Soviet Union for violating the principles of the Charter and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, urge all member States not to give military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists, and recommend to the member States not to accord diplomatic recognition to any regime which the Chinese Communists might set up. To support his stand, he contended that it was the elementary duty of member states to bar military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists; that it was not right for some government to recognize the Peiping regime for the sake of safeguarding commercial interests; and that the President and the Department of State of the United States had already declared that the Soviet Government had violated solemn agreements concerning China.³⁶

Another principal speaker of the meeting was Jessup of the United States. For a second time, Jessup criticized the attitude of the Soviet delegation toward the Chinese question, saying that it was contrary to the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. Defending the

³⁵ United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 1949*, p. 565.

³⁶ Chinese Delegation to the United Nations, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-49. United Nations, *op. cit.*, pp. 566-567.

joint draft resolution of which the United States was one of the sponsors, he said that it went to the roots of the international problem and was constructive because it looked to the future.³⁷

Their nature and purpose having been elucidated, the two resolutions were put to the vote the following day at the 273d plenary meeting. They were both adopted. Thus the Chinese appeal against the Soviet Union was left to the care of the Interim Committee.³⁸

THE INTERIM COMMITTEE SHELVES THE APPEAL

On February 7, 1950, the Interim Committee took up the question of the Chinese appeal. On that occasion Tsiang renewed the charges against the Soviet Union. He cited the speech of Secretary of State Acheson before the National Press Club on January 12, in which it was said that the Soviet Union was detaching the Chinese northern provinces from China. He supported this view by repeating many of the statements which he had previously presented to the First Committee. He also submitted more or less the same draft resolution which he had once submitted to the First Committee, and which included such matters as a moral pronouncement on the Soviet Union, cessation of aid to the Chinese Communists, and non-recognition of the Peiping regime. Undoubtedly attaching most importance to the last issue, he told the Interim Committee that the Chinese Communist Party was but an instrument of Moscow and was about to carry out Soviet designs in southeast Asia, and that recognition of the Peiping regime could neither promote Titoism in China nor lead to better trade with China. Saying that his government was determined to continue the fight against the Chinese Communists, he quoted the English international jurist, Lauterpacht, to show that it was against international law to accord premature recognition to a rebel regime.³⁹

The Interim Committee took no action.

TRYGVE LIE'S MEMORANDUM ON RECOGNIZING THE COMMUNISTS

In March the question of recognizing the Chinese Communists took a drastic turn when Secretary-General Trygve Lie circulated a memorandum on "Legal Aspects of Problems of Representation in the United Nations." In the opinion of the Chinese delegation, the memorandum was "really an attempt to influence the delegates to the United Nations to vote for the admission of Red China to

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 568-569.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 570-571.

³⁹ Chinese Delegation to the United Nations, *China Fights for Peace and Freedom*, pp. 6-12.

the United Nations." Accordingly the Chinese representative, Tsiang, sent a vigorous protest to Lie. Tsiang charged that Lie's memorandum "is a deliberate attack on China's UN front." Refuting the assertion in the memorandum that "it is wrong to link the question of representation with the question of recognition by Member governments," Tsiang stated that "as practised in the League of Nations as well as in the United Nations this linkage is the general rule." He accused Lie of having "destroyed public confidence in the impartiality of the Secretariat"; and he maintained that according to Article 100 of the Charter, "the impartiality of the Secretary General and his staff in all questions under controversy is one of the essential foundations of the United Nations." He requested that his letter "be circulated among the Delegations in the same way that your memorandum was circulated."⁴⁰

THE FIRST COMMITTEE CONSIDERS THE APPEAL

Towards the end of November 1950, during the fifth session of the General Assembly, the First Committee held several meetings to consider the Chinese case against the Soviet Union. At the 400th meeting on November 21, Tsiang started the discussion by making a long statement. He reiterated the charges that the Soviet Union had violated the Charter and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 by obstructing the Chinese Government, while helping the Chinese Communists, in Manchuria. He cited once again Secretary Acheson's speech of January 12 concerning Soviet annexation of China's northern provinces, and noted that Vyshinsky, while trying to deny the charge, did not produce any facts. In addition, he cited a statement made on October 23 by Averell Harriman, former United States ambassador to Moscow, to the effect that the Soviet Union had broken both the Yalta agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. He contended that the Chinese Communist regime was "the fruit of Soviet aggression in China;" that the foreign policy of this regime was "completely subservient to that of the Soviet Union"; that through this regime "the sovereign rights of the Chinese people are being robbed by the Soviet imperialists"; that this regime was being used as an instrument for Soviet expansion in Tibet and other parts of Asia; that under this regime, 4500 Soviet advisers were working in China to carry on the Sovietization of the country; that this regime had ordered the burning of "all the classics of Confucius, Laotse, Mencius, and the commentaries on these classics by 2,500 years of classical scholarship"; and that this regime was

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-22.

"confronted with an effective and widespread resistance movement."⁴¹

Before concluding his statement, the Chinese representative submitted to the meeting a draft resolution calling for the appointment of a "United Nations Commission of Enquiry to gather information and facts relating to this item from member States of the United Nations."⁴²

The United States delegation under Foster Dulles quickly endorsed the proposal and urged its adoption. Commenting on the Chinese statement, Dulles quoted Stalin's works to show that Soviet policy toward the colonial peoples consisted of two stages. The first stage was to stir up and support their national aspirations; the second was to fight against national insularity before nationalism became consolidated.⁴³

At the following meeting, held on the same day, the Soviet representative, Jacob Malik, made a speech. This marked a change in the Soviet stand toward the Chinese charges, and Soviet participation in the discussion made possible a kind of confrontation between the accuser and the accused. This confrontation gave a new note and a new significance to the discussion. Malik began with a reference to the behavior of the Interim Committee which, he said, had held meetings on February 7 and September 15, 1950, but had decided not to consider the Chinese question and therefore not to submit any report. He then tried to rebut some of the statements made by the Chinese delegation against the Soviet Union. He asserted that the Soviet Command in Manchuria had informed the Kuomintang authorities about the withdrawal of Soviet troops in ample time. Dealing with the charge that the USSR had supplied weapons to the Chinese Communists, he referred to the White Paper and Acheson's letter of transmittal, and said that the Chinese People's Liberation Army had captured tremendous quantities of United States equipment from the Nationalist forces. In regard to Acheson's charge that the USSR was annexing the northern provinces of China, he merely quoted Vyshinsky's previous repudiation. He denied that the Soviet Union had violated the Yalta agreement, saying that Soviet entry into the war against Japan had saved the lives of at least 200,000 American officers and soldiers by hastening Japan's surrender. He also denied that the People's Government in Peiping had ordered the burning of the Chinese classics, saying

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 63-78; United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee, 1950*, pp. 345-349.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 349.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

that the accusation was nothing but slander. Concerning Dulles' exposition of Stalin's two-stage policy toward the colonial peoples, he stated that Dulles had ascribed to Stalin intentions which he did not have. Finally, he expressed objection to the establishment of a commission of enquiry, calling it a waste of time.⁴⁴

THE ADOPTION OF A NEW RESOLUTION

When the Soviet representative had finished, other representatives expressed opinions on the Chinese draft resolution. In continuing to support it, Dulles stated that the task of the proposed commission of enquiry seemed to be one for a small group of experts who would evaluate conflicting statements and get their information from historical records. The British representative, however, thought that the situation in the Far East was very grave, and anything which would tend to further embitter it could only result in harm. The Syrian delegation then suggested that the Sino-Soviet dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice. This suggestion at once drew objection from the Soviet delegation. Malik declared that the USSR did not agree to any such proposal, and that therefore the Court was not competent to deal with the matter. Supporting the British position, the French delegate stated that the only function of the proposed commission would be to make a platonic examination of a matter of which every aspect was already known. Amidst the conflict of opinions the Syrian delegation submitted a new draft resolution to the effect that "the General Assembly . . . decides to instruct the Interim Committee to continue inquiry on this question for obtaining more information and facts having direct bearing upon the case if such findings are obtainable." This new draft resolution called forth again conflicting opinions. The representative of Australia said that in view of the situation in the Far East, the wisest course the Committee could take would be to shelve the matter. This view met with immediate approval on the part of the British delegation. Malik opposed the Syrian proposal by saying that the Interim Committee was illegally created. The delegations of Egypt and Peru disapproved the idea of shelving the matter. Dulles too denounced this idea. The fact that a great power might be the target of accusations, he said, should not constitute sufficient reason for burying the question. Everyone would understand that, if the question were buried, it was precisely because the matter was not purely academic, he added. He later declared at the following meeting on November 22 that his delegation would support the

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 351-354.

Syrian draft resolution. Opposing the United States position, the Polish representative quoted profusely the White Paper and said that the White Paper answered all charges made against the Soviet Union and also provided the fullest justification for the establishment of the People's Republic of China and its recognition by the United Nations.⁴⁵

The delegations of Canada and Israel also opposed Dulles and the Syrian draft resolution.

The Chinese delegation, however, in support of the Syrian draft resolution, withdrew its own. Strong support also came from Sir Carl Berendsen of New Zealand. Sir Carl pointed out that the very contradiction between Malik's version and Tsiang's version of the matter proved that the facts were not so well known or so clearly established that an inquiry would be useless. He asserted that the Assembly was in duty bound to make an investigation. The ascertainment of facts could not be open to legitimate opposition from any quarter, he added.

The Syrian draft resolution with an Egyptian amendment was then put to the vote and was adopted by thirty-five votes to seventeen with seven abstentions.⁴⁶ Thus the Chinese appeal against the Soviet Union was thrown back into the lap of the Interim Committee which had previously ignored it.

COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

A few days later, the delegation from Communist China came via Moscow to the United Nations in New York. This was no sudden development. The delegation was invited to come by the Security Council of the United Nations on September 29, over the opposition of T. F. Tsiang, head of the Chinese delegation. Scarcely a month after the invitation, Communist China intervened in the Korean war which started on June 24 when, according to the report of the United Nations Commission in Korea, North Korean forces invaded the territory of South Korea. When the Chinese Communist delegation arrived in New York, the Korean war was already several months old and there was an acute crisis in the Far East. On November 28 the delegation, headed by Wu Hsiu-ch'uan, appeared at a meeting of the Security Council, where Wu read with gusto an elaborate and forceful statement ferociously attacking the United States, the Nationalist Government, and the Chinese delegation. Wu demanded, *inter alia*, that the Council "condemn, and take concrete steps to apply severe sanctions" against the United States

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 355-363.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 365-373.

for its "criminal acts of armed aggression against the territory of China, Taiwan, and armed intervention in Korea."⁴⁷ Pitted against Wu was Warren Austen of the United States, who charged Communist China with aggressive intervention and fired a barrage of questions at the Chinese Communist representative. No action was taken and no resolution was made by the Council.

This accusation of Communist China against the United States was a counterpart of Nationalist China's accusation against the Soviet Union and pointed up the complicated picture of international relations concerning China as represented by two rival governments.

Before long, as the Korean war continued apace, Communist China felt the pressure of the United Nations. On February 1, 1951, she was branded an aggressor nation. On May 18 an embargo on strategic materials was voted against her. In this way much of what the Chinese delegation had hoped and asked for became realized, if only in consequence of developments in Korea.

THE FIRST COMMITTEE RECONSIDERS THE APPEAL

Throughout 1951 the Chinese appeal against the Soviet Union lay buried in the Interim Committee. It was not until the beginning of the following year that it was exhumed from the Committee and brought out for further discussion in the sixth session of the General Assembly. On January 26, 1952, at the 502nd meeting of the First Committee, the Chinese representative renewed the charge that the Soviet Union had violated the Charter and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 by giving aid to the Chinese Communists and preventing the Chinese Government from taking over Manchuria. He concluded by submitting a draft resolution calling for recognition by the General Assembly of Soviet violation of treaty obligations toward China.⁴⁸ Thereupon Malik spoke out in defense of his government. He denounced the Chinese delegation as slanderers under United States protection and as no longer representing any government. He quoted Dean Acheson to the effect that the Nationalist Government was overthrown, not through force of arms, but through its inherent weakness, and that Soviet participation in the war against Japan had saved a million American lives. He contended that the Soviet Union did not violate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 because this treaty had been replaced by the new treaty of February 14, 1950. Referring to the new treaty, he said that the Soviet

⁴⁷ *New York Times*, November 29, 1950; Chinese text in *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao* [New China Monthly], Vol. 3 (1950) pp. 243-250.

⁴⁸ United Nations, *Official Records of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 1951-1952*, pp. 259-263.

Union had given very favorable credits to China and had transferred to China the entire property of Soviet land organizations in Manchuria, and that therefore it was absurd to say that the Soviet Union was threatening the territorial integrity and political independence of China. He then lunged at the United States, saying that it was the United States that threatened the territorial integrity and political independence of China by occupying the island of Taiwan and bombing villages in China. He proposed to put an end to the consideration of the Chinese appeal.⁴⁰

Despite this proposal, the debate continued and lasted four more successive sessions.

In the subsequent meetings the delegations of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland endorsed and rehashed what Malik had said. Some other delegations took a different position. The delegation of Cuba considered that the Soviet Union had been consistently unable to refute the charges leveled by China and that the General Assembly must recognize that the Soviet Union had violated the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. Similarly, the delegation of Peru stated that the Soviet Union in its defense was merely repeating inaccuracies and slandering the United States, and that sufficient evidence had been supplied concerning Soviet violation of treaty obligations. The United States representative, Cooper, urged the adoption of the Chinese draft resolution, saying that determination by the General Assembly that the Soviet Union had violated the Treaty of 1945 with China would enhance the solemnity of international obligations. He considered Soviet looting of Manchuria as the most obvious violation of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty.

Malik then spoke out again. Although he had previously contended that the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty and the related agreements were no longer valid, he made repeated reference to that set of instruments. He said that the agreement relating to the Changchun Railway had in no way violated the principle of equality between the two partners, since provision had been made for joint ownership and operation. Referring to the agreement on Port Arthur, he said that it provided for the administration of the port by a Sino-Soviet commission with an equal number of Soviet and Chinese representatives, but later the Chinese Government sabotaged the negotiations and failed to appoint any representatives. Therefore, he argued, it was not correct to say that Port Arthur had been occupied by the USSR. He repeated the assertion that the Soviet Command in Manchuria had invariably given the Chinese Government prior notice

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Commenting on the Pauley mission, he stated that its real aim was to draw up military maps and plans of North Korea and that the information it furnished about Soviet looting of Manchurian industries was not reliable. In denial of the charge respecting Soviet military aid to the Chinese Communists, he quoted General George Marshall as having said that there was no evidence of Soviet equipment being used by Chinese Communist troops. Maintaining that the 1950 Soviet treaty with the Chinese Communists was even more favorable than the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty, he said it was unreasonable to say that the Soviet Union had violated its undertakings toward China. He then resumed attack on the United States, saying it was making slanderous charges against the Soviet Union in order to disguise its own policy of aggression. He declared that the question of Soviet relations with China was for the two countries themselves to decide and should not be discussed in the United Nations. It was of course not true, he added, that the Soviet Union had pledged itself to help the Chinese Nationalist Government in the civil war, for the Soviet Union always abstained from intervening in the domestic affairs of other states.⁶⁰

In reaction to Malik's statement, Cooper stated that the Soviet representative had merely denied evidence of Soviet equipment in the hands of the Chinese Communists, but had given no reply to the charge that the Soviet Union had permitted the Chinese regime to secure large stocks of Japanese war equipment. He stated further that the Soviet representative had merely attacked the Pauley mission but had not denied the charges leveled by that mission. The Chinese representative, Tsiang, also rebutted some of the statements made by Malik. He said that the Soviet representative had omitted to state that the agreement relating to the Changchun Railway provided that the general manager should be a Russian, and that it was the general manager that practically ran the railway. He contended that the reason why the treaty of 1950 compared favorably with that of 1945 was that the Chinese Communist regime was an instrument of Soviet policy. Urging support for his draft resolution, he said that the voice of the United Nations on the moral issue would be of great help to the Chinese people.⁶¹

The delegations of Colombia and the Philippines expressed support for the Chinese position. The British representative, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, however, was of the opinion that the complaint under discussion was really one of academic importance and that the future

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 265-274.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 275-277.

course of events could not materially be influenced by the adoption of the Chinese draft resolution.

Later, the draft resolution was put to the vote and was adopted by twenty-four votes to nine, with twenty-five abstentions.⁵²

THE CHINESE RESOLUTION IS ADOPTED IN PART

The resolution was then reported to the General Assembly for its approval or disapproval. At the plenary meeting of the Assembly on February 1, 1952, the matter was brought up, and the Soviet representative eagerly seized the opportunity to denounce the resolution in sharp terms. He called it a piece of chicanery emanating from the slanderers who represented the nonexistent Kuomintang Government and founded on a nonexistent treaty. He contended that the Soviet Union, in strict accordance with the obligations it had assumed under the Yalta Agreement and the treaty with China, not only helped China to throw off the Japanese yoke but also saved from destruction more than a million Americans in that war. He charged that the United States had embarked on a policy of open aggression in the Far East, saying that the United States Command was engaged in transporting Kuomintang troops from Formosa to Thailand and Burma for purposes of aggression against China.

Similar themes were developed later in the speeches of the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Poland.⁵³

In reply Cooper of the United States denied the charge that the United States was planning aggression in southeast Asia and quoted a statement by the Burmese representative to support the denial. Coming to the resolution before the Assembly, he said that it supported the charges made by the Republic of China against the Soviet Union and that the First Committee, in its decision, found those charges to be true. He asserted that in the debate in the First Committee, and in the plenary meeting, the Soviet Union had never offered a serious defense of its conduct in Manchuria. The Soviet defense, he said, centered around the frivolous contention that a government which the Soviet Union did not recognize had no legal right to press a charge against the Soviet Union. The Soviet defense, he added, consisted also of attacks upon the United States and upon the morality of the Chinese Government, but none of those attacks was a defense to the charges which were made against the Soviet Union. Specifically, Cooper pointed out that the Soviet

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 278.

⁵³ United Nations, *Official Records of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 1951-1952*, pp. 450-453.

delegation had failed to defend the Soviet looting of Manchuria and the Soviet action of giving to the Chinese Communists large amounts of Japanese equipment.⁵⁴

Just before the resolution was put to the vote, the Chinese representative addressed the meeting. After demonstrating once again how the Soviet Union failed to live up to its obligations under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, he called the Assembly's attention to the fact that Soviet violation of the treaty had led to the sovietization of China and the aggression in Korea, and that so long as China was under Communist control there could be no permanent peace and security in southeast Asia.

The resolution proposed by the Chinese delegation was finally adopted by twenty five votes to nine, with twenty-four abstentions.⁵⁵ The essential portion of it read:

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

Finding that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics obstructed the efforts of the National Government of China in re establishing Chinese national authority in the three Eastern Provinces [Manchuria] after the surrender of Japan and gave military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists against the National Government of China,

Determines that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in its relations with China since the surrender of Japan, has failed to carry out the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 14 August 1945.⁵⁶

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CHINESE APPEAL

The Chinese appeal against the Soviet Union in the United Nations brought into a clear light not only an important phase of Sino-Soviet relations but also the state of international relations in general as centered around China. It was also a test of the efficacy of the United Nations in handling a critical and complicated international issue. For these reasons an effort has been made in the above survey not only to present the highlights of the case and arguments of the contending parties, but also to demonstrate how the United Nations machinery functioned in dealing with the case. As the United Nations is what the member governments make of it, the range of attitudes and the shades of opinion of the member

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 452-453.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁵⁶ United Nations, *Official Records of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 20, p. 4.

governments vis-à-vis the Chinese appeal have also been set forth as far as is consistent with a general survey.

There are involved in the survey a number of points which call for comment and deserve further consideration.

An interesting aspect of the Chinese appeal is that it placed the Soviet Government in a sort of dilemma. The basic charge brought by the Chinese delegation was that the Soviet Government had given aid to the Chinese Communists and had violated its solemn pledge to give aid to the Nationalist Government alone. On the one hand, the Soviet Government of course could not admit the charge and confess it had broken its word of honor. On the other hand, it could not very well deny the charge; for in making the denial it would have to show that it had never given aid to the Chinese Communists but had rendered assistance to the Nationalist Government. And this the Soviet Government probably found it inconvenient to do, now that it had dropped the Nationalist Government and recognized Peiping. Placed in this dilemma, the Soviet delegation at first absolutely refused to take part in any discussion of the Chinese appeal, even though such refusal was in contravention of United Nations rule and practice. Later, when it did now and then participate in the discussions, it did not face the main charges and arguments of the Chinese delegation with any logical cogency, but made use of the occasions to carry on propaganda and to make countercharges against the United States as well as against the Nationalist Government with a view to discrediting both of them.

The Chinese delegation did a good job in presenting its case so far as the narration of facts was concerned. From the technical or tactical point of view, the presentation seems to have left something to be desired. In the first place, some of the facts presented could have been effectively organized under some legal concepts, but such concepts seldom appeared in the presentation. Secondly, a bit too much emphasis was placed on the governmental aspect of the issue. At the very outset, at the meeting of the General Committee on September 28, 1949, the Chinese delegation stated that the issue was a "litigation between the Government of China and that of the Soviet Union." Later, after presenting the main case and introducing a draft resolution, the Chinese delegation declared that "of the four operative clauses of the draft resolution, the third, recommending non-recognition of the Chinese Communists, is, in the opinion of my Delegation, the most important." This emphasis on the governmental aspect of the case played into the hands of the delegations of the Soviet bloc. In reaction, these delegations simply concentrated on discrediting the Nationalist Government, and they found it very

convenient to do so. What they had to do was to quote and quote and keep on quoting the White Paper put out by the United States Government. It seems the Chinese appeal would have been more effective and attracted more support if in its presentation the facts and arguments had been organized in such a way as to point up the injury and injustice done by the Soviet Government toward China as a state and toward the Chinese as a people.

The attitude of the various governments towards the situation in China was nowhere more clearly indicated than in their sensitive reaction to the recommendation that the Peiping regime should not be recognized. All the governments represented in the General Assembly either expressed opposition to or made an exception of the recommendation, although quite a number of them approved the other operative clauses of the Chinese draft resolution without stint. This reaction apparently caused disappointment to the Chinese delegation, but it did not mean that all the governments wanted to recognize the Peiping regime. Of course some of them, notably the British Government, had already accorded Peiping *de jure* recognition; but the others simply did not want to commit themselves beforehand in any way. They continued to recognize the Nationalist Government, but at the same time they wanted to reserve full freedom to shift their position later on in the light of changed circumstances. In other words, they were adopting a wait-and-see attitude towards the Chinese situation.

After the Chinese delegation had presented its case and introduced its draft resolution, the United States delegate Philip Jessup took the floor in the succeeding meeting and gave a long classroom lecture on the principles that should govern international relations, winding up with a new and rival draft resolution whose operative portion read as follows:

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

Desiring to promote the stability of international relations in the Far East,

Calls upon all States:

1. To respect the political independence of China and to be guided by the principles of the United Nations in their relations with China;
2. To respect the right of the people of China now and in the future to choose freely their political institutions and to maintain a government independent of foreign control,
3. To respect existing treaties relating to China; and
4. To refrain from (a) seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create foreign-controlled regimes within the territory

of China; (b) seeking to obtain special rights or privileges within the territory of China.

This resolution was intended as a final disposition of the Chinese appeal and later got passed. Inasmuch as it was a mere restatement of well-worn principles and pious wishes, the resolution bordered on the ridiculous, despite the attempts at eloquence on the part of Jessup to recommend it. When a case has arisen involving an alleged violation of principles and pledges, the thing to do is not to merely reaffirm the principles and pledges, but to examine whether the alleged violation is true and, if so, to find a way to redress the wrong and to make justice prevail. When a person is sick and hungry, it would be ridiculous merely to say to him that he should be healthy and well-fed and that all the world should respect the strategic importance of his alimentary canal and the integrity of his nervous system. In a civil case involving infringement of personal or property rights, it would be ridiculous for the judge to deal with it by reciting the Declaration of Independence or the Sermon on the Mount. Similarly, when the Chinese delegation accused the Soviet Government of violating solemn pledges and principles, it was ridiculous to try to close the case by merely reaffirming the principles and pledges already claimed to have been violated.

Despite its vast structure and organization, the United Nations did not have a proper agency to deal with the Chinese appeal fairly and effectively. Although the appeal went through a number of discussions in the First Committee and the plenary session of the General Assembly, actually no serious study or appraisal of it has been made. The discussions were in the nature of incoherent and irresponsible debates or quarrels, not calm deliberations with a view to sifting evidence and determining facts. Few delegations seemed to take a serious interest in the appeal. All the major powers—the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and the United States—wanted to close and bury it as soon as possible. The Soviet delegation proposed to bury it even before it was born, saying that it was all slander and should not be dignified with a discussion in the United Nations. The British and French delegations urged burying it because, they said, all the facts relating to it were already well known and there was no use wasting time to discuss them. The United States delegation too preferred to have it buried, but in a more decent manner, at least with a tombstone over the grave, inscribed with the lofty principles of international relations and signed by Philip Jessup.

During the discussions there had been repeated suggestions on the

part of the lesser powers that the appeal should be referred to the International Court of Justice; but the suggestion did not find favor with many of the delegations and was never put to the vote. Later, over the opposition of all the four major powers, a resolution was passed referring the appeal to the Interim Committee. It was hoped that this Committee would study and analyse the appeal and make a report, with recommendations, to the Security Council or at least to the General Assembly. The Committee, however, did literally nothing, and at the following Assembly tossed it back to the First Committee. Here after some inconclusive discussion, the appeal was referred back to the Interim Committee again. But the latter again did nothing. Time marches on. Soon another year came around and another Assembly opened. Then the Interim Committee conveniently tossed the appeal back to the First Committee again, without a single word of recommendation. Thus back and forth the appeal was tossed from Committee to Committee like a dead cat or a hot potato which nobody cared to touch or carry. Under the circumstances, for any delegation to conclude that the Soviet Union had committed aggression would be to pass a verdict before examining the evidence. Besides, aggression could only be recognized and determined by the Security Council.

If the Soviet Union had indeed committed aggression, as charged by the Chinese delegation, it had already got away with it, the United Nations notwithstanding.

The New Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements

ON JUNE 30, 1949, when the Chinese Communist forces were riding a whirlwind of military success to supreme power, Mao Tse-tung sent forth a long treatise commemorating the twenty-eighth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, and setting forth the basic principles of Communist China's foreign policy and political organization. In reference to foreign policy, he said:

"You lean to one side." Exactly. To lean to one side is the lesson taught us by the forty years of experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years of experience of the Communist Party. We firmly believe that, in order to attain and consolidate victory, we must lean to one side. In the light of the forty years and the twenty-eight years of experience, the Chinese people either lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. There is no exception to this rule. To sit on the fence is impossible, and there is no third path. We oppose the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique which leans to the side of imperialism. We also oppose the illusion of the third path. Not only in China, but in the whole world, one leans without exception either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is a hoax. The third path does not exist.¹

This lean-to-one-side policy was not new in Mao's thinking. Derived from the Marxist concept of class struggle, it was clearly implicit in the two-camp view of the world which was set forth by Mao as early as 1926 in the following terms:

The present world situation is a situation where the two forces, the revolutionary and the anti-revolutionary, are engaged in their final struggle. These two forces unfold two big banners:

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Lun Jen-Min Min-Chu Chuan-Cheng* [On the People's Democratic Dictatorship], Hong Kong, Hsin Min-Chu Ch'u-Pan She, 1949, pp. 7-8.

on one side is the big red revolutionary banner raised high by the Third International and signaling all the oppressed classes of the world to assemble thereunder; on the other side is the big white anti-revolutionary banner raised high by the League of Nations and signaling all the anti-revolutionary elements of the world to assemble thereunder. Those classes in between must undergo rapid disintegration, scampering perhaps to the left to join the revolutionary faction or perhaps to the right to join the anti-revolutionary faction. There is no spare "independent" ground for them.²

For over twenty years since then and up to June 1949, Mao had gone through many political vicissitudes, but never did he deviate from the lean-to-one-side policy. Far from deviating from the policy, he now and then reasserted it with added vigor. For instance, in 1950 he expressed his pet idea thus:

The moment the contest between the socialist state of Soviet Russia and the imperialist states of England and America becomes further sharpened, China must stand either on one side or on the other. This is the inevitable tendency. Cannot China be neutral, without leaning to either side? This is dream talk. The whole globe will get embroiled in these two battle lines. In the world from now on, "neutrality" is only a term for deceiving people.³

After the Chinese Communists had come to power, Mao's pet policy was enshrined in an important basic law, namely, the Common Program, passed by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 29, 1949, and later referred to by Liu Shao-ch'i, second highest Chinese Communist leader, as "the Magna Carta of the entire people of the present period."⁴ Article 11 of this Magna Carta reads in part as follows: "The People's Republic of China shall unite with all free and peace-loving countries and peoples in the world, above all, with the Soviet Union." Later the Common Program was displaced by a formal constitution, the preamble of which reads in part: "China has already built up an indestructible friendship with the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

² Mao Tse-tung, *Chung Kuo She Hui Ko Chieh Chi Ts' Fen-Hsi* [An Analysis of the Various Classes of Chinese Society] Peking, Jen-Min Ch'u Pan She, 1951, p. 3.

³ Mao Tse-tung, *Hsin Min-Chu Chu I Lun* [On the New Democracy] Yen-an, North-west Hsin Hua Book Store, 1949, p. 37.

⁴ Propaganda Department of the South China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Kan Pu Hsueh-Hsi Tzu-Liao* [Study Materials for Cadres], Canton, Hsin Hua Book Store, 1950, III, pp. 9-10.

and the People's Democracies. . . . This friendship will be continuously developed and consolidated." ⁵

Inasmuch as it is often difficult if not impossible to amend a basic law, the lean-to-one-side policy will presumably remain the cardinal policy of Communist China for a long time to come and will serve as a strong antidote to the development of Titoist tendencies in Communist China.

A product of mingled ideological affinity and historical associations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mao's lean-to-one-side policy has thus become the mainspring of Communist China's foreign relations. Although clear in its general purport, the policy is rather hazy in its specific implications and may find some form of expression in treaties and agreements with Soviet Russia. In analyzing the first and basic treaty and its related agreements between Peking and Moscow, therefore, it is worthwhile to note how the policy manifests itself in the formal provisions.

GENESIS AND CONTENT OF THE TREATY AND AGREEMENTS

In December 1949, scarcely three months after he had become Chairman of the Central People's Government, Mao Tse-tung led a delegation to Moscow, ostensibly for the purpose of attending the celebration of Stalin's seventieth birthday. His main purpose turned out to be the negotiation of a treaty between China and Soviet Russia, and his delegation was later enlarged to include Chou En-lai, Premier and Foreign Minister; Li Fu-ch'un, Vice-chairman of the Northeast [Manchurian] government; and Sai Fu-ting, Vice-chairman of the Sinkiang government. Despite Mao's strong leanings towards Russia, the negotiations lasted quite some time. It was not until February 14, 1950, after Mao had been in Moscow for two months, that the negotiation was ended in the signing of (1) a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, (2) an Agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen; and (3) an Agreement on the Granting by the Government of the Soviet Union of a Long-term Credit to the Government of the People's Republic of China.⁶

On the same day Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai and Soviet Foreign Minister A. Y. Vyshinsky exchanged notes "to the effect that the respective Treaty and Agreements concluded on

⁵ Editorial Board of the Hsin Hua Book Store, *Chung-Yao Wen-Hsien* [Important Documents], Shanghai, Hsin Hua Book Store, 1949, p. 28; *Supplement to People's China*, July 1, 1954, p. 4.

⁶ *The Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1950.

August 14, 1945, between China and the Soviet Union are now null and void, and also that both Governments affirm that the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic is fully guaranteed as a result of the plebiscite of 1945 and the establishment with it of diplomatic relations by the People's Republic of China."⁷

At the same time the two parties also exchanged notes "on the decision of the Soviet Government to transfer without compensation to the Government of the People's Republic of China the property acquired in Manchuria from Japanese owners by Soviet economic organizations, and also on the decision of the Soviet Government to transfer without compensation to the Government of the People's Republic of China all the buildings in the former military compound in Peking."⁸

By the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the two contracting parties undertake to enter into close cooperation to prevent the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan "or any other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan," to participate "in all international actions aimed at ensuring peace and security throughout the world," to bring about "the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan," to "consult with each other in regard to all important international problems affecting the common interests of China and the Soviet Union," and "to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties between China and the Soviet Union." By the same treaty the two contracting parties impose upon themselves the negative obligation "not to conclude any alliance directed against" either party, and "not to take part in any coalition or in any actions or measures directed against" either party.

By the Agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen, the Soviet Government undertakes (1) to transfer, without compensation, to the Peking Government "all its rights to joint administration of the Chinese Changchun Railway with all the property belonging to the Railway" either after a peace treaty with Japan or "not later than the end of 1952"; (2) to withdraw Soviet troops from Port Arthur and to hand over to the Peking Government the installations there for a certain amount of compensation, either after a peace treaty with Japan or "not later than the end of 1952," with the understanding that in case of war with Japan or any state collaborating with Japan, Soviet Russia may again "use the naval base Port Arthur for the purpose of conducting joint military operations against the aggressor"; and (3) to hand over to the Peking Government in the course of 1950 "all the property in

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 23.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Dairen now temporarily administered by or leased to the Soviet Union." According to the same agreement, while the administration of Dairen is to be in the hands of the Peking Government, "the question of Dairen harbor" is to be "further considered on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan." The agreement stipulates that pending the transfer of Soviet rights and interests in the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Sino-Soviet joint administration of the railway is to remain unchanged; and that pending the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur and the transfer of the port installations, the civil administration in the area of Port Arthur is to be under the direct authority of the Peking Government, but the military affairs in the area will be under the charge of a joint Sino-Soviet Military Commission to be organized by the two contracting parties on an equal basis.

The Agreement on the Granting of Credit provides for a grant by the Soviet Government to the Peking Government of a \$300,000,000 credit, to be apportioned in five equal annual instalments starting from January 1, 1950, and to be repaid in ten equal annual instalments starting from the end of 1954. The agreement specifies that the credit is to be used for the payment of purchases from the Soviet Union of various kinds of industrial and engineering equipment necessary for the restoration and development of the national economy of China.

After the signing of the above treaty and agreements, both parties appeared highly elated and stressed the great significance of the new instruments. Said Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky: "The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance and the aforementioned Agreements, based on respect for the principles of equality, state independence and national sovereignty, seal the historical bonds between the peoples of the Soviet Union and China."⁹ According to Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai: "The significance of the Treaty and Agreements between China and the Soviet Union is of particular importance for the new-born People's Republic of China. This Treaty and these Agreements will help the Chinese people to realize that they are not alone, and will help in the restoration and development of Chinese economy."¹⁰ Commenting on the same treaty, Molotov had this to say: "The Treaty of Fraternal Alliance between the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China, concluded in February, transformed Soviet-Chinese friendship into a great and mighty force for consolidating universal peace such as has no equal and has never had an equal in human his-

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

tory."¹¹ Mao Tse-tung left Moscow on February 17, 1950. On that day, in a farewell speech, he said:

People can see that the unity of the two peoples of China and the Soviet Union, already solidified through a treaty, will be everlasting, unbreakable, and inseparable by any people. This kind of unity not only will affect the prosperity of China and the Soviet Union but will certainly affect the future of humanity and the victory of world peace and justice.¹²

NEW VERSUS OLD TREATY AND AGREEMENTS

The new Sino Soviet Treaty and Agreements are similar in general purport and outline to the old ones between the Kremlin and the Nationalist Government; but there are also some major differences between them. The new set of instruments have a number of aspects which are generally favorable to China and appear more favorable when contrasted with corresponding aspects in the old treaty and agreements.

(1) Under the new treaty the scope of the Sino Soviet alliance has been extended. The 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty provided for joint measures to prevent the resumption of aggression by Japan only. The 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty, however, binds the two parties to cooperate against aggression by Japan "or any other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan." This difference has considerable implications, for it clearly indicates that the new Sino-Soviet alliance is aimed at the United States as much as or even more than Japan. The Soviet Government and the Peking Government always hold the belief that the United States is committed to the policy of rearming Japan and reviving Japan's war industries. In their speeches and through their organs of propaganda the Soviet and the Chinese Communist leaders have made it quite plain that the new treaty has an anti-American import. For instance, in its leading article for February 26, 1950, the *Jen Min Jih Pao*, official organ of the Peking Government, said:

This Sino-Soviet alliance, established in a new era of history and comprising one-third of the world's population, is an unconquerable alliance for opposing imperialist aggression. This alliance will effectively prevent Japan and other countries allied directly or indirectly with Japan from renewing aggression and breaking world peace. For this reason, it is a heavy blow against American imperialism which is now fostering the re-emergence of Japanese aggression.

¹¹ Quoted in Max Beloff, "Soviet Policy in China," *Pacific Affairs*, June 1950, p. 136.

¹² *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao* [New China Monthly], Vol. 1 (1950) p. 1112.

On the same day *Pravda*, organ of the Soviet Communist Party, said in a special article:

At present, the reactionaries of Japan are becoming more fanatic and reckless under the protection of the American occupation authorities and have openly declared their attempt at revenge. At present, American imperialism is making all efforts to transform Japan into a strategic bridgehead for attack on the Soviet Union and on the People's Democracy of China.

(2) The old agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railway was intended to run for thirty years, and only upon the expiration of this term was the railway to be returned to China. The new agreement provides for the return of the railway to China "not later than the end of 1952." And this provision has been carried out. In August 1952 Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, accompanied by Ch'en Yun, Deputy Premier, Li Fu-ch'ün, Deputy Chief of the Commission on Financial and Economic Affairs, and Su Yu, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, went to Moscow, where they carried on negotiations with Stalin, Foreign Minister Vyshinsky, and Trade Minister Kумыкин.¹³ Subsequently a joint communiqué on the Chinese Changchun Railway was issued to the effect that "the Soviet Government and the Chinese Government have begun taking steps" to implement the agreement of February 1950 concerning the transfer of the railway.¹⁴ On December 31, 1952, a ceremony was held at Harbin to solemnize the transfer. Present at the ceremony were Premier Chou En-lai and Soviet Ambassador A. S. Panyushkin. Following the transfer the name "Chinese Changchun Railway" was changed to "Harbin Railway."¹⁵

(3) According to the 1945 agreement on Port Arthur, the Soviets were to withdraw from that port in thirty years. Under the new agreement, they pledged to do so "not later than the end of 1952." Subsequently, however, the Soviet Government did not keep the pledge, or was relieved of it. In the course of the negotiations in Moscow in the fall of 1952 the subject of Soviet withdrawal from Port Arthur was undoubtedly discussed, but it was decided that the period for joint Sino-Soviet use of the naval base should be extended until the conclusion of peace with Japan. The extension was made supposedly on the request of the Peking Government and with the consent of the Soviet Government, on the pretext that Japan's refusal to conclude a peace treaty with Soviet Russia and with Communist

¹³ *New York Times*, September 16, 1952.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Chao Ching-lun, "The Transfer of the Chinese Changchun Railway," *People's China*, January 16, 1953, p. 8.

China had created conditions *dangerous to peace*.¹⁶ At that time, the Korean War was in full swing and might have been a decisive factor in extending the Soviet stay in Port Arthur. It is interesting to note, however, that the war was not made a pretext for the extension; and that the extension was to last, not till the end of the Korean War, but till the conclusion of peace with Japan, for which the prospects have been none too good ever since Japan's surrender in 1945. Later the Soviet Government changed its mind again. According to a report in *People's China* (June 16, 1955) Peking and Moscow issued a joint communiqué on May 25, 1955, declaring that Soviet Russia had withdrawn all her armed forces from Port Arthur and that all installations in that area had been transferred to the Peking regime.

It is worthwhile to note also that while according to the 1945 agreement the Sino-Soviet Military Commission to take charge of military affairs in Port Arthur was to consist of two Chinese and three Soviet representatives, the corresponding agreement of 1950 provides for a similar commission based on equal representation and presided over by each side alternately.

(4) By the new agreement regarding Dairen the Soviet Government pledged to hand over to the Peking Government, without compensation, "all the property in Dairen now temporarily administered by or leased to the Soviet Union." There was no counterpart of this pledge in the 1945 agreement on Dairen.

(5) In an exchange of notes in 1950 the Soviet Government pledged to transfer to the Peking Government without compensation "the property acquired in Manchuria from Japanese owners by Soviet economic organizations." In 1945 the Soviet Government made no such pledge to the Nationalist Government.

In pursuance of the above pledges, the Peking Government and the Soviet Government in July 1950 each appointed three delegates to form a joint Sino-Soviet Committee to see to the transfer of the property. From July 8 to August 7 the committee had held three meetings. At the third meeting it signed a protocol stipulating various procedures for effecting the transfer. After having been ratified by the two governments concerned, the protocol was later put into practice and the transfer formally began on August 9. By August 28 the whole process was completed. The property so transferred to the Peking Government was reported to have totaled 302 items, including 47 industrial plants, 11 movie theaters, 188 tenement houses, 33 warehouses, and 23 plots of land.¹⁷ Later a more specific list was issued classifying the returned property into three categories accord-

¹⁶ *New York Times*, September 16, 1950.

¹⁷ *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao*, Vol. 3 (1951), p. 826.

ing to their locality. In Peking the returned property consisted of the former Russian military barracks, some warehouses, and 18 other buildings. In Dairen the returned property included 16 industrial plants such as the Dairen Shipyard, a petroleum refinery, a machine factory, a cement factory, a glass factory, and so on; 3 factories for making steel cables, tin cans, and sacks; the equipment and installations of Dairen harbor; 4 cold storages; 2 electricity generating plants; 9 cultural and educational organs; 206 tenement houses; and so on. In Manchuria the returned property included 21 plants of such light industries as the manufacture of cement, sugar, soap, and the like; 4 factories for making paper, cigarettes, and the like; 1 automobile plant; 11 movie houses; 188 tenement houses; and so on.¹⁸ It can be seen that none of the vast amount of installations for heavy industries which the Soviet authorities considered as belonging to the Japanese Army and therefore constituting "war booty" has been returned.¹⁹

(6) In 1950 the Soviet Government agreed to extend to the Peking Government a credit loan of \$300,000,000; whereas in 1945 it gave to the Nationalist Government only an indefinite assurance to the effect that Soviet moral support and material aid would be "entirely given to the National Government as the Central Government of China." As is well known, subsequently the Soviet Government violated this assurance by acting in just the contrary manner—by giving aid to the Chinese Communists. But even if it had in any way acted up to its assurance, it would not have gone very far in aiding the Nationalists. Theoretically the aid assured had no upper limit; on the other hand, it might mean next to nothing. The Soviet credit agreement with the Peking Government, however, is very definite and specific in every respect. The Soviet Government could not easily evade it, and the Peking Government is sure to benefit by it—if only to a very limited extent. The credit was purposed for the development of China's economy and the speed-up of China's national reconstruction. It is decidedly too small for the task. In view of the vast territory and teeming population of China, and in view of the extensive devastation caused by several decades of warfare, China's economic development and national reconstruction would need a tremendously bigger sum than \$300,000,000 over a period of five years, or \$60,000,000 a year.

(7) Last but not least, the agreement on Outer Mongolia is also

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3 (1951) p. 1063.

¹⁹ In his *Moscow and the Chinese Communists*, Robert North wrote that the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty stipulated the return of war booty to China by Russia. This interpretation seems a bit too imaginative.

more favorable to the Peking Government than to the Nationalist Government. It was the latter Government that originally surrendered China's sovereignty over Outer Mongolia and later recognized Outer Mongolian independence, in pursuance of an agreement with the Soviet Government. The Peking Government merely affirmed a fact which had already been accomplished. If future Chinese historians should deplore the fact, they would most probably lay the blame on the Nationalist Government.

The discussion above deals with those aspects of the new instruments between China and Soviet Russia that compare favorably with similar aspects of the old instruments. As regards those aspects of the new instruments that are not so favorable to China, they are less apparent but they are there just the same. An examination of them follows.

In 1945 the Soviet Government in an exchange of notes with the Nationalist Government solemnly declared that it "regarded the Three Eastern Provinces [Manchuria] as part of China and reaffirmed its respect for China's sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognized their territorial and administrative integrity." In 1950 the Soviet Government made no such declaration. In fact in the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements, nothing is mentioned about Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. The same may be said of Sinkiang. While in 1945 the Soviet Government gave assurance that it would not interfere in the affairs of Sinkiang, in 1950 the whole subject of Sinkiang was ignored in the treaty and agreements. What the silence in both cases may portend only the future can tell.

The 1950 agreement concerning the status of Dairen represents another arrangement not favorable to the interests of China. According to the 1945 agreement, Dairen was to be made an international free port; and while "in case of war against Japan" it was to be under Soviet control and supervision, it would be under Chinese administration in time of peace. The new agreement provides, however, that "the question of Dairen harbor be further considered on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan." In the meantime, it is presumed, Dairen harbor will be, as it has actually been, under Soviet supervision and control. This means that only foreign vessels flying a Soviet flag could use the harbor.

A provision relating to Port Arthur in the 1950 agreement is not favorable to China either. The old agreement stipulated the return of the port installations to China "without compensation." Under the 1950 agreement, China has to "compensate the Soviet Union for expenses which it has incurred in restoring and constructing instal-

lations since 1945." This means that even if the Soviet Government had fulfilled its pledge to withdraw from Port Arthur "not later than the end of 1952," the Peking Government would have had to pay a high price for it. According to the exchange of notes on Port Arthur between Peking and Moscow in September, 1952, the period for Soviet use of the port has been extended,²⁰ but there is no mention as to whether or not China has to pay for the port installations by the time the Soviets withdraw.

It should be noted also that in 1945 the Chinese Nationalist Government made no commitment relating to cultural cooperation and diplomatic consultation with the Soviet Government; in 1950 the Peking Government did make such commitment under the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, and this commitment has, as will be shown presently, very important implications concerning China's national interests.

As those aspects favorable to China stand out prominently in the new treaty and agreements, while those less favorable to China lie more or less submerged, not a few people considered the new instruments an embodiment of important Soviet concessions to China. Thus a Chinese observer wrote: "The treaty and the supplementary agreements seem in general advantageous to China, and the terms of the treaty do not prove that China under Communist rule is an obedient tool of the Kremlin."²¹ A Western writer went farther and asserted the view that by the new instruments not only has the Soviet Government made considerable concessions to China, but China has "conceded nothing but the independence from China of the Mongolian People's Republic, an area already within the Soviet orbit."²² These views may appear reasonable at first sight. In the light of a more searching analysis, they seem to be somewhat too sanguine over Soviet altruism.

In the first place, while it is true that the new set of instruments has many aspects favorable to China, these are by no means roses without thorns, and must be balanced against the less favorable aspects as have been set forth.

Secondly, what the Soviet Government has returned to China rightfully belongs to China and should not involve any *quid pro quo*. Incidentally, there is no evidence that any of the "war booty" has been returned.

²⁰ *New York Times*, September 16, 1952.

²¹ C. M. Chang, "Communism and Nationalism in China," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1950, p. 548.

²² R. C. North, "The Sino-Soviet Agreements of 1950," *Far Eastern Survey*, July 12, 1950, p. 126.

Thirdly, although no specific concessions to Soviet Russia are stipulated in the new treaty and agreements, many provisions in the new instruments have very important implications and far-reaching effects and clearly indicate that important concessions have been or will be made by Communist China to Soviet Russia. Most of these provisions are related to "mutual assistance." The 1945 treaty was called "Treaty of Alliance and Friendship"; that of 1950, "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance." The difference in wording between the two titles does not seem to be accidental. In the 1950 treaty the provisions for mutual assistance, in both the positive and the negative aspects, are more numerous and more comprehensive in scope than those in the preceding treaty. By the 1945 treaty, the Nationalist Government and the Soviet Government agreed to close cooperation only to cope with untoward events in the Far East, especially aggression on the part of Japan. By the 1950 treaty the Peking Government and the Soviet Government agreed to close cooperation not only in the event of aggression by Japan either alone or in alliance with other powers, but "in all international actions aimed at ensuring peace and security throughout the world."

By the 1945 treaty the two parties "agree to render each other every possible economic assistance in the postwar period." By the 1950 treaty the two parties have agreed "to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties between China and the Soviet Union," and to render each other "all possible economic assistance and to carry out necessary economic cooperation."

By the 1945 treaty each contracting party only undertook not to join "any alliance" or "any coalition" directed against the other. By the 1950 treaty each contracting party undertakes not only to refrain from joining "any alliance" or "any coalition," but also to refrain from joining "any actions or measures directed against the other contracting party."

Above all, while the 1945 treaty was silent about diplomatic consultation, the 1950 treaty contains an explicit provision for diplomatic consultation between the Soviet Government and the Peking Government "in regard to all important international problems affecting the common interests of China and the Soviet Union."

This diplomatic consultation device was designed probably as a foolproof bottleneck to prevent any mistaken voluntary move on the part of either contracting party. Technically, it rests on an equal and reciprocal basis: not only has Peking to consult Moscow, but vice versa; not only has Peking to defer to the opinion of Moscow, but vice versa. It should be noted, however, that among Communist

countries Soviet Russia is more than a *primus inter pares*. The expression, "the peace camp headed by the Soviet Union," is profusely used in the works and speeches of the Chinese Communist leaders, clearly indicating that Soviet Russia is recognized as the leader of the other Communist countries. Furthermore, Soviet Russia considers herself as the base for world revolution, to whose power and interest the power and interest of the other Communist countries have to be subordinate. On these considerations it would seem likely that the provision for diplomatic consultation will enable the Soviet Union to exercise great influence in China's foreign relations.

If the effects of the various provisions for mutual assistance and consultation are now added up and considered as a whole, Mao Tse-tung's lean-to-one-side policy will emerge in clear and definite form. Communist China is to cooperate with Soviet Russia in the whole gamut of international problems. She will enter into intimate economic and cultural collaboration with Soviet Russia. She will not participate in any action or measure, to say nothing of alliance or coalition, that is directed against Soviet Russia. She will consult Soviet Russia about her diplomatic moves and will most probably follow the line of her ally. In a word, she has to consider and serve Soviet interests in addition to her own.

Naturally this condition of affairs has numerous implications of paramount importance. For instance, if the Peking Government wants to use French capital to build a railway in Yunnan province, or to employ British technical experts to help develop the coal and iron mines in central China, or to negotiate with the United States a big loan for general industrial development, it will have in all cases to consult the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government is thus in a position to influence the foreign and domestic policies of Communist China, and there can be little doubt that it will use that influence as far as possible for the benefit and interest of Soviet Russia. This latent Soviet influence in China's affairs practically amounts to a pre-emptive right to, and a potential monopoly of, all the concessions which Communist China may have to make from time to time in the course of her national development and construction. The immense benefits and profits to Russia implicit in this possible right of monopoly, when fully materialized, will surely surpass all the dreams of avarice ever dreamed by the traditional Western imperialists in the past. Whether in the development of the vast Chinese market, or in the exploitation of China's human labor or material resources, or in the promotion of financial investment in China's industries, or in the endeavors to effect the cultural transformation of the Chinese people, the Soviet Government will be able to secure

the top opportunities and advantages and to deny them to the Western capitalist countries. It is a well known Marxist-Leninist strategy in the global capitalist-communist struggle to deprive the capitalist powers of their markets and investment opportunities in the colonies and backward countries so as to accentuate the inner conflicts in the capitalist system and thereby hasten its downfall. The Soviet ascendancy in China goes far in the implementation of that strategy.

THE POSSIBILITY OF SECRET AGREEMENTS

A day or so after the publication of the new Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements, there appeared reports to the effect that the new instruments covered some secret codicils whereby Communist China gave concessions of considerable weight to Soviet Russia, such as the appointment of Soviet advisers to key positions in the Chinese army, police, and party organizations, the transfer of several million Chinese laborers to Siberia, the sale of Sinkiang to Soviet Russia, the allocation of various areas in China as residential districts for Russian immigrants, the placing of various Chinese ports at the disposal of the Soviets in case of war, and the employment of Soviet experts to direct certain parts of the Chinese economy.²³ Whether these reports correspond to realities only time will tell. In the light of past Russo-Chinese diplomacy, however, some sort of secret agreement between Peking and Moscow is by no means improbable. It will be recalled that in 1896 Li Hung-chang, while in Russia as China's special envoy to attend Czar Nicholas' coronation ceremony, negotiated and signed a secret treaty with the Czarist Government envisaging a military alliance against Japan. The treaty was a subject of considerable conjecture at that time, but was officially kept secret until 1922, when the Chinese delegation to the Washington Conference made it public. Some of its provisions were:

Article 1. The High Contracting Parties engage to support each other reciprocally by all the land and sea forces at any aggression directed by Japan against Russian territory in Eastern Asia, China, or Korea.

Article 2. No treaty of peace with an adverse party can be concluded by either of them without the consent of the other.

Article 3. During military operations all Chinese ports shall be open to Russian vessels.

Article 4. The Chinese Government consents to the construction of a railway across the Provinces of Amur and Kirin in the direction of Vladivostok.

²³ *New York Times*, February 16, 1950.

countries, to facilitate the exchange of goods and the interflow of intelligence and information, and to promote cultural and commercial relations between the two peoples.²⁸

To implement the credit agreement of February 14, 1950, a trade delegation from Communist China and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade signed two agreements on April 19, 1950, in Moscow: a trade agreement for 1950 and a barter agreement. The latter specified the various kinds of industrial equipment to be sent from Soviet Russia to China and the various kinds of raw materials from China to Soviet Russia.²⁹

About a year later, on March 14, 1951, the Chinese Ministry of Railways and the Soviet Ministry of Communications concluded their negotiations in Peking and signed an agreement dealing with through rail traffic between China and Soviet Russia. According to this agreement, through rail traffic would be established as from April 1, 1951, between the two countries, providing service for passengers, baggage, and freight.³⁰

On June 15, 1951, a trade delegation from Peking and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade repeated their performance of the preceding year and signed two agreements in Moscow to implement the credit agreement of February 14, 1950. It was reported that the trade agreement for 1951 envisaged a greater exchange of goods than the one for 1950.³¹ On April 12, 1952, the performance was repeated once more for the year 1952-1953, involving further expansion in the exchange of goods between the two countries.³²

It will be recalled that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance provides for close economic cooperation and development of economic ties between the two parties. To implement this provision, the Peking Government and the Soviet Government entered into three specific agreements of an economic character on March 27, 1950. One of the agreements deals with civil aviation and runs for ten years. The other two are concerned with development of natural resources in Sinkiang and will remain effective for thirty years. The texts of the agreements were not made public. A digest of their contents, however, was given in an announcement issued by the two governments.³³ According to this announcement, the civil aviation agreement provided for the organization of a Sino-Soviet civil aviation company in which the two

²⁸ Texts of the two agreements in *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao*, Vol. 1 (1950) pp. 1088-1092.

²⁹ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), April 21, 1950.

³⁰ *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao*, Vol. 3 (1951) p. 1313.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 4 (1951) p. 651.

³² *Shanghai News*, April 18, 1952.

³³ *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao*, Vol. 2 (1950) p. 134.

countries would be on an equal basis, with the aim of developing China's aviation enterprises and consolidating Sino-Soviet economic ties. Three lines were to be established namely, the Peking-Chita line, the Peking-Irkutsk line, and the Peking-Alma Ata line. The company was to be administered by both Chinese and Soviet citizens on a rotatory basis, and its expenses as well as its profits were to be shared evenly by the two governments. As regards the two agreements on the development of Sinkiang, they provided for the establishment of a Sino-Soviet petroleum company and a Sino-Soviet nonferrous metal company. The business of the petroleum company was to prospect for and develop petroleum; that of the metal company was to search for and open up nonferrous metal mines. The products as well as the profits and expenses were to be shared by the two governments on an equal basis.³⁴

Before the three agreements expired, the Soviet Government made a rather unusual move. On October 12, 1954, Peking and Moscow issued a joint communiqué announcing that the Soviet Government had agreed to transfer, as of January 1, 1955, the Soviet shares in the three above-mentioned companies. Later the transfer was effected on the appointed date.³⁵

The above study of Peking-Moscow agreements shows that Soviet Russia has secured economic concessions from Peking and that the trend is strong for the Chinese economy to be integrated into the Soviet economy and for Chinese trade to gravitate toward Soviet Russia. They illustrate the practical effects of the lean-to-one-side policy of Mao Tse-tung.

To conclude, it seems fair to say that against the gloomy background of China's unequal treaties, the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of 1950 deserve, so far as their formal texts go, to be called a long stride forward in China's foreign relations. But this does not mean that Communist China has the better side of the bargain. Soviet Russia also derives considerable rights, privileges, and benefits from the new pattern of relations. As regards Mao's lean-to-one-side policy, one may observe, first, that it tends to exonerate Soviet Russia from charges of being highhanded and imperialistic in its dealings with Communist China. Secondly, the policy does not *per se* necessarily mean that Communist China has become a subservient satellite of Soviet Russia. What it does definitely mean is that in all phases of international relations—diplomatic, economic, scientific, and cultural—Soviet Russia enjoys in China a special and privileged position which the Western Powers can hardly hope to attain.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

³⁵ *People's China*, February 16, 1955, p. 7.

Sino-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation

EVER since October 1949, Peking and Moscow have taken parallel actions on many occasions and in regard to a large number of issues. At first such parallel diplomacy may seem to rest on Article IV of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, which stipulates that the two parties "will consult with each other in regard to all important international problems affecting the common interests of China and the Soviet Union." It is more correct to say, however, that it rests on Mao Tse-tung's lean-to-one-side policy. Evidence in this regard may be derived from the fact that even before the conclusion of the 1950 treaty, the Chinese Communists had already marched in time with Soviet music and had endorsed every major Soviet move in the realm of diplomacy. It will be recalled that in line with their Soviet comrades the Chinese Communists had opposed the Marshall Plan in 1947,¹ denounced Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party in the summer of 1948,² and assailed the North Atlantic Pact in the spring of 1949.³ After the conclusion of the treaty and in consequence of the added incentive of diplomatic consultation, the two parties naturally have had more occasions for diplomatic cooperation.

Besides diplomatic cooperation, the two parties have also entered into close scientific and cultural cooperation. Following the Chinese Communists' advent to power, many thousands of Soviet scientific experts and cultural workers came to China to spread "advanced Soviet ideas," "advanced Soviet science," and "advanced Soviet technology," with the aim of guiding the national reconstruction of China and converting the Chinese people to the Soviet way of life. As a result, a new Sovietized China is shaping up.

¹ *Jen Min Jih Pao* [People's Daily], July 18, 1949.

² Liu Shao-ch'i, *Internationalism and Nationalism*, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1948, p. 1.

³ *China Digest*, Vol. 6, No. 1, April 19, 1949, p. 2.

It may be worthwhile, then, to take a look into the nature of Sino-Soviet cooperation in the various fields, diplomatic, scientific, and cultural, and to appraise as far as is feasible the results.

SINO-SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION

Roughly speaking, Sino-Soviet diplomatic cooperation manifests itself in three sectors: in the United Nations, in the World Peace Congress, and in the general field of diplomacy.

Cooperation in the United Nations

From the very beginning of its existence, the Peking Government has wanted to displace the Chinese Nationalist Government as the representative of China in the United Nations, and the Soviet Government has exerted its influence in various ways to fulfill its ally's aspiration. On August 26, 1950, Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai sent a telegram to Secretary-General Trygve Lie of the United Nations claiming that the Central People's Government was the only legal government of China, demanding the expulsion of the representative of the Nationalist Government from the United Nations, and informing Lie that Peking had already appointed Chang Wen-t'ien as the first delegate to attend the United Nations meetings.⁴ On September 17, on the eve of the opening of the Fifth United Nations Assembly, Chou sent Lie another telegram of the same tenor.⁵ Two days later, at the opening of the Assembly, the Soviet delegate echoed Peking's demand and made a proposal to the effect that the Nationalist delegation should be expelled from the United Nations and that the representative of the Peking Government should be invited to attend the Assembly and its related organs. The proposal, however, was voted down.⁶

A little over two months later, a delegation from Communist China reached New York; and its leader Wu Hsiu-ch'uan, while attending a session of the United Nations Security Council, launched a vitriolic attack on the United States and the Chinese Nationalist Government.⁷ That the delegation came to New York via Moscow had clear implications. While at the United Nations, it received considerable support and assistance from the Soviet delegation.

In November of the following year the Sixth United Nations Assembly was held in Paris. At a meeting on November 5, Soviet delegate Malik proposed that the question of Communist China's right

⁴ *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao*, Vol. 2 (1950) pp. 1018-1019.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1299-1301.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1297.

⁷ *New York Times*, November 29, 1950.

to represent China at the United Nations be considered by the Assembly. The proposal failed to receive any favorable response. Instead, the General Committee of the Assembly adopted a resolution refusing to consider any proposal connected with the expulsion of the Nationalist delegation and the admission of the representative of the Peking Government to take part in the Assembly. Soviet delegate Vyshinsky attacked this resolution as fantastic and mysterious and ascribed it to the hostility of the United States toward the Peking Government.⁸ Since then, the Soviet proposal to invite the Peking representative to take part in the United Nations Assembly has become an annual event.

In 1950 prospects seemed bright for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. The prestige of the Nationalist Government was then at a low ebb in consequence of the White Paper. Furthermore, in March of that year Secretary General Trygve Lie circulated a letter to member delegations of the United Nations stating that admission of a government to the United Nations was not linked to recognition of that government by other governments. This letter was highly favorable to the position of the Peking Government and prejudicial to the interest of the Nationalist Government. It will be recalled that Dr. T. F. Tsiang, head of the Chinese delegation, wrote an angry letter to Lie by way of protest.⁹ Under the circumstances, if the Soviet delegation had been more tactful, it might have succeeded in leading the Peking Government into the United Nations. According to some critics the Soviet delegation followed a rather violent approach and failed to befriend many of the other delegations in regard to that issue. Instead of escorting its friend through the main entrance whose doors might have yielded to a few gentle knocks, it had chosen to shoot its way in and thrust its friend through a narrow side window which, by the way, was closed.

In consequence of Communist China's intervention in Korea, the United Nations Assembly on February 1, 1951, passed a resolution branding her the aggressor. About two weeks later, on February 16, in an interview with a *Pravda* correspondent Stalin referred to the resolution and called it a "shameful act."¹⁰ In doing this, Stalin was obviously trying to uphold the prestige and save the face of Peking.

As the Korean war went on with increasing fury, Communist China became more and more embroiled in it and thereby antagonized the United Nations, which were enforcing "police action" in the war-ridden area. On May 18, 1951, the United Nations passed a

⁸ *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao*, Vol. 3, No. 26, December 1951, p. 88.

⁹ *Supra*, pp. 250-251.

¹⁰ *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao*, Vol. 3 (1951) pp. 1029-1031.

resolution placing an embargo on shipment of arms and strategic materials to Communist China and North Korea. On that occasion Soviet delegate Malik strongly denounced the resolution and accused the United States of converting the United Nations into a tool for American aggression. On May 23 he notified the United Nations Secretariat that the embargo resolution passed by the United Nations Assembly against Communist China and North Korea was illegal, and therefore he refused to inform the Soviet Government of the development.¹¹

While Moscow tried to defend and uphold Peking against every denunciatory or punitive action on the part of the United Nations, Peking on its part echoed and supported all Soviet proposals in the world organization. For instance, on November 8, 1951, Soviet delegate Vyshinsky gave a long speech at the United Nations Assembly, a major part of which was devoted to the denunciation of the United States. Towards the end of his speech he made four proposals: (1) the air bases of the United States and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in foreign soil to be declared incompatible with the qualifications of membership in the United Nations; (2) an immediate cease fire in Korea and withdrawal of all foreign troops and volunteers from Korea within three months; (3) a world conference to discuss disarmament and suppression of atomic weapons; (4) the Assembly to ask the United States, Great Britain, France, China, and the Soviet Union to conclude a peace pact.¹² On November 19 Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai of the Peking regime issued a declaration, expressing complete agreement with the four Soviet proposals.¹³

Cooperation in the World Peace Congress

As a sort of counterpart to the United Nations, the Communists have their own world organization called the World Peace Congress, formed in Paris in April 1949 and claiming a membership of seventy-two countries.¹⁴ At that time, the Chinese Communists had not yet completed their conquest of China, and their Central People's Government had not yet been formed; but they were represented at the Congress, as were many other Communist Parties which had not yet seized power. As soon as the Chinese Communist representatives returned to Peking, they organized the Chinese Peace Congress as

¹¹ Chung Su Yu Hao [Sino-Soviet Friendship], June 5, 1951, p. 5; June 20, 1951, p. 42.

¹² Hsin Hua Yueh Pao, No. 26, December 1951, pp. 81-87.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 80-81.

¹⁴ China Fights for Peace, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1950, pp. 18-19.

the national unit of the World Peace Congress, and through this unit the Peking Government has closely participated in the work of the World Peace Congress ever since. Branches of the unit were soon afterwards formed in the leading cities throughout the country.

The second World Peace Congress met in Warsaw in November 1950. Presently a World Peace Council was formed, and it met for the first time in Berlin towards the end of February 1951. In the first part of the following November it met again, this time in Vienna. All these meetings were staged mainly for the purpose of promoting and intensifying propaganda campaigns against the United States and pointing up the charge that the United States was the chief war-monger and the chief threat to world peace. To all these and subsequent meetings the Peking regime sent delegates. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the dominating influence of Moscow was behind the meetings and behind the World Peace Council.

On March 19, 1950, the Permanent Committee of the World Peace Congress issued at Stockholm a peace appeal, demanding the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggression and mass murder, considering "the government which first uses the atomic weapon against any other country . . . as a war criminal," and calling upon all people all over the world to sign the appeal.¹⁵ In response to this appeal the Chinese Peace Congress on April 25, 1950, instructed all its branches throughout the country to launch a peace signature campaign. Later, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (the Chinese Communist version of parliament) fixed July 1-7, 1950, as a publicity week for the peace signatures.¹⁶ On September 18, 1951, during the ceremony wherein she was awarded the Stalin Peace Prize, Madame Sun Yat-sen made a speech and pointed out that the Chinese people who had signed the Stockholm peace appeal numbered more than 223,000,000, while those who had signed the appeal for a Five-Power Peace Pact numbered over 344,000,000.¹⁷ (The Five-Power Peace Pact was first proposed by the Soviet delegation at the Fourth United Nations Assembly on September 23, 1949, and the proposal was renewed several times in later years.)

When the World Peace Council met at Berlin in February 1951, it passed a large number of resolutions, most of which were against the United Nations and the United States. The first five of those resolutions may be succinctly summarized as follows:

¹⁵ *Hsin Hua Yuch Pao*, Vol. 2 (1950) p. 247.

¹⁶ *China Fights for Peace*, pp. 3, 25.

¹⁷ *Chung Su Yu Hsiao*, October 10, 1951, p. 26. *Jen Min Chou Pao* [People's Weekly], September 30, 1951, p. 6.

The first resolution stated that the United Nations used its power and prestige to sanction and cover up America's systematic slaughter of nearly 1,000,000 people in Korea.

The second resolution expressed opposition to German rearmament.

The third resolution condemned the revival of militarism in Japan.

The fourth resolution declared as illegal the United Nations resolution branding Communist China as aggressor in Korea.

The fifth resolution demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.¹⁸

Later, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference sent a telegram to the World Peace Council pledging full support for all the resolutions it had passed.¹⁹

Cooperation in General Diplomatic Issues

In the general field of diplomatic problems, Sino-Soviet cooperation has been no less marked. Whether the problems are connected with Korea or with Japan or with Formosa and other parts of Asia, the Peking Government and the Soviet Government have in general adopted the same attitude and pursued the same policy.

In Korea their cooperation had developed even before the Korean war broke out in June 1950. According to a United Nations report, during 1949 and 1950 "the Soviets have supplied the North Korean forces with munitions and the Chinese Communists have supplied trained manpower."²⁰ Following the outbreak of the war, both Moscow and Peking considered the event as the result of American aggression and intensified their anti-American propaganda campaign. They both charged the United States with resort to germ warfare,²¹ and in trying to pin the stigma on the United States gave their charge the widest publicity. Technically, the Soviet Union was not involved in the war. But so-called Soviet neutrality or noninterference was more apparent than real. The war involved the use of planes, tanks, field pieces, and other modern weapons. Neither China nor North Korea could make them, indeed, they could hardly afford to purchase them. They all came from the Soviet Union.

In the course of the later negotiations for a truce, Peking and Moscow on more than one occasion demonstrated their solidarity. They both rejected a compromise resolution of the United Nations

¹⁸ Hsin Hua Yueh Pao, Vol. 3 (1951) pp. 1041-1043.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 26, December 1951, p. 64.

²⁰ United Nations, *Security Council Document*, S/1796, September 18, 1950.

²¹ Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol. 27, July 28, 1952, pp. 155-159.

General Assembly on the repatriation of war prisoners in Korea.²² On the other hand, when on March 31, 1953, Premier Chou En-lai of Peking proposed to the United Nations a plan for the repatriation of war prisoners, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov at once endorsed and supported it.²³

After several more months of irksome negotiations, a truce agreement was reached and signed on July 26. On that occasion, both Premier Malenkov and Foreign Minister Molotov sent a message to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, saying that a great victory had been won.

About two months after the truce agreement had been signed, the Soviet Government announced that it would grant one billion rubles to North Korea for economic reconstruction.²⁴ Later, Peking followed suit. On November 23, 1953, Peking signed a ten-year agreement with North Korea, providing for substantial Chinese financial and technical assistance needed in North Korea's reconstruction.²⁵

In the Geneva Conference which opened on April 26, 1954, and in which the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Communist China, and some minor powers took part, one of the two principal subjects under discussion was peace in Korea, the other being peace in Indochina. Here as elsewhere, Peking and Moscow presented a united front. When Secretary of State Dulles returned to Washington at the beginning of May, he reported that he found no differences between the policies of Soviet Russia and Communist China.²⁶

Both Soviet Russia and Communist China backed the North Korean plan, calling for all-Korean elections supervised by representatives from the North Korean and the South Korean parliament and urging withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea within six months.²⁷

Both Soviet Russia and Communist China refused to accept free elections under United Nations supervision.²⁸

Their firm united stand rendered the Geneva Conference a failure so far as peace in Korea was concerned.

In regard to Japan, both Peking and Moscow have charged that the United States is rearming Japan and reviving Japanese war industries and otherwise strengthening Japan as a base for aggression.

²² *New York Times*, February 26, 1953.

²³ *Ibid.*, April 7, 1953.

²⁴ *Izvestia*, September 20, 1953.

²⁵ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, November 24, 1953.

²⁶ *New York Times*, May 3, 1954.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, April 29 and 30, 1954.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, July 31, 1954.

The separate peace treaty with Japan in 1951 especially drew fire from the two allies. The United States Government divulged the text of the draft peace treaty with Japan on April 5. Several days previously, on March 29, it sent a copy of the draft to the Soviet Government for its consideration. After apparently a careful study of the draft, the Soviet Government made a number of comments on it in a note to the United States Government on May 7, saying that many provisions in the draft were violative of existing agreements between the former allies against Japan, such as the Yalta and the Potsdam agreements. Simultaneously it sent a duplicate of the note to Peking. On May 22 Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai replied in a communication to the Soviet Ambassador in China, stating that the Peking Government was in complete agreement with the views of the Soviet Government on the draft peace treaty.²⁹

Later, the United States Government convened a peace conference on Japan, which opened in San Francisco on September 5 and to which the Soviet Government was invited. At the conference Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko severely criticized the peace draft, saying that it failed to provide any guarantee against the resumption of Japanese militarism and aggression.³⁰ At the close of the conference, he issued a statement to the press, in which he spoke not only for the Soviet Union but also for the Peking regime and China. Apart from attacking the Japanese peace treaty as a violation of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Agreements and as a plan for preparing a new war in the Far East, he said that the Chinese people "has made the greatest contribution to the cause of victory over the Japanese militarists," that "without the participation of the Chinese People's Republic . . . no genuine peace settlement in the Far East can be achieved," and that "it is the government of the Chinese People's Republic that expresses the will of 500,000,000 people of China."³¹

On October 12, 1954, Peking and Moscow issued a joint declaration on their relations with Japan, in which they charged the United States with violating the Potsdam decisions and expressed their stand for the development of broad trade relations with Japan and the establishment of close cultural ties with Japan. They also expressed their readiness to support all measures which Japan might take to secure conditions for her peaceful and independent development.³²

Another hot diplomatic issue in the Far East is Formosa. Last bulwark of the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, Formosa has

²⁹ *Jen Min Chou Pao*, June 3, 1951, pp. 9-11.

³⁰ *New York Times*, September 7, 1951.

³¹ *Ibid.*, September 9, 1951.

³² *People's China*, Supplement, November 1, 1954, p. 6.

been an eyesore to both the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. Both Peking and Moscow have attacked the Nationalist Government as corrupt and reactionary. Since October 1949, both have contended that the Nationalist Government in Formosa is illegal and has no right to represent China and speak for the Chinese people, and both have made efforts to drive the Chinese Nationalist delegation out of the United Nations. Since June 27, 1950, when President Truman ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to patrol the Formosa Strait, both Peking and Moscow have charged that the United States is an aggressor and has occupied Formosa and is converting the island into a military base for aggressive purposes.

In the course of the Korean war the Formosa problem lost some of its significance. After the truce in Korea in the summer of 1953 and especially after the truce in Indochina in the summer of 1954, however, Formosa quickly regained its importance and prominence in Far Eastern controversies. On August 11, 1954, in making his report on foreign affairs to the Central People's Government Council, Premier Chou En-lai of the Peking regime urged the Council "to take determined action on the liberation of Taiwan so as to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity."³³ The Council adopted the report on the same day. Since then a state of tension has existed in the Formosa area.

During this period of tension, Nationalist news agencies such as the Ta Tao agency and the Chinatone agency frequently sent forth dispatches to the effect that Soviet submarines are operating in Chinese waters and that Soviet experts are training Chinese pilots and directing the construction of jet airfields along the China coast opposite Formosa. These dispatches cannot easily be verified. But one thing is certain, and that is that Soviet Mig jet fighters are being employed by the Chinese Communists to cope with the American Sabrejets stationed in Formosa. This sufficiently indicates that the Soviet Government has been backing the Chinese Communists in their policies towards the last bastion of Chiang Kai-shek.

On October 12, 1954, Peking and Moscow issued a joint declaration on Taiwan (Formosa). At the very outset the declaration said that the two governments "are in complete accord in regard to their daily developing all-round cooperation and in regard to the various problems of the international situation." It then went on to say that "America's continued occupation of the Chinese territory of Taiwan as well as America's aid to Chiang Kai shek is incompatible

³³ *Ibid.*, September 1, 1954, PP 2-4

with the task of preserving peace in the Far East and easing the tense international situation."³⁴

With the presence of alleged Chinese Nationalist troops in its northern part, Burma has been regarded as a potential source of danger to Communist China. As usual, both Peking and Moscow associated this situation with sinister American designs. On more than one occasion the Soviet delegate at the meetings of the United Nations Assembly accused the United States of transporting Nationalist troops to Burma and helping the Nationalists in their aggression. The United States delegation, however, categorically denied the accusation.³⁵

Peking-Moscow diplomatic cooperation may be seen in Indochina too. In the course of the civil war here, led on one side by Ho Chi Minh, Communist leader of Viet Minh, and on the other by Emperor Bao Dai, both Peking and Moscow backed Viet Minh and gave it considerable moral and possibly material support. At the same time they both attacked the policy of the United States in supporting the French and Bao Dai.

When Ho Chi Minh called for recognition of his regime at the beginning of 1950, Communist China quickly gave a favorable response. This took place on January 19. Ten days later, the Soviet Government followed suit.

From January 25 to February 18, 1954, the foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France met at a conference in Berlin. Toward the end of the conference, they agreed on calling a conference at Geneva to discuss peace in Korea and in Indochina. Although Communist China was not a participant of the Berlin conference, it joined the Soviet Union in insisting on admitting Ho Chi Minh into the proposed conference.³⁶

In the course of the Geneva conference Molotov and Chou En-lai, respectively representing the Soviet Union and Communist China, echoed each other in their utterances, thereby showing their unity of aims and purposes. When the truce agreement was signed on July 20, with a number of terms quite favorable to Viet Minh, it was no wonder that Ho Chi Minh acknowledged that "the victory" was won through the aid rendered by the Soviet Union and Communist China.³⁷

In regard to southeast Asia and world peace in general, Peking

³⁴ Hsin Hua Yueh Pao, No. 11, 1954, p. 32.

³⁵ United Nations, *Official Records of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 1951-1952*, pp. 450-453.

³⁶ *New York Times*, February 19, 1954.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, July 26, 1954.

and Moscow likewise echoed each other with dull monotony. On August 11, 1954, Premier Chou En-lai declared that the Peking government "firmly opposes the formation by the United States aggressive group of the so called Southeast Asian Treaty Organization." On September 14 the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying that the actions envisaged in the South-east Asian Collective Defense Treaty "are diametrically opposed to the work of strengthening peace."³⁸

Then on February 9, 1955, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union made a declaration proposing the establishment of direct contact between parliaments and expressing welcome for any steps by parliaments of other states designed to strengthen peace among nations. Three days later, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress at Peking adopted a resolution supporting the Soviet declaration.³⁹

SINO-SOVIET SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION

Mao Tse-tung's lean-to-one-side policy is not, as is generally supposed, confined to China's foreign policy, but covers also China's domestic development and national reconstruction. This is to be expected. As a Communist, Mao is all for Soviet Communist institutions and practices and against those of Western capitalist countries. In this regard he wrote in 1940:

The feudalistic system of thought and social institutions have become museum pieces. A part of the capitalistic system of thought and social institutions has also become museum pieces; and the remaining part is fast becoming so, being now like the setting sun or a sick man gasping on the point of death. The Communist system of thought and social institutions, however, are beautiful and wonderful in their blooming youth, and pervade the whole world with a thunderous force mighty enough to level mountains and overturn oceans.⁴⁰

Mao's visit to the Soviet Union must have further strengthened his faith in the lean-to-one-side policy. On February 17, 1950, in his farewell speech at a Moscow railway station, he said:

During my stay in the Soviet Union I have visited many factories and farms and have seen Soviet workers and peasants engaged in the building of socialism and its great results. I have seen the working style which is formed out of a mingled revolutionary and practical spirit fostered under the education

³⁸ *People's China*, October 16, 1954, p. 25.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, March 1, 1955, p. 44.

⁴⁰ Mao Tse tung, *Hsin Min Chu Chu-I Lun* [On the New Democracy], p. 32.

of Comrade Stalin and the Russian Communist Party. All this confirms the historic conviction of the Chinese Communists that the experience of Soviet economic, cultural, and other important developments will become the pattern for the reconstruction of China.⁴¹

Another important Chinese Communist leader, Liu Shao-ch'i, is no less enthusiastic than Mao Tse-tung in following the Soviet way. In an address on the occasion of the founding of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association on October 5, 1949, he said:

The reason why we particularly emphasize and value friendly cooperation between China and the Soviet Union is that the path already traversed by the Soviet people is exactly the path we should follow. The experience of the Soviet people in national reconstruction deserves very careful study by us Chinese. In the past our Chinese people's revolution was carried on "with Russia as teacher," and that is why it could attain the success of today. From now on in our national reconstruction, we must likewise proceed "with Russia as teacher" and learn the Soviet people's experience of national reconstruction.⁴²

It is clear, then, that the Chinese Communist leaders are bent on creating a new China in the Soviet image. For their part, the Soviets are delighted to help in the building of socialism in another vast and important sector of the world. Under the circumstances it is no wonder that after the Chinese Communists had seized power, numerous Soviet experts came to China to spearhead Sino-Soviet cooperation in the scientific and cultural fields. Indeed, some of them came even before the Chinese Communists' advent to power. According to Liu Shao-ch'i, by the beginning of October 1949 more than two hundred Soviet experts had come to Manchuria, with no other motive than serving China. Said Liu: "When they come to China, they are assigned to various factories, enterprises, and economic organs where they work under the direction of the responsible Chinese officials. They serve only as advisers and receive a salary equal to that of Chinese engineers of the same rank."⁴³ If Liu's statement is correct, the Soviet Government must have accorded much better treatment to Communist China than it had ever accorded to Yugoslavia. In a letter to Stalin, Tito once complained: "The wages of the Soviet experts were four times as high

⁴¹ *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao*, Vol. 1 (1950), p. 1112.

⁴² *Jen Min Jih Pao*, October 8, 1949.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

as the wages of the commanders of our armies and three times as high as the wages of our Federal Ministers." ⁴⁴

The first Soviet technical experts who came to China were the medical and railway experts. Towards the end of 1949 a bubonic epidemic broke out in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and constituted a great menace to the life of the people there. Over thirty Soviet medical workers came, and together with about fifty Chinese medical workers formed a medical team to go to the infected areas to fight the plague. They saved, it was reported, many lives. They had worked in China for about three weeks before they left Mukden and returned home toward the end of November. ⁴⁵

In later years there was built in Peking the Soviet Red Cross Hospital, where a number of Soviet doctors are employed. Apart from attending to their patients, they take part in training Chinese medical workers and disseminating "the most advanced medical knowledge and technique." ⁴⁶

In the course of the civil war, the railway system of China was subjected to frequent bombing and underwent a great deal of damage and dislocation. To facilitate the transportation of troops and goods, the Chinese Communists were anxious to have the system repaired and restored to normal operation. Their anxiety increased in mid-1949 when their troops were rushing southward in an attempt at quick conquest. At that time the most experienced Soviet railway experts, those who had served in the Nazi-Soviet war, came along, repaired the Lunghai and the Peking-Hankow railway lines, and thereby hastened the Communist conquest of the mainland. ⁴⁷ About this time there was a report that Soviet technical experts were also aiding the Chinese Communists in reopening the war-damaged Tientsin Pukow Railway which links North China with the Nanking-Shanghai area. ⁴⁸ After the Chinese Communists had occupied the mainland, other Soviet railway experts were employed in building or restoring those railway bridges that had been blown up. It was under their direction that the Huai River bridge on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and the Yellow River bridge on the Peking-Hankow Railway were repaired. ⁴⁹ As a result, towards the end of

⁴⁴ Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, London, 1948, pp. 19-20.

⁴⁵ *Kwang Ming Jih Pao* (a daily in Peking), November 5 and 29, 1949; Chao Ti-sheng and Tung Sheng, "How Soviet Experts Aid New China's Economic Construction," *People's China*, February 16, 1952, p. 32.

⁴⁶ *People's China*, June 16, 1954, p. 28.

⁴⁷ *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao*, Vol. 3 (1951) pp. 978-979.

⁴⁸ *Christian Science Monitor*, July 27, 1949.

⁴⁹ *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao*, Vol. 3 (1951) p. 979; Chao Ti-sheng and Tung Sheng, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 31.

1950 the railway system of China was brought into smooth and efficient functioning again and played an important part in the general pacification of the country.⁵⁰ The Soviet experts also rendered their aid in the construction of new lines. For instance, they took an important part in the construction of the line linking Chungking with Chengtu. In about a year and a half after work began in June 1950, upwards of 300 miles of rail had been laid. By mid-1952, the whole line (about 500 kilometers long) was completed.⁵¹ In addition, Soviet railway administration experts also came to China to train the Chinese in the efficient operation of railways. The Chinese Changchun Railway (formerly called the Chinese Eastern Railway, and now the Harbin Railway) was used as the training school, and the result was reported to be very satisfactory.⁵² Prior to the transfer of the railway to sole Chinese administration at the end of 1952, 1300 Soviet experts had trained nearly 20,000 Chinese railway administration cadres and technical workers.⁵³

According to a joint communiqué issued on October 12, 1954, Peking and Moscow have decided to build a railway from Lanchow through Urumchi (on Chinese territory) to Alma Ata (on Soviet territory). Each government will undertake to construct the part on its territory. The Soviet Government is willing, however, to provide Peking with all the technical assistance it may need.⁵⁴

The Huai River project furnished another occasion for the employment of Soviet engineering experts. About 600 miles long, this river has more than two hundred tributaries and drains an area of nearly 90,000 square miles. It was a fertile source of floods, and therefore a grave menace to the teeming millions of inhabitants in the river valley. It was perhaps with some bitterness that Mao Tse-tung said: "The Huai River must be harnessed." Towards the end of 1951 it was reported that the first part of the project had been successfully carried out.⁵⁵ According to Chinese Communist sources, the Soviet experts, especially a hydraulic engineer named Bukov, had made signal contributions to the project.⁵⁶ Some neutral observers, however, have pointed out that the Chinese people, although

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*; Literary Workers of the Workers Daily, *Su-Lien Chuan-Chia Tao-Liao Wo-Men Kung-Ch'ang* [Soviet Experts Have Come to Our Factories], Peking, Workers Publishing Institute, 1951, pp. 31-32.

⁵¹ *Jen Min Chou Pao*, July 10, 1952, p. 20.

⁵² *Chung Su Yu Hao*, November 10, 1951, pp. 6-7; Chao Ti-sheng and Tung Sheng, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 31.

⁵³ Chao Ching-lun, "The Transfer of the Chinese Changchun Railway," *People's China*, January 16, 1953, p. 9.

⁵⁴ *People's China*, Supplement, November 1, 1954, p. 9.

⁵⁵ Chao Ti-sheng and Tung Sheng, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁵⁶ *Chung Su Yu Hao*, November 10, 1951, p. 12.

they acknowledged the importance of Soviet engineering methods, were proud that the project was carried out entirely with Chinese materials and with Chinese hands.⁵⁷

In industry and agriculture Soviet experts were also employed, but do not seem to have attained any great distinction. It was reported that, with Soviet technological and industrial know-how, some progress had been made in the mining, metallurgical, and machine-tool industries and in the textile industry.⁵⁸ The specific instances reported, however, are rather trite in nature. One instance referred to an iron smelter whose productive capacity had increased 50% from 250 to 376 tons through Soviet technical aid.⁵⁹ Another instance referred to a zinc smelter which could not be restored, it was said, by either the Japanese or the Kuomintang experts, but was made to work by the Soviet experts.⁶⁰ Still another instance referred to a steel mill which was restored by Soviet experts and was producing heavy rails for the first time in Chinese history.⁶¹ It was also claimed that through Soviet technical assistance the prospecting for oil in the northwest and the southwest of China met with great success, that oil production in Sinkiang was making such progress and increasing at such a rate as to bid fair to make China independent of foreign supplies, and that coal mining had increased its output by over 20%.⁶²

There seems to be little doubt that behind the above reports there was an effort to make the picture look as bright as possible. But as a whole the picture is not cheering, especially for a vast country like China with its huge population.

As in industry, so in agriculture. Here too, after several years of Sino-Soviet scientific cooperation, the major claims put forth are far from spectacular. It was claimed that through the adoption of superior Soviet techniques, hundreds of thousands of cubic feet of timber had been saved in the lumber industry, that a certain plantation in Peking had increased its cotton production 400%, and that some progress had been made in veterinary knowledge and in the raising of livestock.⁶³ These reported achievements are patently minor in character and restricted in scope. The fact that they were

⁵⁷ Frank Moraes, *Report on Mao's China*, New York, 1953, p. 94.

⁵⁸ Chao Ti-sheng and Tung Sheng, *op. cit.*, p. 5. *Chung Su Yu Hao*, January 25, 1952, p. 10.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Chao Ti-sheng and Tung Sheng, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁶² *Ibid.*; *Chung Su Yu Hao*, February 25, 1952, p. 12.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, December 10, 1951, p. 13; January 25, 1952, p. 10; *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao*, Vol. 2 (1950) p. 636.

seized upon and treated as if they were of great importance indicates that basic and vital achievements in the agricultural field have been lacking.

The foregoing reports were connected mainly with Soviet technical advice and industrial know-how that had been imparted to the Chinese. How about Soviet aid in the form of capital goods such as industrial equipment and agricultural implements and machines? A random survey of Chinese Communist journalistic literature indicates that reports regarding such aid are as rare as swallows in winter. One report of some major significance appeared in the summer of 1950 and referred to the arrival from Soviet Russia of various items for the improvement of agriculture. It revealed that 272 sowing machines, 114 tractors, and 71 harvest combines were included in those items. Besides, there were 130,000 kilograms of pasture grass seeds, and a number of livestock breeders, including 50 hogs, 250 sheep, and 1125 horses of 8 different pedigrees.⁶⁴

Another report referred back to an instance occurring in 1949 when, it was said, Soviet Russia sent to China 171 miles of rails for the rehabilitation of the Chinese railway system.⁶⁵

Still another report is interesting and may be translated as follows:

A group of coal-mining machines from Soviet Russia have come to the Shih Jen coal mine in the municipality of Tung Hua. They are efficient for mining both hard and soft coal and can stand a lot of wear and tear. They are stronger than the former Japanese machines used in the mine. As it was the first time the miners handled them, however, they were not used to their working technicalities and so, despite considerable perseverance, failed to operate them. The miners then inferred that the Japanese machines were better and lost interest in the Soviet machines. Small study groups are now trying to understand and master the latter.⁶⁶

It is not hard to discern an attempt at courtesy in the above report. Although the blame was laid on the ignorance of the miners, the probability would seem to be that the Soviet machines were not of good quality.

In the beginning of 1952 there was already talk in Communist China of launching the first Five Year Plan. Later in the year, in August, Premier Chou En-lai led a large delegation to Moscow, apparently to solicit aid for carrying out that ambitious project. The negotiations that ensued were rather protracted, indicating that

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3 (1951) pp. 978-979.

⁶⁶ *Chung Su Yu Hao*, August 10, 1951, p. 9.

Moscow was not quite ready to grant the necessary aid. It was not till September 1953 that an announcement was made. On September 15 Mao Tse-tung sent a message to Malenkov, expressing thanks for Soviet assistance. Among other things, he said:

Since the great Soviet Government has agreed to extend systematic economic and technical aid in the construction and reconstruction of 91 new enterprises and to the 50 enterprises now being built or reconstructed in China, the Chinese people, who are striving to learn from the advanced experience and the latest achievements of the Soviet Union, will be able to build up step by step their own mighty heavy industry.⁶⁷

Some effort on the part of the Soviets seems to have been made at the beginning to implement this agreement. For soon, in December 1953, there was a report that the Soviet Union had helped in constructing the three new projects of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company.⁶⁸ However, this auspicious beginning was quickly followed by an adverse turn. According to an Associated Press dispatch dated London, January 24, 1954, the Soviet Government had told Peking that Soviet Russia could not fulfill all China's demands for vital tools and machinery, nor could she absorb all the agricultural products from China.⁶⁹ Afterward no report concerning the Soviet supply of capital goods to China appeared until October of the same year, when Nikita Khrushchev, Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, went to Peking to take part in the celebration of the Chinese Communist National Day and presented to the Chinese people the machinery and equipment needed for running a state farm of about 50,000 acres, including 98 tractors, 100 combine harvesters, and 120 tractor-drawn grain sowers.⁷⁰ This gesture was apparently called forth by the solemn occasion and was not repeated in the subsequent period. Furthermore, the machinery and equipment presented are used for the development of agriculture, not for the development of heavy industry, which is the pet desire of such Chinese Communist leaders as Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai.

Mainly for lack of industrial capital goods, the first Five Year Plan launched by the Chinese Communists met with great difficulties. For some time these difficulties were either played down or hushed up. By the summer of 1955 the leaders of the Peking regime considered it time to make a sincere accounting of the situation, and in the course of the National People's Congress held in July

⁶⁷ *People's China*, October 1, 1953, p. 3.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, February 1, 1954, pp. 11-13.

⁶⁹ *Los Angeles Times*, January 25, 1954.

⁷⁰ *People's China*, November 1, 1954, p. 40.

delivered detailed reports on the economic problems. According to an Associated Press dispatch from London dated September 12, 1955, those reports appeared only in an abridged form in the Communist press; but the British managed to get hold of their full texts, and upon subjecting them to a close analysis, obtained a number of important findings—namely, that Russia's free aid is confined largely to the loan of designers and other experts to help in the construction of 156 [sic] major industrial projects, that Peking was paying heavily for the goods coming from Russia, that food and other products badly needed at home were transported to Eastern Europe in exchange for industrial goods, and that this situation was especially disappointing to the Chinese Communist leaders who had thought that a considerable amount of industrial capital goods from Russia would be coming to them free of charge.⁷¹

It may be reasonably asserted that as a whole, Soviet technological aid to China consists not so much in the supply of capital goods as in the provision of technical and industrial know-how necessary for the repair or construction of dams and railways, the reconditioning of old machinery, the restoration of old industrial plants, and undertakings of similar nature. This circumstance points up a flaw in Mao Tse-tung's lean-to-one-side policy, which is mainly based on ideological and political considerations. For the industrialization of China, it is better to be able to secure Western technological know-how and capital goods also. Dependence on Soviet Russia alone will not only retard considerably the process of industrialization, but will also increase the cost to a great extent, even assuming that goods from all countries are of the same quality.

SINO-SOVIET CULTURAL COOPERATION

In any discussion of Sino-Soviet cultural cooperation, an account must first be given of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, a powerful organ for the promotion of Chinese friendship for Soviet Russia. It is of interest to note that there is no corresponding association in Soviet Russia; so it may be said that the efforts made in China to promote friendship for Soviet Russia have not been reciprocated.

Organized on October 5, 1949, and headed by the ardent Rusophile Liu Shao-ch'i, the association aims "to develop and consolidate friendly relations between China and the Soviet Union, promote Sino-Soviet cultural and economic cooperation, introduce Soviet experience in political, economic, and cultural reconstruction and

⁷¹ *Chinese World*, September 13, 1955.

scientific achievements, and strengthen the firm unity of the two countries in the joint struggle for a durable world peace."⁷² On the day of its inauguration, the association received from cultural associations in Soviet Russia considerable encouragement in the form of various kinds of gifts such as movie films, music records and scores, school textbooks, and specimens of Russian literary classics.⁷³

Not long after its formation, the association became a powerful parallel organization of the Chinese Communist Party and had a branch in every important locality. For instance, by the fall of 1951, there was a branch of the association in practically every county in North China and in Manchuria.⁷⁴ Toward the end of 1952, an official report stated that the association "had established 1896 regional associations at the provincial, city, and county levels and 119,978 branch associations."⁷⁵

The major activity of the association in the promotion of pro-Soviet sentiments is the publication of books, pamphlets, and newspapers. Hardly two years after its inception, the association had published, it was reported, nearly 400 different books, over 20 different newspapers, and over 70 different periodicals. Of these periodicals nearly 5,000,000 copies had been issued during the period.⁷⁶

To propagandize the masses, the association also makes use of such media as movie films, slide lanterns, and radio broadcasts and has obtained considerable aid from the Soviet Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS). On the first anniversary of the founding of the association, VOKS presented it with a number of radio sets, projectors, batteries, and "propaganda waggon" equipped with broadcast facilities.⁷⁷ By the fall of 1952, the association was reported to have "over 200 motion picture projection teams and more than 2000 lantern slide teams" regularly working in "factories, villages, and residential areas."⁷⁸

As the network of the association's branches spread far and fast, the membership of the association increased correspondingly. Towards the end of 1950 the membership stood at around 3,000,000. A year later, it had soared to 17,000,000.⁷⁹ In another year, this

⁷² Article 2 of the association's bylaws—*Jen Min Jih Pao*, October 6, 1949.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Chung Su Yu Hao*, October 25, 1951, p. 15.

⁷⁵ Ch'ien Chun-jui, "The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association," *People's China*, November 16, 1952, p. 23.

⁷⁶ *Chung Su Yu Hao*, September 25, 1951, p. 4; October 25, 1951, pp. 11-12.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Chien Chun-jui, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁷⁹ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, October 15, 1951.

huge figure more than doubled and reached the astounding total of 38,900,000. Troops of the People's Liberation Army and of the public security forces have collectively entered the association as members.⁸⁰

Apart from carrying on propaganda to influence public opinion in favor of Soviet Russia, the association also serves as a kind of clearinghouse for the interflow of Chinese and Soviet cultural currents. While, as will be shown presently, it is predominantly concerned with the spread of Soviet culture in China, it does not neglect efforts to introduce Chinese culture into Soviet Russia.

Chinese Cultural Influence in Soviet Russia

Through VOKS, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association has maintained close contacts with sixty-four Soviet cultural associations and regularly sent to them music records, movie films, and literary works dealing with the Chinese revolutionary struggle and national reconstruction.⁸¹ In celebration of the second anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, theaters in thirty Soviet cities showed films on China for ten days to several millions of people. On the same occasion, various localities of the Soviet Union also held exhibitions, lectures, and music concerts to trumpet forth the achievements of Communist China during her first two years of existence.⁸²

In compliance with the request of the Soviet authorities, a Chinese vaudeville troupe was sent to Moscow in October 1950 and apparently met with great success. It gave over a hundred performances during a four-month stay there, and afterwards the show was filmed in color in a Soviet studio.⁸³ Similar groups followed suit in later years. For instance, in the latter part of 1954 "the Song and Dance Company of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" toured the Soviet Union, and was so warmly welcomed that every time it gave a show the theater had to issue standing-room-only tickets, it was reported.⁸⁴

Other attempts to make the people of Soviet Russia understand Communist China include the holding of exhibitions, the translation of books, and related activities. In the latter part of 1950 an exhibition of modern Chinese sculpture, oil painting, and wood

⁸⁰ Chien Chun-jun, *op. cit.*, p. 23; *Chung Su Yu Hao*, December 10, 1951, pp. 9-10.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, September 25, 1951, p. 4; October 25, 1951, p. 13.

⁸² *Ibid.*, November 10, 1951, p. 26.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, August 25, 1951, p. 26; Hung Shen, "Chung-Su Liang-Kuo Liang-Nien-Lai Wen-Hua Ho-Tso Ti Sheng-Li" [Triumphs of 'Two Years' Sino-Soviet Cultural Cooperation], *Kwang Ming Jih Pao*, February 9, 1952, p. 6.

⁸⁴ *People's China*, April 1, 1955, p. 29.

engraving was held in Moscow and Leningrad and was reported to have been a great success. Over 300,000 people were said to have seen it.⁸⁵ In November 1952 a *Pravda* editorial pointed out that Chinese culture, art, and science were being widely propagated in the Soviet Union through exhibitions, lectures, radio broadcasts, and television programs.⁸⁶ As regards the translation of books, Liu Shao-ch'i reported that in Soviet Russia "more than one hundred Chinese books have been translated into sixteen different languages and published in close to five million copies."⁸⁷ By the beginning of 1954 the first four volumes of *Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works* had appeared in Russian in the Soviet Union and were widely read.

During the last few years, many Chinese delegations also have visited Soviet Russia, although their purpose was not directly concerned with culture. Some went to take part in the celebration of the October Revolution, others went to attend the May 1 ceremony, and still others went to fraternize with the Russian people. In June 1951 a group of Chinese children was sent to Moscow to stay with Russian children in a summer camp. Later, the Peking Government sent a group—the first group—of students to study in Soviet schools and universities.⁸⁸ About the same time a Chinese student delegation went to Soviet Russia for a visit, sojourned there for almost two months as guests of the Soviet Communist Youth Corps, and met a large number of Soviet youths.⁸⁹ According to a report by Liu Shao-ch'i, "China has sent twenty-two delegations to the Soviet Union for the purpose of visit and study," and "has sent several hundred students to study in the Soviet Union and will in the future send students there in large numbers."⁹⁰

Soviet Cultural Influence in China

The Soviet Government has displayed great zest in spreading Soviet cultural influence in China from the start. During the inaugural ceremony of the Peking Government on October 1, 1949, a Soviet cultural delegation led by Fedeyev and Simonov came to present felicitations. Later it left Peking and spent about a month visiting other parts of China. In the course of the trip, some of its members lectured to the Chinese people on various subjects, but

⁸⁵ Hung Shen, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁸⁶ *Ta Kung Pao* (Hongkong), November 12, 1952.

⁸⁷ Liu Shao-ch'i, "An Address on the Third Anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance," *People's China*, Supplement, March 1, 1953, p. 5.

⁸⁸ *Chung Su Yu Hsiao*, August 10, 1951, p. 26; September 25, 1951, p. 26.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, December 10, 1951, p. 26.

⁹⁰ Liu Shao-ch'i, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

mainly on two themes: the merits of Soviet culture and the demerits of American culture.⁹¹ It is clear that their chief aim was to discredit and destroy American influence in China in order to pave the way for the introduction of Soviet influence. On the second anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic in 1951, another Soviet delegation of cultural workers, including labor leaders, educational leaders, musicians, and scientists came to China, this time under the leadership of Ehrenburg and Soloviev. After attending the celebration in Peking, they toured other places and as usual gave talks and performances to arouse the interest of the Chinese people in Soviet culture.⁹² Towards the end of 1952 a nation-wide movement was launched in China to promote Sino-Soviet friendship. November was designated the Soviet friendship month. Throughout this month the extensive network of branches of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association was mobilized to put up various programs to stimulate friendship and support for the Soviet ally. To give color and content to the nation-wide movement, the Soviet Government sent a huge cultural delegation to China, made up of three groups: the group of Soviet artists with 28 members, the Soviet cinema workers group with 7 members, and the Soviet Army Red Banner Song and Dance Ensemble with 259 members. On November 6 the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association sponsored a "gala concert" in Peking, featuring the Soviet musicians and dancers and attended by Mao Tse-tung and other government and party leaders. After their stay in Peking the Soviet cultural workers toured China and repeated their performances in the principal cities.⁹³

In 1953, on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Communist accession to power in China, there was held a grand parade as usual before Tien An Men, but no delegation either from the Soviet Government or from the Soviet people came to take part in the celebration.

In the following year, however, celebration of the National Day was again paralleled by an elaborate attempt to spread Soviet cultural influence in China. On that occasion a grand exhibition of Soviet economic and cultural achievements was held at the newly built Soviet Exhibition Center in the western suburbs of Peking. According to a report, over 11,500 exhibits were on display in the three

⁹¹ Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, ed., *Tsai Chung-Kuo I-Yueh* [One Month in China], Peking, Hsin Hua Book Store, 1950; Tientsin Municipal Communist Committee, ed., *Kung-Ku Chung-Su Yu-I* [Consolidate Sino-Soviet Friendship], Tientsin, Tientsin Municipal Communist Committee, 1949. These two works contain the Chinese versions of the lectures.

⁹² *Chung Su Yu Hao*, October 25, 1951, p. 12.

⁹³ *People's China*, November 16, 1952, p. 18.

main exhibition halls of industry, agriculture, and culture.⁹⁴ The exhibition lasted till December 26, 1954; and on March 15, 1955, it opened in Shanghai, where it was housed in the new Sino-Soviet Friendship Building.⁹⁵

Education is a vital and principal process of molding character and disseminating knowledge and ideas. On this account it is worthwhile to note that Soviet influence on education in Communist China is exceedingly strong. Under the direction of Soviet educational experts, the educational system is being remolded along Soviet lines in spirit as well as in structure. Soviet methods of teaching have been adopted, and Soviet textbooks are used in the high schools for a wide variety of subjects, including chemistry, physics, geography, mathematics, and biology.⁹⁶

On May 25, 1953, the Moscow radio announced that students in Communist China were soon going to be studying the same lessons—in Chinese—as the students in Soviet Russia. The broadcast added that a "mass translation" of Soviet textbooks into Chinese would be carried out by experts of the universities in China.⁹⁷

Hu Hsi ku'ei, Vice-president of the Chinese People's University, pointed out that "with the direct help of Soviet experts the various departments of pedagogical research have translated and compiled 75 kinds of teaching syllabus and 114 kinds of lecture materials."⁹⁸

Soviet scholars have also played a part in the education of the Chinese. In March 1950 Nuzhdin, Kiselev, and Makarova were invited by the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association to Peking to give special lectures, respectively, on biology, history, and economics to a group of party cadres.⁹⁹ In early October of the same year the official New China News Agency reported that 35 Soviet professors had been appointed to special faculty posts at the Chinese People's University, and that they would instruct 250 advanced students and more than 200 teachers in pedagogical and research techniques.¹⁰⁰

Another potent agency for the dissemination of Soviet cultural influence in China is the publication of books on Soviet Russia and the translation of works by Soviet writers. As can be expected, here

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, October 16, 1954, p. 54.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, April 1, 1955, p. 39.

⁹⁶ *Chung Su Yu Hao*, December 25, 1953, p. 8.

⁹⁷ *Los Angeles Times*, May 26, 1953.

⁹⁸ Hu Hsi-ku'ei, "Chung Kuo Jen-Min Ta-Hsueh Chiao-Yu Kung-Tso Ti Ch'u-Pu Chung Yen" [Initial Experience in Educational Work at the Chinese People's University].

Chung Su Yu Hao, December 25, 1953, pp. 9-10.

⁹⁹ *Chin Pu Jih Pao* (a daily in Tientsin), March 6, 1950.

¹⁰⁰ *New York Times*, October 8, 1950.

the ideological factor receives primary consideration. A vast number of books on Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism have been printed and distributed throughout the country.¹⁰¹ Stalin's work *Economic Problems of Soviet Socialism*, released in Soviet Russia in October 1952, was translated into Chinese and published in huge quantities. The first printing of the work was reported to be in the neighborhood of 600,000 copies.¹⁰² By June 1953, forty-one of Stalin's works had been published in a total of 6,604,000 copies.¹⁰³ Apart from political and ideological treatises, Soviet literary works have also been translated and published on a large scale. They include all the winners of the Stalin prize for literature.

Movies and exhibitions of various kinds are two other media through which Soviet cultural influence filters into China. For several decades prior to the rise of the Chinese Communists, American films had been the most popular with the Chinese. Since the Chinese Communists came to power, American films have been displaced by Soviet films, which are now shown all over China. Towards the end of 1951 it was reported that upwards of ninety Soviet films and fifty Soviet documentary films had been adapted into the Chinese language.¹⁰⁴ More have been adapted since that time for stimulating Chinese interest in Soviet life. In 1954 thirty cities throughout China held a Soviet Film Week, starting November 7, to commemorate the thirty-seventh anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and during that period Soviet films were shown to eight and a half million people, it was reported.¹⁰⁵

As regards exhibitions about Soviet life and achievements, they have been held in numerous localities throughout the country. One report stated that by April 1951 the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association had held 14,187 exhibitions in various places scattering over thirty-five provinces and municipalities, and that these exhibitions had attracted over 39,000,000 people.¹⁰⁶ Later, an official report said that "from September 1951 to August 1952, the association sponsored more than 19,000 picture and photographic exhibitions, which were seen by over 49,000,000 visitors."¹⁰⁷

Lectures on Soviet Russia were also systematically organized and

¹⁰¹ Hung Shen, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹⁰² *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), November 30, 1952.

¹⁰³ *People's China*, March 16, 1954, p. 16.

¹⁰⁴ Mao T'un, "Kung-Ku Ho Fa-Chien Ko-Kuo Jen-Min-Chien Ti Wen-Hua Chiao-Liu" [Consolidate and Develop Cultural Interchange among Peoples of Various Countries], *Hsin Hua Yuch Pao*, No. 26, December 1951, p. 70.

¹⁰⁵ *People's China*, November 16, 1954, p. 38; Hung Chiu, "Foreign Films in Chinese Cinemas," *ibid.*, February 16, 1955, p. 23.

¹⁰⁶ *Chung Su Yu Hao*, October 25, 1951, p. 12.

¹⁰⁷ Chien Chun-ji, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

have become a common feature in the social and intellectual life of Communist China. According to one report, in two years 73,550 lectures on various aspects of Soviet life were given in thirty-six important centers.¹⁰⁸

In consequence of China's close ties with the Soviet Union in practically every field, there has been aroused a strong desire to learn the Russian language on the part of the Chinese people. To satisfy this desire, Russian language schools were established in various localities. Toward the end of 1951 there were twelve such schools in the country with an enrollment of about 5,000 students.¹⁰⁹ A year later it was reported that the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association had established eighty spare-time Russian language schools in various places, with a total enrollment of more than 21,000 students from different walks of life.¹¹⁰ In later years, Russian has displaced English as the secondary language in the Chinese schools. This means that all high-school graduates will understand Russian.

AN APPRAISAL OF SINO-SOVIET COOPERATION

After a survey of Sino-Soviet cooperation in the diplomatic, scientific, and cultural fields, it may be appropriate to venture an appraisal of it and see what should be the proper conclusions.

Sino-Soviet diplomatic cooperation, whether in the United Nations or in the World Peace Council or in the general field of diplomacy, is and has been aimed at the United States. This is perfectly clear from the record and leaves no room for doubt. But why? The reasons are partly ideological, partly historical, and partly power-political.

The Chinese Communists are Communists and no mere agrarian reformers. Their party and their program are based on orthodox Marxist-Leninist principles. As Communists, they naturally band together with their Soviet comrades to promote world revolution, to combat capitalism, and to tackle the United States which they consider to be the leader of the capitalist camp.

The Chinese Communist Party was born with the Comintern as midwife. Ever since its birth, it has entered into habitual cooperation, through the Comintern, with the Soviet Communist Party. The habitual cooperation and long-standing historical associations between the two parties naturally produces a high degree of solidarity between them against any common enemy.

It is Soviet policy to strengthen Soviet influence in China. To pave the way for the introduction of Soviet influence, American

¹⁰⁸ *Chung Su Yu Hao*, October 25, 1951, p. 12.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Chien Chun-jui, op. cit.*, p. 24.

influence in China must be discredited and liquidated. For this purpose, American policies and institutions must be attacked. Much of the anti-American atmosphere is due, at least in part, to Soviet propaganda and instigation. The speeches of the Soviet cultural workers in China make this point amply clear.

After World War II the most significant development in international relations is the estrangement and later the cold war between the United States and the USSR. This development is the cause of most of the world's troubles today. In China and the Far East the effect of this development is sharpened and heightened by the chronic conflict between the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists under Mao Tse-tung. As the Nationalists are supported by the United States, it is inevitable for the Communists to band together with their Soviet comrades to struggle against the United States.

By all reports both Soviet Russia and Communist China cherish the ambition to expand in Asia, especially in the Far East and South-east Asia, not necessarily in a military sense aiming at seizure and occupation of territory, but politically and economically for the purpose of cultural assimilation and economic integration. However, in every direction they turn in that area they meet with opposition from the United States and its allies, whose policy is to contain Communism. Their ambitious plan thwarted, they adopt a hostile attitude toward the United States.

Another cause of their hostility toward the United States is the fear of attack from the direction of Japan and Formosa. Until 1945 Japan had followed a policy of rampant aggression on the continent, thereby menacing both China and Russia. The latter two countries now fear that Japan under the aegis of the United States might try again. In the case of Formosa they know that the Nationalists have not given up their fight yet, but will try to stage a comeback to the mainland as soon as they feel that they can do so with an even chance of success. As the United States has "occupied" the island (this is the contention of Peking and Moscow) Peking and Moscow consider the United States their enemy.

Turning now to Sino-Soviet scientific cooperation, one may say that it has some good results, but leaves much to be desired. The many Soviet experts in China seem to have achieved signal success in rehabilitating and improving the transportation system, especially the railway system, and in harnessing turbulent rivers and preventing floods. In industrial and agricultural developments, however, their achievements have been rather limited. New enterprises and new developments are scarce. Main efforts appear to have been directed

merely towards the restoration of old plants, repair of old machinery, and rehabilitation of old mines, and towards improving the methods of work and management in order to raise efficiency, economize manpower and materials, and reduce cost. In all these efforts the Soviet experts have made their contributions through their scientific training and experience in industrial planning and management. In the matter of capital equipment, so necessary to new developments in industry and agriculture, the supply from Soviet Russia has been meager. This circumstance shows that Soviet Russia is not in a position to export large amounts of capital goods. During World War II, Soviet Russia had suffered considerable material losses as well as manpower. According to a Soviet report, "the Fascist robbers of Germany, in the regions under their temporary occupation, have destroyed and burnt 1,710 cities and over 70,000 villages. They have looted and destroyed 98,000 collective farms, 2,890 tractor stations, and industrial enterprises that once employed 4,000,000 workers."¹¹¹ How far Soviet Russia has recovered from these wounds of war is anybody's guess. It may be presumed that for some years to come she will concentrate on her own recovery and expansion and will not be able to spare much industrial equipment for China. This situation was indeed foreseen by Stalin. In a conversation with Harry Hopkins in May 1945 Stalin said that the reconstruction of China would depend largely on the United States, because Russia would be preoccupied with her own reconstruction.¹¹² In saying this, Stalin had the weakened Soviet economy in mind. He surely did not mean that he would concede the vast field of economic development and investment in China to the United States. At that time it was by all indications the Chinese Nationalists that were to rule China, and under Nationalist rule China's development would employ American capital anyway, whether Stalin liked it or not. After the Chinese Communists came to power, the situation was different. The iron curtain has since descended on China; and Western influence, economic and otherwise, has to be kept out, while Soviet influence is to dominate every phase of China's development where foreign aid or capital is required. If Soviet Russia were a capital-exporting country and could invest, say, a billion dollars in China every year, China's economic development might proceed by leaps and bounds. But Soviet Russia, at the height of her honeymoon with Communist China, could loan the latter only \$60,000,000 a year for five years. Under the circum-

¹¹¹ *Chung Su Yu Hwa*, October 25, 1951, p. 18.

¹¹² Department of State, *United States Relations with China*, Washington, 1949, p.

stances, China's economic development is bound to be slow. To illustrate, China's economic development may be likened to a large and delicious apple pie. Soviet Russia does not like anybody else to have a finger in the pie and wants to eat the whole pie all by herself. She has, however, a rather poor appetite and can only nibble at the pie now and then. It follows that she will take a long time to finish the pie.

In the field of culture, Sino-Soviet cooperation is humming with activity, especially on the China end of the field. The cooperation is theoretically placed on a reciprocal basis. Actually, it is a lopsided affair. There is no Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in Russia to promote good will for the Chinese. In China, however, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association is a ubiquitous organization, with a branch in every locality and with influence reaching down to the humblest peasant in the remotest village. It is a parallel organization to the Chinese Communist Party and is dedicated to the sole purpose of promoting friendship and good will for Soviet Russia. Not only the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association but the entire network of propaganda media and the entire educational system are being harnessed to the effort of spreading Soviet ideas and ideals and eulogizing Soviet institutions and practices. While Soviet cultural influence thus pours into China in tidal waves, Chinese cultural influence flows into Russia only in little streams. To change the metaphor, while Chinese influence in Russia barely scratches the skin of the Soviet system, Soviet influence in China is performing a major operation on the body and soul of China, aiming at putting new brain and new blood into the Chinese system. Indeed, ever since the Chinese Communists came to power, such has been the onrush and diffusion of Soviet influence that it may well be generating a force "mighty enough for leveling mountains and overturning oceans," as Mao Tse-tung once said of Communism.¹¹³ But the soul of China or the psyche of the Chinese people seems to be greater than mountains and oceans. There is indeed a Chinese proverb which says: "It is easy to alter rivers and mountains; to change human nature and character is hard."

According to the leading article of *Nan Fan Jih Pao* (A Communist publication) of May 25, 1952, the intelligentsia in Chinese universities and colleges, after having been under Communist rule for several years, still had a "love-America, admire-America, and fear-America attitude," and entertained "anti-Communist and anti-Soviet thoughts." This remark would seem to suggest that Soviet influence

¹¹³ Mao Tse-tung, *Hsin Min-Chu Chu-I Lun* [On The New Democracy], Yenan, Northwest Hsin Hua Book Store, 1949, p. 32.

has not yet produced any deep effect; and that American ideas and ideals planted in the minds of the Chinese people by American scholars and scientists cannot be swept away overnight, but linger on, at least for a time, as an antitoxin against anti-America propaganda which has become so rampant since the new regime was set up in Peking.

Then in 1951 and 1952 the Chinese Communists found it necessary to launch the Three Anti campaign against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism, and the Five Anti campaign against bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of state properties, and revelation of state secrets. These campaigns obviously reflected the widespread though pent-up discontent and resentment of the Chinese people.

The moment they came into power, the Chinese Communist rulers became aware of the danger and menace of what they called counter-revolutionaries and promptly set in motion a gigantic and drastic campaign against them, intending to exterminate them root and branch. The campaign lasted several years. Though its fury subsided after 1952, counterrevolutionary activities continued. Throughout all the years since, there have been not infrequent reports of such activities in various parts of the country and of execution of counterrevolutionaries.

All this points to the conclusion that Communist propaganda and the spread of Soviet influence in China have not yet changed the mentality and general outlook of the Chinese people.

In view of the close and widely publicized relationship between Communist China and Soviet Russia, it is but natural for the Chinese people to associate their weal or woe with that relationship. This means that whether or not the Chinese people will heartily support the alliance with Soviet Russia depends essentially upon whether or not their standard of life in general has been improved. If their well-being in general is daily falling to lower and lower levels, they will blame not only Peking but also Moscow, and far from accepting the rosy pro Soviet propaganda, will entertain rebellious and anti-Soviet thoughts.

If, therefore, the Chinese Communists want to continue to hold power and to promote Sino-Soviet friendship, they cannot rely too much upon propaganda and the spread of Soviet influence. They must attend to the essential task and primary duty of improving the livelihood of the people and giving the people a sense of justice, freedom and security. If they fail to fulfill this duty, then not only will their propaganda and spread of Soviet influence be in vain, but their entire regime will collapse, perhaps after the fashion of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti's dynasty over two thousand years ago.

Summation and Interpretation

AFTER tracing the long course of Sino-Soviet relations, with its zigzags and zags, it may be fitting to give a telescopic version of the relations and to set forth some afterthoughts on their development.

At the time of her birth and during her infancy, Soviet Russia was beset by troubles and dangers, her very existence hanging as if by a thread over a deep precipice. Just as some people in trouble have to live by their wits, so Soviet Russia had to rely heavily on her well-planned propaganda as a weapon, as a means to incite revolutions abroad and to overthrow hostile foreign governments. Such subversive propaganda was first tried in Europe, but without any success. Soviet Russia then turned her gaze toward the east—toward China. "Don't forget the East," urged the young Stalin. In 1919 a golden opportunity presented itself for the Soviet purpose. At that time the Chinese people were smarting under the humiliating settlement at the Versailles Peace Conference, whereby the former German interests in the Chinese province of Shantung were assigned to Japan. Quick to seize the psychological moment, the Kremlin sent a public message to China, the first Karakhan Declaration, playing upon the nationalistic sentiments of the Chinese people and offering to abolish the former unequal Czarist treaties with China. As for decades China had been under the incubus of foreign imperialism, the Soviet message came like a fresh breeze through the heated atmosphere and almost instantaneously captured the sympathy and attention of the Chinese intelligentsia and students, who then began to look toward Soviet Russia for friendly support of their national cause. Thus Soviet propaganda secured its first success in the Orient.

The Soviet Government soon followed up by sending envoys to Peking, and the two parties soon began negotiations with a view to the establishment of diplomatic relations. At that early stage, despite the high-sounding sentiments it had expressed toward China, the Soviet Government already displayed a highly realistic trait in

its diplomacy. While willing and ready to relinquish its extraterritorial rights in China, it was from the very beginning insistent on its rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway and on the necessity of stationing Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia. The negotiations lasted intermittently over four years and involved several changes of Soviet missions; but throughout, the Soviet envoys stood firm on their contentions regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway and Outer Mongolia. The negotiations finally led to the signing of the first Sino-Soviet treaty in May 1924. Both the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the question of Soviet troops in Mongolia were left to be settled in a later conference, which was delayed, however, beyond the stipulated period and did not settle anything. In the meantime a general agreement was concluded for the joint administration of the railway, while Soviet troops remained in Mongolia. It was not until March 1925, that these troops voluntarily withdrew after a pro-Soviet regime had been set up in that important strategic region.

In establishing diplomatic relations with Peking, the Soviet Government did not at all mean to uphold the Peking Government or to build up friendly relations between the two countries. On the contrary, it meant to overthrow that government, which from the Marxist standpoint was considered "feudalistic," "bourgeois," and hence extremely "reactionary." The Soviet embassy and consulates that came into being after the establishment of diplomatic relations were used as agencies for infiltration and propaganda. At the very time the first Sino-Soviet treaty was signed at Peking, Soviet arms and agents were sent to Canton to strengthen Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary regime, whose aim was to destroy the Peking Government.

In the meantime, under Soviet guidance, or technically, under the guidance of the Comintern, the Chinese Communist Party was formed in July 1921 and has since become an articulate medium for the promotion of Soviet influence in China. Before long this young party was to attempt to seize the revolutionary initiative and to displace Dr. Sun's Kuomintang, which in turn, as mentioned above, was to destroy the Peking Government. "Wheels within wheels" may be an apt description of the intricate Communist conspiracy in China in the 1920's.

While Soviet assistance in one form or another was being given to Dr. Sun's regime in the south and attracted considerable attention, Soviet plots in North China were hatched and carried out during the same period, although they seem to have escaped the attention of contemporaneous observers and later writers on

China. At that time the leading warlord in North China was Marshal Wu P'ei-fu, main prop of the Peking Government. Marshal Wu had an able lieutenant by the name of Fêng Yü-hsiang, often dubbed the "Christian General." Fêng early came under Soviet influence, and through him Soviet influence affected politics in North China. In the latter part of 1924, when Marshal Wu was in the midst of a gigantic campaign against Marshal Chang Tso-lin, warlord of Manchuria, Fêng turned against his superior commander, causing his downfall, and later cooperated with Marshal Chang to form a new government in Peking. In the following year, history repeated itself. Marshal Chang's ablest general was Kuo Sung-lin, who was in command of the best-equipped Manchurian forces. Like Fêng, Kuo fell under Soviet influence, reportedly through his wife. Fêng and Kuo then combined forces and attacked Marshal Chang, aiming at his downfall. Had they succeeded, Manchuria and North China might have come under Soviet influence; but Japan intervened and the plot failed. Nevertheless, the northern warlords had been greatly weakened and thus became more vulnerable to the military expedition that was soon to be launched from Canton under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek, then supported by Soviet arms and advisers.

The Northern Punitive Expedition launched from Canton in the summer of 1926 was a propaganda campaign as well as a military campaign; and as such it progressed with great success and rapidity. In a matter of months the expeditionary forces reached the shores of the Yangtze River and captured the important Wuhan cities. At the same time, under the personal direction of Chiang Kai-shek, a group of armies were heading in a northeasterly direction toward Shanghai. The dazzling military success, however, accentuated the political feud between Chiang and Borodin, chief Soviet adviser, and between the left wing and the right wing of the Kuomintang. In April 1927, after the capture of Shanghai, Chiang took drastic actions and resorted to wholesale persecution and execution of the Communists. He also set up a new government in Nanking in opposition to the Wuhan regime under Borodin and the Kuomintang left wing.

The situation in China then became highly complicated. Wuhan was more or less isolated and seemed to be threatened by enemies from all sides. The Comintern in Moscow decided to assume a more active direction of the Chinese revolution by passing resolutions and issuing directives. Towards the end of May 1927 it sent a directive to China urging the Chinese Communist leaders to start the agrarian revolution, to organize a new peasant-worker army, and to displace some of the left-wing Kuomintang leaders. The

Comintern representative in China, a Hindu Communist by the name of Roy, thought the left-wingers could not choose but submit to Communist direction and so he revealed to them the text of the directive. The left-wing leaders, however, were shocked by the document. Not being Marxists, they hated to start the class war. Furthermore, they resented the Communist attempt at displacing them or their comrades. Consequently they took swift measures to deal with the critical situation. They ordered the Soviet advisers back to Russia and outlawed the Chinese Communist Party.

Meanwhile, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, in control of the Peking Government, also took drastic measures against the Communists and the Soviet agents. In April he directed the police to raid the various Soviet official agencies in Peking and Tientsin and made public the subversive documents found during the raid. These documents revealed that Soviet official agencies in China were hotbeds of sedition and propaganda.

The nation-wide hostile atmosphere toward Communism did not discourage the Chinese Communists. A number of the Communist military commanders, notably Yeh Ting, Ho Lung, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai, tried to secure a new base to carry on their revolutionary activities. In the beginning of August they seized Nanchang and set up a new regime; but soon they were suppressed and their new regime vanished like a summer cloud. This uprising in Nanchang is now looked back upon by the Chinese Communists as a glorious landmark in their march to power. After Nanchang, Yeh Ting and some other leaders drifted into the coastal port of Swatow; but here they were again defeated by superior forces. In the following December, under direct orders from Stalin, they staged a coup and drove into Canton. They hoped to hold the city with the aid of the workers, but the aid never came; so after a few days they were driven out.

As the Soviet consular officials were implicated in the Canton coup, they were put under arrest, and later some of them were executed and some deported. Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek broke off relations with Soviet Russia and ordered the closing of all Soviet consulates in Nationalist-controlled territory.

By the end of 1927 the Chinese Communists were driven underground and Soviet influence in China, once so pervasive, practically disappeared.

Failure of the Communist conspiracies in China sharpened the political struggle between Stalin and Trotsky in the Kremlin. Trotsky strongly advocated an independent course of direct action on the part of the Chinese Communists. There was little ground for be-

believing that this course would have been a better course; but Trotsky appeared convinced that he was the wiser man and he attacked Stalin's policies with great vehemence. This feud between the two political giants was an important cause of the subsequent bloody purges which convulsed the entire fabric of Soviet society. Thus the Soviet intervention in China proved a boomerang and brought immense troubles and difficulties to Soviet Russia and to Stalin himself.

From the complex developments in China in 1927, there emerged clearly the sharp conflict in ambitions between Chiang Kai-shek and Stalin. Chiang was essentially a nationalist. He was interested in the nationalist revolution and wanted to achieve the goals laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Stalin was interested in the cause of the proletariat, and he considered the Chinese nationalist revolution as only a transition to the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship led by the Chinese Communists. Furthermore, while Stalin's clandestine policies in China had aroused the ire of Chiang, Chiang's drastic measures against the Communists and Soviet officials could not but produce unforgettable resentment on the part of Stalin. In other words, since 1927 Chiang and Stalin had become personal as well as political enemies.

Yet for over twenty years after 1927 the same two leaders continued to direct the national destiny of their respective countries. This circumstance underlay many of the unhappy developments in the subsequent relations between the Kremlin and the Chinese Government.

In the light of this circumstance it was no wonder that in 1929 a dispute arose over the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and led to large-scale warfare along the Manchurian-Siberian border for several months. Apart from worsening Sino-Soviet relations, the warfare revealed China's diplomatic and military weakness and therefore served as an encouragement to Japan in her program of expansion.

In the same year the United States suffered a financial crash, which soon gave rise to an economic depression with world-wide repercussions. This was another encouragement to Japan; for the Western Powers were so harassed by their economic problems as to be unable to intervene in the Far East.

In the fall of 1931, therefore, Japan started her vast program of armed expansion on the continent. With swiftness and precision her forces occupied the whole of Manchuria right up to the Siberian border. At the same time, Japan proclaimed her determination to combat Bolshevism.

for power under the direction of the Comintern. At first they tried to seize the big cities, but only met with one fiasco after another. Mao Tse-tung saved the situation by resorting to guerilla tactics and promoting agrarian reform in the rural districts. In the early 1930's the Red areas along the Hunan-Kiangsi-Fukien borders became virtually a Soviet state and constituted a thorn in the side of the Nanking Government under Chiang Kai-shek. The latter determined to exterminate the Communists; but it was not until October 1934 that after five or six big campaigns and at tremendous cost of blood and treasure, he succeeded in dislodging the Communists from their stronghold and forced them to embark on what has since been called the Long March. This modern odyssey lasted exactly one year and ended in the northern part of Shensi province. Before reaching their destination, the Communists echoed the Comintern line and called upon the Chinese people to form a united front to resist Japanese aggression. Chiang Kai-shek, however, paid no heed to the appeal. He was bent on suppressing the Communists before everything else. So he kept up the pressure on them for over a year longer, giving them scarcely any breathing space for reorganizing their forces or consolidating their positions.

Thus, towards the end of 1936, both Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists found themselves in a tight spot: the former menaced by aggressive Japan and Germany; the latter virtually brought to bay by the pursuing forces of Chiang Kai-shek.

Just at this critical moment, however, there occurred a dramatic incident which, such is the freak of history, proved in the end to be the salvation of both Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists. It was the Sian incident. On December 12, Chiang Kai-shek was "kidnaped" by the troops of Chang Hsüeh-liang, former Young Marshal of Manchuria, who was commissioned to fight the Communists but played ball with them instead. The Communists at first clamored for the death of Chiang; but under the influence of Moscow and through the mediation of Chou En-lai, the "reasonable Communist," Chiang was released on the condition, or so it was generally believed, that he accept the united-front policy and mobilized his troops against Japan.

In order to understand this mild policy of Moscow toward Chiang Kai-shek, it is necessary to refer to the accomplishments of the Nanking Government during the preceding years. After Japan had occupied Manchuria, the Nanking Government appealed to the League of Nations, expecting that it would apply sanctions to curb the aggressor. Failing to receive satisfaction from the appeal, Nanking buckled itself to the task of national reconstruction. With the

aid of technical experts from the League of Nations and with financial support from Great Britain and the United States, the program of national reconstruction proceeded apace and soon produced healthy signs in all walks of life. By the end of 1936 China had attained a high degree of national unity and consolidation, with an efficient and effective central government, a unified national army, a unified national currency, a unified national educational system, improved means of communication and transportation, better-developed industries, and increased foreign trade. And Chiang Kai-shek was emerging as the symbol of the new unified China. As such he was considered by Moscow to be the one man to lead China against Japan. At that time Moscow was more concerned with the defense of the Soviet Union against possible Japanese aggression than with the issue of settling old scores with Chiang Kai-shek. Hence Moscow's intercession to spare the life of the staunch enemy of Communism.

The Sian incident aroused considerable misgiving in Japan. Since her occupation of Manchuria, Japan had continued her aggressive expansion into Inner Mongolia and North China. What was Japan driving at? Was she building up a big military base in preparation for a gigantic struggle with Soviet Russia? Or was she planning to conquer the whole of China? Japan kept Nanking and Moscow guessing. And Nanking and Moscow were hoping and scheming to avoid the brunt of full-scale Japanese aggression. The Sian incident and the subsequent clamor of the Chinese Communists for war against Japan helped Japan make up her mind and drew the spearhead of Japanese aggression to Chinese soil.

In July 1937 the fateful hour struck. Japan started hostilities around Peking, whence they spread to Tientsin, Shanghai, and Nanking. The heroic epic of China's eight-year war with Japan thus began in earnest.

In starting the war Japan was expecting a quick victory. She apparently thought that China was an easy prey and that she could finish her victim before breakfast. But Chiang Kai-shek, after years of patient temporizing with piecemeal Japanese expansion in North China, was determined to fight Japan to the end, and adopting the policy of trading space for time, frustrated all Japan's attempts at a quick conquest. This pleased Moscow no end. Moscow therefore spared no effort to render moral support and material aid to Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist regime. This Soviet policy lasted several years, and much of the material aid had to come all the way from Soviet Central Asia through Sinkiang (Chinese Turkistan) to China.

The Soviet aid-to-China policy was not at all motivated by any love for China, much less by any love for the No. 1 anti-Communist Chiang Kai-shek. It was conceived and executed primarily in the interests of Soviet Russia herself. The point was that China had to be kept in the fight against Japan so as to divert Japanese ambitions and designs from Soviet Siberia.

The attitude of Nazi Germany toward the Sino-Japanese war was diametrically opposed to that of Soviet Russia. Nazi Germany decidedly did not like Japan to squander her strength in China, but wanted her to preserve it for the expected campaign against Russia. This is why in the first years of the war German envoys repeatedly tried to mediate between China and Japan and to bring peace between the two countries; but their efforts were all in vain, owing chiefly to the adamant attitude of Chiang Kai-shek against Japan.

With Japan bogging down deeper and deeper in the mire in China, Hitler must have considerably discounted her value as an anti-Comintern ally, and he sought to find an adequate compensating equivalent for the lost or weakened alliance. He planned to conquer Europe; and in August 1939 he concluded with the Kremlin the astounding Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, whereby he secured a sufficiently long peace with Russia to carry out his plan of European conquest.

The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact shocked the sensibilities of Japan and dealt a shattering blow to the Anti-Comintern Pact. Japan at once revised her policy toward Soviet Russia and became more cautious. This was evidenced by the fact that soon after the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Soviet-Japanese hostilities around Nomonhan on the Mongolian border, which had been raging fiercely for several months, abruptly came to an end on the basis of a truce. The situation now became favorable for a Russo-Japanese *rapprochement*. And at that time Soviet Russia, while continuing her aid to China, was indeed moving closer to Japan. In the fall of 1940 Molotov admitted that Soviet-Japanese relations had shown appreciable improvement.

Meanwhile as a result of German attack on Poland in early September 1939, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany and brought about a state of war in Europe. Noting the preoccupation of Britain and France in Europe, Japan seriously planned her expansion southward into Indochina and the East Indies; and both Japan and Germany were concerned with possible opposition from the United States. Consequently, the Anti-Comintern Pact was transformed into an Anti-American Pact! This is exactly what the Tripartite Pact, signed in September 1940 between Germany, Japan,

and Italy, should be called; for this Pact excluded Soviet Russia from the scope of its operation and was aimed at a power "at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict." This power could not be other than the United States.

In April 1941 Soviet Russia signed a *Neutrality Pact with Japan* and thereby obtained further relief. The Soviet Siberian front became secure, as far as diplomacy could make it secure. Significantly, after the conclusion of this pact Soviet aid to China dwindled to nothing. This was because, from the standpoint of Soviet interest, the value of China as a counterweight against Japan had dwindled to almost nothing.

By mid-1941 Hitler had conquered France and other parts of Europe. He apparently thought he could now conquer Russia single-handed, that is, without help from Japan. Toward the end of June, therefore, his mighty mechanized armies poured into Soviet territory. The "phony" war in Europe, which had lasted for nearly two years since September 1939, then took on grim reality. The initial stage of the war was an uninterrupted series of rapid victories for the Nazis. By August 1941 Moscow was menaced and was evacuated in anticipation of imminent attack. What finally stemmed and slowed down the onward advance of the Nazi armada? According to a high Soviet official and eyewitness who later deserted the Soviet Government, it was the Soviet Far Eastern troops. Wrote Victor Kravchenko: "Beginning with the nineteenth [October 1941] the situation improved. The first seasoned Siberian and Far Eastern forces began to arrive. . . . Far Eastern troops, hardened in border struggle with the Japanese, and Siberian forces inured to winter warfare were rushing westward across a continent to hold the invaders."¹

This bare fact has important historical implications. It clearly shows what might have happened if the Anti-Comintern Pact had been implemented instead of being shattered. If the pact had been implemented, and consequently if Japan had kept up her menace to Soviet Siberia, the Soviet Siberian and Far Eastern forces could not have been moved across the continent to save European Russia, and Hitler might have taken Moscow and brought European Russia under his iron heels.

But what shattered the Anti-Comintern Pact? It was Japan's protracted war in China; and this protracted war was a patent consequence of the Sian incident and the Communist united-front policy. Thus the salvation of Soviet Russia can be traced directly to the Sian incident.

¹ V. Kravchenko, *I Chose Freedom*, New York, 1946, p. 378.

This incident also saved the Chinese Communists from extermination. Towards the end of 1936 Chiang Kai-shek was planning his Sixth Bandit-Extermination Campaign. If carried out, this campaign would very likely have crushed the Communists. The Sian incident occurred in the nick of time to make the campaign a mere empty dream. What luck for the Chinese Communists!

Following the outbreak of the eight-year war with Japan, the Chinese Communists for a time cooperated quite faithfully with the National Government. A year or so later, however, they took a different course. They no longer cared to be cooped up in the war zone assigned to them by the Government. Their guerrilla forces broke into other war zones and set up their own brand of regimes wherever they could, often coming into inevitable collision with the Government forces. Mao Tse-tung himself admitted that during the war with Japan, the Chinese Communist Party had increased considerably in membership and had brought vast territories and populations under its control.

In December 1941 occurred Pearl Harbor. The United States immediately declared war on Germany as well as Japan, thus engaging in a two-front or two-ocean war. This American policy was a double blessing to Soviet Russia. In the first place, it practically guaranteed that Japan, now entangled in a new war with a mighty opponent, could not possibly make trouble in Soviet Siberia. More Soviet troops could be transferred from Siberia to the European front. In the second place, with the colossal armed might and industrial strength of the United States thrown into the struggle against Germany, the defeat of the latter was merely a matter of time. It should be noted that shortly before Pearl Harbor, American Lend-Lease aid had been extended to Soviet Russia, beginning with a \$1,000,000,000 loan carrying no interest.

With heightened morale and with continued large-scale American aid, the Red Army began to give a better and better account of itself. After the trying ordeal of Stalingrad it even assumed the offensive and forced the Nazi invaders to yield back occupied territory.

Nobody is perhaps more popular than a triumphant ally in the midst of an all-out war. In the latter part of 1943 and in 1944, as the Red Army thundered its majestic march toward Germany, Soviet prestige in Allied countries was soaring heavenward, and Soviet words carried great weight in Allied circles. This was perhaps the most gratifying period for Stalin & Company. Soviet Russia was saved. In the west, her armies were winning victories; in the east she had not a ghost of fear from Japan. In fact, it was now Japan's turn to feel jittery about Soviet motives and designs. China was

practically exhausted and was gasping under the strain and stress of a long war.

Under these circumstances, even without fresh provocation, Stalin would have swung back to the China scene to tackle Chiang Kai-shek and to build up the Chinese Communists and tried to do again what he had repeatedly and strenuously failed to do in 1927. A more favorable situation for this purpose could scarcely be imagined. However, it happened that in 1942 General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Governor of Sinkiang province, staged an anti-Soviet coup and pledged his allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government. As a result, China resumed effective control of Sinkiang, while Soviet interests were withdrawn or liquidated. This fresh provocation plus memories of 1927 must have influenced Stalin's China policy. In August 1943, therefore, the powerful Soviet propaganda machine, for the first time since the Sian incident, raised its mighty voice for the Chinese Communists and openly denounced the Chinese Government. While praising the patriotism, fighting spirit, and splendid achievements of the Chinese Communists, it characterized the Chungking Government as reactionary and corrupt and accused it of appeasing Japan and committing various treasonable acts. These themes were continually harped upon by Soviet propaganda in the course of the succeeding years, and were echoed first by the Chinese Communists and then by the foreign correspondents.

There could be no doubt that the Soviet propaganda represented the views of the Kremlin. The latter indeed made no pretence about it. At the Moscow Conference towards the end of 1943 and during the preparatory stages of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944, the Kremlin wanted to boycott the Chinese Government and officially declared that it would not participate in any conference in which the Chinese Government also took part. The official pretext was that Russia was not then at war with Japan. But this pretext was a lame one. Since Pearl Harbor, the United States and Great Britain were both at war with Japan, and their status vis-à-vis Japan was technically the same as that of China. If Russia could confer with the United States and Great Britain at Dumbarton Oaks, there was no technical reason why she could not do so with China at the same time. The real reason for the Soviet refusal to sit at the same conference with China would seem to be that there was acute tension in Sino-Soviet relations at that time and that the Soviet Government wanted to slight and discredit the Chinese Government.

Coming as it did from a triumphant ally, this hostile attitude toward the Chinese Government was somewhat embarrassing to the United States, whose attitude towards the Chinese Government had

been cordial and cooperative. Should the American Government defend and uphold the Chinese Government? This would surely offend the triumphant ally whose cooperation was badly needed to defeat Germany and might afterwards be needed to defeat Japan. Should the American Government abandon the Chinese Government and support the Chinese Communists instead? This was inconceivable. The Chinese Government was still maintaining a vast war front against Japan and was tying up a huge Japanese force in China. Besides, the American Government did not even know whether the Chinese Communists were Communists! The subsequent American China policy came quite close to the Moscow line. It included the contemplation of giving arms to the Chinese Communists, and the application of pressure on the Chinese Government to make concessions to the Chinese Communists and to form a coalition government. In view of the dynamism of Communism, and in the light of the historical record and the basic incompatibility and hostility between the Kuomintang Government on the one hand and the Kremlin and the Chinese Communists on the other, the American China policy was foredoomed to failure. Yet it remained unchanged for several more years.

In 1944 Soviet Russia, though still in the throes of a gigantic war with Germany, seemed to be in a relatively secure position to maneuver international forces and to play upon the hopes and fears of her allies. The United States and Great Britain were engaged in a two-front war. After the defeat of Hitler they still had to encompass the defeat of Japan; and this, or so it appeared at that time, was no easy task. For this reason they not only hoped that Soviet Russia would continue to be their ally after the defeat of Germany. They also feared that she would go over to the side of Japan, or become a benevolent neutral to Japan, thereby making the task of defeating Japan even more formidable. The Kremlin was not slow to exploit the anxious psychology of the Allies. As late as March 30, 1944, it entered into an agreement with Japan providing for certain kinds of economic cooperation "after the cessation of the present war." What was expressly stipulated in the agreement was nothing compared to the possible designs it might have envisaged.

This flexible diplomatic position of Soviet Russia in 1944 might perhaps serve as a key to the understanding of the concessions she obtained at the Yalta Conference, particularly the "pre-eminent interests" in Manchuria.

It has often been contended that in allowing those concessions to Soviet Russia, the United States had nothing to lose. This is true, inasmuch as the "pre-eminent interests" in Manchuria did not belong

to the United States. Another implication of the contention is that even without the Yalta concessions Soviet Russia could have driven into Manchuria anyway, if she had wanted to. This is true too. Similarly it is true that the United States can at any time pour its armed might into Canada and occupy the whole country, if it wants to.

In fact, there was a dramatic moment when, despite the Yalta agreement, Soviet motives toward Manchuria would have been brought to the acid test. It will be recalled that on July 26, 1945, the United States, Great Britain, and China sent an ultimatum to Japan demanding her surrender. If Japan had promptly accepted the ultimatum and surrendered, Soviet Russia would have had no *casus belli* against Japan. If nevertheless Russia sent her armies into Manchuria and occupied that region, what would American and world public opinion be? Would Soviet Russia expose her naked imperialism to the public gaze of the world? Could she still claim to be the champion of colonial and weak nations? Was she ready to wreck the newly born United Nations? Was she willing to bear the stigma of aggressor and breaker of the peace at the very time when a flood wave of peace hopes was rising from the ocean of humanity and sweeping across the world?

But as things turned out, Japan did not accept the ultimatum. She delayed her acceptance for nearly three weeks, thereby giving the Kremlin ample time to declare war on August 8, two days after an atom bomb had destroyed Hiroshima. The ensuing Soviet-Japanese war lasted six days. Many people considered Soviet Russia lucky. Few seem to know that she was also fortunate. To parody Sir Winston Churchill: Never was so much gained in so short a time and at so little cost. It will be recalled that since the latter part of her First Five Year Plan, Soviet Russia had been building up the Soviet Far East into a big powerhouse in preparation for a gigantic war with Japan. Japan, on her part, since her victory over Russia in 1905 and especially since 1931, had been building up Manchuria into a big powerhouse in preparation for a gigantic war with Russia. In the 1930's it was expected that in time the two big powerhouses would collide and destroy or weaken each other. This expected collision, however, did not take place; and in 1915, after further expansion and consolidation, both big powerhouses fell conveniently into Soviet hands. This vast store of human and material power under Soviet control cannot be discounted in any discussion of power politics in the Far East.

Soviet troops stayed in Manchuria from August 10, 1945, to May 31, 1946. The stay was more than five months longer than it should

have been according to a solemn Soviet pledge. While in Manchuria the Soviet authorities used the newly acquired "pre-eminent interests" to frustrate the Nationalists in their attempt to take over the area, and to help build up the power of the Chinese Communists. Nationalist troops marching into Manchuria could not enter the cities without protracted negotiations with the Soviet authorities. Sea-borne troops were not permitted to land. Air-borne troops could land with Soviet permission, but often had to get out quickly afterwards. Industrial plants were dismantled and moved into Siberia; and Manchuria, once a highly industrialized area, was converted into something like an industrial desert. The purpose was twofold: to strengthen industrial development in Siberia, and to deprive the incoming Nationalists of the industrial war potential. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists were admitted into Manchuria, given large stores of Japanese arms, and allowed to enter the cities after evacuation by the Soviet troops. Furthermore, partisan regimes hostile to the Nationalists were organized all over the land. In short, during the many months of Soviet occupation, Manchuria was converted into a vast trap for the Nationalist forces.

Needless to say, all this was in contravention of the so-called Treaty of Alliance and Friendship signed by the Nationalist Government and the Kremlin in August 1945. But the very signing of this treaty was in a sense a great humbug. In signing it the Kremlin was administering to Chiang Kai-shek and his regime the same bitter dose which it administered to the Peking Government in 1924. Just as in 1924 the Kremlin signed a formal treaty with the Peking Government and at the same time helped Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary regime to overthrow the Peking Government, so in 1945 the Kremlin signed a formal treaty with the Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-shek and at the same time conspired with the Chinese Communists to overthrow the Nationalist Government.

It will be recalled that up to the time of the negotiations of the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty Moscow's relations with Chungking were all but severed. Infamous charges were heaped upon Chungking by the Soviet propaganda machine, and the Soviet Government boycotted the Chinese Government in international conferences. What thawed this frosty attitude of the Soviet Government and made it willing to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance with the Chinese Government? Was it a desire to get China's support for the war against Japan? No, indeed. China's value as a war ally had been written off by Moscow long years before. In the light of after events, what Moscow wanted was the affirmation of the Yalta agreement and the legitimization of Russia's "pre-eminent interests" in

Manchuria. In 1931 and subsequent years Japan relied on force alone and failed to secure legitimization of her position in Manchuria. Consequently she appeared as the aggressor, incurred the censure of the civilized world, and failed to get the support of the Chinese people. But now nobody could rashly point an accusing finger at Russia's "pre-eminent interests" in Manchuria. Herein lies the true significance of the Yalta agreement.

Why did the Nationalists fight in Manchuria if the conditions there were so unfavorable after Soviet occupation? Indeed, both General Marshall and General Wedemeyer had advised Chiang Kai-shek not to launch campaigns in Manchuria. From a short-term point of view, such advice may have been sound. On long-term considerations the Nationalists simply could not leave Manchuria to the Communists. In the game of power politics the dictum that whoever controls Manchuria controls China may be taken as a scientific law. Anyway, the weight of historical evidence bears heavily on that dictum. In the latter part of the Sung dynasty (960-1279) some Manchurian tribes called Kín or Nuchen made inroads into China and gradually occupied the entire northern part of the country until they were conquered by the Mongols, who later set up the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368). In 1644 Manchurian tribes, collectively called Manchus, again successfully invaded China and dominated the whole country for nearly three hundred years until 1911, when the Manchu dynasty was overthrown and China became a republic. After 1911, Marshal Chang Tso-lin emerged as the strong man of Manchuria, and he in 1924 sent his armies across the Great Wall, seized eastern China, and controlled the Peking Government. Then came the fateful year 1931, when Japanese forces attacked and overran the whole of Manchuria. Later, Japan converted Manchuria into a gigantic military base and therefrom sent armies, first to penetrate North China, and later to put more than half of China under her domination. It was not until V-J Day in 1945 that China was liberated from the incubus of Japanese aggression. In the light of this historical perspective, it would seem clear that if the Chinese Communists were allowed to hold Manchuria, it would be a mere matter of time before they would get hold of the rest of China. Chiang Kai-shek undoubtedly knew the dynamism of Communism as well as the importance of Manchuria. So he decided to get at the Communists before they were fully organized. Apparently he was a bit too late. He won some initial victories in the struggle; but before long the tide began to turn. By November 1948 the loss of Manchuria was symbolized by the fall of Mukden. The Communists won this key region after more than three years of preparation and effort. They

then poured their forces across the Great Wall and in less than a year captured the entire China mainland, furnishing one more piece of eloquent evidence regarding the strategic importance of Manchuria.

It has been contended that the Nationalist downfall was not due to the loss of Manchuria alone. Indeed, as has been mentioned, General Marshall and General Wedemeyer had both advised the virtual abandonment of Manchuria. According to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's covering letter for the well-known White Paper, the defeat of the Nationalists was due to the corruption and unpopularity of the Kuomintang. This view was supported by previous dispatches and reports from American correspondents, intelligence officers, and other diplomatic agents stationed in China.

Other observers ascribed the Nationalist downfall to untimely and inadequate American aid to Chiang Kai-shek. "Too little; too late."

Still others maintained that the Nationalist downfall was due to sabotage on the part of anti-Kuomintang elements in the State Department and in such influential organizations as the Institute of Pacific Relations. For instance, after prolonged hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary came to this conclusion:

Until late in 1945, United States policy with respect to China was one of support to the Chinese Nationalist Government. We sought to keep the Chinese army in the field to fight the Japanese. Officially, we took no hand in China's internal strife. . . . In 1945 our policy changed to one of intervention; and our intervention thereafter was in aid of the Chinese Communists and in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek. This new policy continued from 1945 until 1950.²

After setting forth the supporting facts, the Committee continued:

Thus the demand for support of the idea of a coalition government in China, made in May 1945 by Mao Tse-tung, taken up by the American Communist Party, and recommended to the President by Owen Lattimore, in his memorandum of July 3, 1945, was adopted and sponsored by Vincent; memoranda elaborating upon that idea were drafted by Vincent and were affirmed by the Secretary of State; these became the basis of the policy in relation to China which was announced by President Truman on December 15, 1945, and in pursuance of that policy General Marshall was sent to China to bring to bear upon the Chinese National Government the pressure of United States influence.³

² U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Report on the Institute of Pacific Relations*, 82d Cong., 2d sess., Report No. 2050, p. 198

³ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

APPENDIX II

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE NEUTRALITY PACT, APRIL 13, 1941

Article 1. Both Contracting Parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other Contracting Party.

Article 2. Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third Powers, the other Contracting Party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.

Article 3. The present pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both Contracting Parties and remains valid for five years. In case neither of the Contracting Parties denounces the pact one year before expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years.

Article 4. The present pact is subject to ratification as soon as possible. Instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Tokyo also as soon as possible.

APPENDIX III

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE FRONTIER DECLARATION, APRIL 13, 1941

In conformity with the spirit of the neutrality pact concluded April 13, 1941, between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Japan, in the interests of ensuring peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, solemnly declare that the U.S.S.R. pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, and Japan pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic.

APPENDIX IV

THE CAIRO DECLARATION, DECEMBER 1, 1943

The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan.

The three great Allies [the United States, Great Britain, and China] expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising.

The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.

They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen

from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

APPENDIX V

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE PROTOCOL ON SAKHALIN, MARCH 30, 1944

Article 1. The Government of Japan shall transfer all rights concerning Japanese oil and coal concessions in northern Sakhalin in accordance with stipulations of the present protocol and the terms for application of the protocol attached thereto.

Concession contracts concluded on December 14, 1925, and additional contracts and agreements subsequently concluded between Japanese concessionaires on the one hand and the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the other hand shall be abrogated by virtue of the present protocol.

Article 2. All property—installations, equipment, materials, spare stocks, provisions, etc.—possessed by the Japanese concessionaires in northern Sakhalin shall be transferred in their actual state, unless otherwise provided for in the present protocol and the terms for application of the protocol attached thereto, to the possession of the Government of the U.S.S.R.

Article 3. In connection with the preceding two articles the Government of the U.S.S.R. agrees to pay to the Government of Japan the sum of 5,000,000 rubles in accordance with stipulations of the terms for application of the protocol attached to the present protocol.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. will undertake to deliver each year to the Government of Japan 50,000 metric tons of oil produced in the Okha oil fields in northern Sakhalin on ordinary commercial terms for a period of five consecutive years after cessation of the present war.

Article 4. The Government of the U.S.S.R. guarantees removal from the concession territory, without hindrance and without taxation, of oil and coal stored and possessed by the Japanese concessionaires in accordance with stipulations of the terms for application of present protocol.

Article 5. The present protocol shall come into force on the date of its signature.

APPENDIX VI

THE YALTA AGREEMENT CONCERNING CHINA, FEBRUARY 11, 1945

The leaders of the three great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The *status quo* in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.: *a.* The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union; *b.* The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored; *c.* The Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway, which provides an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

APPENDIX VII

THE POTSDAM PROCLAMATION, JULY 26, 1945

We—the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen—have conferred and agreed that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end the war.

The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon

Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

The result of the futile and senseless resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges upon Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest. We insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

The terms of the Cairo declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.

Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan

as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

APPENDIX VIII

THE SOVIET DECLARATION OF WAR ON JAPAN, AUGUST 8, 1945

After the defeat and capitulation of Hitlerite Germany, Japan became the only great power that still stood for the continuation of the war.

The demand of the three powers, the United States, Great Britain and China, on July 26 for the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces was rejected by Japan, and thus the proposal of the Japanese Government to the Soviet Union on mediation in the war in the Far East loses all basis.

Taking into consideration the refusal of Japan to capitulate, the Allies submitted to the Soviet Government a proposal to join the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the duration of the war, reduce the number of victims and facilitate the speedy restoration of universal peace.

Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the declaration of the Allied Powers of July 26.

The Soviet Government considers that this policy is the only means able to bring peace nearer, free the people from further sacrifice and suffering and give the Japanese people the possibility of avoiding the dangers and destruction suffered by Germany after her refusal to capitulate unconditionally.

In view of the above, the Soviet Government declares that from tomorrow, that is from August 9, the Soviet Government will consider itself to be at war with Japan.

APPENDIX IX

THE SINO-SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE AND RELATED AGREEMENTS, AUGUST 14, 1945

A. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE

Article 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake in association with the other United Nations to wage war against Japan until final victory is won. The High Contracting Parties undertake mutually to render to one another all necessary military and other assistance and support in this war.

Article 2. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into separate negotiations with Japan and not to conclude, without mutual consent, any armistice or peace treaty either with the present Japanese Government or with any other government or authority set up in Japan which do not renounce all aggressive intentions.

Article 3. The High Contracting Parties undertake after the termination of the war against Japan to take jointly all measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Japan.

In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties becoming involved in hostilities with Japan in consequence of an attack by the latter against the said Contracting Party, the other High Contracting Party shall at once give to the Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and assistance with the means in its power.

This article shall remain in force until such time as the organization "The United Nations" may on request of the two High Contracting Parties be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by Japan.

Article 4. Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take any part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Article 5. The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of the security and economic development of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the coming of peace and to act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other Contracting Party.

Article 6. The High Contracting Parties agree to render each other every possible economic assistance in the post-war period with a view to facilitating and accelerating reconstruction in both countries and to contributing to the cause of world prosperity.

Article 7. Nothing in this treaty shall be so construed as may affect the rights or obligations of the High Contracting Parties as members of the organization "The United Nations."

Article 8. The present Treaty shall be ratified in the shortest possible time. The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place as soon as possible in Chungking.

The Treaty comes into force immediately upon its ratification and shall remain in force for a term of thirty years.

If neither of the High Contracting Parties has given notice, a year before the expiration of the term, of its desire to terminate the Treaty, it shall remain valid for an unlimited time, each of the High Contracting Parties being able to terminate its operation by giving notice to that effect one year in advance.

B. EXCHANGE OF NOTES ON SINKIANG, MANCHURIA, AND AID TO CHINA

Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh:

Your Excellency, With reference to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed today between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R., I have the honor to put on record the understanding between the High Contracting Parties as follows:

1. In accordance with the spirit of the aforementioned Treaty, and in order to put into effect its aims and purposes, the Government of the U.S.S.R. agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the Central Government of China.

2. In the course of conversations regarding Dairen and Port Arthur and regarding the joint operation of the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Government of the U.S.S.R. regarded the Three Eastern Provinces as part of China and reaffirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognized their territorial and administrative integrity.

3. As for the recent developments in Sinkiang the Soviet Government confirms that, as stated in Article V of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, it has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China.

If Your Excellency will be so good as to confirm that the understanding is correct as set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the present note and Your Excellency's reply thereto will constitute a part of the aforementioned Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.

V. M. MOLOTOV

[In his reply, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh, after reproducing the body of Molotov's note, confirmed that the understanding as set forth in that note was correct.]

C. EXCHANGE OF NOTES ON OUTER MONGOLIA

From Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh to Soviet Minister V. M. Molotov:

Your Excellency, In view of the desire repeatedly expressed by the people of Outer Mongolia for their independence, the Chinese Government declares that after the defeat of Japan should a plebiscite of the Outer Mongolian people confirm this desire, the Chinese Government will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia with the existing boundary as its boundary.

The above declaration will become binding upon the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. signed on August 14, 1945.

WANG SHIH-CHIEH

[In his reply, Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, after reproducing the body of Wang's note, expressed satisfaction with it and stated that the Soviet Government would respect the political independence and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia.]

D. AGREEMENT ON DAIREN

In view of a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance having been concluded between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. and of the pledge by the latter that it will respect Chinese sovereignty in the control of all of Manchuria as an integral part of China; and with the object of ensuring that the U.S.S.R.'s interest in Dairen as a port of entry and exit for its goods shall be safeguarded, the Republic of China agrees:

1. To declare Dairen a free port open to the commerce and shipping of all nations.

2. The Chinese Government agrees to apportion in the mentioned port for lease to the U.S.S.R. wharfs and warehouses on the basis of a separate agreement.

3. The Administration in Dairen shall belong to China.

The harbor-master and deputy harbor-master will be appointed by the Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchuria Railway in agreement with the Mayor. The harbor-master shall be a Russian national, and the deputy harbor-master shall be a Chinese national.

4. In peacetime Dairen is not included in the sphere of efficacy of the naval base regulations, determined by the Agreement on Port Arthur of August 14, 1945, and shall be subject to the military supervision or control established in this zone only in case of war against Japan.

5. Goods entering the free port from abroad for through transit to Soviet territory on the Chinese Eastern and South Manchuria Railways and goods coming from Soviet territory on the said railways into the free port for export shall be free from customs duties. Such goods shall be transported in sealed cars.

Goods entering China from the free port shall pay the Chinese import duties, and goods going out of other parts of China into the free port shall pay the Chinese export duties as long as they continue to be collected.

6. The term of this Agreement shall be thirty years and this Agreement shall come into force upon its ratification.

E. PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON DAIREN

1. At the request of the U.S.S.R. the Chinese Government leases to the U.S.S.R. free of charge one half of all port installations and equipment. The term of lease shall be thirty years. The remaining half of port installations and equipment shall be reserved for the use of China.

The expansion or re-equipment of the port shall be made by agreement between China and the U.S.S.R.

2. It is agreed that the sections of the Chinese Changchun Railway

running from Dairen to Mukden that lie within the region of the Port Arthur naval base, shall not be subject to any military supervision or control established in that region.

F. AGREEMENT ON PORT ARTHUR

Article 1. With a view to strengthen the security of China and the U.S.S.R. against further aggression by Japan, the Government of the Republic of China agrees to the joint use by the two countries of Port Arthur as a naval base.

Article 2. The precise boundary of the area provided in Article 1 is described in the Annex and shown in the map.

Article 3. The High Contracting Parties agree that Port Arthur, as an exclusive naval base, will be used only by Chinese and Soviet military and commercial vessels.

There shall be established a Sino-Soviet Military Commission to handle the matters of joint use of the above-mentioned naval base. The Commission shall consist of two Chinese and three Soviet representatives. The Chairman of the Commission shall be appointed by the Soviet side and the Vice Chairman shall be appointed by the Chinese side.

Article 4. The Chinese Government entrusts to the Soviet Government the defence of the naval base. The Soviet Government may erect at its own expense such installations as are necessary for the defence of the naval base.

Article 5. The Civil Administration of the whole area will be Chinese. The leading posts of the Civil Administration will be appointed by the Chinese Government taking into account Soviet interests in the area.

The leading posts of the Civil Administration in the city of Port Arthur are appointed and dismissed by the Chinese Government in agreement with the Soviet military command.

The proposals which the Soviet military commander in that area may address to the Chinese Civil Administration in order to safeguard security and defence will be fulfilled by the said Administration. In cases of disagreement, such cases shall be submitted to the Sino-Soviet military commission for consideration and decision.

Article 6. The Government of the U.S.S.R. have the right to maintain in region mentioned in Article 2, their army, navy and air force and to determine their location.

Article 7. The Government of the U.S.S.R. also undertakes to establish and keep up lighthouses and other installations and signs necessary for the security of navigation of the area.

Article 8. After the termination of this agreement all the installations and public property installed or constructed by the U.S.S.R. in the area shall revert without compensation to the Chinese Government.

Article 9. The present agreement is concluded for thirty years. It comes into force on the day of its ratification.

G. APPENDIX TO THE AGREEMENT ON PORT ARTHUR

The territory of the area of the naval base provided for by paragraph 2 of the Agreement on Port Arthur is situated south of the line which begins on the west coast of Liaotung Peninsula—south of Housantaowan—and follows a general easterly direction across Shihe Station and the point of Tsoukiachutse to the east coast of the same peninsula, excluding the town of Dairen.

All the islands situated in the waters adjoining the west side of the area on Liaotung Peninsula established by the Agreement, and south of the line passing through the points 39 degrees North latitude, 120 degrees and 49 minutes East longitude, 39 degrees and 20 minutes North latitude, 121 degrees and 31 minutes East longitude, and beyond in a general northeasterly direction along the axis of the fairway leading to port Pulantien to the initial point on land, are included in the area of the naval base.

All the islands situated within the waters adjoining the eastern part of the area on Liaotung Peninsula and south of the line passing from the terminal point on land in an easterly direction towards the point 39 degrees and 20 minutes North latitude, 123 degrees and .08 minute East longitude, and farther southeast through the point 39 degrees North latitude, 123 degrees and 16 minutes East longitude, are included in the area.

The boundary line of the district will be demarcated on the spot by a mixed Sino-Soviet Commission. The Commission shall establish the boundary posts and, when need arises, buoys on the water, compile a detailed description of this line, enter it on a topographical map drawn to the scale of 1 : 25,000 and the water boundary on a naval map drawn to the scale of 1 : 300,000.

The time when the Commission shall start its work is subject to special agreement between the parties.

Descriptions of the boundary line of the area and the maps of this line compiled by the above Commission are subject to approval by both Governments.

11. AGREEMENT ON MILITARY COOPERATION IN MANCHURIA AGAINST JAPAN

1. After the Soviet troops enter the "Three Eastern Provinces" of China as a result of military operations, the supreme authority and responsibility in all matters relating to the prosecution of the war will be vested, in the zone of operations for the time required for the operations, in the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces.

2. A Chinese National Government representative and staff will be appointed for the recovered territory, whose duties will be: a. To establish and direct, in accordance with the laws of China, an administration for the territory cleared of the enemy; b. To establish the cooperation between the Chinese armed forces, both regular and irregular, and the Soviet forces in recovered territory; c. To ensure the active cooperation

of the Chinese administration with the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces and, specifically, to give the local authorities directions to this effect, being guided by the requirements and wishes of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces.

3. To ensure contact between the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces and the Chinese National Government representative, a Chinese military mission will be appointed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces.

4. In the zones under the supreme authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces, the Chinese National Government administration for the recovered territory will maintain contact with the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces through the Chinese National Government representative.

5. As soon as any part of the liberated territory ceases to be a zone of immediate military operations, the Chinese National Government will assume full authority in the direction of public affairs and will render the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces every assistance and support through its civil and military bodies.

6. All persons belonging to the Soviet forces on Chinese territory will be under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces. All Chinese, whether civilian or military, will be under Chinese jurisdiction. This jurisdiction will also extend to the civilian population on Chinese territory even in the case of offenses against the Soviet armed forces, with the exception of offenses committed in the zone of military operations under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces, such cases coming under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces. In disputable cases the question will be settled by mutual agreement between the Chinese National Government representative and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces.

7. With regard to currency matters after the entry of Soviet troops into the "Three Eastern Provinces" of China, a separate agreement shall be reached.

8. The present Agreement comes into force immediately upon the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the U.S.S.R. signed this day.

1. AGREEMENT ON THE CHINESE CHANGCHUN RAILWAY

Article 1. After the Japanese armed forces are driven out of the Three Eastern Provinces of China the main trunk line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway from Manchuli to Suifeng and from Harbin to Dairen and Port Arthur united into one railway under the name "Chinese Changchun Railway" shall be in joint ownership of the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of China and shall be operated by them jointly.

There shall be joint ownership and operation only of those lands acquired and railway auxiliary lines built by the Chinese Eastern Railway during the time of Russian and joint Sino-Soviet administration and

by the South Manchuria Railway during the time of Russian administration and which are designed for direct needs of these railways as well as the subsidiary enterprises built during the said periods and directly serving these railways. All the other railway branches, subsidiary enterprises and lands shall be in the complete ownership of the Chinese Government.

The joint operation of the aforementioned railway shall be undertaken by a single management under Chinese sovereignty and as a purely commercial transportation enterprise.

Article 2. The High Contracting Parties agree that their joint ownership of the railway shall be in equal shares and shall not be alienable in whole or in part.

Article 3. The High Contracting Parties agree that for the joint operation of the said railway the Sino-Soviet Company of the Chinese Changchun Railway shall be formed. The Company shall have a Board of Directors to be composed of ten members of whom five shall be appointed by the Chinese Government and five by the Soviet Government. The Board of Directors shall be in Changchun.

Article 4. The Chinese Government shall appoint one of the Chinese directors as President of the Board of Directors and one as the Assistant President. The Soviet Government shall appoint one of the Soviet directors as Vice-President of the Board of Directors, and one as the Assistant Vice-President. Seven persons shall constitute a quorum. When questions are decided by the Board, the vote of the President of the Board of Directors shall be counted as two votes.

Questions on which the Board of Directors cannot reach an agreement shall be submitted to the Governments of the Contracting Parties for consideration and settlement in an equitable and friendly spirit.

Article 5. The Company shall establish a Board of Auditors which shall be composed of six members of whom three are appointed by the Chinese Government and three appointed by the Soviet Government. The Chairman of the Board of Auditors shall be elected from among the Soviet auditors, and Vice-Chairman from among the Chinese auditors. When questions are decided by the Board the vote of the Chairman shall be counted as two votes. Five persons shall form a quorum.

Article 6. For the administration of current affairs the Board of Directors shall appoint a manager of the Chinese Changchun Railway from among Soviet citizens and one assistant manager from among Chinese citizens.

Article 7. The Board of Auditors shall appoint a General Comptroller from among Chinese citizens, and an assistant General Comptroller from among Soviet citizens.

Article 8. The Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of the various departments, Chiefs of sections, station masters at important stations of the railway shall be appointed by the Board of Directors. The Manager of the Railway has right to recommend candidates for the above-mentioned posts.

Individual members of the Board of Directors may also recommend such candidates in agreement with the Manager. If the Chief of a department is a national of China, the Assistant Chief shall be a national of the Soviet Union, and vice versa. The appointment of the Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of departments and Chiefs of sections and station masters shall be made in accordance with the principle of equal representation between the nationals of China and nationals of the Soviet Union.

Article 9. The Chinese Government will bear the responsibility for the protection of the said Railway.

The Chinese Government will also organize and supervise the railway guards who shall protect the railway buildings, installations and other properties and freight from destruction, loss and robbery, and shall maintain the normal order on the railway. As regards the duties of the police in execution of this Article, they will be determined by the Chinese Government in consultation with the Soviet Government.

Article 10. Only during the time of war with Japan the railway may be used for the transportation of Soviet troops. The Soviet Government has the right to transport by the above-mentioned railway for transit purpose military goods in sealed cars without customs inspection. The guarding of such military goods shall be undertaken by the railroad police and the Soviet Union shall not send any armed escort.

Article 11. Goods for through transit and transported by the Chinese Changchun Railway from Manchuli to Suifenho or vice versa and also from Soviet territory to the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur or vice versa shall be free from Chinese Customs duties or any other taxes and dues, but on entering Chinese territory such goods shall be subject to Chinese Customs inspection and verification.

Article 12. The Chinese Government shall ensure, on the basis of a separate agreement, that the supply of coal for the operation of the railway will be fully secured.

Article 13. The railway shall pay taxes to the Government of the Republic of China the same as are paid by the Chinese state railways.

Article 14. Both Contracting Parties agree to provide the Board of Directors of the Chinese Changchun Railway with working capital the amount of which will be determined by the Statute of the Railway.

Profits and losses and exploitation of the railway shall be equally divided between the parties.

Article 15. For the working out in Chungking of the Statutes of joint operation of the railway the High Contracting Parties undertake within one month of the signing of the present Agreement, to appoint their representatives—three representatives from each Party. The Statute shall be worked out within two months and reported to the two Governments for their approval.

Article 16. The determination, in accordance with the provisions in Article 1, of the properties to be included in the joint ownership and operations of the railway by China and the U.S.S.R. shall be made by

a Commission to be composed of three representatives each of the two Governments. The Commission shall be constituted in Chungking within one month after the signing of the present Agreement and shall terminate its work within three months after the joint operation of the railway shall have begun.

The decision of the Commission shall be reported to the two Governments for their approval.

Article 17. The term of this present Agreement shall be thirty years. After the expiration of the term of the present Agreement, the Chinese Changchun Railway with all its properties shall be transferred without compensation to the ownership of the Republic of China.

Article 18. The present Agreement shall come into force from the date of its ratification.

APPENDIX X

SINO-SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, ALLIANCE AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, AND RELATED AGREEMENTS, FEBRUARY 14, 1950

A. COMMUNIQUE ON THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

In the recent past, negotiations have been held in Moscow between Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, and Chou En lai, Premier of the Government Administration Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, on the one hand, and J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and A. Y. Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., on the other, in the course of which important political and economic questions concerning the relations between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union were discussed.

These negotiations, which proceeded in an atmosphere of cordiality and friendly mutual understanding, confirmed the desire of both parties to strengthen and develop their friendly cooperation in every way, and likewise confirmed their desire to cooperate for the purpose of ensuring peace and security for the peoples of all nations.

The negotiations concluded with the signing on February 14 in the Kremlin of the following:—(1) A Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, (2) An Agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen, according to which the Chinese Changchun Railway is to be handed over *in toto* to the People's Republic of China and Soviet troops are to be withdrawn from Port Arthur, following the signing of a peace treaty with Japan; (3) An Agreement on the granting by the Government of the Soviet Union of a long-term economic credit to

be used by the Government of the People's Republic of China to pay for deliveries of industrial and railway equipment from the Soviet Union.

The aforementioned treaty and agreements were signed on behalf of the People's Republic of China by Chou En-lai, Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on behalf of the U.S.S.R. by A. Y. Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In connection with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, and the Agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen, Chou En-lai, Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and A. Y. Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs, exchanged notes to the effect that the respective Treaty and Agreements concluded on August 14, 1945, between China and the Soviet Union are now null and void, and also that both Governments affirm that the independent status of the Mongolian People's Republic is fully guaranteed as a result of the plebiscite of 1945 and the establishment with it of diplomatic relations by the People's Republic of China.

At the same time, A. Y. Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Chou En-lai, Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, also exchanged notes on the decision of the Soviet Government to transfer without compensation to the Government of the People's Republic of China the property acquired in Manchuria from Japanese owners by Soviet economic organizations, and also on the decision of the Soviet Government to transfer without compensation to the Government of the People's Republic of China all the buildings in the former military compound in Peking.

B. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, ALLIANCE AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

Article 1. Both Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or any state allied with her and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.

The Contracting Parties also declare their readiness to participate in a spirit of sincere cooperation in all international actions aimed at ensuring peace and security throughout the world and to contribute their full share to the earliest implementation of these tasks.

Article 2. Both Contracting Parties undertake in a spirit of mutual agreement to bring about the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan jointly with other powers which were Allies in the Second World War.

Article 3. Each Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance directed against the other Contracting Party and not to take part in any coalition or in any actions or measures directed against the other Contracting Party.

Article 4. Both Contracting Parties, in the interests of consolidating peace and universal security, will consult with each other in regard to all important international problems affecting the common interests of China and the Soviet Union.

Article 5. Each Contracting Party undertakes, in a spirit of friendship and cooperation and in conformity with the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity and non interference in the internal affairs of the other Contracting Party, to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties between China and the Soviet Union, to render the other all possible economic assistance and to carry out necessary economic cooperation.

Article 6. The present Treaty shall come into force immediately after its ratification; the exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place in Peking.

The present Treaty shall be valid for thirty years. If neither of the Contracting Parties gives notice a year before the expiration of this term of its intention to denounce the Treaty, it shall remain in force for another five years and shall be further extended in compliance with this provision.

C. AGREEMENT ON THE CHINESE CHANGCHUN RAILWAY, PORT ARTHUR AND DAIREN

Article 1. Both Contracting Parties agree that the Soviet Government transfer without compensation to the Government of the People's Republic of China all its rights to joint administration of the Chinese Changchun Railway with all the property belonging to the Railway. The transfer shall be effected immediately after the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end of 1952.

Pending the transfer, the existing Sino Soviet joint administration of the Chinese Changchun Railway shall remain unchanged. After this Agreement becomes effective, posts (such as manager of the Railway, chairman of the Central Board, etc.) will be periodically alternated between representatives of China and the U.S.S.R.

As regards concrete methods of effecting the transfer, they shall be agreed upon and determined by the Governments of both Contracting Parties.

Article 2. Both Contracting Parties agree that Soviet troops be withdrawn from the jointly-utilized naval base Port Arthur, and that the installations in this area be handed over to the Government of the People's Republic of China immediately on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end of 1952. The Government of the People's Republic of China will compensate the Soviet Union for expenses which it has incurred in restoring and constructing installations since 1945.

For the period pending the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the transfer of the above mentioned installations, the Governments of China and the Soviet Union will each appoint an equal number of military repre-

sentatives to form a joint Chinese-Soviet Military Commission which will be alternately presided over by each side and which will be in charge of military affairs in the area of Port Arthur; concrete measures in this sphere will be drawn up by the joint Chinese-Soviet Military Commission within three months after the present Agreement becomes effective and shall be put into force upon approval of these measures by the Governments of both countries.

The civil administration in the aforementioned area shall be under the direct authority of the Government of the People's Republic of China. Pending the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the zone for billeting Soviet troops in the area of Port Arthur will remain unaltered in conformity with existing frontiers.

In the event of either of the Contracting Parties becoming the victim of aggression on the part of Japan or any state that may collaborate with Japan, and as a result thereof becoming involved in hostilities, China and the Soviet Union may, on the proposal of the Government of the People's Republic of China and with the agreement of the Government of the U.S.S.R., jointly use the naval base Port Arthur for the purpose of conducting joint military operations against the aggressor.

Article 3. Both Contracting Parties agree that the question of Dairen harbor be further considered on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. As regards the administration of Dairen, it is in the hands of the Government of the People's Republic of China. All the property in Dairen now temporarily administered by or leased to the Soviet Union shall be taken over by the Government of the People's Republic of China. To carry out the transfer of the aforementioned property, the Governments of China and the Soviet Union shall appoint three representatives each to form a Joint Commission which, within three months after the present Agreement comes into effect, shall draw up concrete measures for the transfer of the property; and these measures shall be fully carried out in the course of 1950 after their approval by the Governments of both countries upon the proposal of the Joint Commission.

The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of its ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification shall take place in Peking.

D. AGREEMENT ON THE GRANTING OF CREDIT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Article 1. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics grants to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China a credit which, in terms of American dollars, amounts to US \$300,000,000, taking 35 American dollars to one ounce of fine gold.

In view of the extraordinary devastation of China as a result of prolonged hostilities on its territory, the Soviet Government has agreed to grant the credit at the favorable rate of interest of 1% per annum.

Article 2. The credit mentioned in Article 1 shall be granted over a period of five years starting January 1, 1950, in equal portions of one-

fifth of the credit per year, to be used in payment for deliveries from the U.S.S.R. of equipment and materials including equipment for electric power stations, metallurgical and engineering plants, mining equipment for the extraction of coal and ores, railway and other transport equipment, rails and other materials for the restoration and development of the national economy of China.

Types, quantities, prices and dates of delivery of the equipment and materials shall be determined by special agreement of the two parties. Prices will be determined on the basis of prices on the world markets.

Any part of the credit which remains unused in the course of one year may be carried over to the following year.

Article 3. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall repay the credit mentioned in Article 1, together with the interest thereon, in deliveries of raw materials, tea, gold and American dollars. Prices for raw materials and tea and their quantities and dates of delivery shall be determined by special agreement, with prices to be determined on the basis of prices on the world markets.

The credit shall be repaid in ten equal annual installments—one-tenth of the total credit to be paid not later than December 31 of every year. The first repayment shall be made not later than December 31, 1954, and the last not later than December 31, 1963. Interest on the credit, which will be computed for the amount actually used and from the date of use, is to be paid every six months.

Article 4. For clearance with regard to the credit provided for in the present Agreement, the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Bank of the People's Republic of China shall open special accounts and jointly establish the order of clearance and accounting under the present Agreement.

Article 5. The present Agreement comes into force on the day of its signing and is subject to ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification shall take place in Peking.

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